PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM FITZGERALD JAMES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
August 29, 2006
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266521
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 04-002925-FC
WILLIAM FITZGERALD JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Neff and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted an order of the circuit court denying his request for
the appointment of appellate counsel to pursue an appeal of his guilty-plea conviction of armed
robbery, MCL 750.529. Although the court ultimately reversed its decision and granted
defendant's request, we conclude that the circuit court's denial of appellate counsel and its
reasoning are contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Halbert v Michigan, 545
US 605, ___; 125 S Ct 2582, 2586; 162 L Ed 2d 552 (2005), which held "that the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on
their pleas, who seek access to first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals."
The circuit court has since appointed counsel for defendant, rendering the appointment of
counsel a moot question with respect to defendant, but we nevertheless address the issue
presented because it is one that pertains to similarly situated defendants, and is capable of
repetition, yet may evade judicial review.1 Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467
Mich 98, 112; 649 NW2d 383 (2002).
I. Facts and Procedural History
1
As the concurrence notes, defendant timely filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court
in propria persona after the trial court wrongfully denied appointed counsel pursuant to Halbert.
However, we fail to see how defendant's preservation of this issue in propria persona renders
judicial review of the violation of his constitutional rights "wholly unnecessary."
-1-
Defendant pleaded guilty of armed robbery on November 15, 2004, and was sentenced on
December 13, 2004, by Judge Dennis Kolenda of the Kent Circuit Court, to 10 to 20 years'
imprisonment. Defendant requested the appointment of appellate counsel within 42 days of
sentencing,2 but Judge Kolenda denied his request pursuant to then-existing Michigan law, MCL
770.3a.
On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court decided Halbert, in which it held that the denial of
appellate counsel to indigent defendants under MCL 770.3a violated the constitutional right to
due process and equal protection. At the time Halbert was decided, defendant was still entitled
to file a delayed application for leave to appeal his conviction in this Court under the 12-month
rule of MCR 7.205(F)(3). Defendant resubmitted his request for the appointment of counsel to
the circuit court on July 5, 2005, and it was again denied by Judge Kolenda on the grounds that
answering "n/a" to the income and assets questions precluded a finding that defendant was
indigent.
On July 29, 2005, defendant resubmitted his request for appointed counsel for a third
time, with an attached trust account statement from his current place of incarceration as proof of
his indigence. On September 27, 2005,3 Judge Kolenda issued a 20-page opinion, addressing the
decision in Halbert and essentially concluding that Halbert does not require the appointment of
appellate counsel for defendants convicted by plea before Halbert was decided, and that any
discussion in Halbert concerning waiver was obiter dictum and, therefore, not binding on the
circuit court. Judge Kolenda held that defendant explicitly waived his right to the appointment
of appellate counsel.4
On January 20, 2006, this Court granted defendant's delayed application for leave to
appeal Judge Kolenda's order denying the appointment of appellate counsel. On March 6, 2006,
however, Judge Kolenda entered an order directing that appellate counsel be appointed to
represent defendant in all further proceedings in this appeal as required by MCL 770.3a(2)(c),
2
MCR 6.425(F)(1)(c) formerly provided that "'[i]n a case involving a conviction following a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere the court should liberally grant the request [for appointed
counsel] if it is filed within 42 days after sentencing.'" People v Bulger, 462 Mich 495, 505; 614
NW2d 103 (2000). However, MCR 6.425 has since been amended to more accurately reflect
the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Halbert, supra. MCR 6.425, staff comment
to December 2005 Amendment.
3
The corrected opinion, referenced herein, was filed on January 12, 2006.
4
In the opinion and order, Judge Kolenda denied the requests for the appointment of appellate
counsel from defendant and ten other defendants, deciding that defendant and five other similarly
situated defendants had explicitly waived the right to appellate counsel.
-2-
noting that defendant had finally established his financial inability to retain counsel by his filing
of March 3, 2006.5
II. The Right to Appointed Counsel in Michigan
In November 1994, Michigan voters approved an amendment to the state constitution to
provide that "an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of
the court . . . ." Const 1963, art 1, § 20; People v Bulger, 462 Mich 495, 504; 614 NW2d 103
(2000).6 Following the amendment, "'several Michigan state judges began to deny appointed
appellate counsel to indigents' convicted by plea." Halbert, supra at 2586, quoting Kowalski v
Tesmer, 543 US 125, 127; 125 S Ct 564; 160 L Ed 2d 519 (2004). Lacking legislative guidance
clarifying the right to the appointment of counsel in light of the constitutional amendment, the
Michigan Supreme Court adopted MCR 6.425(F)(1)(c), which directed that courts liberally grant
requests for counsel in guilty plea cases if filed within 42 days of sentencing. Bulger, supra at
505-506.
Subsequently, in 1999, the Michigan Legislature enacted statutory provisions governing
the appointment of counsel, which were codified at MCL 770.3a. 1999 PA 200; Bulger, supra at
506. The statutory amendments required the appointment of appellate counsel in guilty plea
cases in certain defined circumstances, permitted appointment in another, and otherwise
provided that appellate counsel shall not be appointed. Id. The amendments became effective
April 1, 2000. Id.
Under MCL 770.3a, a court was prohibited from appointing appellate counsel for a
defendant who pleaded guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo contendere, except under limited,
specified circumstances. MCL 770.3a(2)7 and (3).8 Of particular importance to this case is MCL
5
Although appellate counsel was appointed for defendant, his brief in this appeal was filed in
propria persona, apparently without the involvement of appellate counsel.
6
Before the amendment, all defendants convicted of a crime were entitled to an appeal by right.
Bulger, supra at 503. The elimination of appeals by right was proposed as a means of
controlling the overwhelming caseload in this Court, which in 1992 had a backlog of some 4,000
cases awaiting decision. Id. at 504.
7
Subsection 2 required a court to appoint appellate counsel if (1) the prosecuting attorney seeks
leave to appeal, (2) the defendant's sentence exceeds the upper limit of the minimum sentence
range of the applicable sentencing guidelines, (3) the court of appeals or the supreme court grants
the defendant's application for leave to appeal, or (4) the defendant seeks leave to appeal a
conditional plea under MCR 6.301(C)(2) or its successor rule.
8
Subsection 3 permitted a court to appoint appellate counsel in three instances: (1) the
defendant seeks leave to appeal a sentence based on an alleged improper scoring of an offense
variable or prior record variable, (2) the defendant objected to the scoring or otherwise preserved
the matter for appeal, or (3) the sentence imposed by the court constitutes an upward departure
from the upper limit of the minimum sentence range that the defendant alleges should have been
scored.
-3-
770.3a(4), which required that the court advise a defendant that the right to appointed counsel
was waived by a guilty plea:
While establishing that a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo
contendere was made understandingly and voluntarily under Michigan Court Rule
6.302 or its successor rule, and before accepting the plea, the court shall advise
the defendant that, except as otherwise provided in this section, if the plea is
accepted by the court, the defendant waives the right to have an attorney
appointed at public expense to assist in filing an application for leave to appeal or
to assist with other postconviction remedies, and shall determine whether the
defendant understands the waiver. Upon sentencing, the court shall furnish the
defendant with a form developed by the state court administrative office that is
nontechnical and easily understood and that the defendant may complete and file
as an application for leave to appeal.
It is not disputed that at the time of defendant's plea and sentencing in this case, MCL
770.3a governed his right to the appointment of appellate counsel. Further, the Michigan
Supreme Court had considered and rejected the claim that the federal constitution imposed any
requirement for the appointment of appellate counsel for guilty-plea defendants seeking leave to
appeal to this Court. Bulger, supra at 511-516. Reviewing United States Supreme Court
decisions, particularly Douglas v California, 372 US 353; 83 S Ct 814; 9 L Ed 2d 811 (1963),
and Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600; 94 S Ct 2437; 41 L Ed 2d 341 (1974), the Bulger Court held that
no right to appellate counsel was required under federal law:
Despite the muddled state of its jurisprudence, we adhere to our duty to
attempt to understand and apply what the Supreme Court has opined regarding the
right of meaningful access [to review]. As explained below, we conclude that
meaningful access does not require the appointment of counsel for defendants
who seek discretionary leave to appeal from their guilty pleas. Our current system
already provides those defendants with an adequate opportunity to present their
claims fairly. [Id. at 516.]
In accordance with existing Michigan law at the time of defendant's plea, Judge Kolenda advised
defendant pursuant to MCL 770.3a(4) that his guilty plea waived the right to appointed counsel
to assist in filing an application for leave to appeal or to assist with other postconviction
remedies.
III. Halbert
In Halbert, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Michigan Supreme Court's view
of the right to appointed counsel in seeking appeal in this Court, holding that indigent defendants
who plead guilty or nolo contendere in a Michigan court have a federal constitutional right to the
appointment of appellate counsel with regard to first-tier review in this Court. Halbert, supra at
2586. Halbert involved the appeal of Antonio Dwayne Halbert, a Michigan defendant convicted
on his plea of nolo contendere. Id. Following his plea, Halbert sought the appointment of
counsel to assist him in applying for leave to appeal in this Court. The trial court and this Court
denied his requests, and the Michigan Supreme Court declined review. Id.
-4-
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Halbert argued that an appeal to this
Court ranks as a first–tier appellate proceeding requiring the appointment of counsel under
Douglas. However, the state argued that appeal to this Court is discretionary and, therefore,
under Ross, counsel need not be appointed. The Court agreed with Halbert, classifying an appeal
to this Court as a "first-tier" review such that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses
required the appointment of counsel for defendants convicted on their pleas. Id. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that Halbert's case was properly ranked with Douglas, as an appeal of right,
rather than with Ross, as a discretionary appeal. Id.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reiterating the due process and equal protection
principles underlying criminal appeals. Id. at 2586-2587. The Court observed that the federal
constitution imposes no obligation on the states to provide appellate review of criminal
convictions. Id. at 2586. However, "[h]aving provided such an avenue," "a State may not 'bolt
the door to equal justice.'" Id., quoting Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 24; 76 S Ct 585; 100 L Ed
891 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). Decisions so holding appropriately reflect
due process and equal protection concerns. "'The equal protection concern relates to the
legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs,'
while '[t]he due process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered
proceedings.'" Id. at 2587 (citation omitted). Consequently, when a state deems it wise and just
that convictions are susceptible to review, it may not, by forcing exactions from indigent
persons, draw a line that precludes them from securing such review. Id. at 2586-2587.
Looking to the Michigan two-tier appellate system, the Supreme Court observed that the
Michigan Supreme Court hears appeals by leave only. Id. at 2587-2588. Further, although
before 1994 this Court adjudicated appeals as of right from all criminal convictions, following
the state constitutional amendment of 1963 Const, art 1, § 20, a defendant convicted by plea who
seeks leave to appeal to this Court must file an application for leave pursuant to MCR 7.205 and
MCL 770.3a(2) and (3). Halbert, supra at 2588. In responding to an application for leave, this
Court may grant or deny the application, enter a final decision, or grant other relief. Id. The
Supreme Court observed, however, that this Court routinely denies applications for leave on the
basis of "'lack of merit in the grounds presented.'" Id.
Comparing the Michigan appellate system with those addressed in Douglas and Ross, the
Court concluded that Douglas provided the controlling instruction. Id. at 2590. The Court noted
that in Douglas, which held that a state is required to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant's
first-tier appeal as of right, two considerations were key to its decision. First, the appeals at issue
entailed an adjudication on the merits. Second, first-tier review differs from subsequent reviews
because the claims have once been presented by appellate counsel and reviewed by an appellate
court. Id. at 2587. Similarly, two aspects of review by this Court mandated that the rule of
Douglas governed Halbert's case. First, in deciding an application for leave to appeal, this Court
looks to the merits of the claims made in the application. Second, indigent defendants seeking
review in this Court are generally ill-equipped to represent themselves. Id. at 2590. Whether
characterized as a decision of an appeal or a disposition on an application for leave, this Court's
"ruling on a plea-convicted defendant's claims provides the first, and likely the only, direct
review the defendant's conviction and sentence will receive." Id. at 2591.
-5-
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the Bulger Court's view that a pro se defendant
seeking discretionary review in this Court is adequately armed because he or she will have a
transcript, trial counsel's framing of the issues in a motion to withdraw, and the trial court's
ruling on the motion. Id. at 2592. Observing that materials prepared by trial counsel are no
substitute for an appellate lawyer's aid, the Court emphasized that the assistance of counsel in
presenting a plea-convicted defendant's claims to this Court was essential for any meaningful
access to review. Id. at 2592-2593. The Court further noted that Michigan's procedures for
seeking leave to appeal after sentencing on a plea may intimidate the uncounseled, particularly
given the legal complexities of the application form and requirements. Id. at 2593-2594.
"Without guides keyed to a court of review, a pro se applicant's entitlement to seek leave to
appeal to Michigan's intermediate court may be more formal then real." Id. at 2592.
Having decided that plea-convicted defendants were entitled to appointed counsel, the
Halbert Court next considered the state's argument that, even if Halbert had a constitutionally
guaranteed right to appointed counsel for first-level appellate review, he waived that right. The
Court rejected this argument. Id. at 2594.
First and foremost, the Court observed that at the time Halbert entered his plea, he, like
other Michigan defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to appointed
appellate counsel. Accordingly, he could not elect to forgo this right. Secondarily, the Court
noted that the trial court did not simply and directly advise Halbert that in his case there would
be no access to appellate counsel. Id. In regard to the second point, the Court cited Iowa v
Tovar, 541 US 77, 81; 124 S Ct 1379; 158 L Ed 2d 209 (2004), for the proposition that a waiver
of the right to counsel must be a knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances. Halbert, supra at 2594. In addressing the dissent, the majority rejected
the argument that a conditional waiver was effected in Halbert's case, i.e., a waiver in which the
defendant agrees that if he has a right, he waives it. Id. at 2594 n 7.
Given the Supreme Court's consideration of MCL 770.3a and the detailed reasoning in
Halbert, there can be no credible dispute that Halbert governs the circumstances of this case with
regard to defendant's essential right to appointed counsel in seeking leave to appeal to this
Court.9 Nonetheless, the circuit court repeatedly denied defendant's request for appointed
counsel to seek leave to appeal in this Court, ultimately concluding that despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Halbert, defendant had waived his right to appointed counsel in pleading
guilty.
IV. The Circuit Court's Finding of Waiver
Despite its view that the decision in Halbert was incorrect, the circuit court
acknowledged in its opinion that Halbert authoritatively held that defendants who plead guilty or
nolo contendere in Michigan are entitled to court-appointed appellate counsel. However, the
9
The circuit court held that Halbert applied retroactively to defendant's case, which was not final
at the time Halbert was decided. See MCR 7.205(F)(3). This ruling has not been appealed; we
therefore do not consider whether Halbert applies retroactively and, if so, to what extent.
-6-
circuit court concluded that the discussion of waiver in Halbert was, with respect to anyone other
than Halbert, merely dictum and, therefore, not binding on any other court.
The circuit court observed that Halbert did not authoritatively determine that a guiltyplea defendant cannot waive the right to appointed counsel. The court also found Halbert
factually distinguishable from defendant's case with respect to waiver because defendant was
"told in so many words" that his proffered plea would preclude the appointment of appellate
counsel. On the contrary, in the circuit court's view, Halbert was only told that he could have
appointed counsel in some circumstances and was never told that his plea would preclude
appointed counsel in all other instances. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the
discussion of waiver in Halbert was dictum because, since Halbert did not waive any right, the
validity of the waiver was irrelevant to the outcome, making the discussion of validity of the
waiver dictum.
The circuit court took issue with what it viewed as the Halbert majority's analysis of
waiver, stating: "The majority opinion in Halbert cites no authority whatsoever for the
proposition that a constitutional right cannot be waived before recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States, and that proposition is, frankly, illogical," and incorrect. The circuit court
concluded that the fact that defendant was told that he would waive the right to appointed
counsel at a time when that right was not yet recognized by the Supreme Court did not invalidate
defendant's waiver. The court apparently reasoned that because the right to appointed counsel
was disputed among the trial courts and thus arguable, defendant could relinquish that right as
through a forfeiture, which is "waiver by inaction." That is, the uncertainty of the right to
appointed counsel placed guilty-plea defendants on notice that they might have a right, and
therefore, given what they were told concerning waiver pursuant to MCL 770.3a(4), their pleas
were an intelligent decision to forgo pursuing that right. The court concluded that if the
discussion of waiver in Halbert was not dictum, then defendant explicitly waived his right to
appointed counsel, and Halbert did not preclude giving effect to the waiver.
We find the circuit court's reasoning flawed and contrary to the law of waiver. We
conclude that the discussion of the validity of waiver in Halbert is not dictum. "Obiter dictum is
defined as '[a] judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one
that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential . . . ." People v
Williams, 475 Mich 245, 251 n 1; 716 NW2d 208 (2006), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (7th
ed). In Halbert, the issue whether Halbert validly waived his right to counsel was presented and
considered, and was necessary to the decision. Had the Court found a valid waiver, i.e., that
Halbert knowingly and intelligently acted to forgo the right to appointed counsel with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances, Halbert would not be entitled to a remand for further
proceedings. The Court's analysis and conclusion logically reasoned that if no right exists, it
follows that one cannot knowingly and intelligently elect to forgo that right. Halbert, supra at
2594.
Moreover, we disagree with the analogy drawn by the circuit court between defendant's
relinquishment of his right to appointed counsel and, in the court's words, "forfeiture, which is
'waiver by inaction.'" Michigan law clearly distinguishes between "forfeiture" and "waiver."
"'Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely
assertion of a right, waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
-7-
right."'" People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), quoting United States
v Olano, 507 US 725, 733; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). The fundamental reasoning
concerning waiver in Halbert applies equally in defendant's case, but principles of forfeiture do
not. The dispositive question in this case then is whether the circuit court erred in holding that
defendant waived his right to appointed counsel under the holding and analysis in Halbert.
V. Defendant's Waiver Claim
Defendant argues that the denial of appointed appellate counsel following his guilty plea
was contrary to the decision in Halbert because defendant, like Halbert, entered his plea at a time
when Michigan did not recognize a guilty-plea defendant's right to appointed appellate counsel.
Accordingly, defendant did not waive his right because there was no recognized right that he
could elect to forgo. Given the analysis and resolution of the waiver issue in Halbert, we agree.
While it is true that the advisements of the lower court concerning the appointment of
counsel to Halbert were different from those provided in this case to defendant, we conclude that
any distinction does not warrant a different result. The circuit court erred in concluding that
defendant waived his right to appointed appellate counsel.
The waiver of counsel in this case was compelled by MCL 770.3a. The Halbert Court, in
effect, found MCL 770.3a unconstitutional as applied. Further, in its concluding note in the
opinion, the Halbert majority rejected the statute's exaction of a waiver of the appointment of
appellate counsel, MCL 770.3a(4), for all indigent defendants who enter a guilty plea:
We are unpersuaded by the suggestion that, because a defendant may be
able to waive his right to appeal entirely, Michigan can consequently exact from
him a waiver of the right to government-funded appellate counsel. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14. Many legal rights are "presumptively waivable," post, at 2602 (Thomas,
J., dissenting), and if Michigan were to require defendants to waive all forms of
appeal as a condition of entering a plea, that condition would operate against
moneyed and impoverished defendants alike. A required waiver of the right to
appointed counsel's assistance when applying for leave to appeal to the Michigan
Court of Appeals, however, would accomplish the very result worked by [MCLA]
770.3a (West 2000): It would leave indigents without access to counsel in that
narrow range of circumstances in which, our decisions hold, the State must
affirmatively ensure that poor defendants receive the legal assistance necessary to
provide meaningful access to the judicial system. See Douglas, [supra,] 372 U.S.,
at 357-358, 83 S. Ct. 814; M.L.B. [v S.L.J.], 519 U.S. [102] at 110-113, 117 S Ct
555 [136 L. Ed. 2d 473]; cf. Griffin v Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100
L. Ed. 891 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (ordinarily, "a State
need not equalize economic conditions" between criminal defendants of lesser
and greater wealth). [Halbert, supra at 2594 n 8 (emphasis added).]
Under the circumstances of this case, the pronouncements in Halbert and the principles of
waiver result in but one conclusion: defendant did not intentionally relinquish a known right.
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
-8-
It is noteworthy that our resolution of the question presented in this case has the support
of both the prosecution and amici curiae. While not expressly conceding error in this case, the
prosecution concurs with our conclusion that the circuit court erroneously applied waiver
principles to deny appellate counsel to guilty-plea defendants who still timely file a delayed
application for leave to appeal. The prosecution agrees that the Halbert Court deliberately
decided the issue of waiver in circumstances analogous to this case, and that the Court's
discussion of waiver is an authoritative holding of the United States Supreme Court, not dictum:
The waiver of counsel in this case was one that was compelled by the
language of MCL 770.3a. That was the statute found by the United States
Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. We do not believe that such a waiver,
compelled by a statute struck down by the Supreme Court, can be considered "the
intentional relinquishment of a known right," [Carter, supra at 215]. And since
the trial court's decision is contrary to the position we have taken on the issue of
dictum in other cases before this Court, we believe that we cannot honorably
advance any other argument in favor of the trial court's position. [Plaintiff 's brief,
p 5.]
Likewise, our resolution of this case is supported by the amici curiae briefs filed in this
appeal. Amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan advances the position
that the discussion of waiver in Halbert was fundamental to the decision and, therefore, is
controlling in this case. The American Civil Liberties Union Fund urges this Court to decide the
question of waiver on behalf of defendant and other similarly situated defendants. Amicus
curiae Saginaw County Prosecuting Attorney agrees that the Halbert majority expressly
determined that Halbert did not waive his right to appointed counsel, but advances the position
that Halbert did not hold that a defendant may not, under appropriate circumstances, waive such
a right. We need not, and do not, decide this latter question.
VI. Conclusion
We hold that pursuant to Halbert, defendant was entitled to the appointment of appellate
counsel to seek leave to appeal to this Court. Further, defendant did not waive his right to the
appointment at the time of entering his guilty plea on the basis of the circuit court's mere
advisement that waiver would occur, MCL 770.3a(4). We vacate the circuit court's opinion and
order to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.
We decline to address the merits of defendant's substantive claim that his plea must be
vacated. The merits of this claim are properly addressed in the context of defendant's pursuit of
leave to appeal his conviction.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Donald S. Owens
-9-
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