CITIZENS PROTECTING MICHIGAN'S CONSTITUTION V SECRETARY OF STATE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITIZENS PROTECTING MICHIGAN’S
CONSTITUTION, LOWELL R. ULRICH,
MICHAEL BISHOP, ALAN L. CROPSEY,
VIRGIL SMITH, JR., and MIKE BRYANTON,
FOR PUBLICATION
August 20, 2008
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiffs,
v
No. 286734
SECRETARY OF STATE and BOARD OF
STATE CANVASSERS,
Defendants,
Advance Sheets Version
and
REFORM MICHIGAN GOVERNMENT NOW!,
Intervening Defendant,
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Amicus Curiae.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Whitbeck and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs have filed an original action in this Court, seeking a writ of mandamus against
defendants Michigan Secretary of State (the Secretary) and the Michigan Board of State
Canvassers (the Board). Plaintiffs request a writ directing the Secretary and the Board to reject
an initiative petition that intervening defendant Reform Michigan Government Now! (RMGN)
has filed. The RMGN initiative petition seeks to place a proposal on the ballot for the November
2008 general election that would modify the Michigan Constitution. We grant the relief sought
in the complaint for a writ of mandamus.
-1-
I. Introduction
The issues before this Court concern the interpretation and application of certain
provisions of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. The framers of Michigan’s Constitution
inserted specific provisions, which must be followed, not overlooked, when seeking to modify
our state’s guiding legal document. As Judge Meter observed several years ago:
The Constitution reigns supreme. It is an immutable, enduring document.
Its fundamental integrity cannot be diluted nor tarnished by those who would
interpret it in a myopic, transient or parochial fashion. The principles enunciated
therein will not change unless we the People so decide by prescribed methods. It
is also inviolate. There should be no modification to the sacred document we call
our Constitution unless there are no less invasive or intrusive means to
accomplish needed change. This I call the constitutional doctrine of manifest
necessity. [Meter, An analysis of the unified trial court, 20 Quinnipiac L R 697,
706 (2001).]
Today our Court reaffirms these principles. Constitutional modification requires strict
adherence to the methods and approaches included in the constitution itself. Shortcuts and end
runs to revise the constitution, which ignore the pathways specifically set forth by the framers,
cannot be tolerated. As Justice Markman said in his concurrence in Michigan United
Conservation Clubs v Secretary of State (After Remand), 464 Mich 359, 393; 630 NW2d 297
(2001) (MUCC III), “the ‘overarching right of the people’ is to have the constitution that they
have ratified given respect and accorded its proper meaning.”
We offer no opinion on the merits of any or all of the substantive matters contained in the
RMGN initiative petition. Also, let us be clear at the outset what our opinion today does not do.
We do not act to prevent the citizens from voting on a proposal simply because that proposal is
allegedly too complex or confusing. Nor do we seek to substitute our own preferences regarding
governmental form, structure, or functioning for those of the electorate. We do not, for example,
determine whether reducing the salaries of legislators and certain executive branch officers is a
good idea or a bad one. Nor do we decide whether establishing new financial disclosure
requirements for elected officials and candidates for public office should be done in the
constitution, by statute, or not at all. We do not agree or disagree with the redistricting criteria or
process contained in the RMGN proposal. And we most certainly do not address the question
whether there should be a reduction in judicial salaries and in the number of appellate court
judgeships on the ground that these judgeships are “unnecessary.” The broad range of public
policy issues, and those items that involve politics and elections, are not the province of the
judicial branch of government.
RMGN contends that plaintiffs’ arguments amount to a “judicial veto,” preventing a vote
on this massive initiative petition. RMGN misstates the legal issue and ignores specific
constitutional requirements, and its argument reflects an appeal to the court of public opinion,
not a court of law. Our decision interprets and applies provisions of the constitution of the state
of Michigan, nothing less and nothing more.
-2-
As we will explain, the Michigan Constitution clearly establishes separate methods for
enacting an “amendment” to, as compared to a “general revision” of, the constitution. It is
absolutely clear that the procedure for amending the constitution cannot effectuate such a
“general revision.” Here, RMGN submitted its proposal under the initiative petition procedure
that Const 1963, art 12, § 2, established for amending the constitution. However, we conclude
that the proposal is a “general revision” of the constitution. Only the constitutional convention
procedure established by Const 1963, art 12, § 3, can accomplish such a general revision.
Therefore, the constitutional power of initiative does not extend to this proposal. Accordingly,
the RMGN initiative petition does not meet the constitutional prerequisites for acceptance and
the Board and the Secretary have a clear legal duty to reject the petition. Concurrently with the
release of this opinion, we have issued an order directing the Secretary and the Board to stop the
canvass, to reject the RMGN initiative petition, and to not allow the proposal to be placed on the
ballot.
II. Facts and Procedural History
A. The Parties
(1) Plaintiffs
Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution is a “ballot question committee” organized
for the purpose of challenging the RMGN petition. Lowell R. Ulrich is the chief judge of the
Chippewa County Probate Court. Michael Bishop and Alan Cropsey are members of the
Michigan State Senate. Virgil Smith, Jr., is a member of the Michigan State House of
Representatives. Mike Bryanton is the Ingham County Clerk.
(2) Defendants
The Secretary holds office under the constitution. See Const 1963, art 5, § 3. The
Secretary is the single executive, see id., heading the Department of State. The Department of
State is one of the principal departments in the executive branch of state government. See MCL
16.104(1). The Secretary is the chief election officer of the state and has supervisory authority
over local election officials in the performance of their duties. MCL 168.21.
The Board is established by the constitution and by statute. Const 1963, art 2, § 7; MCL
168.22. It is the Board that canvasses an initiative petition to ascertain if the requisite number of
qualified and registered electors has signed the petition and that makes a final determination
regarding the sufficiency of a petition. See MCL 168.476.
(3) Intervening Defendant
We granted RMGN permission to intervene in this matter. RMGN is a “ballot question
committee” that was organized for the purpose of drafting, circulating, collecting signatures for,
and submitting for approval the initiative petition that is being challenged here.
-3-
(4) Amicus Curiae
We granted the Attorney General permission to file a brief as amicus curiae. Although
the Attorney General’s office represents the Board and the Secretary, the Attorney General
asserts that he has an independent obligation as a state officer to protect and defend the
constitution.
B. The RMGN Initiative Petition
The RMGN initiative petition seeks to alter four articles of the Michigan Constitution of
1963: article II (elections), article IV (legislative branch), article V (executive branch), and
article VI (judicial branch). More specifically, as the Attorney General points out, the proposal
would, among other things:
(1) allow voting by absentee ballot without giving a reason;
(2) establish in the executive branch a new office of elections;
(3) modify the referendum procedure;
(4) modify the initiative procedure;
(5) reduce the number of legislators in the state Senate from 38 to 28;
(6) reduce the number of legislators in the state House of Representatives from 110 to
82;
(7) create a new commission with sole and exclusive authority over legislative
districting;
(8) establish specific rules for creating legislative districting plans;
(9) eliminate the current provision allowing for judicial review of districting plans;
(10) limit lobbying activities of members of the Legislature who leave office;
(11) reduce the base salaries of legislators, the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary;
(12) authorize the Legislature to grant any citizen standing to bring certain
environmental lawsuits;
(13) alter the pension and retirement benefits of legislators, certain executive officers,
and judges elected after January 1, 2009;
(14) provide for public inspection of financial records of the Legislature;
-4-
(15) reduce the maximum number of principal departments in the executive branch;
(16) limit the lobbying activities of heads of principal departments in the executive
branch after leaving office;
(17) establish a maximum number of state boards and commissions;
(18) require a separate vote to elect the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor, rather
than a single joint vote for the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor candidates
nominated by the same party;
(19) eliminate the Governor’s authority to fill vacancies in the office of the Secretary and
the Attorney General;
(20) require financial disclosures by certain elected officials (including judges and
legislators) and candidates for those positions;
(21) reduce the number of Supreme Court justices from seven to five;
(22) require the Supreme Court to issue rules for the public inspection of documents and
records relating to the administration of the courts;
(23) reduce the number of Court of Appeals judges to 21;
(24) reduce the number of Court of Appeals districts to three;
(25) eliminate the Legislature’s authority to increase the number of Court of Appeals
judges and change the districts from which they are elected;
(26) add 10 circuit court judgeships;
(27) reduce judicial salaries by 15 percent;
(28) require the Legislature to implement certain requirements regarding jury lists; and
(29) replace the Judicial Tenure Commission with a judicial performance commission,
composed primarily of non-lawyer citizens.
C. The Filing of the RMGN Initiative Petition
RMGN filed its initiative petition with the Secretary on July 7, 2008. The Secretary
subsequently notified the Board, and the Board has since begun its canvass of the petition. In a
letter of July 23, 2008, to plaintiffs’ counsel, the Secretary expressed an intention “to proceed
with the actions necessary to place this proposal on the ballot provided the requisite number of
valid signatures have been submitted.”
-5-
D. The Complaint for Writ of Mandamus
On July 24, 2008, plaintiffs filed their complaint for a writ of mandamus in this Court.
Plaintiffs claim that the RMGN initiative petition is not eligible to be placed on the ballot
because it is not merely an “amendment” to the constitution, but is a “general revision” of the
constitution that only a constitutional convention can accomplish. Plaintiffs further claim that
the RMGN initiative petition is not eligible to be placed on the ballot because it offers more than
a single amendment with a single purpose.
III. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
This Court has original jurisdiction to entertain an action for “mandamus against a state
officer.” MCR 7.203(C)(2), citing MCL 600.4401. The Secretary and the Board are “state
officers” for purposes of mandamus. See, e.g., Citizens for Protection of Marriage v Bd of State
Canvassers, 263 Mich App 487, 491; 688 NW2d 538 (2004). Therefore, this case is within our
jurisdiction.
B. “Ripeness”
RMGN argues that this case is not properly before the Court because the Board has not
yet made its sufficiency determination regarding the initiative petition. Although RMGN
phrases the argument in terms of jurisdiction, we do not consider this a jurisdictional issue, but a
“ripeness” issue. A claim is not ripe if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur
as anticipated, or may not occur at all. Huntington Woods v Detroit, 279 Mich App 603, 615616; ___ NW2d ___ (2008). RMGN essentially argues that because its initiative petition is
currently before the Board, there remains the possibility that the Board will deem the initiative
petition insufficient and the submission of the proposal on the ballot may not occur. However,
we hold that this case is indeed “ripe” for a decision by this Court.
In Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Secretary of State (On Remand), 246 Mich
App 82; 630 NW2d 379 (2001) (MUCC II), rev’d 464 Mich 359 (2001), the plaintiffs sought a
writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary and the Board to reject a petition for a referendum.
This Court, by order, initially denied mandamus on the ground that the issue was not ripe
because the Board had not completed its canvass. However, the Supreme Court in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, vacated our order and remanded the case for plenary consideration. In
so doing, the Supreme Court stated:
The issue in this case is whether the referendum sought is with respect to a
law “making appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in state
funds.” Const 1963, art 2, § 9. This controversy is ripe for review because it is
not dependent upon the Board of Canvassers’ counting or consideration of the
petitions but rather involves a threshold determination whether the petitions on
their face meet the constitutional prerequisites for acceptance. All of the
information necessary to resolve this controversy, i.e., whether 2000 PA 381
-6-
constitutes a law which is excepted from the referendum process under Const
1963, art 2, § 9, is presently available. [Michigan United Conservation Clubs v
Secretary of State, 463 Mich 1009 (2001) (MUCC I) (internal citations omitted).]
Here, plaintiffs are arguing that, for reasons other than the sufficiency of the RMGN
initiative petition, the proposal is not eligible to be placed on the ballot. Essentially, plaintiffs
contend that this case involves a “threshold determination” that is ripe for our consideration
because its resolution is not dependent on any determination by the Board. We agree and
conclude that the doctrine of ripeness does not preclude our resolution of plaintiffs’ claims.
C. Mandamus
(1) Requirements for Mandamus
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy for a party seeking to compel action by election
officials. See, e.g., Wolverine Golf Club v Secretary of State, 24 Mich App 711; 180 NW2d 820
(1970), aff’d 384 Mich 461 (1971); Automobile Club of Mich Comm for Lower Rates Now v
Secretary of State (On Remand), 195 Mich App 613; 491 NW2d 269 (1992). That said, a writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will only be issued where: (1) the party seeking the
writ has a clear legal right to performance of the specific duty sought, (2) the defendant has the
clear legal duty to perform the act requested, (3) the act is ministerial, and (4) no other remedy
exists that might achieve the same result. Tuggle v Dep’t of State Police, 269 Mich App 657,
668; 712 NW2d 750 (2005); Genesis Ctr, PLC v Comm’r of Financial & Ins Services, 246 Mich
App 531, 546; 633 NW2d 834 (2001). We also note that, under MCR 7.216(A)(7), this Court
can, in our discretion and on terms we deem just, “enter any judgment or order and grant further
or different relief as the case may require.”
(2) Positions of the Parties
The Secretary, the Board, and RMGN argue that plaintiffs have failed to establish the
necessary prerequisites for granting mandamus. In particular, they argue that determining
whether a proposal is an “amendment” to, or a “general revision” of, the constitution, or whether
a proposal has more than a single purpose, is beyond the scope of the authority of the Secretary
and the Board. Therefore, they argue, plaintiffs cannot establish that the Secretary and the Board
have a clear legal duty to preclude submission of the RMGN proposal to the electors. They go
on to argue that even if such duties exist, the exercise of those duties would not be a ministerial
task.
Plaintiffs argue to the contrary. According to plaintiffs, the Board and the Secretary do
indeed have a clear legal duty to make the “threshold determination” of whether the proposal is
eligible to be placed on the ballot. Plaintiffs then note that the Secretary, in her July 23, 2008,
letter, and on the basis of her belief that it is not her job to do so, has expressly declined to
address the threshold ballot-eligibility questions that plaintiffs raise. They assert that if the
RMGN proposal is not “ballot eligible,” the proper, indeed the only, remedy is a writ of
mandamus.
-7-
The Attorney General argues that the RMGN initiative petition is a revision of the
constitution, and therefore not the proper subject of an initiative petition, but he does not
specifically take a position on whether mandamus should issue.
(3) Existence of a Clear Legal Duty
This Court has previously held that the Board’s duties with regard to a proposed
constitutional amendment are “limited to determining whether the form of the petition
substantially complies with the statutory requirements and whether there are sufficient signatures
to warrant certification of the proposal.” Citizens for Protection of Marriage, supra at 492; see
also MCL 168.476 and MCL 168.482. The Board has no authority to consider the lawfulness of
a proposal. Citizens for Protection of Marriage, supra at 493. The Board must complete its
canvass and make the official declaration of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition “at
least 2 months before the election” at which the proposal is to be submitted. MCL 168.476(2);
MCL 168.477(1). The Board also has the responsibility to approve the proposal’s statement of
purpose, which the director of elections creates and which is not to exceed 100 words. MCL
168.474; MCL 168.22e; see also Citizens for Protection of Marriage, supra at 494.
The Secretary’s duties in regard to an initiative petition are also limited. Upon the filing
of a signed petition, the Secretary must “immediately” notify the Board by first-class mail. MCL
168.475(1). The Secretary has no further duties until after the Board deems a petition sufficient
and approves the director of elections’s statement of purpose. Once the Board approves the
statement of purpose, the Secretary must send copies of the statement of purpose to newspapers
to give “as wide publicity as possible . . . .” MCL 168.477(1). In addition, the Secretary must
“[p]repare the form of ballot for any proposed amendment to the constitution or proposal under
the initiative or referendum provision of the constitution to be submitted to the voters of this
state.” MCL 168.31(1)(f). The Secretary then provides the form, along with copies of the
proposed amendment of the constitution, to the county clerks. MCL 168.480.
On their face, these duties of the Board and the Secretary may not include making a
“threshold determination” whether a ballot proposal is an “amendment” to, as opposed to a
“general revision” of, the constitution, or whether the ballot proposal contains more than one
purpose. Further, an act is ministerial if it is “‘“prescribed and defined by law with such
precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.”’” Carter v
Ann Arbor City Attorney, 271 Mich App 425, 439; 722 NW2d 243 (2006) (citations omitted).
We agree with the Secretary, the Board, and RMGN that determining whether a ballot proposal
is an “amendment” to, or a “general revision” of, the constitution, and determining whether a
ballot proposal serves more than one purpose involve, at a minimum, the exercise of judgment.
But even assuming that the duties plaintiffs ascribe to the Board and the Secretary do not exist
or, even if they do exist, that they are not “ministerial” in nature, we conclude that the Board and
the Secretary have a clear legal duty that this Court can enforce in this particular case.
The entire history of the Michigan United Conservation Clubs case best illustrates the
clear legal duty at issue here. As we mentioned earlier, this Court initially denied mandamus on
the ground that the issue was not “ripe” because the Board had not completed its canvass. The
Supreme Court remanded the case for plenary consideration, stating that “[a]ll of the information
necessary to resolve this controversy, i.e., whether 2000 PA 381 constitutes a law which is
-8-
excepted from the referendum process under Const 1963, art 2, § 9, is presently available.”
Michigan United Conservation Clubs I, supra at 1009. On remand, this Court denied the request
for a writ of mandamus, concluding that 2000 PA 381 was indeed subject to the referendum
process. See Michigan United Conservation Clubs II, supra at 84, 93. On appeal after this
Court’s decision on remand, the Supreme Court reversed, holding:
The issue here is whether 2000 Public Act 381 is exempt from the power
of referendum of the Michigan Constitution. Having granted leave to appeal and
heard oral argument, this Court finds as follows:
(1)
The power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution “does not
extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions . . . .” Const 1963, art
2, § 9.
(2)
2000 PA 381 states that “one million dollars is appropriated from
the general fund to the department of state police . . . .” MCL 28.425w(1).
(3)
An appropriation of $1,000,000 is an “appropriation,” and the
Department of State Police is a “state institution.”
(4)
Therefore, the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution
does not extend to 2000 PA 381.
Accordingly, consistent with Const 1963, art 2, § 9 and an unbroken line
of decisions of this Court interpreting that provision, the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the relief sought in the complaint for mandamus is granted. The
May 21, 2001 declaration by the Board of State Canvassers of the sufficiency of
the petition for referendum on 2000 PA 381 is vacated and defendant Secretary of
State and the Board of State Canvassers are directed that 2000 PA 381 is not
subject to referendum for the reasons set forth herein. [Michigan United
Conservation Clubs III, supra at 365-366.]
Michigan United Conservation Clubs clearly establishes that challenges of the type made
by plaintiffs in this case may be raised in a mandamus action against the Board and the Secretary
before the Board’s sufficiency determination.
The Secretary further contends that neither it nor the Board has a clear legal duty to
conduct a substantive review of the RMGN initiative petition to determine its constitutional
sufficiency. And, indeed, plaintiffs concede that it is well settled that a substantive analysis of
the RMGN initiative petition is premature. In Hamilton v Secretary of State, 212 Mich 31, 3435; 179 NW 553 (1920), the Michigan Supreme Court established that substantive constitutional
challenges to the validity of a ballot proposal are premature when made before the voters adopt
the proposition in question.1 However, our Supreme Court has since made a distinction between
1
See Fontana v Lindholm, 276 Mich 361, 363; 267 NW 860 (1936) (Stating that in Hamilton the
(continued…)
-9-
substantive challenges and questions related to whether the proposition is constitutionally
eligible to be presented before the voters.
In a subsequent case, Leininger v Secretary of State, 316 Mich 644, 654-656; 26 NW2d
348 (1947), the Court carved out an exception to the Hamilton rule, holding that a
constitutionally fatal defect in an initiative petition supported the issuance of a writ of mandamus
prohibiting the Secretary of State from transmitting the proposed law. The Leininger Court
explained that, unlike in Hamilton, “[i]n the case at bar . . . we are not concerned with the
question of whether the substance of the proposed law is violative of the Federal or State
Constitutions. Here the question is whether the petition, in form, meets the constitutional
requirements so as to qualify it for transmittal to the legislature and submission to the people.”
Id. at 651. On this point, the words of Chief Justice Ostrander in Scott v Secretary of State, 202
Mich 629, 643; 168 NW 709 (1918), are most instructive:
Of the right of qualified voters of the State to propose amendments to the
Constitution by petition it may be said, generally, that it can be interfered with
neither by the legislature, the courts, nor the officers charged with any duty in the
premises. But the right is to be exercised in a certain way and according to
certain conditions, the limitations upon its exercise, like the reservation of the
right itself, being found in the Constitution. [Emphasis added.]
This is exactly what is involved here. The inquiry here involves the “threshold determination”
whether the RMGN initiative petition meets the constitutional prerequisites for placement on the
ballot. This is not an instance of “judicial veto” that Justice Sharpe admonished against in
Hamilton, supra at 38 (Sharpe, J., concurring).
City of Jackson v Comm’r of Revenue, 316 Mich 694; 26 NW2d 569 (1947), is also
directly relevant. In that case, the plaintiffs, by way of mandamus, sought to compel the
defendants to comply with an amendment of the constitution that the voters had approved in a
general election. The amendment reached the ballot for the general election through an initiative
petition. At one point, the Supreme Court stated:
Defendants also claim that the amendment is void because it contains
proposals for more than one purpose; and that it is an ineffectual attempt to revise
the Constitution. The claims are without merit. We have carefully considered all
of the objections raised as to the legality of the petitions and the manner in which
this amendment has been submitted to the people. We find no defects in the
petitions or in the manner of submitting the proposed amendment, to such extent
that the amendment must now be declared a nullity. In that regard we are not
unmindful of the fact that to now declare the amendment a nullity would thwart
the expressed will of the voters. We also are conscious of the fact that these
(…continued)
Court held that “where a proposed amendment to the State Constitution was proper in form and
contained the required number of signatures, it was the duty of the secretary of State to place it
upon the ballot, that he may not question the constitutionality of said amendment, and that under
such circumstances his duties were ministerial and not judicial.”).
-10-
objections might have been raised in advance of the submission, as was done in
Leininger v. Secretary of State [316 Mich 644; 26 NW2d 348 (1947)]. In that
case we found that the initiative petition was fatally defective[2] and directed the
secretary of State, the State board of canvassers and the attorney general to
refrain from submitting the proposal to the voters. [City of Jackson, supra at 711
(emphasis added).]
The cases establish that a “threshold determination” of whether the RMGN initiative
petition meets the constitutional prerequisites for acceptance is now ripe for a decision by this
Court. Further, the cases establish that a petition will not meet the constitutional prerequisites
for acceptance if the constitutional power of initiative does not extend to the proposal at issue.
And, finally, the cases establish that if we determine that the RMGN initiative petition is not
subject to the constitutional power of initiative, we may grant mandamus and direct the Board
and the Secretary to reject the RMGN initiative petition.
Thus, assuming the Board and the Secretary have no clear legal duty to determine
whether the RMGN initiative petition is an “amendment” to, or a “general revision” of, the
constitution, or a duty to determine whether the RMGN initiative petition serves more than one
purpose, then this Court must make the “threshold determination” that the RMGN initiative
petition does not meet the constitutional prerequisites for acceptance. And, at that point, the
Board and the Secretary have a clear legal duty to reject the RMGN petition. In other words, in
this case, our order would not enforce any duty on the part of the Board and the Secretary to
make the “threshold determination” whether the RMGN initiative petition is an “amendment” or
a “general revision,” or whether it serves more than one purpose. Rather, our order would
enforce a duty on the part of the Board and the Secretary to reject the RMGN initiative petition
in light of our “threshold determination” that it does not meet the constitutional prerequisites for
acceptance. As noted earlier, we have the power under MCR 7.216(A)(7), in our discretion and
on terms we deem just, to “enter any judgment or order or grant further or different relief as the
case may require.” And the subsequent act of the Secretary and the Board in rejecting the
RMGN initiative petition in light of our “threshold determination” would be ministerial in nature
because it would not require the exercise of judgment or discretion.
2
The “fatal defect” in Leininger was that the initiative petition was not in the proper “form”; in
particular, the petition did “not contain the title of the proposed measure” as required by the
constitution. Leininger, supra at 654.
-11-
D. Threshold Determinations
(1) “Amendment” Versus “General Revision”
(a) Constitutional Provisions
Const 1963, art 12, § 2, which pertains to amendment by petition and vote of electors,
provides:
Amendments may be proposed to this constitution by petition of the
registered electors of this state. Every petition shall include the full text of the
proposed amendment, and be signed by registered electors of the state equal in
number to at least 10 percent of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor
at the last preceding general election at which a governor was elected. Such
petitions shall be filed with the person authorized by law to receive the same at
least 120 days before the election at which the proposed amendment is to be voted
upon. Any such petition shall be in the form, and shall be signed and circulated in
such manner, as prescribed by law. The person authorized by law to receive such
petition shall upon its receipt determine, as provided by law, the validity and
sufficiency of the signatures on the petition, and make an official announcement
thereof at least 60 days prior to the election at which the proposed amendment is
to be voted upon.
Any amendment proposed by such petition shall be submitted, not less
than 120 days after it was filed, to the electors at the next general election. Such
proposed amendment, existing provisions of the constitution which would be
altered or abrogated thereby, and the question as it shall appear on the ballot shall
be published in full as provided by law. Copies of such publication shall be
posted in each polling place and furnished to news media as provided by law.
The ballot to be used in such election shall contain a statement of the
purpose of the proposed amendment, expressed in not more than 100 words,
exclusive of caption. Such statement of purpose and caption shall be prepared by
the person authorized by law, and shall consist of a true and impartial statement of
the purpose of the amendment in such language as shall create no prejudice for or
against the proposed amendment.
If the proposed amendment is approved by a majority of the electors
voting on the question, it shall become part of the constitution, and shall abrogate
or amend existing provisions of the constitution at the end of 45 days after the
date of the election at which it was approved. If two or more amendments
approved by the electors at the same election conflict, that amendment receiving
the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.
-12-
In contrast, Const 1963, art 12, § 3, which pertains to general revision of the constitution,
provides:
At the general election to be held in the year 1978, and in each 16th year
thereafter and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a general
revision of the constitution shall be submitted to the electors of the state. If a
majority of the electors voting on the question decide in favor of a convention for
such purpose, at an election to be held not later than six months after the proposal
was certified as approved, the electors of each representative district as then
organized shall elect one delegate and the electors of each senatorial district as
then organized shall elect one delegate at a partisan election. The delegates so
elected shall convene at the seat of government on the first Tuesday in October
next succeeding such election or at an earlier date if provided by law.
The convention shall choose its own officers, determine the rules of its
proceedings and judge the qualifications, elections and returns of its members. To
fill a vacancy in the office of any delegate, the governor shall appoint a qualified
resident of the same district who shall be a member of the same party as the
delegate vacating the office. The convention shall have power to appoint such
officers, employees and assistants as it deems necessary and to fix their
compensation; to provide for the printing and distribution of its documents,
journals and proceedings; to explain and disseminate information about the
proposed constitution and to complete the business of the convention in an orderly
manner. Each delegate shall receive for his services compensation provided by
law.
No proposed constitution or amendment adopted by such convention shall
be submitted to the electors for approval as hereinafter provided unless by the
assent of a majority of all the delegates elected to and serving in the convention,
with the names and vote of those voting entered in the journal. Any proposed
constitution or amendments adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the
qualified electors in the manner and at the time provided by such convention not
less than 90 days after final adjournment of the convention. Upon the approval of
such constitution or amendments by a majority of the qualified electors voting
thereon the constitution or amendments shall take effect as provided by the
convention.
(b) Interpreting the Constitutional Provisions
The difference in procedure established “for amendments and for revision undoubtedly
was purposely made and cannot be ignored.” People v Bd of State Canvassers, 323 Mich 523,
528; 35 NW2d 669 (1949) (interpreting Const 1908, art 17, §§ 1 and 4). Therefore, whether
RMGN’s initiative petition proposes an “amendment” or a “general revision” is of central
significance: only a constitutional convention can make a “general revision” of the constitution.
Stated differently, to allow the constitutional power of initiative to extend to a “general revision”
-13-
of the constitution would be to ignore the framers’ intentional differentiation in terms and
procedure. Consequently, determining whether the RMGN proposal is an “amendment” to, or a
“general revision” of, the constitution is of primary importance.
In this regard, we note that counsel for RMGN took the position at oral argument that the
initiative procedure under Const 1963, art 12, § 2, would encompass an amendment, or series of
amendments, that would result in a wholly new constitution. This position of necessity means
that the initiative procedure under Const 1963, art 12, § 2, is an alternative to the constitutional
convention procedure in Const 1963, art 12, § 3. In practical effect, therefore, Const 1963, art
12, § 3, would become superfluous. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc v Governor, 481 Mich 56, 70;
748 NW2d 524 (2008) (stating that an interpretation that renders language meaningless must be
avoided). We do not, therefore, consider Const 1963, art 12, § 2, and Const 1963, art 12, § 3, to
be alternative provisions. Rather, they set out separate procedures for “amendments” as
contrasted to “general revisions.”
Further, we typically discern the common understanding of constitutional text “by
applying each term’s plain meaning at the time of ratification.” Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc, supra
at 67-68. We may discern the “plain meaning” by reference to a dictionary. See, e.g., id. at 69.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1965), p 68, defines an “amendment” as
“the process of amending (as a motion, bill, act, or constitution).” To “amend” means “to alter
(as a motion, bill, or law) formally by modification, deletion, or addition <~the constitution>.”
Id. A “revision” is “an act of revising.” Id. at 1944. To “revise” means “to make a new,
amended, improved, or up-to-date version.” Id. While somewhat helpful to the analysis, the
dictionary definitions of “amendment” and “revision” do not completely reveal the
differentiation that was intended by the framers of the constitution from their use of the words
“amendment” and “revision.”
However, decisions of our Supreme Court provide some clarity. For example, in Kelly v
Laing, 259 Mich 212, 217-218; 242 NW 891 (1932), our Supreme Court considered the
difference between a “revision” and an “amendment” in the context of a city charter. The
question posed was “whether the changes of the nature here proposed may be made by
amendment to the charter or only by revision.” Id. at 216. The distinction was of import
because there were different statutory methods for amending the charter and for revising the
charter. Id. at 216-217. The Supreme Court delineated the differences between an amendment
and a revision, stating:
“Revision” and “amendment” have the common characteristics of working
changes in the charter and are sometimes used inexactly, but there is an essential
difference between them. Revision implies a re-examination of the whole law
and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the
old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a
convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new
instrument, whether the desired changes from the old be few or many.
Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purport of the law, with
corrections to accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental
change, while amendment is a correction of detail. [Id. at 217.]
-14-
The Supreme Court went on to state:
It is a specific instrument, the charter, as to which the change must be
“within the lines” in order to constitute an amendment, not the general “subject of
municipal government” or “local self-government.” The latter, however, is a
proper and principal consideration on revision.
There is reason in the distinction made by the legislature. An amendment
is usually proposed by persons interested in a specific change and little concerned
with its effect upon other provisions of the charter. The machinery of revision is
in line with our historical and traditional system of changing fundamental law by
convention, which experience has shown best adapted to make necessary
readjustments.
From the express implication arising from an advisory vote in proceedings
for revision, from the difference in method providing for difference in character
of changes, and from the proper meaning of the words used, we are of the opinion
that the statute must be construed to require that a change in the form of
government of a home-rule city may be made only by revision of the charter. [Id.
at 221-222.]
Although Laing specifically interpreted statutes and a city charter, not the constitution,
we find the decision to be of significant relevance here, primarily in that Laing stands for the
proposition that there is a qualitative aspect to the meanings of the words “amendment” and
“revision” when used to describe changes to “fundamental law” such as the constitution. In
particular, differentiating between an amendment and a revision requires consideration of the
substance and the effect of the proposed changes.
City of Pontiac School Dist v City of Pontiac, 262 Mich 338; 247 NW 474 (1933),
supports this conclusion. In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court considered a challenge to an
amendment of the constitution approved in the November 1932 general election. The
amendment, which had been initiated by a petition of qualified electors, limited property tax
assessments and purportedly altered or abrogated “some 16 or 18 other provisions of the
Constitution . . . .” Id. at 343. The plaintiff’s challenge in City of Pontiac included an argument
similar to the challenge that plaintiffs make here. In addressing the argument, the Supreme
Court stated:
The validity of the 1932 amendment is further challenged on the ground
that it is not an amendment, but instead it is so far reaching in its modification and
restriction of governmental powers that it amounts to a revision of the State
Constitution, and, not having been accomplished in the manner provided in the
Constitution for revision (article 17, § 4), it is wholly ineffective and invalid. We
are fully convinced that the adoption of this new limitation upon the power of
taxation, under the construction hereinafter placed upon it, does not so interfere
with or modify the operation of governmental agencies as to render it other than
an amendment by way of an addition to the Constitution. As an amendment it
was legally adopted and became a part of our fundamental law. [Id. at 345.]
-15-
In Laing and City of Pontiac, our Supreme Court established the proper analysis for
determining whether a proposal is a “general revision” of, or merely an “amendment” to, the
constitution: the analysis should consider not only the quantitative nature of the proposed
modification, but also the qualitative nature of the proposed modification. More specifically, the
analysis does not turn solely on whether the proposal offers a wholly new constitution, but must
take into account the degree to which the proposal interferes with, or modifies, the operation of
government. The clear implication is that the greater the degree of interference with, or
modification of, government, the more likely the proposal amounts to a “general revision.”3
Such a quantitative and qualitative analysis of proposed changes is consistent with the analysis
other states have used when considering the distinction between an “amendment” and a
“revision” for purposes of modifying a state constitution.
(c) Out-of-State Decisions
The primary out-of-state case that plaintiffs, RMGN, and the Attorney General discuss is
McFadden v Jordan, 32 Cal 2d 330; 196 P2d 787 (1948). In McFadden, the petitioner sought a
writ of mandamus against California’s secretary of state directing him not to place an initiative
proposal, titled the “California Bill of Rights,”4 on the ballot. The issue before the California
Supreme Court was whether the proposal was an attempted “revision” of the constitution, rather
than an “amendment” to the constitution. This issue was critical because the California
Constitution, as does our constitution, provides separate methods for its revision and its
amendment. Id. at 332-334.
The McFadden court noted that in Livermore v Waite, 102 Cal 113; 36 P 424 (1894), the
court previously held that the establishment of a specific procedure for revising the constitution
(by way of constitutional convention) precluded the idea that the framers of the constitution
intended to afford a means of effecting a revision by way of the procedure established for
amending the constitution (legislative proposal). At one point, the court stated:
3
There are some distinctions between City of Pontiac and the case here. Primarily, City of
Pontiac was decided under the Michigan Constitution of 1908, and considered the issue of the
propriety of the amendment after the amendment was approved in the general election.
However, these distinctions are of no significant legal consequence. First, the 1908 Michigan
Constitution is similar to the 1963 Michigan Constitution in that it also established separate
methods for enacting “amendments” to, and a “general revision” of, the constitution. See Const
1908, art 17, §§ 1, 2, and 4. Second, the fact that the voters had already approved the
amendment in the general election did not affect the Supreme Court’s analysis in City of Pontiac.
As a result, our reliance on City of Pontiac is appropriate.
4
As the Attorney General notes in his brief as amicus curiae, the measure purported to add only
one new article to the California Constitution, but contained 12 separate sections, 208
subsections, and more than 21,000 words. McFadden, supra at 334. In contrast, the California
Constitution at the time contained 25 articles, composed of 347 sections and 55,000 words. Id.
Moreover, the measure contained a clause making it controlling over any conflicting provision in
the existing California Constitution. Id. at 346.
-16-
“The very term ‘constitution’ implies an instrument of a permanent and
abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the
will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term ‘amendment’ implies such
an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.”
[McFadden, supra at 333, quoting Livermore, supra at 118-119.]
The McFadden court then went on to state:
It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished
only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the
scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed “the measure”) now
before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly
be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue.
[McFadden, supra at 334.]
In determining whether the measure at issue was a revision or an amendment, the
McFadden court summarized the content of the measure, stating:
To recapitulate, at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in our present
Constitution would be either repealed in their entirety or substantially altered by
the measure, a minimum of four (five, if the civic center provision be deemed
new) new topics would be treated, and the functions of both the legislative and
judicial branches of our state government would be substantially curtailed. [Id. at
345.]
The court then stated:
Our review of the subjects covered by the measure and of its effect on the
totality of our plan of government as now constituted does not purport to be
exhaustive. It is amply sufficient, however, to demonstrate the wide and diverse
range of subject matters proposed to be voted upon, and the revisional effect
which it would necessarily have on our basic plan of government. The proposal is
offered as a single amendment but it obviously is multifarious. It does not give
the people an opportunity to express approval or disapproval severally as to each
major change suggested; rather does it, apparently, have the purpose of
aggregating for the measure the favorable votes from electors of many suasions
who, wanting strongly enough any one or more propositions offered, might grasp
at that which they want, tacitly accepting the remainder. Minorities favoring each
proposition severally might, thus aggregated, adopt all. Such an appeal might
well be proper in voting on a revised constitution, proposed under the safeguards
-17-
provided for such a procedure, but it goes beyond the legitimate scope of a single
amendatory article. [Id. at 345-346 (emphasis in original).]
The court specifically rejected the intervenors’ argument that “if any less than all sections
of the Constitution are altered, and if any less than all old sections are discarded, the change is
merely an amendment.” Id. at 347. The court stated:
We cannot accept such an arbitrary and strained minimization of [the]
difference between amend and revise. The differentiation required is not merely
between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between
their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary
principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field
of application, not to be (as argued in intervenors’ Answering Memorandum) a
mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must
be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of
application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this state have spoken;
they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment
relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional
convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision,
that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment and
revision. . . . Intervenors’ contention–that any change less than a total one is but
amendatory–would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully
erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of amendment, as
contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its
own facts. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question would be
close and where there would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the
line of demarcation; but we have no such case or occasion here. [Id. at 347-348
(emphasis in original).]
The McFadden court ultimately concluded:
Applying the long established law to any tenable view of the facts which
have been related, it is overwhelmingly certain that the measure now before us
would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or “such
an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement or better carry out the purposes for which it was framed.” Indeed,
as has been shown in some detail, the effect of adoption of the measure proposed,
rather than to “within the lines of the original instrument” constitute “an
improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed,” would be
to substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines
of the Constitution as now cast. [Id. at 349-350 (citations omitted.]
After McFadden, California courts adopted a two-pronged test, consisting of both a
qualitative and a quantitative element, to determine whether a ballot initiative constituted an
“amendment” versus a “revision” of the constitution. In Raven v Deukmejian, 52 Cal 3d 336,
329-331, 350-351; 801 P2d 1077; 276 Cal Rptr 326 (1990), the ballot initiative at issue sought to
-18-
limit the rights of criminal defendants by mandating that California courts could not offer greater
protections than those offered by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal
constitution.
The initiative passed the quantitative prong of the test because it did not delete any of the
language in the California Constitution and affected only a single article. Id. at 351. However,
the court held that the initiative failed the qualitative prong of the test and constituted a revision
because it sought far-reaching changes to the structure of the California judiciary by transferring
its interpretive power concerning criminal defendants to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at
352-353. The court reasoned that the ballot initiative “ substantially alter[ed] the substance and
integrity of the state Constitution . . . .” Id. at 352. Therefore, it was not proper subject matter
for a ballot proposal. See also Brosnahan v Brown, 32 Cal 3d 236, 259-261; 651 P2d 274; 186
Cal Rptr 30 (1982) (examining both the quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposal to
determine if it constituted an “amendment” of or “revision” og the California Constitution).
Moreover, McFadden and its California progeny have formed the basis for the decisions
of several other states that have considered the “revision” versus “amendment” issue in the
context of modifying a state constitution. For example, in Bess v Ulmer, 985 P2d 979, 987
(Alas, 1999), the Supreme Court of Alaska stated that it “must consider both the quantity and
quality of the proposed constitutional changes,” and that the “core determination is always the
same: whether the changes are so significant as to create a need to consider the constitution as an
organic whole.” The Supreme Court of Alaska relied, in part, on decisions of the California
Supreme Court, which held that
an enactment which is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
“substantial entirety” of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions may well constitute a revision thereof. However, even a
relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also. [Amador
Valley Joint Union High School Dist v State Bd of Equalization, 22 Cal 3d 208,
223; 583 P2d 1281; 149 Cal Rptr 239 (1978).]
Likewise, in Opinion of the Justices, 264 A2d 342, 346 (Del, 1970) (citations omitted), the
Supreme Court of Deleware considered an “amendment” to be “‘an addition or change within the
lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed,’” and a “revision” to make “extensive alterations in the basic plan and
substance of the existing document” and attain “objectives and purposes beyond the lines of the
present Constitution.” See also Martinez v Kulongoski, 220 Or App 142, 149-150; 185 P3d 498
(2008) (holding that “the distinction between a ‘revision’ and an ‘amendment’” “can properly
involve quantitative and qualitative considerations,” and that changes can be “so ‘fundamental’
and ‘far reaching’ as to effect a ‘revision’”) (citation omitted). The upshot of McFadden and
these out-of-state decisions is that the distinction between a revision and an amendment depends
on both the quantitative and the qualitative nature of the proposed changes to a constitution.
-19-
We agree with the reasoning of these decisions and find them to be consistent with
Michigan law as stated in Laing and City of Pontiac. Consequently, we hold that in order to
determine whether a proposal effects a “general revision” of the constitution, and is therefore not
subject to the initiative process established for amending the constitution, the Court must
consider both the quantitative nature and the qualitative nature of the proposed changes. More
specifically, the determination depends on, not only the number of proposed changes, or whether
a wholly new constitution is being offered, but on the scope of the proposed changes and the
degree to which those changes would interfere with, or modify, the operation of government.
(d) Application
We recognize that it is not possible to “define with nicety the line of demarcation”
between an “amendment” and a “general revision.” McFadden, supra at 348. But, as in
McFadden, “we have no such case or occasion here” that requires us to do so. Id. After
evaluating the quantitative and the qualitative nature of the changes the RMGN initiative petition
proposes, we hold that the proposal does not even approach the “field[] of application” for the
amendment procedure. Id. at 347. Instead, the proposal plainly falls within the realm of a
“general revision” of the constitution.
In particular, the RMGN initiative petition modifies §§ 1, 4, 7, and 9 of article 2; §§ 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 17, and 52 of article 4; §§ 2, 3, and 21 of article 5; and §§ 2, 3, 8, 11, 18, 19,
and 30 of article 6, and would add §§ 55 and 56 to article 4, § 31 to article 5, and § 31 to article
6.
Looked at quantitatively, the proposal affects four articles of the constitution, modifies 24
current sections of the constitution, and adds four new sections to the constitution. Clearly, the
number of proposed changes and the proportion of current articles and sections affected by those
proposed changes are very significant.
From a qualitative standpoint, the scope of the proposed changes is expansive. In the
words of McFadden, the proposal “obviously is multifarious.” McFadden, supra at 346. The
proposal touches on a wide and diverse range of subjects, from the number of executive
departments, legislators, and judges, to absentee ballots, jury lists, lobbying activities, public
disclosure of records, retirement and pension benefits, legislative districting, and standing to
bring lawsuits. Also, the impact of the proposal on the operation of the three branches of
government, and the electoral process, is substantial. As just one example, the proposal strips
the Legislature of any authority to propose and enact a legislative redistricting plan. It abrogates
a portion of the judicial power by giving a new executive branch redistricting commission
authority to conduct legislative redistricting. It then removes from the judicial branch the power
of judicial review over the new commission’s actions. We agree with the Attorney General that
the proposal affects the “foundation power” of government by “wresting from” the legislative
branch and the judicial branch any authority over redistricting and consolidating that power in
the executive branch, albeit in a new independent agency with plenary authority over
redistricting.
We have thoroughly reviewed the number, scope, breadth, and impact of the petition’s
changes to the fundamental governmental structure that our current constitution creates and
-20-
allows. We are further cognizant of the abruptness with which some of the changes are to be
made. For example, the reduction in the number of justices of the Supreme Court and the
number of Court of Appeals judges is to be implemented on December 20, 2008, and the
reduction in the number of departments, boards, and commissions, and the establishment of the
judicial performance commission, are to be made by April 2009. In addition, the proposal
requires the convening of the new commission on legislative districting and the completion of
the commission’s work within months of the effective date of the proposal.
We conclude, in light of these factors, that the modification of, and interference with, the
operation of government is so far-reaching and so substantial that, considering both the
quantitative and the qualitative nature of the proposed changes, the RMGN initiative petition
effects a “general revision” of, and not simply an “amendment” to, the constitution. The
substantial entirety of the petition alters the core, fundamental underpinnings of the constitution,
amounting to a wholesale revision, not a mere amendment.
Therefore, we conclude that the power of initiative established by Const 1963, art 12, § 2,
for amending the constitution does not extend to the RMGN initiative petition. In light of our
“threshold determination” that the RMGN initiative petition does not meet the constitutional
prerequisites for acceptance, the Board and the Secretary now have a clear legal duty to reject the
petition. Consequently, we grant the relief sought in the complaint for mandamus and preclude
the proposal from being placed on the ballot.
(2) Multiple Purposes
In light of our conclusion that the RMGN initiative petition does not meet the
constitutional prerequisites for acceptance because the proposal at issue amounts to a “general
revision” of the constitution, we need not make a “threshold determination” about whether the
proposal also fails to meet the constitutional prerequisites for acceptance because it serves more
than one purpose. Consequently, we offer no opinion on whether a proposal submitted under the
initiative petition procedure established by Const 1963, art 12, § 2, must embrace only a single
purpose, or whether the RMGN initiative petition would violate such a requirement.
IV. Conclusion
The RMGN initiative petition is overarching, of a reach and expanse never before seen in
any constitutional initiative in Michigan’s long history. It proposes fundamentally to redesign
the very framework of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, which emerged after an historic
convention and subsequent voter approval. The issue is not whether the motivation for the
proposed changes is altruistic or parochial. And the issue is not whether any one, or several, or
all of the proposals in the RMGN initiative petition are warranted or make sound public policy.
The issue is that our present constitution contains specific language requiring that any proposal
of the magnitude and enormity of the RMGN initiative petition be submitted to a constitutional
convention, and then to the citizens for approval. We may not blithely ignore or conveniently
overlook Const 1963, art 12, § 3, requiring a constitutional convention for any “general
revision.” The Michigan Constitution has transcended, and will continue to transcend, the
lifetime of any single constituency, and it demands no less than a rigorous application of its
prescribed methods for modification.
-21-
We grant the relief sought in the complaint for a writ of mandamus.
No costs, a public question being involved. We retain jurisdiction. This opinion is to
have immediate effect, MCR 7.215(F)(2).
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-22-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.