PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN JOSEPH LEE CONYER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 25, 2008
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 278812
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 06-010611-FH
KEVIN JOSEPH LEE CONYER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Advance Sheets Version
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms of 30 to 120
months for the assault conviction and two years for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose from a shooting incident that took place outside a home
where a large party was in progress during the early morning hours of January 29, 2006. The
victims of the shootings, Alfred Peterson and Matthew Blossey, were at the party, but had been
asked to leave. As they left, one or both of them threatened to return with guns. Hearing these
threats, Kevin Lijewski’s roommate, Shawn Galan, called Lijewski for a ride from the party.
Defendant accompanied Lijewski to retrieve Galan. Defendant and Lijewski arrived at the party,
located Galan, and were returning to Lijewski’s truck to leave when Peterson and Blossey
arrived with two other people and in multiple vehicles. Defendant and Lijewski observed
Blossey strike a guest with a bottle, so they walked back toward the house. Blossey then walked
away, so defendant and Lijewski again started toward Lijewski’s vehicle to leave. Before they
reached the vehicle, however, a group of people formed a semicircle around them. Peterson,
who admittedly returned to the party intending to fight, struck Lijewski in the head, knocking
him to the ground. After he fell, Lijewski saw Blossey running toward him while brandishing a
pointy wooden stake. Lijewski fired warning shots into the ground. Defendant asserts that he,
too, fired shots to defend Lijewski after Lijewski, who had been assaulted and was in danger,
yelled for help. The shots struck Peterson and Blossey.1
1
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,
felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and two counts of felony-firearm in connection with the shooting
(continued…)
-1-
Defense counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury, consistently with the
recently enacted Self-Defense Act (SDA), MCL 780.971 et seq., that defendant did not have a
duty to retreat before he engaged in defense of himself or of someone else under the
circumstances presented in this case. The trial court rejected defense counsel’s request on the
ground that the shootings occurred before the effective date of the SDA and thus, the SDA was
inapplicable. Consequently, the trial court gave the jury instructions consistent with the
common-law rule regarding self-defense, including the duty to retreat.
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by instructing the jury
that defendant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force because the SDA applies
retroactively to this case. We disagree.
Whether a statute applies retroactively presents a question of statutory construction,
which this Court reviews de novo. Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich
578, 583; 624 NW2d 180 (2001). The intent of the Legislature governs the determination
whether a statute is to be applied prospectively or retroactively. Id. A statute is presumed to
operate prospectively “unless the Legislature has expressly or impliedly indicated its intention to
give it retrospective effect.” People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 594; 487 NW2d 698 (1992). Stated
differently, a statute is “‘presumed to operate prospectively unless [a] contrary intent is clearly
manifested.’” Lynch, supra at 583, quoting Franks v White Pine Copper Division, 422 Mich
636, 671; 375 NW2d 715 (1985); see also People v Doxey, 263 Mich App 115, 121; 687 NW2d
360 (2004) (“‘[A]mendments of statutes are generally presumed to operate prospectively unless
the Legislature clearly manifests a contrary intent.’”) (citation omitted). However, an exception
to this general rule is recognized if a statute is remedial or procedural in nature. Russo, supra at
594; People v Link, 225 Mich App 211, 214-215; 570 NW2d 297 (1997). A statute is remedial if
it is designed to correct an existing oversight in the law or redress an existing grievance, or if it
operates in furtherance of an existing remedy and neither creates nor destroys existing rights.
Saylor v Kingsley Area Emergency Ambulance Service, 238 Mich App 592, 598; 607 NW2d 112
(1999); Link, supra at 214-215. A statute that affects or creates substantive rights is not
remedial, and is not given retroactive effect, absent clear indication of legislative intent
otherwise. Lynch, supra at 585.
Section 2(1) of the SDA provides:
An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime
at the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force against another
individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if
either of the following applies:
(…continued)
of Blossey. He was acquitted of those charges. Defendant’s convictions arose from the shooting
of Peterson. Defendant was also convicted of felonious assault and felony-firearm in connection
with the shooting of Peterson, but those convictions were dismissed at sentencing on the basis of
double jeopardy.
-2-
(a) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly
force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm
to himself or herself or to another individual. [MCL 780.972(1).]
In addition, § 3 of the SDA provides: “Except as provided in section 2, this act does not modify
the common law of this state in existence on October 1, 2006 regarding the duty to retreat before
using deadly force or force other than deadly force.” MCL 780.973. The shootings that gave
rise to defendant’s arrest took place on January 29, 2006; the SDA did not become effective until
October 1, 2006. As acknowledged by § 3 of the SDA, the statute altered the common law of
self-defense concerning the duty to retreat. Therefore, even if the SDA perhaps could be
characterized as partly remedial, it nevertheless created a new substantive right, i.e., the right to
stand one’s ground and not retreat before using deadly force in certain circumstances in which a
duty to retreat would have existed at common law.2 Thus, it does not apply retroactively absent
an indication that such was the intention of the Legislature in passing the statute. Lynch, supra at
585 (“[W]e have rejected the notion that a statute significantly affecting a party’s substantive
rights should be applied retroactively because it can also be characterized in a sense as
‘remedial.’”).
We conclude that the SDA in general, and MCL 780.972 in particular, apply
prospectively only. The SDA contains no language indicating that the Legislature intended the
act to apply retroactively. Enacting § 1 of 2006 PA 309 states specifically that the SDA “takes
effect October 1, 2006.” This is an indication that the Legislature intended the provision to apply
prospectively from that date. See Lynch, supra at 583-584. Additionally, enacting § 2 states that
the SDA would not take effect unless other legislative bills, which became 2006 PA 310, 2006
PA 311, 2006 PA 312, 2006 PA 313, and 2006 PA 314, were also enacted into law.3 This, too,
signals a legislative intent that the act apply only prospectively. See id. Further, the legislation
cited in enacting § 2 relates to the same subject matter and thus is read in pari materia with the
SDA. People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998); Doxey, supra at 121. None
of this legislation suggests any intent that it be applied retroactively. Therefore, all indications
are that the Legislature intended the SDA to apply only prospectively. Doxey, supra at 121.
Section 2 of the SDA, MCL 780.972. affects substantive rights and, as such, cannot be
classified as a remedial statute. Therefore, because the Legislature manifested no intent that it
apply retroactively, it applies only prospectively, to offenses committed one or after its effective
2
Generally, the use of deadly force in self-defense is justified if a person “honestly and
reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily
harm.” People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 502; 456 NW2d 10 (1990). However, unless attacked
inside one’s own home, or subjected to a sudden, fierce, and violent attack, a person has a
common-law duty to retreat, if possible, as far as safely possible. People v Riddle, 467 Mich
116, 118-121; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). Conversely, under § 2 of the SDA, there is no duty to
retreat if the person has not committed or is not committing a crime and has a legal right to be
where the person is at the time he or she uses deadly force. MCL 780.972(1). Section 2 of the
SDA thus constitutes a substantive change to the right of self-defense.
3
These acts codified at MCL 780.961, MCL 780.951, MCL 600.2922c, MCL 768.21c, and MCL
600.2922b, respectively.
-3-
date. Because the incident that formed the basis of defendant’s convictions took place before the
SDA’s effective date, defendant’s right to use deadly force in self-defense or defense of others
was limited by a duty under the common law to retreat, and the jury instruction reflecting as
much was appropriate.
We affirm.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.