DANIEL ADAIR V STATE OF MICHIGAN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL ADAIR, et al.,
FOR PUBLICATION
August 4, 2005
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiffs,
v
No. 230858
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET and
TREASURER OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
ON REMAND
Defendants.
Official Reported Version
Before: Saad, P.J., and Talbot and Fort Hood, JJ.
TALBOT, J.
This original action returns on remand from our Supreme Court to explore the factual
support for plaintiffs' claim that the record-keeping obligations required of plaintiff school
districts by MCL 388.1752 and Executive Order No. 2000-9 (EO) constitute new, unfunded
mandates in violation of the second sentence of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art
9, § 29. Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 129-131, 133; 680 NW2d 386 (2004).1 The state
seeks summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We hold that plaintiffs have failed to
present documentary support from which it can be inferred that either MCL 388.1752 or the EO
mandates the school districts to actively participate in the maintenance of data that the state
requires for its own purposes. Accordingly, we grant summary disposition in favor of
defendants and dismiss plaintiffs' remaining claims with prejudice.2
I
This action is brought pursuant to the second sentence of Const 1963, art 9, § 29, which
is commonly referred to as the "prohibition on unfunded mandates" (POUM) provision. Adair
1
For ease of reference, this case will be referred to as Adair II in subsequent citations.
2
The motion for summary disposition is being decided without oral argument.
2.119(E)(3), 7.206(D)(3).
-1-
MCR
II, supra at 111. Under the POUM provision, a plaintiff "must show that the state-mandated
local activity was originated without sufficient state funding after the Headlee Amendment was
adopted or, if properly funded initially, that the mandated local role was increased by the state
without state funding for the necessary increased costs." Id. This does not mean, however, that,
under a POUM analysis, every required change in school activities requires state funding under
the Headlee Amendment. Id. at 112; Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v Michigan, 460 Mich 590, 603;
597 NW2d 113 (1999). "Headlee, at its core, is intended to prevent attempts by the Legislature
'to shift responsibility for services to the local government . . . in order to save the money it
would have had to use to provide the services itself.'" Adair II, supra at 112, quoting Judicial
Attorneys Ass'n, supra at 602-603.
Plaintiffs are school districts and taxpayers seeking a declaratory judgment that the state
has failed to honor its obligation to reimburse the school districts for the necessary costs of
maintaining certain records on behalf of the state. In their original complaint, plaintiffs alleged,
among other claims, that the state required school districts to collect and maintain certain data
regarding students, programming, and facilities and to transmit those data over the Internet to the
state's Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI). Plaintiffs further alleged
that those record-keeping obligations required the districts to actively maintain data that the state
required for its own purposes. The state's failure to fund the districts' costs in carrying out those
obligations, according to plaintiffs, violates the POUM provision of the Headlee Amendment.
The state moved for summary disposition on the ground that plaintiffs failed to state a
claim for a violation of the POUM provision. The state asserted that the record-keeping
functions required by MCL 388.1752 and the EO existed at the time the Headlee Amendment
was ratified. As support for this assertion, the state relied on MCL 388.1552, as enacted by 1977
PA 90 and repealed by 1979 PA 94. This statutory provision required school districts to "furnish
to the department [of education] those reports as the department considers necessary for the
determination of the allotment of funds" under the State School Aid Act. Because it possessed
broad powers to require school districts to collect and provide data under MCL 388.1552, the
state asserted that the record-keeping functions required by MCL 388.1752 and the EO do not
increase the level of an activity or service beyond that required in 1978. In the alternative, the
state argued that the record-keeping functions required by MCL 388.1752 and the EO are not
activities or services within the meaning of the POUM provision.
We had previously granted summary disposition in favor of the state, in a two-to-one
decision, on the ground that "neither MCL 388.1752 nor Executive Order 2000-6, separately or
in combination, mandate[s] a new activity or increase[s] the level of a state-mandated activity
within the meaning of the POUM clause." Adair v Michigan, 250 Mich App 691, 711; 651
NW2d 393 (2002).3 The majority observed that the record-keeping obligations existed by statute
before the ratification of the Headlee Amendment. MCL 388.1752 merely clarified the scope of
the preexisting record-keeping obligations, without substantively changing the nature of the
3
For ease of reference, this case will be referred to as Adair I in subsequent citations.
-2-
obligations. Adair I, supra at 712. Citing MCL 21.233(7), the majority ruled, "Clarifying
nonsubstantive changes in an earlier, existing state law does not constitute a new activity or
service or increase in the level of an existing activity or service." Adair I, supra at 712.
With regard to the effects of the EO, the majority opined that the order mandated no new
activity within the meaning of the POUM provision:
The data addressed by the executive order [are] already in the possession
of plaintiff districts and agencies in various forms as a by-product or necessary
consequence of general school operations. Plaintiff school districts and agencies
are already under a broad duty to report a variety of data pursuant to MCL
388.1752. To the extent that plaintiff districts and agencies are now required to
report the information in a uniform manner through the Internet, we believe that
such activity does not implicate art 9, § 29, because the state may require local
units of government to take advantage of improved technology to streamline and
increase the efficiencies of a process by which the public is served without
running afoul of the goals of the Headlee Amendment. Judicial Attorneys Ass'n,
supra at 605.
Further, the gathering of this data and its transfer to a central location for
use in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the educational delivery
process and in developing improved methods of providing elementary and
secondary education are administrative functions that constitute the essence of the
state's constitutional obligation to "maintain and support a system of free public
elementary and secondary schools . . . ." Const 1963, art 8, § 2. In effect, the
executive order executes a constitutional mandate. Accordingly, the activities
required by the order fall outside the ambit of the restrictions imposed by the
Headlee Amendment. Durant [v State Bd of Ed, 424 Mich 364, 387-388; 381
NW2d 662 (1985).] As observed by a panel of this Court in Durant [v Dep't of
Ed (On Remand), 129 Mich App 517, 524; 342 NW2d 591 (1983)], not all
functions performed by a school district are required by state law within the
meaning of the Headlee Amendment. For these reasons, we grant summary
disposition in favor of the state pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) with regard to ¶
22K of count III of the second amended complaint. [Adair I, supra at 713-715.]
Our Supreme Court vacated this Court's grant of summary disposition, finding that we
"erred in concluding that the statute and the order do not mandate new activities within the
meaning of the Headlee Amendment." Adair II, supra at 129. In doing so, the Court
acknowledged that plaintiff school districts were under a broad statutory obligation to report to
the state whatever information the statute required that predated the ratification of the Headlee
Amendment. Id. It further acknowledged that "[t]he Headlee Amendment is not necessarily
implicated when the state increases or changes what information it requires because the schools'
obligation to provide that information has existed since before the time Headlee was effective."
Id.
-3-
After these acknowledgements, however, the Court pointed out that plaintiffs had not
only alleged that MCL 388.1752 and the EO required different data from the school districts, but
also had alleged that the statute and the EO required plaintiffs to "actively participate in
maintaining data that the state requires for its own purposes." Id. at 129-130. More simply
stated, "plaintiffs here alleged new requirements that were not funded at all." Id. at 130. The
Supreme Court reminded this Court that "[a]n off-loading of state funding responsibilities onto
local units of government without the provision of funds presents a colorable claim under
Headlee." Id. The Court then opined that plaintiffs had stated a claim on which relief could be
granted with regard to the record-keeping activity. It remanded the matter to this Court to allow
the parties to "explore the factual support" for plaintiffs' allegations that the record-keeping
activities "constitute[ ] a new, unfunded mandate in violation of the Headlee Amendment." Id. at
130-131.
On remand, plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, at which point plaintiffs
pleaded the nature of their record-keeping claim with more specificity. Plaintiffs alleged that
Michigan's Governor established the CEPI on September 28, 2000, through EO 2000-9.
According to plaintiffs, the CEPI implemented and administers the Michigan Education
Information System. School districts use the information system to collect, maintain, update,
and electronically transmit data pursuant to instructions prescribed by the CEPI. Plaintiffs
represent that the data are generated for inclusion in six core data sets. Plaintiffs further allege
that:
17. Prior to each required submission cycle, CEPI reviews, and often
modifies the manner in which data is [sic] required to be reported by local school
districts by updating the specifications for each of the hundreds of data fields,
including adding, editing and eliminating data fields, and changing definitions
and instructions for reporting.
18. In order to satisfy the CEPI requirements, plaintiff school districts are
required, on an on-going basis, to expend significant amounts of time, at very
considerable expense, in planning, preparing, training staff members and
consulting with CEPI personnel, due to frequent changes in definition, data fields,
and coding schemes and changes in directions as to how the information is to be
reported and submitted.
After setting forth certain allegations regarding the nature of the information the school
districts are required to collect and report to the CEPI, plaintiffs alleged that these mandated
activities and services were first required of the school districts after Durant v Michigan, 456
Mich 175; 566 NW2d 272 (1997),4 was issued. Also according to plaintiffs, the state has failed
to pay the school districts for the necessary increased costs of providing the required data to the
state.
4
For ease of reference, this case will be referred to as Durant I.
-4-
The state again seeks summary disposition. The state argues that it is entitled to
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because the data collection and reporting
activities are not post-Durant I activities, and our Supreme Court has already expressly ruled in
this case that the state may increase or change the data that school districts must collect and
maintain without implicating the Headlee Amendment. Further, the data at issue exist at the
individual school district level and are already in the possession of each school district as a by
product or necessary consequence of general school operations.
The state also argues that it is entitled to summary disposition because (1) the limitations
of the Headlee Amendment are only implicated when the state shifts its fiscal responsibility for
school operations to local units of government, (2) plaintiffs cannot show any such shifting of
responsibility, (3) the recording-keeping functions plaintiffs identify merely continue the local
school districts' existing obligations to collect, maintain, update, and transmit data to the state, as
required by state and federal law, (4) the requirement that school districts electronically transmit
data in a particular format and according to certain specifications is an instance of the state
mandating higher standards for existing obligations, which it can do without implicating or
violating the Headlee Amendment, and (5) the changes made to the manner in which the school
districts transmit data to the state are required to improve efficiencies of data reporting through
the use of current, advanced technologies and eliminate outdated, paper-based reporting and the
inefficient Education Data Network, rather than off-load fiscal responsibility for school
operations. The state maintains that any increased spending attributable to causes other than the
off-loading of state funding responsibilities does not implicate the Headlee Amendment.
Plaintiffs respond that (1) the amount of data school districts are required to collect and
transmit to the CEPI reflects a dramatic increase in the types of information that school districts
must compile, maintain, and report, (2) the reporting requirements are extremely burdensome
and extremely technical and have forced school districts to purchase additional equipment and
devote significant amounts of staff time to comply with them, (3) although some of the
information was previously reported to the state by the school districts, other information is
being reported for the first time, and (4) the school districts are now required to continually
update, aggregate, or disaggregate the data, which is a newly imposed obligation. Under these
circumstances, plaintiffs contend, genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to whether the
state has off-loaded state funding responsibilities onto local school districts.
Finally, plaintiffs assert that the Supreme Court, in its opinion in this case, rejected the
state's argument that the changes made by the CEPI do not constitute new or increased levels of
activities or services for purposes of the Headlee Amendment.
II
A motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the
complaint. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). We review
the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted, make all reasonable
inferences therefrom, and determine whether a genuine issue of material facts exists. Bertrand v
Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open
-5-
an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177,
183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).
The movant must specifically identify the matters that have no disputed factual issues,
MCR 2.116(G)(4); Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999), and has the
initial burden of supporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence, Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). To
survive a motion for summary disposition, the nonmoving party must then produce evidence
showing a material dispute of fact left for trial. Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich App 553, 566;
618 NW2d 23 (2000). When the burden of proof at trial would rest on the nonmoving party, the
nonmovant may not rely upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must, by
documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
III
In this Court's previous decision, we found that the state was entitled to summary
disposition with regard to the claims advanced by plaintiffs under both the "new activity or
service" prong and the "increased level of an activity or service" prong of the POUM provision.
Adair I, supra at 693, 711. Our Supreme Court, however, focused solely on the "new activity or
service" prong of the POUM provision. Adair II, supra at 130-131. The more narrow focus of
the Supreme Court's decision indicates an implicit rejection by the Court of plaintiffs' claim that
MCL 388.1752 and the EO resulted in an unconstitutional increase in the level of an existing
activity or service. Accordingly, on remand, the parties are limited solely to the question
whether factual support exists for plaintiffs' claim that the record-keeping function required by
the statute and the EO constitutes a mandated new activity for which the state has shifted its
funding responsibility to the school districts by requiring the school districts to actively
participate in maintaining data that the state requires for its own purposes. Stated another way,
in order to survive summary disposition, plaintiffs must show that a genuine question of material
fact exists with regard to whether the statute and the EO require the districts to collect and
maintain data for which they have no use and would not collect and maintain but for the dictates
of the CEPI and the state's need of the information for its own purposes.
The state supports its motion with the affidavits of Dr. Margaret Merlyn Ropp, the
Director of the CEPI; Oren Christmas, the Manager of the Data Analysis and Reporting Services
for the CEPI; Glenda Rader, the Deputy Director of State School Aid and Finance in the
Department of Education; and Lynne Erickson, an education consultant for the CEPI, as well as
certain technical documents. This documentation supports the state's position that the challenged
record-keeping mandate requires school districts to produce data that the state required the
districts to produce before the issuance of the EO, with the exception of certain data the districts
are required to maintain and transmit to the Registry of Educational Personnel (REP). This
documentation also supports the conclusion that the reporting process created by the CEPI is
more efficient, more secure, and more user-friendly than the prior reporting methods dictated by
the state and employed by the districts.
-6-
Plaintiffs submit the affidavits of Tamra Arens, an operational assistant for the
Birmingham Public Schools; Jane Holloway, a record support system analyst for the
Birmingham Public Schools; Renee Koehn, a second operational assistant for the Birmingham
Public Schools; Estralee Michaelson, the Director of Safe Schools and Student Services for the
Farmington Public School District; and Mary Reynolds, the Executive Director of Business for
the Farmington Public School District. Plaintiffs devote a significant portion of each affidavit to
establishing the degree to which the record-keeping requirements of the CEPI have substantially
increased the workload, and the associated labor and equipment costs, of the school districts and,
thus, the level of state-mandated activities required of them. The remaining averments contained
in the affidavits support plaintiffs' claim that the CEPI has mandated that school districts collect
and maintain some new data to be transmitted to the REP, as well as the Single Record Student
Database (SRSD) and the School Infrastructure Database (SID).
Plaintiffs well document that the mandates of MCL 388.1752 and the EO have resulted in
the school districts acquiring new equipment; devoting increased staff time to collecting,
maintaining, and transmitting the mandated data; and incurring the costs associated with
equipment acquisition and labor reallocation. Such documentation is relevant only to a
determination of whether the mandates violate the "increased level of service" prong of the
POUM provision. As we have already observed, however, our Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs'
claim that MCL 388.1752 and the EO resulted in an unconstitutional increase in the level of an
existing activity or service. Accordingly, the documentation is not relevant to this proceeding on
remand, which is concerned with proof of an alleged violation of the "new activity or service"
prong of the POUM.
This is not to say, however, that plaintiffs have failed to provide any documentation
pertaining to the purported violation of the "new activity or service" prong. Indeed, plaintiffs
provide affidavits containing factual averments from which it could be concluded that the school
districts are required by the CEPI to collect and maintain some new data that they were not
required to collect and maintain before 1997 with regard to the REP, the SID, and the SRSD.
These affidavits, when juxtaposed against the documentation supplied by the state, create factual
questions with regard to the nature and extent that the CEPI mandates the collection and
maintenance of new information. These factual questions are not material, however, to the
resolution of the question before us. As our Supreme Court indicated, the Headlee Amendment
is directed at preventing the state from off-loading its obligations to avoid its funding
responsibilities. Adair II, supra at 112, 130. The affidavits offered by plaintiffs are deficient in
this latter regard. They contain no express factual averments indicating, or even supporting an
inference, that the new data they are now required to collect and maintain are data for which the
districts have no use and would not otherwise collect and maintain but for the dictates of the
CEPI. Similarly, the affidavits offered by plaintiffs contain no express factual averments that
these new data are used only by the state for its own purposes.
Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs' record-keeping claim cannot survive summary
disposition in the absence of any factual support, either express or inferential, demonstrating that
a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to whether the dictates of MCL 388.1752 and
the EO impermissibly shift a state obligation to the school districts to avoid the costs of the
-7-
obligation. We grant summary disposition in favor of the state and dismiss plaintiffs' remaining
claim with prejudice.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.