COLE'S HOME & LAND CO LLC V CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
COLE'S HOME & LAND CO., LLC, ROBERT
COLE, and EDWIN AMMERMAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 9, 2006
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 258526
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 02-004493-CZ
CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS and GRAND
RAPIDS CITY COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellees.
Official Reported Version
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case arising from the Grand Rapids City Commission's (city commission)
rejection of plaintiffs' proposed residential subdivision plat, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial
court's order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition. We reverse.
I. Facts
Plaintiffs submitted a preliminary plat for the development of a residential subdivision to
the city of Grand Rapids for approval. The Grand Rapids Planning Commission (planning
commission) passed a resolution granting tentative and final approval of the preliminary plat
with a zoning condition. The zoning condition is not at issue. However, at the public hearing for
the rezoning, neighbors expressed various concerns about increased traffic. The planning
commission resolved to give tentative and final approval of the plat with a traffic-calming device
at the northern intersection of Monticello Drive and Skyline Drive. The city commission then
conducted a meeting resolving all issues except the traffic-calming device at this intersection.
Plaintiffs objected to the use of a T-intersection because it would cause them to lose lots. They
instead proposed a traffic circle that would cause drivers to slow down. The city commission
denied approval of the preliminary plat without any reason. Subsequently, the city clerk
informed plaintiffs that the application was denied because "[t]he consensus of the Committee
was to request a revision to the street layout to provide an 'off set' of the proposed Monticello
Drive and Skyline Drive."
Plaintiffs appealed the city commission's decision to the Kent Circuit Court. Plaintiffs'
complaint also requested a writ of mandamus and alleged equal protection violations. Plaintiffs
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also filed a motion to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue. Plaintiffs contended
that defendants rejected the plat but failed to provide a reason in writing as required by Grand
Rapids City Ordinances, § 5.332(a)(3). The trial court denied plaintiffs' request for a writ of
mandamus, but ordered defendants to state a reason for its rejection of plaintiffs' plat. Plaintiffs
filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that this was an improper expansion of the record.
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion.
Plaintiffs then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting
plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry
of an order dismissing plaintiffs' mandamus request. Cole's Home & Land v Grand Rapids,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 17, 2003 (Docket No. 245879). This
Court also determined that the trial court properly exercised its discretion as an appellate court
by remanding the matter to the city commission for an explanation of its refusal to approve
plaintiffs' plat request. Id.
The city commission subsequently amended its letter of rejection to state:
The consensus of the Committee was that the proposed plat street layout
would encourage higher speeds and cut-through traffic and reduce the quality of
life of the established neighborhood. The consensus of the Committee was to
request a revision to the street layout to provide a tee intersection [sic] at the
proposed Monticello Drive and Skyline Drive, with the understanding that the plat
meet the drainage requirements as established by the City of Grand Rapids. The
Fire Chief has stated that this was acceptable from a fire safety standpoint. Plat
changes to include the requested revised street layout providing for a tee
intersection at Monticello Drive and Skyline Drive will render the proposed plat
acceptable.
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to compel the city to provide an acceptable basis for
rejecting plaintiffs' plat, arguing that the amended reasons for rejection did not fall within those
reasons permitted by the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 560.101 et seq. The trial court denied
this motion.
Both parties subsequently filed motions for summary disposition. Plaintiffs contended
that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants denied plaintiffs'
plat application without authority or an appropriate basis. Defendants argued that the city
commission's rejection of the plat was supported by the record and complied with the LDA,
specifically asserting that the decision was based on rules of a municipality adopted to carry out
the provisions of the LDA under MCL 560.105(b). The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion and
granted defendants' motion on the grounds that the city commission had complied with the law,
its decision had a rational basis, and the record supported it.
II. Analysis
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in determining that the city
commission's amended reasons for rejecting plaintiffs' plat were authorized by the LDA. We
agree.
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A. Standard of Review
The trial court was acting as an appellate court in reviewing the decision of the city
commission. Cole's Home & Land Co, supra. Accordingly, the following standard of review
applies:
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative
officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or
quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review
by the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the
determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are
authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same
are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole
record. . . . [Const 1963, art 6, § 28 (emphasis added); see also Carleton
Sportsman's Club v Exeter Twp, 217 Mich App 195, 200-203; 550 NW2d 867
(1996).]
This Court reviews for clear error a circuit court ruling when reviewing an administrative
decision. Glennon v State Employees' Retirement Bd, 259 Mich App 476, 478; 674 NW2d 728
(2003). "We will overturn the circuit court's decision only if we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. This appeal also involves statutory
interpretation, which presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
B. City Commission's Decision Was Unauthorized by Law
The LDA confers on municipalities the power to approve or disapprove a proposed land
division. MCL 560.109(1). However, that power is limited by MCL 560.106, which provides,
"No approving authority or agency having the power to approve or reject plats shall condition
approval upon compliance with, or base a rejection upon, any requirement other than those
included in section 105." This Court has previously construed MCL 560.106 to mean that, "a
municipality cannot rely upon a reason not contained in § 105 to deny preliminary plat
approval." Eversdyk v Wyoming City Council, 167 Mich App 64, 69; 421 NW2d 574 (1988); see
also Carlson v City of Troy, 90 Mich App 543, 552; 282 NW2d 387 (1979).
Defendants contend that the city commission's rejection was supported by the Grand
Rapids master plan, street classification policy, and street-calming program. Defendants assert
that these are published rules of the municipality adopted to carry out the provisions of the LDA
and, therefore, the city commission's rejection fell within MCL 560.105, which provides:
Approval of a preliminary plat, or final plat shall be conditioned upon
compliance with all of the following:
* * *
(b) Any ordinance or published rules of a municipality or county adopted
to carry out the provisions of this act.
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There is no question that the Grand Rapids master plan, street classification policy, and
street-calming program are not ordinances. The question is whether they are "published rules of
a municipality or county adopted to carry out the provisions of [the LDA]." Because the LDA
does not offer a definition for this phrase or any part thereof, we must construe the meaning of
this provision.
"'[O]ur primary task in construing a statute, is to discern and give effect to the intent of
the Legislature.'" Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685 NW2d 648 (2004), quoting Sun Valley
Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). "If the statutory language is
unambiguous, we must presume that the Legislature intended the meaning it clearly expressed,
and further construction is neither required nor permitted." Nastal v Henderson & Assoc
Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005). "Undefined statutory terms must
be given their plain and ordinary meanings, and it is proper to consult a dictionary for
definitions." Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572, 578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004).
According to Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001), a "rule" is "a
principle or regulation governing conduct, procedure, arrangement, etc." This is distinguishable
from mere guidelines, reports, or objectives, which, though guiding conduct, do not regulate or
govern conduct. The difference is that guidance is permissive while regulation and governance
are not. Thus, according to the ordinary meaning of "rule" and the plain language of MCL
560.105(b), we conclude that a published rule of a municipality or county adopted to carry out
the provisions of this act must actually regulate or govern conduct for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of the LDA. A publication that merely provides objectives or guidance does not
constitute a rule as that term is used in MCL 560.105(b). Furthermore, for the purposes of MCL
560.105(b), the published rule must be adopted specifically for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of the LDA.
Applying the plain meaning of MCL 560.105(b), we conclude that none of the programs
and polices relied on by defendants is a published county or municipal rule adopted to carry out
the provisions of the LDA. Defendants first rely on the city's master plan. The city's master plan
contains recommendations and proposals for land use as a general guide for city development. It
includes proposals and general guidance for subdivision regulations, but does not itself constitute
a subdivision regulation. The master plan provides that, if implemented, the tools for
implementation are subdivision regulations. Those regulations are contained in the city code, not
in the master plan. Defendants assert that the city's master plan offered "direction and support"
for the city commission's decision to reject plaintiffs' plat. However, as discussed above, a rule
does not merely provide direction and support; a rule regulates or governs conduct. The master
plan is not a published municipal or county rule adopted to carry out the provisions of the LDA.
For these reasons, defendants cannot rely on the guidelines of the master plan as a basis for
rejecting plaintiffs' plat under MCL 560.105(b).
Defendants next rely on the city's street classification policy. Defendants assert that it is
a "promulgated policy of the City of Grand Rapids." A "promulgated policy," generally
speaking, is not a published rule. Additionally, the street classification itself provides that it is
merely a "report" that provides "objectives and guidelines." Further, it was adopted "in 1963 as
part of the current Master Plan." As discussed above, the city's master plan is not a published
municipal or county rule adopted to carry out the provisions of the LDA. Accordingly, the city's
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street classification policy, as part of the city's master plan, is also not a published municipal or
county rule adopted to carry out the provisions of the LDA. Therefore, defendants cannot rely
on the city's street classification policy as a basis for rejecting plaintiffs' plat under MCL
560.105(b).
Finally, defendants rely on the neighborhood traffic-calming program. This program was
developed by the Grand Rapids Traffic Safety Department "to respond to citizen concerns
regarding problems with vehicular traffic in their neighborhoods." It provides a procedure by
which a citizen or neighborhood may contact the traffic safety department with traffic concerns.
The traffic safety department then performs studies, discusses the results, and develops a trafficcalming plan. The program is clearly for implementation on existing streets to address citizen
complaints about traffic. It was not adopted for any reason having anything to do with the LDA,
subdivision regulations, or plat approval. Therefore, even if it is a published municipal rule, it
was not adopted to carry out the provisions of the LDA. Accordingly, defendants cannot rely on
the neighborhood traffic-calming program as a basis for rejecting plaintiffs' plat under MCL
560.105(b).
The master plan, street classification policy, and street-calming program relied on in
support of the city commission's rejection of plaintiffs' plat are not municipal or county
ordinances or published rules adopted to carry out the provisions of the LDA. Thus, defendants
have not cited any justification for the commission's decision that falls within MCL 560.105(b).
Nor have defendants relied on any other subsection of MCL 560.105. Because the city
commission's decision was not supported by a reason contained in MCL 560.105, it was not
authorized by law under MCL 560.106. Eversdyk, supra at 69; Carlson, supra at 552.
Defendants contend, nonetheless, that the powers granted to municipalities by the
Michigan Constitution "should include those that are fairly implied and not prohibited." More
accurately, Const 1963, art 7, § 34 provides:
The provisions of this constitution and law concerning counties,
townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers
granted to counties and townships by this constitution and by law shall include
those fairly implied and not prohibited by this constitution.
However, as this Court has previously recognized, MCL 560.106 clearly prohibits a municipality
from relying on a reason not contained in MCL 560.105 to deny preliminary plat approval.
Eversdyk, supra at 69; Carlson, supra at 552. In this case, we are asked to construe the meaning
of MCL 560.105(b), of which even the most liberal construction does not permit a municipality
to rely on guidelines, reports, or objectives, which, though guiding conduct or setting forth
objectives, do not constitute published rules of a municipality or county adopted to carry out the
provisions of the LDA. Nor does MCL 560.105(b) permit a municipality to rely on a published
municipal rule that was not adopted for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the LDA.
Thus, even the most liberal construction of MCL 560.105(b) does not support defendants'
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contention that the city commission's rejection of plaintiffs' proposed plat was permitted under
the LDA. The trial court erred in determining that the city commission's rejection of plaintiffs'
plat was authorized by the LDA.1
Reversed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
Our resolution of this issue resolves the matter on appeal. Therefore, we need not address
plaintiffs' other issues on appeal.
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