PEOPLE OF MI V TAHIRAH HASSEENA SHAKUR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
August 14, 2008
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283360
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 06-004971-AR
TAHIRAH HASEENA SHAKUR,
Defendant,
Advance Sheets Version
and
KEISA YVETTE COOPER and ERICKA
NICHOLE JACKSON,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
TALBOT, J.
Defendants, Ericka Nichole Jackson and Keisa Yvette Cooper, appeal by delayed leave
granted.1 Defendants were charged in the district court with violating MCL 333.21771(1), which
is a misdemeanor pursuant to MCL 333.21799c(1)(e). The district court denied defendants’
motion to quash2 the complaints and dismiss the charges against them. Defendants appealed to
the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s ruling. We reverse and remand.
I. Factual History
Defendants worked as nurse’s aides at Cherrywood Nursing and Living Center. On
October 13, 2004, a resident of the nursing home, Lillian McIntyre, passed away. Although
other nurses’ aides had been assigned to clean and prepare McIntyre’s body for transport to a
1
Although defendant Tahirah Haseena Shakur was involved in the circuit-court appeal, she does
not participate in the appeal before this Court.
2
We use the terminology “to quash” because it was employed by the parties in the lower courts,
but construe defendants’ respective motions to be more properly considered as motions to
dismiss.
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funeral home, defendants entered the room and took over the task. Defendants posed McIntyre’s
body by raising her hands in the air, putting her arms behind her head, and bending her knees.
They also patted McIntyre’s hand and told her to “wake up.” Defendant Tahirah H. Shakur,
using the camera on her cellular phone, took a picture of defendants Keisha Y. Cooper and
Ericka N. Jackson hugging McIntyre’s dead body.
Defendants were suspended from employment pending an investigation and were
subsequently fired. The Department of Community Health (DCH), Health Investigation
Division, launched an investigation and determined that there was insufficient evidence that
defendants had violated the Public Health Code (PHC) and, therefore, did not revoke their
nurse’s aides licenses. However, the DCH Bureau of Health Systems cited the nursing home for
“a violation of patient dignity.”
II. Lower Court Arguments and Rulings
Although the DCH ended its investigation against defendants, the Attorney General
subsequently charged defendants with physically mistreating a patient in violation of MCL
333.21771(1)3 of the nursing-homes section of the PHC. Defendants denied the veracity of the
allegations and filed motions in the district court to quash the criminal complaints and dismiss
the charges against them, asserting, under the plain language of the statute, that McIntyre ceased
being a patient when she died. Defendants contended that a deceased person cannot feel and,
therefore, cannot be mentally or emotionally abused, mistreated, or harmfully neglected.
Moreover, defendants argued that the alleged conduct, i.e., taking pictures of people hugging the
deceased, did not amount to abuse or mistreatment.
The district court denied defendants’ motions and noted that MCL 333.21703(1) defines
a “patient” as a “person who receives care or services at a nursing home.” “Person,” in turn, is
defined as an “individual, partnership, association, private corporation, personal representative,
receiver, trustee, assignee, or other legal entity” under MCL 333.1106(2). The district court then
reviewed dictionary definitions and determined that a “patient” is “an object that is capable of
receiving treatment.” The court noted that the definition did not require the object to be living.
The court further reasoned that, if an object is capable of receiving treatment, it is also capable of
being mistreated. More specifically, a dead body is capable of receiving treatment such as
involving preparation for burial. The district court ruled that the Legislature could have limited
MCL 333.21771(1) to living persons had it so intended and the court declined to read such
limiting language into the statute. The court further noted that it was the jury’s job to determine
whether defendants’ specific conduct rose to the level of abuse or mistreatment. Thereafter, all
three defendants filed applications for leave to appeal to the Macomb Circuit Court, which were
granted, and the cases were consolidated.
In the circuit court, defendants argued that MCL 333.21771(1) was inapplicable to their
alleged conduct because the victim must be a “patient” and, therefore, must be living.
3
The statutory subsection provides, in relevant part: “A[n] . . . employee of a nursing home shall
not physically, mentally, or emotionally abuse, mistreat, or harmfully neglect a patient.” MCL
333.21771(1).
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Defendants incorrectly asserted that the term “patient” is not defined under the statute and
resorted to dictionary definitions of the term to plead their case. Defendants relied on the
definition of “patient” in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed) as “one who has been committed to
the asylum and has remained there for care and treatment,” and Merriam-Webster Dictionary’s
definition as “a person under medical care.” Defendants also relied on dictionary definitions of
“mistreat” as “to treat badly; abuse” and “neglect” as “disregard; to leave undone or unattended,
especially through carelessness; omit; ignore; overlook; forget.” Defendants then argued that the
plain language of the statute evinces the Legislature’s intent to protect only living nursing-home
residents because it does not specifically mention deceased residents. Further, the statute speaks
of physical, mental, or emotional harm, which defendants asserted could only be inflicted on a
living person. On the basis of this language, defendants argued that the body of a recently
deceased person cannot be a “patient” and, therefore, is not protected by the statute. Defendants
also relied on People v Hutner, 209 Mich App 280; 530 NW2d 174 (1995), in which this Court
found that a dead body could not consent, or deny consent, to sexual acts to support their
assertion that a person must be alive to suffer the physical and emotional effects of mistreatment
in order to be covered by the statute.4
In response, the prosecutor noted that McIntyre clearly received care or services from
Cherrywood while she was alive. The question remained whether MCL 333.21771(1) required a
“person” to be living to continue to receive the protections of the statute. Specifically, the
prosecutor noted that, contrary to defendants’ reliance on Hutner, “mistreatment” does not
require an injury or suffering by the victim. Accordingly, the victim need not be alive like the
victim of criminal sexual conduct (CSC), who must deny consent to a sexual act. Therefore, a
dead body should be considered a patient pursuant to MCL 333.21771(1).
The circuit court affirmed the district court’s order denying defendants’ motions to quash
the complaints and dismiss the charges. The circuit court reviewed the statutory definitions and
further noted that the PHC defines “individual” as “a natural person.” MCL 333.1105(1).
Although the Legislature failed to define “natural person” and, therefore, did not specifically
indicate whether he or she could be deceased, the circuit court noted that the Legislature did
differentiate between living and dead persons in numerous statutes in the PHC. Accordingly, the
court determined that the Legislature must have purposefully omitted such language in MCL
333.21771(1). The circuit court then noted that McIntyre continued to be a “patient” under the
definition of MCL 333.21703(1) because she was still receiving treatment when her body was
being prepared for transfer to a funeral home.
The circuit court also rejected defendants’ reliance on Hutner, supra, for the proposition
that a deceased person cannot suffer physically, mentally, or emotionally and, therefore, is not
protected under MCL 333.21771(1). The court first noted that Hutner involved a charge of
third-degree CSC. An element of that offense is a nonconsensual sexual act, which requires a
living person to either consent or deny consent. The circuit court parsed out the phrases in MCL
4
Specifically, this Court ruled, “A dead body is not a person . . . . A dead body has no will to
overcome. It does not have the same potential to suffer physically or mentally as a live or even
an unconscious or dying victim.” Hutner, supra at 284.
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333.21771(1) and determined that the qualifying phrase “physically, mentally or emotionally”
applies only to “abuse.” Similarly, the phrase “harmfully” applies only to “neglect.”
Accordingly, the circuit court determined that the prosecutor needed only to demonstrate that
defendants “mistreated” McIntyre to pursue the current charges. The court then found, “While a
person would arguably have to be alive to suffer physical, mental or emotional abuse, a person
need not be alive to suffer mistreatment” and that an inanimate object might be “treated badly.”
III. Standard of Review
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v Buehler, 477 Mich 18,
23; 727 NW2d 127 (2007).
IV. Analysis
The sole issue on appeal involves the interpretation of MCL 333.21771(1) of the PHC.
Specifically, the dispute centers on whether a deceased person can be considered a “patient”
subject to mistreatment, abuse, or neglect. As previously discussed by this Court:
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the Legislature in enacting a provision. Statutory language should
be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the statute. The first
criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. If the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither
required nor permitted, and courts must apply the statute as written. However, if
reasonable minds can differ regarding the meaning of the statute, judicial
construction is appropriate. [USAA Ins Co v Houston Gen Ins Co, 220 Mich App
386, 389-390; 559 NW2d 98 (1996) (citations omitted).]
In addition:
Statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a common purpose are
in pari materia and must be read together as one law, even if they contain no
reference to one another and were enacted on different dates. “Statutes relate to
the same subject if they relate to the same person or thing or the same class of
persons or things.” The object of the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the
legislative intent expressed in harmonious statutes. If statutes lend themselves to
a construction that avoids conflict, that construction should control. [Walters v
Leech, 279 Mich App 707, 709-710; ___ NW2d ___ (2008) (citations omitted).]
When interpreting a statute, we rely on its plain language and are precluded from “read[ing] into
a statute language that was not placed there by the Legislature.” Risk v Lincoln Charter Twp Bd
of Trustees, 279 Mich App 389, 399; ___ NW2d ___ (2008).
Defendants were charged with violating MCL 333.21771(1), which provides, in part: “A
licensee, nursing home administrator, or employee of a nursing home shall not physically,
mentally, or emotionally abuse, mistreat, or harmfully neglect a patient.” The subsequent debate
and rulings from the lower courts focused on whether a deceased individual qualified as a
“patient” for invocation of the statute. MCL 333.21703(1) defines “patient” as “a person who
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receives care or services at a nursing home.” MCL 333.1106(2) defines a “person” as “an
individual, partnership, cooperative, association, private corporation, personal representative,
receiver, trustee, assignee, or other legal entity.” An “individual” is further defined by MCL
333.1105(1) as a “natural person.” Unfortunately, the Legislature failed to define the term
“natural person” within the PHC. This omission led the lower courts and parties to pursue a
definition of the term “natural person,” through use of a variety of dictionaries, to determine
whether the term encompasses both living and deceased individuals. We note that these efforts
were not particularly fruitful as the various definitions cited by the respective parties and the
courts were circular in nature and provided no meaningful insight into the intent or meaning of
the statutory language.
Instead, we look solely to the provisions of the statute to determine the meaning of these
ordinary terms and whether they were intended to apply to the specific factual circumstances
presented in this case. As noted, a “patient” is defined as “a person who receives care or services
at a nursing home.” MCL 333.21703(1). What a nursing home is mandated to provide with
regard to “care and services” is delineated in MCL 333.21715, which states, in relevant part:
(1) A nursing home shall provide:
(a) A program of planned and continuing nursing care under the charge of
a registered nurse in a skilled facility and a licensed practical nurse with a
registered nurse consultant in an intermediate care facility.
(b) A program of planned and continuing medical care under the charge of
physicians.
(2) Nursing care and medical care shall consist of services given to
individuals who are subject to prolonged suffering from illness or injury or who
are recovering from illness or injury. The services shall be within the ability of
the home to provide and shall include the functions of medical care such as
diagnosis and treatment of an illness; nursing care via assessment, planning, and
implementation; evaluation of a patient’s health care needs; and the carrying out
of required treatment prescribed by a physician.
Given the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 333.21715(2), the care and services that a
patient receives in a nursing-home setting are necessarily those provided to a live individual for
medical treatment, care, and diagnosis. Because the deceased was not receiving statutorily
defined “care and services” at the time relevant to this case, she cannot be construed as a
“patient” for purposes of MCL 333.21771(1). Consequently, while we condemn the behavior of
defendants and find their actions reprehensible and disrespectful to the deceased, they do not
comprise a violation of the statute. This interpretation is further supported by a separate
provision of the PHC, which defines a “dead body” as “a human body or fetus, or part of a dead
human body or fetus, in a condition from which it may reasonably be concluded that death has
occurred.” MCL 333.2803(1). Notably, the PHC does not use of the terms “patient,” “person,”
“individual,” or “natural person” to define what constitutes a “dead body.” This is consistent
with our interpretation of the statutory language as demonstrating the Legislature’s intent to
protect living patients or residents of nursing homes and provide a mechanism for addressing
instances of abuse, mistreatment, and neglect when they occur.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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