INGHAM COUNTY V CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO 141 FOP
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
INGHAM COUNTY and INGHAM COUNTY
SHERIFF,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 3, 2007
9:05a.m.
Respondents-Appellants,
v
No. 263956
MERC
LC No. 03-000089
CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LABOR
PROGRAM, INC.,
Charging Party-Appellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Bandstra and Schuette, JJ.
SCHUETTE, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of my distinguished colleagues, Chief
Judge Whitbeck and Judge Bandstra.
We may not disturb the legal conclusions of the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission (MERC) "unless they violate a constitutional or statutory provision or they are
based on a substantial and material error of law." Grandville Muni Executive Ass'n v Grandville,
453 Mich 428, 436; 553 NW2d 917 (1996), citing MCL 24.306(1)(a) and (f). Further, this Court
"should give due deference to the agency's expertise and not displace an agency's choice between
two reasonably differing views." West Ottawa Ed Ass'n v West Ottawa Pub Schools Bd of Ed,
126 Mich App 306, 313; 337 NW2d 533 (1983).
The majority holds that Detective Siegrist was not adversely affected by being disciplined
by the sheriff. I disagree. Our Supreme Court has held that "an employee may not be
[disciplined] for attempting in good faith to enforce a right claimed under a collective bargaining
agreement." Michigan Employment Relations Comm v Reeths-Puffer School Dist, 391 Mich 253,
265; 215 NW2d 672 (1974). Disciplining Detective Siegrist for giving the memorandum to the
union's attorney most certainly had an adverse effect on her ability to engage in concerted
activity under the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq. Requiring her
to file under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., would have alerted
the sheriff to her efforts to communicate with the union's attorney and hindered her ability to
seek legal advice in confidence without having to first alert a potentially adverse party.
-1-
The facts of this case present an issue of first impression for this Court regarding the
application of PERA. Our Supreme Court has stated that when "construing the PERA, this Court
frequently looks to the interpretation of analogous provisions of the [National Labor Relations
Act] by the federal courts." Grandville, supra at 436. The majority opinion relies on Texas
Instruments Inc v Nat'l Labor Relations Bd, 637 F2d 822 (CA 1, 1981), in its determination to
reverse MERC. While Texas Instruments has some legal utility, it is factually quite different
from this case.
In Texas Instruments, the employment of six employees belonging to a group called the
"Union Organizing Committee" was terminated for distributing union leaflets to fellow
employees at a Texas Instruments plant in an effort to organize a union. These leaflets had been
anonymously mailed to the group's post office box and contained information from a highly
confidential wage survey. Texas Instruments, as a major defense contractor dealing with
sophisticated electronic products, had a well-developed internal security system to protect
sensitive and confidential information. Id. at 825. The wage surveys in question were classified
as "strictly private," and company policy was to terminate anyone who deliberately disseminated
such information to unauthorized persons. Id. at 825-826. The discharged employees filed a
grievance under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 USC 157, which is the
federal counterpart to § 9 of PERA, MCL 423.209.
In its analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted and
applied the three-part test set forth in Jeannette Corp v Nat'l Labor Relations Bd, 532 F2d 916
(CA 3, 1976). "The test laid out in Jeannette is for the most part based upon an approach
developed by the [United States] Supreme Court in the Fleetwood Trailer and the Great Dane
Trailers cases . . . ." Texas Instruments, supra at 827; see also Nat'l Labor Relations Bd v
Fleetwood Trailer Co, 389 US 375, 378; 88 S Ct 543; 19 L Ed 2d 614 (1967), and Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd v Great Dane Trailers, Inc, 388 US 26, 33-34; 87 S Ct 1792; 18 L Ed 2d 1027
(1967). MERC has adopted the three-part test from Jeannette and relied on it in deciding the
present case. This Court must defer to an enduring statutory construction by MERC in cases
interpreting sections of PERA not previously dealt with by this Court. Grandville, supra at 437,
citing Southfield Police Officers Ass'n v Southfield, 433 Mich 168; 445 NW2d 98 (1989).
In Texas Instruments, supra at 828, although the discharged employees were engaged in
protected activity, the First Circuit, quoting the National Labor Relations Board's decision, stated
that "'because of the highly technical and defense-related material it handled, [Texas
Instruments] has in general shown that it has serious security interests which it justifiably is
seeking to protect.'" The general validity of the rule was not the issue; rather, it was the
appropriateness of its application to the conduct of the employees, just as in the present case. Id.
The First Circuit specifically stated that "'employees are entitled to use for self-organizational
purposes information and knowledge which comes to their attention in the normal course of
work activity and association but are not entitled to their Employer's private or confidential
records.'" Id. at 830, quoting Ridgely Mfg Co v Durban, 207 NLRB 193, 196-197 (1973).
This case is similar to Texas Instruments in that there is a substantial security interest in
making sure that employees do not disseminate confidential information because of the sensitive
nature of the sheriff 's work. However, where the two cases differ materially is how the
documents were obtained, the nature of the documents, and the scope and purpose of their
-2-
dissemination. In this case, the memorandum in question was circulated to all the detectives and
received by them in the normal course of their work. On the other hand, the documents in Texas
Instruments were obtained anonymously and not through voluntary dissemination by the
employer, as in the case at bar. Another key distinction from Texas Instruments is the fact that
the memorandum in this case was not labeled as confidential nor would the information
contained in the memorandum have led Detective Siegrist to reasonably believe that the
information was confidential.
Also, Detective Siegrist did not widely distribute the
memorandum to other employees, as was the case in Texas Instruments, and her activity did not
constitute an act of disloyalty or insubordination because she was merely performing her role as
union president in good faith and not seeking to undermine her employer's operations.
My distinguished colleagues in the majority hold that even if disciplining Detective
Siegrist adversely affected her right to engage in lawful concerted activities under PERA, the
sheriff had a legitimate and substantial business justification for instituting and applying the rule.
I disagree. The majority relies on Texas Instruments for establishing a substantial interest for the
sheriff in keeping certain information confidential. I have a different view of Texas Instruments.
The First Circuit stated that the burden of showing a substantial business justification "'falls on
the employer to demonstrate "legitimate and substantial business justifications" for his conduct,'"
and not just for the rule itself. Texas Instruments supra at 827 (citations omitted). Although the
sheriff is entitled to institute such a rule, he was required to show a legitimate and substantial
business justification for applying it to Detective Siegrist when he restricted her right to engage
in protected concerted activity under PERA. The majority does acknowledge "that the release of
a memorandum pertaining to wearing a pager off duty does not conceivably prejudice the
sheriff 's ability to protect the public." Ante at ___. Therefore, the sheriff did not carry his
burden of showing a substantial business justification for applying the rule to Detective Siegrist
in this situation.
The majority also distinguishes this case from Texas Instruments on the basis of the fact
that the memorandum was not labeled as confidential and holds "that any internal documents
produced by the sheriff 's department, and circulated internally only, are deemed confidential by
simple virtue of the sheriff 's work rule prohibiting release of any internal documents without
prior authorization." Ante at ___ (emphasis omitted). This holding sweeps too broadly in the
sense that the sheriff can effectively eliminate the rights of his employees granted to them by the
Legislature under PERA by promulgating and rigidly applying such an expansive internal work
rule. The sheriff certainly has an interest in keeping documents confidential, but if the
Legislature had intended that organizations such as the sheriff 's department could override
statutorily granted rights through internal rules, then it would have expressly stated so.
I would affirm the MERC decision.
/s/ Bill Schuette
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.