DEBRA LEA MILLER V JOHN THOMAS MILLER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DEBRA LEA MILLER,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 30, 2004
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 242470
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-102843-DM
JOHN THOMAS MILLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Saad and Kelly, JJ.
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court's order denying
plaintiff 's motion to vacate the arbitration award. I believe that the public policy that the
majority unwisely attempts to create threatens to disrupt the arbitration process by causing
instability in this area of the law and threatening the finality of arbitration awards. The decision
departs not only from the plain language of the domestic relations arbitration act (DRAA), MCL
600.5070 et seq., but also from existing precedent. The protection that the Legislature and the
courts have afforded is the protection of the parties' agreement to arbitrate without unwarranted
intrusion by the courts. The very reason appellate review of arbitration is limited is to afford this
protection. I would affirm.
I. Standard of Review
"We review de novo a trial court's decision to enforce, vacate, or modify a statutory
arbitration award." Tokar v Albery, 258 Mich App 350, 352; 671 NW2d 139 (2003). Our review
of a binding arbitration award is "strictly limited by statue and court rule." Krist v Krist, 246
Mich App 59, 66; 631 NW2d 53 (2001). Because the arbitration order was entered after the
effective date of 2000 PA 419 and 420, this case is governed by the specific statutory scheme set
forth in the DRAA. Harvey v Harvey, 257 Mich App 278, 283; 668 NW2d 187 (2003), aff 'd
470 Mich 186; 680 NW2d 835 (2004). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the intent of the Legislature by examining the plain language of the statute. In re MCI
Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
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II. The Plain Language of the DRAA
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the arbitrator failed to comply with the
requirements of the DRAA. The majority reads into the DRAA a requirement that does not exist
and precludes an arbitration procedure the DRAA does not preclude.
The majority correctly points out that the DRAA sets forth several specific requirements
for arbitration. For example, the DRAA requires a signed agreement by the parties, MCL
600.5071, that delineates the arbitrator's powers and duties, MCL 600.5072. The DRAA also
requires that the arbitrator "hear and make an award on each issue submitted for arbitration under
the arbitration agreement subject to the provisions of the agreement." MCL 600.5074(1). But
the DRAA does not define "hearing," nor does it set forth any specific requirements for a
hearing. Notably, the majority states that "hearing" is a word "that has a clear meaning [and]
must be given its clear meaning," but the majority opinion does not indicate what a hearing is,
only what it is not. Ante at ___. In a footnote, the majority refers to the dictionary definitions of
"hearing," ante at ___, and concludes that what took place in this case did not constitute what is
"commonly understood" as a hearing. Ante at ___. This provides little guidance for future
judicial review and impermissibly imposes requirements beyond those imposed by the DRAA.
Pursuant to the majority opinion, parties may now appeal arbitration awards on the
nebulous grounds that the procedure leading to the arbitration award was not a "hearing." But
when these arbitration awards are appealed, there will likely be no record for this Court to
review. Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, the DRAA prohibits making a
record of arbitration hearings:
Except as provided by this section, court rule, or the arbitration agreement,
a record shall not be made of an arbitration hearing under this chapter. If a
record is not required, an arbitrator may make a record to be used only by the
arbitrator to aid in reaching the decision. The parties may provide in the
arbitration agreement that a record be made of those portions of a hearing related
to 1 or more issues subject to arbitration. [MCL 600.5077(1). (emphasis added).]
In the best-case scenario, the parties will generally agree about how the arbitration took place. In
the worst-case scenario, the parties will disagree. How then will a court proceed to review the
arbitration proceedings to determine if they constituted a "hearing" in accord with the majority's
opinion, in which "hearing" is left undefined? Clearly if the Legislature had contemplated
judicial review to determine whether arbitration hearings comported with some formulaic
procedure, it would have required rather than prohibited recording arbitration hearings.
In addition to leaving "hearing" undefined and prohibiting making a record of arbitration
hearings, the Legislature has strictly limited judicial review of arbitration awards. MCL
600.5081(2) provides:
If a party applies under this section, the court shall vacate an award under
any of the following circumstances:
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(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means.
(b) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral,
corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a party's rights.
(c) The arbitrator exceeded his or her powers.
(d) The arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of
sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing to prejudice substantially a party's rights.
Accordingly, the DRAA permits vacation or modification only if the arbitrator conducts a
hearing in a prejudicial, corrupt, or fraudulent manner or if the arbitrator exceeds his or her
powers, i.e., those powers that derive from the parties' agreement to arbitrate.
The DRAA specifies that the arbitrator's power is directly conferred by the parties'
agreement:
The court shall not order a party to participate in arbitration unless each
party to the domestic relations matter acknowledges, in writing or on the record,
that he or she has been informed in plain language of all of the following:
* * *
(e) The arbitrator's powers and duties are delineated in a written arbitration
agreement that all parties must sign before arbitration commences.
(f) During arbitration, the arbitrator has the power to decide each issue
assigned to the arbitration under the arbitration agreement. The court will,
however, enforce the arbitrator's decisions on those issues. [MCL 600.5072(1).]
Our courts have also recognized that "[a]rbitrators derive their authority to act from the parties'
arbitration agreement." Krist, supra at 62, citing Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438
Mich 488, 495; 475 NW2d 704 (1991). Arbitration is generally recognized as a matter of
contract. Rowry v Univ of Michigan, 441 Mich 1, 10; 490 NW2d 305 (1992). Arbitration
agreements are generally interpreted in the same manner as ordinary contracts; they must be
enforced according to their terms to effectuate the intentions of the parties. Amtower v William
C Roney & Co, 232 Mich App 226, 233-234; 590 NW2d 580 (1998).
Nothing in the plain language of the DRAA preludes parties from agreeing to a particular
format for the arbitration procedure. The majority opinion, which precludes a divorcing couple
from agreeing on an arbitration procedure, erroneously limits the parties' ability to contract. This
directly contravenes the plain language of the DRAA, which affords the parties a degree of selfdetermination, lessens governmental intrusion into their private lives, avoids adversarial
posturing, and reduces personal antagonisms. Not only does the DRAA encourage the parties to
enter a contract to arbitrate, it also facilitates further agreement between the parties with respect
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to the procedural form of the arbitration hearing. This allows the parties to take responsibility
for creating the method of resolving their disputeāa method that is uniquely suited to their
relationship and resources. The DRAA sets forth the requirements of this step in the arbitration
process in MCL 600.5076(1), which provides:
As soon as practicable after the appointment of the arbitrator, the parties
and attorneys shall meet with the arbitrator to consider all of the following:
(a) Scope of the issues submitted.
(b) Date, time, and place of the hearing.
(c) Witnesses, including experts, who may testify.
(d)
testimony.
Schedule for exchange of expert reports or summary of expert
(e) Subject to subsection (2), exhibits, documents, or other information
each party considers applicable and material to the case and a schedule for
production or exchange of the information. If a party knew or reasonably should
have known about the existence of information the party is required to produce,
that party waives objection to producing that information if the party does not
object before the hearing.
(f) Disclosure required under section 5075.[1]
Thus, reading the statute as a whole, it is clear that the safeguards the Legislature
imposed through the DRAA do not require the arbitrator to conduct arbitration in any specific
manner (because no specifics are set forth), but do require the arbitrator to conduct the hearing in
accordance with the parties' agreement. The majority's professed aversion for the procedure on
which the parties agreed does not provide a basis for vacating the award. "A court must not
judicially legislate by adding into a statute provisions that the Legislature did not include." In re
Wayne Co Prosecutor, 232 Mich App 482, 486; 591 NW2d 359 (1998). Further, although the
majority refers to the process as mediation, the process was still binding; binding mediation is
equivalent to arbitration and subject to the same judicial limitations on review. Frain v Frain,
213 Mich App 509, 511-513; 540 NW2d 741 (1995).
III. Precedent and Policy
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MCL 600.5075 requires the arbitrator to disclose any circumstance that may affect his or her
impartiality.
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The majority opinion also contravenes existing precedent and the underlying public
policy regarding arbitration. Historically, Michigan courts have declined to establish
requirements for arbitration proceedings. Michigan public policy favors arbitration to resolve
disputes. Rembert v Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc, 235 Mich App 118, 128; 596 NW2d 208
(1999). As such, the scope of judicial review of arbitration is very narrow and procedural
matters should be left to the arbitrator. Huntington Woods v Ajax Paving Industries, Inc, 177
Mich App 351, 356; 441 NW2d 99 (1989). The Michigan Supreme Court has acknowledged
that judicial review of arbitration is restricted because courts are generally reluctant to speculate
on what caused the arbitrator to rule as it did. "It is only the kind of legal error that is evident
without scrutiny of intermediate mental indicia which remains reviewable . . . ." DAIIE v Gavin,
416 Mich 407, 429; 331 NW2d 418 (1982). The Court recognized that, with regard to
arbitration, "there are no formal requirements of procedure and practice beyond those assuring
impartiality, and no findings of fact or conclusions of law are required." Id. at 428. It also
recognized that arbitration procedures are "informal and sometimes unorthodox . . . ." Id. at 429.
In a departure from this precedent, the majority has put restrictions on the arbitration process that
neither the Legislature nor our courts saw fit to impose.
IV. Analysis
A closer look at the facts of this case reveals that the arbitrator did not, as the majority
avers, unfairly deny plaintiff 's requests, refuse to hear plaintiff 's evidence, or unfairly conduct
the hearing. Although there is no record of the arbitration proceedings, the majority opinion
adopts without question and assumes as true plaintiff 's assertions about what took place and
what was said at arbitration. Because there is no record of the arbitration procedure, it is
impossible for this Court to determine the veracity of plaintiff 's assertions. But, on a basic level,
the parties do not dispute that the arbitrator first met briefly with the parties and their attorneys to
discuss the arbitration procedure. At that time, the parties agreed that, because of their
acrimonious relationship, the arbitrator should meet with the parties and their respective
attorneys separately. Neither party objected to this procedure; rather, each party voluntarily
entered a separate room. Then each party, in the presence of his or her attorney, voluntarily
spoke with the arbitrator.
Nonetheless, sometime after the hearing concluded, plaintiff 's attorney contacted the
arbitrator and requested additional arbitration sessions for plaintiff to further present her case and
challenge defendant's assertions. Plaintiff also sent the arbitrator two amended arbitration
statements and additional documentation pertaining to defendant's income.
The arbitrator issued a proposed award without scheduling further sessions. In his
findings of fact, he noted that plaintiff had requested further sessions. But he concluded that
plaintiff raised nothing new that would justify further delay. The arbitrator summarized the
evidence regarding the breakdown of the marriage and concluded that both parties were at fault.
After receiving the proposed award, plaintiff again requested continued arbitration. The
arbitrator gave plaintiff three days to submit an outline of the issues she wanted to pursue.
Plaintiff provided the arbitrator with a lengthy response to the award. She asked for the
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opportunity to present further evidence of defendant's inappropriate use of massage parlors and
escort services, and to cross-examine defendant in this regard, to establish that defendant caused
the breakdown of the marriage. Plaintiff also complained about nearly every aspect of the award
itself.
The arbitrator rendered a final, binding arbitration award in which he stated that he had
considered plaintiff 's concerns, but found that plaintiff failed to raise any new facts or issues.
He also noted that he considered the cumulative evidence, as well as any new facts raised by
both parties. The final arbitration award was substantially similar to the first award, with some
revisions in response to plaintiff 's concerns. As far as plaintiff 's complaints about the
procedure, the arbitrator commented:
The following summary, and the findings contained therein, are based on
the credible testimony of the parties; the credible information contained in any
exhibit; the arguments of the lawyers, and the lengthy summaries filed by both
counsel.
I have allowed both sides the opportunity to present anything further they
felt was necessary to a full and complete understanding of their respective
positions. Each side has submitted lengthy, additional summaries, all of which
have been reviewed in detail, and against all the other evidence submitted.
Plaintiff has insisted on additional "hearings". Plaintiff claims that the Award
proffered to counsel for comment, was unfair, and that an ability to "confront" the
Defendant and cross examine him would effect [sic] drastically his credibility.
The Arbitrator asked the plaintiff to submit a list of items that required
such hearings. No list was received, but another summary was provided. The
plaintiff 's last summary (which was more an appeal of the proposed award) was
answered by the Defendant. All of those submissions have also been carefully
considered.
The defendant argues that all of the after hearing submissions of the
Plaintiff are simply a rehash of old issues, and that no new issues are raised. I
find that no new issues are raised. I further find that all of the topics addressed by
the Plaintiff, post-hearing, were discussed on the day of the hearing I have
considered the cumulative evidence, as well as any "new" facts raised by both
sides.
Plaintiff 's counsel takes issue with the format of the hearing, now
suggesting that it should have had a more formal structure, and that the plaintiff 's
right of confrontation would have added another dimension to this Arbitrator's
appraisal of the case. The parties agreed to the informal nature of the hearing,
and it was not until after the proposed award that any suggestion was made to
testimony in a confrontational mode. [Emphasis added.] Further, had the hearing
been more formal, almost none of the written evidence would have come into the
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record, because most of the exhibits were hearsay. [Emphasis deleted.] Much of
the commentary by the lawyers was only supported by hearsay documents.
The majority further departs from existing precedent in that it finds error in the
arbitrator's findings of fact. "Claims that the arbitrator made a factual error are beyond the scope
of appellate review." Konal v Forlini, 235 Mich App 69, 75; 596 NW2d 630 (1999). In the
emphasized portion of the arbitrator's award, the arbitrator found that the parties agreed to the
informal nature of the hearing. In concluding that plaintiff did not agree to this procedure and
was confused by it, the majority has improperly assigned error to the arbitrator's finding.
Even if this Court could properly review the arbitrator's findings of fact, the majority
ignores several important factors. First, the arbitrator considered all of plaintiff 's proffered
evidence. Plaintiff cannot cite a single piece of evidence that was not considered. With regard
to cross-examination, the arbitrator did not "unfairly" deny plaintiff 's request to cross-examine
defendant, though he did deny her request. The denial was not unfair because, before plaintiff 's
request, the parties had agreed to meet the arbitrator separately and voluntarily did so.
Moreover, plaintiff wanted to cross-examine defendant about his infidelities, which, according to
the arbitration award, defendant generally admitted. Finally, plaintiff did not complain that the
arbitrator failed to comply with procedural requirements of the DRAA until after the arbitration
award was issued. It is paternalistic to conclude that plaintiff, a competent adult who entered
into an agreement in the presence of her attorney and voluntarily participated in the arbitration
hearing while represented by her attorney, "found it difficult to define . . . what transpired." Ante
at ___. The only thing plaintiff found difficult was accepting the arbitration award, despite
having agreed to binding arbitration and the arbitration procedure.
V. Conclusion
I would affirm the arbitration award because there is no proper basis for vacating it:
although the arbitration procedure was "informal" and "unorthodox," DAIIE, supra at 429, there
is no indication that the procedures exceeded the arbitrator's authority or lacked impartiality.
The parties were "afforded basic, protective rights, the most important of which is a full and fair
hearing." Ante at ___.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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