PEOPLE OF MI V LUIS CABAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 3, 2007
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 264150
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-500017
LUIS CABAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Bandstra, JJ.
SAWYER, J.
The question presented in this case is whether a hearsay statement regarding the
defendant's authority to sell a parcel of real estate is admissible at a preliminary examination
under MRE 1101(b)(8). We conclude that the statement is admissible because it concerned who
had an ownership interest in the property, which is one of the purposes allowed under the rule of
evidence.
The charge against defendant arises from an allegedly fraudulent sale of real estate in the
city of Detroit to Yelitza Acevedo and her husband. The victim discovered a house for sale,
called the number on the sign, and spoke with defendant. Defendant represented that he was a
co-owner of the house, along with his uncle, Victor Saavedra. He further represented that he had
the authority to sell the house and that he was offering it for $135,000, a price below market
value. Tenants in the house permitted defendant to show the house to the victims. Saavedra was
not present during the viewing. The victims decided to purchase the house, paying defendant
$20,000 and executing a land contract for the remainder. Defendant informed the victims that it
might be a couple months before the tenants moved out and the victims could move in.
Thereafter, Acevedo saw a different "For Sale" sign in front of the house with a different
telephone number. Upon calling that number, she reached someone other than defendant, a man
named Aturo, who advised her that he was selling the house on behalf of his uncle, Saavedra.
When she informed Aturo that she had already purchased the house from defendant, Aturo told
her that he did not know defendant. Aturo later told Acevedo that he had spoken with Saavedra
and that Saavedra did not know defendant either. Acevedo met with Aturo at the house that
evening, during which meeting he called Saavedra. Apparently, during this call, Acevedo also
spoke with Saavedra, who told her that defendant did not have permission to sell the house.
-1-
It is that statement by Saavedra to Acevedo that is the issue on appeal. Defendant was
charged with larceny by false pretenses over $20,000.1 When Acevedo was asked at the
preliminary examination whether Saavedra had told her that defendant had permission to sell the
house, defendant objected and the trial court upheld the objection. Because Saavedra was not
available to testify and the district court would not adjourn the preliminary examination for more
than two days, the charges were dismissed without prejudice. The prosecutor appealed to the
circuit court, which affirmed. We initially denied leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court
remanded the matter to us for consideration as on leave granted.2 We now reverse.
Because the prosecution was offering Saavedra's out-of-court statement to prove the truth
of the matter asserted, it was hearsay.3 The prosecutor argues, however, that it is admissible
under MRE 1101(b)(8), which provides: "At preliminary examinations in criminal cases,
hearsay is admissible to prove, with regard to property, the ownership, authority to use, value,
possession and entry." The prosecutor argues that Saavedra's statement would show that
defendant was not a joint owner of the property and that he had no authority to sell it. On the
second point, the prosecutor argues that "use" of property includes attempting to profit from it by
selling it. Therefore, Saavedra's statement that defendant did not have authority to sell the
property was the same as saying that defendant did not have the authority to use it.
The meaning of a rule of evidence is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.4 The
principles of statutory interpretation apply to the interpretation of court rules.5 Where the
language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted.6 Where terms are
undefined, we may consult the dictionary to discern their meaning.7
The term "ownership" is undefined in the rules of evidence, but dictionaries commonly
define "ownership" to include the right to convey property to others.8 Therefore, any statement
by Saavedra with respect to defendant's right to convey the property, as well as any statement
whether defendant was a joint owner of the property or if Saavedra solely owned the property
himself, would be a statement regarding ownership. Therefore, Saavedra's statement was
admissible under MRE 1101(b)(8).
1
MCL 750.218(5)(a).
2
People v Caban, 473 Mich 886 (2005).
3
MRE 801(c).
4
People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 442; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
5
Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk, 467 Mich 337, 340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002).
6
Id.
7
People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695, 703; 635 NW2d 491 (2001).
8
See Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich 524, 537-538; 676 NW2d 616 (2004) (opinion of
Cavanagh, J.).
-2-
We reverse the circuit court's order affirming the district court's dismissal of the charges
against defendant and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
-3-
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