IN RE AZARIA MARIE ASHER COX MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of A.M.A.C., Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
formerly known as FAMILY INDEPENDENCE
AGENCY,
FOR PUBLICATION
January 24, 2006
9:15 a.m.
Petitioner-Appellee,
No. 263062
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-700354-NA
v
BRANDY LEE COX,
Official Reported Version
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
CAVANAGH, P.J.
Respondent appeals as of right an order terminating her parental rights to the minor child,
AMAC, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (child or sibling suffered abuse and reasonable likelihood
child will be abused), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), (j) (reasonable likelihood of
harm if child is returned to parent's home), (k)(vi) (parent abused child or sibling and abuse
included murder or attempted murder), and (m) (parental rights to another child voluntarily
terminated under child protective laws). We vacate the order terminating parental rights.
A petition requesting termination of respondent's parental rights was filed following the
birth of AMAC, which primarily alleged that AMAC faced a risk of harm if released from the
hospital to her mother, respondent, because respondent's parental rights to two other children
were voluntarily terminated after she attempted to strangle them to death. After a preliminary
hearing was conducted, the petition was authorized and the court took temporary custody of the
child. A trial, also known as an adjudicative hearing, was scheduled and conducted over the
course of three days. See MCR 3.972; In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 200; 646 NW2d 506
(2002). During the course of the trial, reference to a possible, future "best interests" hearing was
made by respondent's counsel, as well as the guardian ad litem. In fact, respondent's counsel
indicated that certain witnesses would be called at a "best interests" hearing but not at the
adjudicative hearing.
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At the conclusion of the proofs, consistently with MCR 3.972(D), the guardian ad litem
recommended to the court that the only statutory ground alleged in the petition that was proven
was that of the prior terminations. He also indicated that termination was not recommended at
that point and that a psychiatric evaluation of respondent would be of great import to future
proceedings. The trial court closed the hearing with the statement that it would take the matter
under advisement and render a written opinion. The written opinion setting forth the court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law was issued about two months later, and included the
statement that "[t]he court finds that the prosecutor has met their burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence and terminates mother's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i),
3(g), 3(j), 3(k)(vi) and 3(l)[1] of the Juvenile Code." An order terminating respondent's parental
rights was entered accordingly. Respondent appeals.
Respondent first argues that she was entitled to a "best interests" hearing before her
parental rights were terminated, the deprivation of which constituted a denial of due process and
violations of MCL 712A.19b(5) and MCR 3.977. We agree in part. Constitutional questions
and issues of statutory interpretation, as well as family division procedure under the court rules,
are reviewed de novo. See In re MU, 264 Mich App 270, 276-277; 690 NW2d 495 (2004); In re
CR, supra at 197, 200.
Child protective proceedings have long been divided into two distinct phases: the
adjudicative phase and the dispositional phase. See MCR 3.972; MCR 3.973; see, also, In re
PAP, 247 Mich App 148, 153; 640 NW2d 880 (2001); In re Nunn, 168 Mich App 203, 206-207;
423 NW2d 619 (1988); In re Frasier, 147 Mich App 492, 494-495; 382 NW2d 806 (1985). The
adjudicative phase occurs first and involves a determination whether the trial court may exercise
jurisdiction over the child, i.e., whether the child comes within the statutory requirements of
MCL 712A.2(b). In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108-109; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). During the
adjudicative phase, a trial may be held to determine whether any of the statutory grounds alleged
in the petition have been proven.2 MCR 3.972(E). If a trial is held, the respondent is entitled to
a jury determination of the facts, the rules of evidence for a civil proceeding apply, and the
standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. MCR 3.911; MCR 3.972(C)(1); In re PAP,
supra at 152-153. After the trial, "the verdict must be whether one or more of the statutory
grounds alleged in the petition have been proven." MCR 3.972(E). That is, the verdict must be
whether the child comes within the jurisdiction of the court. If the court acquires jurisdiction
over the child, the dispositional phase follows.
The dispositional phase involves a determination of what action, if any, will be taken on
behalf of the child. See In re Brock, supra at 108. MCR 3.973 applies to this phase and
provides:
1
It appears that the court's reference to subsection 3(l) was erroneous and that the court meant to
refer to subsection 3(m).
2
We state that a "trial may be held" in the adjudicative phase because the right to a trial is
waived when a respondent makes a plea of admission or of no contest. See MCR 3.971.
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(A) Purpose. A dispositional hearing is conducted to determine what
measures the court will take with respect to a child properly within its jurisdiction
and, when applicable, against any adult, once the court has determined following
trial, plea of admission, or plea of no contest that one or more of the statutory
grounds alleged in the petition are true.
(B) Notice. Unless the dispositional hearing is held immediately after the
trial, notice of hearing may be given by scheduling it on the record in the presence
of the parties or in accordance with MCR 3.920.
Unlike the adjudicative hearing, at the initial dispositional hearing the respondent is not entitled
to a jury determination of the facts and, generally, the Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply,
so all relevant and material evidence is admissible. MCR 3.911; MCR 3.973(E); MCR
3.977(A)(3); In re Brock, supra at 108. If permanent termination of parental rights is sought, the
petitioner bears the burden of proving the statutory basis for termination by clear and convincing
evidence. MCR 3.977(A)(3) and (E); In re Brock, supra at 111-112.
Termination of parental rights may be ordered at the initial dispositional hearing. MCR
3.977(E); see, also, MCL 712A.19b(4). However, several conditions must be met, including (1)
that the original or amended petition requested termination, (2) that the trier of fact found by a
preponderance of the evidence at the adjudicative hearing that the child came within the
jurisdiction of the court, and (3) that at the initial dispositional hearing, the court finds by clear
and convincing legally admissible evidence that had been introduced at the adjudicative hearing
or the plea proceeding or that is introduced at the dispositional hearing that a statutory ground for
termination is established, "unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence, in
accordance with the rules of evidence as provided in subrule (G)(2), that termination of parental
rights is not in the best interests of the child." MCR 3.977(E).
In this case, there was an adjudicative hearing that concluded with the trial court
rendering its written opinion and order terminating respondent's parental rights without a
dispositional hearing either immediately following the trial or by proper notice after the trial.
See MCR 3.973(B). We construe the plain and ordinary language of MCR 3.973(A) as requiring
a dispositional hearing to be "conducted to determine what measures the court will take with
respect to a child properly within its jurisdiction . . . ." See Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk, 467 Mich
337, 340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002) (rules of statutory interpretation apply to the interpretation of
court rules). Clearly, the dispositional hearing is to be held after the adjudicative phase of the
proceeding in which it was determined that the child was properly within the court's jurisdiction.
See MCR 3.973(A). And the dispositional hearing must be held either immediately following
the adjudicative hearing or after proper notice. See 3.973(B). Therefore, the trial court erred
here in not affording respondent her right to a dispositional hearing. See In re PAP, supra at
153; In re Nunn, supra at 207-208.
Our holding is consistent with longstanding practice and is cognizant of the different
purposes served by the two phases of child protective proceedings. The dispositional phase is
particularly important when permanent termination of parental rights is sought and the
respondent entered a plea of admission or a plea of no contest, or when one of the statutory
grounds for termination is clearly and convincingly established during the adjudicative phase,
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because it provides the respondent with an opportunity to persuade the court that, although a
statutory ground for termination is met, termination is not in the best interests of the child. See
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This case presents that situation. Here,
there is no possibility of respondent prevailing with regard to at least one of the statutory grounds
for termination, namely MCL 712A.19b(3)(m).3 As illustrated by clear and convincing
evidence, including respondent's trial testimony, her parental rights to two other children were
previously voluntarily terminated. Thus, the dispositional hearing will necessarily focus only on
the best interests of the child because that remains the only dispositive disputed issue.4 Without
a dispositional hearing, a respondent is denied the opportunity to present evidence that was not
admissible or relevant in the adjudicative phase of the proceeding in an attempt to prove that
termination is clearly not in the child's best interests, a right and protection granted by MCL
712A.19b(5).5 See In re Trejo, supra at 356. That is, in fact, what happened in this case despite
respondent's counsel's and the guardian ad litem's repeated references to a future "best interests"
hearing, the expectation of which was not debunked by the trial court.
We further note in this case that the trial court did not address the child's best interests in
its opinion, another deviation from the clear mandate that the child's best interests be considered
and that such findings and conclusions be stated in the record or in writing. See In re Trejo,
supra at 351, 356, citing MCL 712A.19b(1). However, we realize that the trial court may not
have been able to make findings on the child's best interests because of a deficient record, which
is one reason the parties must be given an opportunity to present evidence on the issue in a
dispositional hearing, whether or not they take advantage of that opportunity. See In re Gazella,
264 Mich App 668, 678; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Accordingly, we conclude that respondent's
rights under MCL 712A.19b(5), MCR 3.973, and MCR 3.977(E) were erroneously denied, and
we vacate the order terminating her parental rights and remand for a dispositional hearing.
Because this case can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds, we will not decide the due
process issue presented. Pythagorean, Inc v Grand Rapids Twp, 253 Mich App 525, 527; 656
NW2d 212 (2002).
Respondent also argues that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of a personal
protection order file in terminating respondent's parental rights because she was not given the
opportunity to respond to this evidence. After review de novo of this issue of law and procedure,
we disagree. In re CR, supra at 200. The petition filed to initiate this protective proceeding
3
MCL 712A.19b(5) provides that if the petitioner proves at least one ground for termination by
clear and convincing evidence, the court "shall order termination of parental rights . . . ." See In
re Trejo, supra at 351.
4
We recognize that dispositional hearings, particularly when termination is sought, may be
divided into two segments—one focusing on whether a ground for termination is proved by clear
and convincing evidence and, if proved, a segment focusing on whether termination is not in the
best interests of the child—because of the different evidentiary standards. See MCR
3.977(E)(3).
5
We recognize that a respondent is not required to produce such evidence. In re Trejo, supra at
352.
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referenced the previous case as required by MCR 3.961(B)(7). Respondent, therefore, had notice
and the opportunity to object or otherwise respond to the information; thus, this issue is without
merit. In any event, because testimony was introduced during the adjudicative hearing that
included respondent's contact with the other children, the judicially noticed material was largely
cumulative and no relief is warranted. However, because we are remanding the matter to the
trial court for a dispositional hearing, respondent will have the chance to address this evidence.
Order terminating parental rights vacated, and case remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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