PEOPLE OF MI V GENEVIEVE VIOLAROSE KING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
June 6, 2006
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 259295
Benzie Circuit Court
LC No. 04-001889-FH
GENEVIEVE VIOLAROSE KING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Kelly and Davis, JJ.
SAWYER, P.J.
We are asked in this case to determine what constitutes the corpus delicti for a charge of
accessory after the fact. In light of the purpose of the rule, we determine that the corpus delicti
of accessory after the fact is the same as the corpus delicti of the underlying crime itself. In this
case, because the prosecutor had established the corpus delicti for both murder and unlawfully
driving away an automobile, the trial court properly admitted defendant's confession to being an
accessory after the fact to murder and an accessory after the fact to unlawfully driving away an
automobile. We also determine that jurisdiction to try a charge of accessory after the fact
properly lies in the county in which the underlying crime occurred, even if the actual assistance
was rendered outside that county.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of accessory after the fact,1 one as an accessory
to murder and the other as an accessory to unlawfully driving away an automobile (UDAA). She
was sentenced to two years' probation. Her convictions arise out of the murder of Lillian Ross
by Ross's grandson, John Robertson, and another individual, Robert Eckstein, at Ross's home in
Benzie County. One of Ross's neighbors reported that she had seen Robertson, Eckstein, and a
female the night before Ross's body was discovered. Deputy Troy Lamerson was the first officer
responding to the scene and testified that upon his arrival, the garage door was open, but no
vehicle was present. The deputy also received a report from the Mason County library that a jar
containing money had been stolen the same day that Ross was found murdered and that the
persons who had stolen the jar signed a computer log with the names of Eckstein and defendant.
1
MCL 750.505 (common-law offenses).
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Robertson and defendant were later located in Las Cruces, New Mexico. They were
arrested, and Deputy Lamerson, along with Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant Mark
Henschell, went to New Mexico to interview defendant. During the interview, defendant stated
that she had met Robertson on a bus two weeks before the interview. Robertson and Eckstein
later picked her up from her father's house. The three traveled to the Traverse City area and
spent the night in a camper behind the victim's house. Defendant further stated that she woke up
about 9 a.m., but Robertson told her to stay in the camper and get some sleep and that he and
Eckstein had some business to take care of and would be back in about half an hour. Upon their
return, Robertson told defendant to get into the victim's car. She and Robertson left in the
victim's car, with Eckstein following in his own vehicle.
Defendant further told the officers that they stopped at the Mason County library to check
e-mail and Robertson stole the money jar. Defendant stated that it was at this point that
Robertson told her what he and Eckstein had done to the victim. The three traveled in the two
separate cars until reaching Oklahoma, when the victim's car developed brake trouble.
Defendant wiped down the car at Robertson's direction, and then all three left in Eckstein's
vehicle. Upon reaching the bus station in Oklahoma City, defendant and Robertson parted ways
with Eckstein, with defendant and Robertson traveling to Las Cruces, where they were arrested.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing her confession to be
introduced before establishing the corpus delicti of the crimes. We disagree. We review a lower
court's decision regarding corpus delicti for an abuse of discretion. People v Burns.2 Burns3
reviewed the general principles of the corpus delicti rule:
The corpus delicti rule requires that a preponderance of direct or
circumstantial evidence, independent of a defendant's inculpatory statements,
establish the occurrence of a specific injury and criminal agency as the source of
the injury before such statements may be admitted as evidence. People v
McMahan, 451 Mich 543, 548-549; 548 NW2d 199 (1996); People v Konrad, 449
Mich 263, 269-270; 536 NW2d 517 (1995); People v Metzler, 193 Mich App 541,
547; 484 NW2d 695 (1992); People v Brasic, 171 Mich App 222, 227; 429 NW2d
860 (1988).
The question regarding what must be shown to establish the corpus delicti of accessory
after the fact appears to be one of first impression in Michigan. An accessory after the fact is
one who, with knowledge of the principal's guilt, renders assistance to hinder the detection,
arrest, trial, or punishment of the principal.4 The question becomes whether, to establish the
corpus delicti of accessory after the fact, it is necessary to merely establish the corpus delicti of
2
250 Mich App 436; 647 NW2d 515 (2002).
3
Id. at 438.
4
People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 62; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).
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the underlying crime, or whether there must also be some evidence independent of the
confession to establish that assistance was rendered to the principal.
Defendant cites cases from Arizona and California that suggest that there must, in fact, be
a showing of some assistance being rendered in order to establish the corpus delicti of accessory
after the fact. In State v Hernandez,5 the Arizona Supreme Court held that, to establish the
corpus delicti, it was necessary to show that the evidence, if true, would warrant a reasonable
inference that some person committed the crime charged.6 The Court concluded that, in the case
of accessory to kidnapping, it was necessary to establish a reasonable inference that somebody
concealed the kidnapping or harbored and protected the kidnapper. Similarly, in In re IM,7 the
California Court of Appeal concluded that there had to be some evidence of the defendant
rendering assistance to the principal beyond the defendant's confession to rendering such
assistance in order to satisfy the corpus delicti rule.
If we were to follow these cases and conclude that the corpus delicti rule requires in an
accessory after the fact case that some evidence be introduced independent of the confession that
showed that someone provided assistance to the principal, the evidence in the case at bar would
be limited. There was certainly more than adequate evidence introduced establishing the corpus
delicti of murder and unlawfully driving away an automobile. But evidence of assistance being
provided by a third person was minimal at best. There was evidence of a female being seen with
the principal. But that does little to establish assistance being rendered. Somewhat stronger is
the evidence that defendant may have been involved in the theft of money from the library after
the murder. Money would certainly provide assistance for flight from the jurisdiction. Given
the relatively low evidentiary requirement established in In re IM regarding the showing of
assistance, that evidence might be sufficient.
But, in any event, we believe that a requirement that there be some evidence of assistance
having been rendered in order to establish the corpus delicti of accessory after the fact is unduly
restrictive in light of the purpose of the corpus delicti rule. The rule exists to prevent the use of a
confession to convict someone of a crime that did not occur.8 Once it is established that a crime
occurred, the defendant's statement may be introduced to establish the degree of guilt.9 Here, it
was established that a crime occurred. There was evidence presented that the victim had been
murdered and her car taken. Thus, it was shown that a "specific injury or loss occurred and that
some criminal agency was the source or cause of the injury."10 Defendant's statement was then
properly admitted to establish her involvement in the crime and her degree of culpability.
5
83 Ariz 279; 320 P2d 467 (1958).
6
Id. at 282.
7
125 Cal App 4th 1195,1202-1204; 23 Cal Rptr 3d 375 (2005).
8
People v Ish, 252 Mich App 115, 116; 652 NW2d 257 (2002).
9
Id. at 117.
10
Id. at 116.
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It is well established that a defendant's statement may be admitted to establish exactly
which crime was committed: for example, whether a criminal homicide was a first-degree
felony murder, a first-degree premeditated murder, a second-degree murder, or manslaughter.11
Or, in Ish, the defendant's statement was used to establish a first-degree home invasion under
circumstances in which the independent evidence would seem to have only established an entry
without the owner's permission.
For these reasons, we conclude that the corpus delicti requirement for a charge of
accessory after the fact is satisfied when the specific injury at the hands of a criminal agency,
which is established by evidence independent of the confession, is that of the underlying crime
committed by the principal. Once that has been established, as it was in the case at bar, the
defendant's confession may then be introduced to establish that his or her degree of culpability is
that of an accessory after the fact. Accordingly, in the case at bar, the trial court properly
admitted defendant's confession under the corpus delicti rule.
Defendant's other argument on appeal is that jurisdiction did not properly lie in Benzie
County because she rendered no assistance to Robertson and Eckstein in Benzie County. MCL
762.8 provides that jurisdiction properly lies in any county in which any act constituting part of
the crime has occurred:
Whenever a felony consists or is the culmination of 2 or more acts done in
the perpetration thereof, said felony may be prosecuted in any county in which
any one of said acts was committed.
It is important to note that this statute does not require in multiple-offender scenarios that a
particular defendant have committed an act in the county in which the case is tried. One of the
elements necessary to prove the crime of accessory after the fact is the commission of the
underlying crime. See CJI2d 8.6(3). Thus, the commission of the murder and the UDAA in
Benzie County by Robertson and Eckstein is an element of defendant's charge of being an
accessory after the fact to those two crimes. That is, in the language of MCL 762.8, the offense
of accessory after the fact is the culmination of two or more acts, one of which is the underlying
felony committed by the principal. Therefore, a charge of accessory after the fact may be
brought in the county in which the underlying felony occurred. Because the murder and the
UDAA undisputedly occurred in Benzie County, jurisdiction properly lay in Benzie County for
the accessory after the fact charges, even though defendant's actual assistance (with the requisite
guilty knowledge) may not have begun until after they had left Benzie County.
Similarly, to the extent that defendant argues that there was no jurisdiction within the
state of Michigan at all because her acts of assistance occurred outside the state, MCL
762.2(2)(a) provides that Michigan has jurisdiction over any crime where any act constituting an
element of the crime is committed within Michigan. Because, as discussed above, the
11
People v Hughey, 186 Mich App 585, 586-589; 464 NW2d 914 (1990).
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underlying crimes are elements of accessory after the fact and the underlying crimes were
committed in Michigan, this state has jurisdiction over the accessory charges.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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