CYNTHIA GAWLIK V SETTI REGACHARY MD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CYNTHIA GAWLIK,
FOR PUBLICATION
February 21, 2006
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 257754
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-217688-NI
SETTI RENGACHARY, M.D., and
UNIVERSITY NEUROSURGICAL
ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Official Reported Version
Before: O'Connell, P.J., and Smolenski and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by leave granted the trial court's order granting plaintiff 's motion to
strike defendants' affidavit of meritorious defense and entering a default against them.
Defendants also challenge the court's denial of their motion to strike plaintiff 's notice of intent
and affidavit of merit. We reverse both orders.
Defendant University Neurosurgical Associates, P.C. (UNA), employed defendant Setti
Rengachary, a neurosurgeon. Plaintiff visited Rengachary complaining of pain in her neck and
along her right side. Plaintiff had undergone fusion surgery in her neck before, and Rengachary
suggested an operation with a posterior approach that would remove excess bone and disk tissue
on the left side of her cervical vertebrae. Plaintiff consented and was admitted to the hospital on
November 30, 1999. However, before the surgery, Rengachary learned that plaintiff complained
of bilateral pain, which he determined would not be cured by the mere removal of tissue on the
left side, but mandated fusion of the vertebrae above and below the previous fusion. This
required an anterior approach. Rengachary met with plaintiff in the preoperation area and gave
her a consent form explaining some aspects of the procedure, such as the approach and the use of
cadaver bone grafts. Plaintiff signed the consent form. During the operation, Rengachary
perforated plaintiff 's esophagus, and complications arose, including intubation and subsequent
infection. According to her notice of intent to sue, plaintiff was not released from the hospital
until January 14, 2000, and was readmitted a few days later for another week-long hospital stay.
Plaintiff sent her notice of intent to sue on November 16, 2001. In relevant part, the
notice states:
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1. FACTUAL BASIS FOR CLAIM
On or about November 30, 1999, Plaintiff Cynthia Gawlik . . . was
admitted to the Detroit Medical Center, Harper Hospital, under the care of Paul
Ragatzki, M.D. On December 1, 1999, she underwent emergent anterior cervical
dysectomy and fusion (ACDF) by Dr. Setti Rengachary resulting in a series of
complications which are the subject of this NOI, including esophageal perforation
(which was not repaired in a timely fashion) resulting in abscess, osteomyelitis
and mediastinitis and aspiration pneumonia. The medical records from the DMC,
Harper Hospital, and especially Dr. Rengachary, are intentionally incomplete and
false regarding the date and time of the ACDF by Dr. Rengachary, and the
subsequent hospital course of the patient.
The patient acquired staphylococcus aureus, osteomyelitis with
mediastinitis, respiratory distress (not treated timely) and acute adult respiratory
distress syndrome (ARDS) and aspiration pneumonia, tracheostomy, vocal cord
damage, and brain damage secondary to prolonged respiratory distress, which was
not diagnosed in a timely fashion by the hospital team caring for the patient.
* * *
2. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF PRACTICED [sic] OR CARE ALLEGED
The applicable standard of care required is that of reasonably prudent
physicians and surgeons and medical care providers in the same or similar
circumstances as those who were conducting surgical procedures, and caring for
the patient, Cynthia Gawlik, from the time of her admission on November 30,
1999, and subsequent surgeries, including the ACDF by Dr. Rengachary from
neurosurgery on December 1, 1999, and post operative care through discharge on
January 12, 2000.
Pursuant to MCL 332.21513 entitled "Duties and Responsibilities of
Owner, Operator or Governing Body of the Hospital," the owner, operator and
governing body of a hospital licensed under this Article (A) are responsible for all
phases of the operation of the Hospital, selection of the medical staff, and quality
of care rendered in the Hospital. Defendant DMC and Harper Hospital had this
statutory duty in addition to its responsibly to act reasonably under the
circumstances which existed in this case.
3. THE MANNER IN WHICH IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE APPLICABLE
STANDARD OF PRACTICE OR CARE WAS BREACHED
The applicable standard of practice and care was breached when the above
named health care providers, physicians, and surgeons failed to act reasonably
under the circumstances which existed at the time the patient was admitted to
Defendant Harper Hospital on November 30, 1999 and thereafter. Defendants
were required to perform the ACDF by Dr. Rengachary on 12/1/1999 in a
reasonable manner and in accordance with consent from the patient after she had
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been properly apprised of the risks and benefits of the proposed surgery. Dr.
Rengachary and the physicians and residents responsible for this surgery acted
unreasonably, including Dr. Julia Pilitsis, when they changed the surgical plan on
the patient to anterior cervical dysectomy and fusion of C4-5 and C6-7 which
greatly increased the risk to the patient of complications, and then, conducted the
surgery and approach in a negligent manner. Plaintiff never understood and never
consented to the changed surgical plan. Further, the patient never agreed to any
use of cadaver donations for the cervical surgeries and would have refused same
if she had known of the risks and proposed changes.
The 12/1/99 surgery was conducted in a negligent fashion, and resulted in
the above described complications. These complications, including esophaeal
[sic] perforation, were not diagnosed or treated in a timely fashion by Defendant
Surgeon, by the attending physician, by the residents, or the team responsible for
the patient's care and treatment. Post-Operatively, as a result of the negligence of
Defendant Physicians and Surgeons, the patient developed abscesses,
osteomyelitis and mediastinitis and the other complications which would have
been completely avoided but for the radical surgery performed on 12/1/99 without
the consent of the patient, and but for the esophaeal perforation, and failure of the
Defendants to timely diagnose and repair the esophaeal perforation, before
additional complications occurred.
Post-Operatively, these complications were allowed to worsen, requiring I
& D on 12/23/99. She remained hospitalized until January 12, 2000. Plaintiff
complains that the entire admission of 11/30/99 through January 12, 2000 was the
result of a series of complications and botched procedures which were caused [by]
Defendants [sic] negligence and failure to act reasonably from the time of the
surgery on 12/1/99 and thereafter.
4. THE ACTION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ACHIEVE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STANDARD OF PRACTICE OR CARE
In order to comply with the standard of practice, the above named
physicians and health care providers and hospitals needed to [sic, to do] the things
listed in Section #2 above.
Although the notice names several physicians, hospitals, and professional corporations,
plaintiff 's notice generally described the standard of care as "that of reasonably prudent
physicians and surgeons and medical care providers in the same or similar circumstances as
those who were conducting surgical procedures, and caring for the patient . . . ." The notice did
not contain a standard of care particularly tailored to Rengachary and did not contain any
standard of care for UNA. Moreover, the compliance portion of the notice merely referred
defendants to an earlier section, which lacked any information on how defendants could have
complied with the standard of care.
Nevertheless, plaintiff filed suit on May 23, 2002, relying on an affidavit of merit signed
by Dr. Karl Manders. Defendants responded in a timely fashion with an affidavit of meritorious
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defense signed by Rengachary. Defendants' affidavit was extremely conclusory, and in it
Rengachary merely opined that plaintiff received diagnosis and treatment according with the
standard of care, which only required "evaluation of the patient's medical condition and
assessment of reasonable courses of treatment." Their answers, however, clearly challenged the
sufficiency of plaintiff 's notice of intent and affidavit of merit. They also clearly raised the
affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to comply with the statute of limitations. The case
proceeded without further incident, except that the list of defendants dwindled until only
Rengachary and UNA remained in the suit.
During discovery, plaintiff 's expert revealed that he would not disparage Rengachary's
decision to change the approach from a posterior to an anterior approach or from a foraminotomy
on the left side to a fusion and plating procedure. The expert also agreed that the esophageal
perforation could have occurred without negligence on Rengachary's part. In fact, the expert's
only point of genuine contention was how Rengachary obtained plaintiff 's signature on the
surgical consent form. The expert opined that Rengachary should have cancelled or postponed
the surgery indefinitely rather than obtaining consent for a new operation from a distressed
patient. Defendants limited plaintiff 's complaint to the issue of informed consent by
successfully moving to strike the unsupported allegations regarding negligence in the selection
and performance of the actual surgery.
According to the final pretrial order, plaintiff asserted that she would argue the primary
issue of lack of consent, but did not raise any issue regarding defendants' affidavit of meritorious
defense. Nevertheless, on the day scheduled for trial, and only a few weeks after our Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679; 684
NW2d 711 (2004), plaintiff and defendants filed motions to strike; plaintiff sought to strike
defendants' affidavit of meritorious defense, and defendants sought to strike plaintiff 's notice of
intent and affidavit of merit. The trial court heard the motions the following day and held that
plaintiff 's notice and affidavit sufficiently complied with the requirements in Roberts, but
defendants' affidavit did not. The trial court denied defendants' motion, granted plaintiff 's
motion, and entered a default in plaintiff 's favor. Defendants applied for leave to appeal, which
this Court granted.
Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted plaintiff 's
motion for a default on the basis of a timely filed, but defective, affidavit of meritorious defense.
Under the particular facts of this case, we agree. The trial court applied case law designed to
enforce statutes of limitations and a defendant's basic compliance with filing requirements.
Roberts, supra at 686; Kowalski v Fiutowski, 247 Mich App 156, 165-166; 635 NW2d 502
(2001). Here, defendants' pleadings were not tardy or totally absent, but merely deficient, cf.
Kowalski, supra at 161, and defendants were not racing the statute of limitations. See id.; see
also Saffian v Simmons, 267 Mich App 297, 304; 704 NW2d 722 (2005) (explaining that the
requirement in Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547, 549; 607 NW2d 711 [2000], regarding the
mandatory inclusion of an affidavit of merit with a complaint applied only to cases in which the
statute of limitations was an issue).
Nevertheless, the trial court did not discuss the prejudice to plaintiff or the
appropriateness of any other remedial sanctions on the record, but improperly defaulted
defendants without explanation. See Kowalski, supra at 166. This Court has previously rejected
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the argument that default is an appropriate sanction for failing to file an affidavit of meritorious
defense when a plaintiff, as here, suffers no prejudice and fails to raise the issue before trial.
Wilhelm v Mustafa, 243 Mich App 478, 485; 624 NW2d 435 (2000). We have also rejected
dismissal of a plaintiff 's suit merely for the failure to comply perfectly with the affidavit of merit
statute. VandenBerg v VandenBerg, 231 Mich App 497, 502-503; 586 NW2d 570 (1998).
Additionally, the sanction of dismissal with prejudice, comparable to the default in this case, is
only appropriate when a flaw in the affidavit is accompanied by a statute of limitations problem.
Scarsella, supra. Nevertheless, the trial court failed to recognize any of these legal distinctions
and entered the default as a matter of course. An error of law may lead a trial court to abuse its
discretion, see Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 82; 684 NW2d 296 (2004), and a trial court
abuses its discretion by employing default as a sanction without determining, on the record,
whether less drastic alternative sanctions are appropriate; Kowalski, supra at 166; Houston v
Southwest Detroit Hosp, 166 Mich App 623, 631; 420 NW2d 835 (1987). Because the trial court
abused its discretion, we reverse the trial court's order entering the default.
Default was an inappropriate sanction in this case. See Wilhelm, supra at 483-486. Even
assuming that default is ordinarily an available remedy for a technically deficient, but timely
filed, affidavit of meritorious defense, plaintiff forfeited the issue by not raising it for the final
pretrial order. See id. at 485. By that time, Rengachary, plaintiff 's expert, and other medical
personnel had been fully deposed, providing the entire factual backdrop for the claims and
defenses relevant to trial. Defendants correctly argue that, during his deposition, Rengachary
explained how his actions conformed to the standard of care. Moreover, he was available to
clear up any ambiguities in his affidavit of meritorious defense. Nevertheless, plaintiff avoided
the issue and waited until the day of trial to bring her motion to strike. Although this caused
defendants to incur the expense of extensive trial preparation, plaintiff failed to present any
evidence that a deficiency in the affidavit of meritorious defense prejudiced her ability to prepare
for trial or led to any other form of prejudice. See id.
Plaintiff mistakenly relies on a series of cases in which a plaintiff 's failure to provide a
proper affidavit of merit or notice of intent led to dismissal. However, in each of those cases, the
plaintiff ran into problems with the statute of limitations. As we pointed out in Kowalski, supra
at 165, plaintiffs and defendants are different for the simple reason that defendants are never
racing against time to comply with a statute of limitations. Moreover, in VandenBerg, supra at
502-503, we held that, absent statute of limitations problems or other serious prejudice, dismissal
of a plaintiff 's complaint was not a permissible remedy for failing to provide an affidavit of
merit with the complaint. See also Saffian, supra at 304. In other words, we have consistently
distinguished between cases involving a statute of limitations bar and those simply involving
defective pleadings. Even in the total absence of an affidavit of merit, a plaintiff is not barred
from filing a new complaint unless a statute of limitations problem arises. Scarsella, supra at
551-552. The trial court failed to appreciate this legal distinction and granted plaintiff 's motion
for a default as a matter of course, effectively barring defendants' legitimate defenses. The trial
court failed to determine what prejudice, if any, plaintiff suffered because of the cursory
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statements in defendants' affidavit and also failed to consider, on the record, any lesser
alternative remedial sanctions. As stated, this was not a proper exercise of its discretion.
We next consider defendants' challenge to plaintiff 's notice of intent.1 In Roberts, our
Supreme Court held that a claimant's notice of intent must "make good-faith averments that
provide details that are responsive to the information sought by the statute and that are as
particularized as is consistent with the early notice stage of the proceedings." Roberts, supra at
701. As in Roberts, supra at 692-693, plaintiff 's notice of intent contains a one-sentence
standard of care that generally encompasses all caretakers. Moreover, the notice does not
contain any standard of care for UNA and fails to explain any theory of liability that pertains to
it. See id. at 693. The portion of the notice designated for explaining how defendants could
have conformed to the standard of care merely refers defendants back to the portion containing
the standard of care. This practice was expressly condemned in Roberts. Id. at 698. Although
the notice's third paragraph provides more detail about what plaintiff thought Rengachary did
wrong, it still failed to explain what he should have done, a defect that came to light when
plaintiff 's expert stopped short of deeming Rengachary's selection and performance of the
surgery as negligent acts. Because plaintiff 's notice of intent failed to meet the standards set
forth in Roberts, the trial court erred by denying defendants' motion to strike it, and we reverse
that order. However, defendants never moved to dismiss on the basis of the statute of
limitations, so we remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
We do not consider defendants' challenge to plaintiff 's affidavit of merit because our decision
on plaintiff's notice of intent is dispositive.
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