WILLIAM D JOHNSON V LILLIAN B JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM D. JOHNSON,
FOR PUBLICATION
June 7, 2007
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
v
No. 261919
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-336703-DO
LILLIAN B. JOHNSON,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Murray, P.J., and O'Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
FORT HOOD, J.
Plaintiff/counter-defendant appeals as of right from the trial court's order granting
defendant/counter-plaintiff a default judgment of divorce.1 We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1968 and resided in North Carolina for
approximately 10 years before moving to Michigan. In 1978, defendant moved to Michigan with
her six children, and plaintiff followed a short time later. Defendant testified that she moved
here to start a new life because plaintiff was abusing alcohol and had inappropriate relationships
with other women. Defendant testified that initially the couple's relationship improved, but in
1982 she packed a suitcase with plaintiff 's clothing because of his continuing inappropriate
conduct.
The parties' testimony regarding the relationship substantially diverged. Plaintiff testified
that defendant packed a suitcase with some of his belongings on two occasions. On the first
occasion, he simply moved back into the marital home. However, on the second occasion, he
moved in with a friend. Plaintiff stayed with the friend for approximately one year before
moving into a home owned by his girlfriend's mother. Plaintiff and his girlfriend had a son
during the course of the relationship. Plaintiff testified that his family, including defendant and
his children with defendant, knew of his ongoing relationship and the child from that
relationship. He asserted that defendant refused to file for divorce because of her religious
1
For ease of reference, we will use the term "plaintiff" to refer to plaintiff/counter-defendant and
"defendant" to refer to defendant/counter-plaintiff.
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beliefs, but had no objection to the filing of a petition by plaintiff. However, plaintiff testified
that he never "got around" to it.
Between 1982 and 2000, plaintiff worked as a firefighter for a tank arsenal, stayed at the
firehouse at various times, and was promoted to chief. However, he suffered from numerous
health problems and, in 2000, was admitted to the hospital for an amputation. During this
hospital stay, plaintiff asserted that defendant did not express any concern for his condition and
had filed a claim for his benefits. This action purportedly served as the basis for the filing of the
petition for divorce.
On the contrary, defendant and some of her children testified that plaintiff was living two
lives with two families and two homes. Defendant admitted that she packed a suitcase for
plaintiff, but he returned to the marital home after a short separation. She testified that he
received his paycheck on a Thursday or Friday, but would come home on Sunday without any
funds to support the family. Consequently, she filed a request for aid from state agencies.
Additionally, she testified that plaintiff stayed at the marital home three to four nights a week
and explained any absences by stating that he was working overtime. The couple ate meals
together, filed a joint tax return on two occasions, and took vacations together. Marital relations
continued until one week before plaintiff 's hospitalization.
Defendant testified that she learned of the existence of plaintiff 's illegitimate son when
he was two years old. She forgave defendant for the indiscretion, but testified that she believed
that the child was the product of a "one night stand" and did not believe that the child's mother
had a continued presence in plaintiff 's life. Defendant testified that she learned of the
relationship between plaintiff and his mistress from a social worker when defendant was
hospitalized. Thereafter, defendant refused to speak to plaintiff, but did not file for divorce
because she did not have the financial resources. Although plaintiff helped defendant pay the
mortgage on the marital home before his hospitalization, she testified that she was able to pay the
mortgage with the help of her children after she cut ties to plaintiff.
The petition was assigned to a circuit court judge (the first judge). On the date of trial,
the case was heard by a visiting judge (the second judge). The second judge inquired whether
the issue in the trial was the date of separation and whether all issues would "fall into place" once
that question was decided. Defense counsel indicated that the date of separation was not
dispositive, but was an important factor that the first judge would consider when resolving the
case. When plaintiff 's counsel sought to respond to that assertion, the second judge stated:
"Apparently that's why you all can't working [sic] anything through here. You can't even agree
on what the problem is. Let's just hear the witnesses, and I'll make decisions. Now you folks
have absolutely lost control; now it's my decision." Counsel for each party then gave a brief
opening statement that addressed the issue of the date of separation. Testimony at trial focused
on whether plaintiff left the marital home in 1982, when defendant packed his suitcase, or
whether the marital relationship continued until 2000, when defendant alleged that she
discovered plaintiff 's mistress.
After two days of testimony regarding the date of separation, the second judge denied
plaintiff 's request to present rebuttal witnesses or rebuttal testimony. The second judge also
admonished the parties for failing to present evidence regarding the key issues necessary to
resolve the divorce, such as property assets and valuations. Defense counsel stated that the
parties sought a ruling regarding the date of separation and "then we go back and litigate the
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divorce." The second judge advised the parties that he was not bound by decisions rendered by
the first judge and told the parties to produce written orders regarding the prior decision, stating:
What's the matter with these lawyers did I just tell you. You're not going
to go walking out here today and say we'll see you some day in the future. This is
over with. So I'm not sure where you're going from here. This is the trial. This
isn't a piece of a trial. . . . Courts speak through their orders. Show me any orders.
I don't know what you're going to do. I couldn't figure what you were up to from
the beginning. And I didn't hear any competent evidence about anything else. All
I've heard is you got a house with a mortgage on it and you got a pension. . . .
There's nothing to ask [the first judge]. Courts speak through their orders. I don't
understand what's been going on and I've been waiting to hear testimony about the
rest of the property in this case. And nobody, neither one of you, presents any
competent evidence on the rest of it. I don't get that at all.
Now both of you are exposed; it isn't a one-sided exposure. It's the
simplest thing [in] the world to say I know how to deal with that. So my
suggestion is both of you, running some rather interesting bits of exposure, had
best talk to each other. But if you don't want to, you don't have to. I'll deal with
it. . . . I told you [that] you need to work this problem through. One of you would
run a risk—the court's ruled. You just got a ruling. I will also suggest as to the
balance I'm inclined to split 50/50. You may want to meet and talk over the
balance of your problems and [I] invite everyone to be back here nine o'clock
tomorrow morning.
The second judge rendered a ruling with regard to the proofs submitted. This ruling
expressly held that the testimony of the couple's children was credible and that plaintiff led two
lives with two separate families. Consequently, the date of separation was the year 2000, at the
time of plaintiff 's hospitalization. The second judge further held that this ruling entitled
defendant to half of plaintiff 's pension for the 18-year period.
The next day, the parties reported to the second judge that they would proceed to binding
arbitration. The ruling regarding the date of separation and the pension would "stand." The
parties indicated that the first judge held that the issue of spousal support was "off the table."
The parties agreed to file a motion before the first judge to determine if that issue remained
foreclosed. The second judge indicated that he would take proofs that there was a breakdown in
the marital relationship, and that the division of assets was reserved for binding arbitration. The
only instruction provided to the parties by the second trial judge was the following:
Both of you folks understand that what the lawyers have said, and they
have put a lot of time in with you, I'm sure, this afternoon, is that the balance of
the items that are at issue, and this isn't a decision one way or the item [sic], but a
couple of houses, the possibility of alimony or not, what they used to call
alimony, spousal support, that needs to be straightened out with [the first judge].
Property down South, I think, in the Carolinas. I may be missing something, but
those are the things that are now—they're all property issues, and they're all going
to go to an arbitrator who will be the final word, whatever he or she decides, that
it will go no further.
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The case was not returned to the first judge. Rather, another visiting judge, the third
judge, presided over the case and entered a written order providing that the division of the
balance of the marital property was submitted to binding arbitration with each party responsible
for half the fee. Although discovery had closed and trial had occurred, the third judge also
granted a motion by defendant to require asset disclosure. Both parties were to complete an
asset-disclosure form available from the first judge and submit it for arbitration. When the time
for arbitration arrived, plaintiff refused to participate, alleging that it encompassed issues to
which he had not agreed. Plaintiff also requested a new trial. The motion for new trial was
denied, and a default judgment of divorce was entered by the first judge after plaintiff refused to
participate in the arbitration. Plaintiff appeals as of right.
In the present case, domestic-relations arbitration is governed by statute. Issues of
statutory construction present questions of law that are reviewed de novo. Cruz v State Farm
Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002). The goal of statutory construction
is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature by examining the most reliable
evidence of its intent—the words of the statute. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685 NW2d
648 (2004). If the statutory language is unambiguous, appellate courts presume that the
Legislature intended the plainly expressed meaning, and judicial construction is neither permitted
nor required. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).
Under the plain-meaning rule, "courts should give the ordinary and accepted meaning to the
mandatory word 'shall' and the permissive word 'may' unless to do so would clearly frustrate
legislative intent as evidenced by other statutory language or by reading the statute as a whole."
Browder v Int'l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 612; 321 NW2d 668 (1982).
MCL 600.5072 governs domestic relations arbitration and provides, in relevant part:
(1) The court shall not order a party to participate in arbitration unless
each party to the domestic relations matter acknowledges, in writing or on the
record, that he or she has been informed in plain language of all of the following:
(a) Arbitration is voluntary.
(b) Arbitration is binding and the right of appeal is limited.
(c) Arbitration is not recommended for cases involving domestic violence.
(d) Arbitration may not be appropriate in all cases.
(e) The arbitrator's powers and duties are delineated in a written arbitration
agreement that all parties must sign before arbitration commences.
(f) During arbitration, the arbitrator has the power to decide each issue
assigned to arbitration under the arbitration agreement. The court will, however,
enforce the arbitrator's decisions on those issues.
(g) The party may consult with an attorney before entering into the
arbitration process or may choose to be represented by an attorney throughout the
entire process.
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(h) If the party cannot afford an attorney, the party may wish to seek free
legal services, which may or may not be available.
(i) A party to arbitration will be responsible, either solely or jointly with
other parties, to pay for the cost of the arbitration, including fees for the
arbitrator's services. In comparison, a party does not pay for the court to hear and
decide an issue, except for payment of filing and other court fees prescribed by
statute or court rule for which the party is responsible regardless of the use of
arbitration.
"The domestic relations arbitration act permits parties to agree to binding arbitration
of . . . disputes. It contains numerous protections for them, including mandatory prearbitration
disclosures and detailed procedural requirements. MCL 600.5072." Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich
186, 189; 680 NW2d 835 (2004).
MCL 600.5072(1) provides that the trial court "shall" not order a party to participate in
arbitration unless there is an acknowledgment on the record or in writing that the party was
informed of the following: the submission to arbitration is voluntary, the outcome of the
arbitration will be binding and appellate review is limited, and arbitration is not recommended
for domestic violence and may not be appropriate in other domestic cases. MCL 600.5072(1)(a)(d). Additionally, the court must inform the parties in plain language of the arbitrator's powers
and duties, the court's enforcement of the decisions rendered by the arbitrator, the option to
consult with an attorney before entering into or during arbitration, the possibility of free legal
services for arbitration, and the cost of arbitration as contrasted with court resolution, which does
not have an additional fee requirement. MCL 600.5072(e)-(i). Because the statute uses the
mandatory term "shall," the protections set forth in the statute are mandatory prearbitration
disclosures delineating the procedural requirements for voluntary submission to binding
arbitration. Harvey, supra; Browder, supra.
A review of the record reveals that the mandatory prearbitration disclosures were not
satisfied. On the record, the second judge advised the parties that the property issues were being
submitted to the arbitrator and that the decision would be the final word. This statement failed to
apprise the parties that appellate review was available but limited. Moreover, it is unclear if the
agreement to arbitrate delineated the fact that spousal support or alimony was held in reserve for
the first judge to resolve. The written and oral statements did not indicate that the arbitration was
voluntary, and in light of the trial court's admonishment to the parties that the case would be
resolved the next day, it is unclear if the decision to arbitrate was voluntary. Further, the second
judge did not advise the parties that the fee for arbitration was unnecessary if they elected to
have the court resolve the matter. Under these circumstances, the first judge erred in allowing
the default judgment premised on plaintiff 's failure to participate in arbitration when he was not
advised of the statutory criteria for voluntary submission.
Plaintiff next alleges that the trial court erred in determining that the date of separation
was in the year 2000 when the great weight of the evidence did not support that factual finding. I
disagree. The trial court's factual findings in a divorce case are reviewed for clear error. Beason
v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990). A finding is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made after
reviewing all the evidence. Id. Although this standard is less rigorous than the standard applied
to a jury determination, it does not authorize the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for
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that of the trial court. Id. "This Court gives special deference to a trial court's findings when
they are based on the credibility of the witnesses." Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415,
429; 566 NW2d 642 (1997).
A review of the record reveals that the trial court's factual findings were not against the
great weight of the evidence. The second judge was presented with two diametrically opposed
versions of events. Plaintiff and his witnesses alleged that he had separated from defendant in
1982 and that his family was aware of his relationship with his girlfriend and their child. On the
contrary, defendant and her witnesses, including the parties' children, testified that plaintiff
continued to reside at the marital home on a part-time basis and attributed his absence from the
home to his work schedule. Because of the nature of his employment as a firefighter and later as
chief, it was plausible that plaintiff would be required to remain at work beyond normal work
hours. The defense asserted that the child was not hidden, but the continued relationship with
plaintiff 's mistress was not disclosed. Rather, it was asserted that plaintiff indicated that the
child was the product of a one-night stand and that he did not have a continuing relationship with
the child's mother. The second judge assessed the credibility of the witnesses and concluded that
the testimony presented by the children of the parties was to be believed. Under the
circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the factual finding regarding the date of separation
was clearly erroneous. Beason, supra.
Plaintiff alleges two additional issues regarding the determination of value of the marital
assets and whether the final judgment was equitable. The conclusion that the default judgment
must be set aside in light of the noncompliance with MCL 600.5072 renders these issues moot.2
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
2
I agree with the second judge that the court speaks through its written orders. In re Gazella,
264 Mich App 668, 677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Furthermore, the circuit court is bound to
follow the published decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. People
v Hunt, 171 Mich App 174, 180; 429 NW2d 824 (1988). There is no requirement that a circuit
judge follow the decision of another. Id. If the first judge agreed to allow the parties to bifurcate
the trial and to decide the issue of the date of separation in a separate hearing, a written order to
that effect should have been entered and would have guided the second judge with regard to the
nature of the trial when the parties could not agree on the first judge's preliminary ruling.
Moreover, although it appeared that discovery had closed, there did not appear to be any
indication that the parties could have proceeded to address assets and valuation, particularly in
light of the fact that a motion to disclose assets was filed after the trial regarding the date of
separation. It is imperative that the rule regarding written orders be followed to allow a visiting
judge to step in and handle matters in place of the original trial judge. Moreover, the first judge
should have made clear whether discovery was extended in light of the bifurcation of the issues
at trial. If discovery had been completed and written orders regarding the posture of the case had
issued, the procedural irregularity in this case arguably would have been avoided.
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