PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL E BELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
October 7, 2004
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209269
Recorder's Court
LC No. 95-004885
MICHAEL E. BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON SECOND REMAND
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209270
Recorder's Court
LC No. 97-001258
MICHAEL E. BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Saad and Meter, JJ.
SAAD, J.
Once again, this case is before us on remand from our Supreme Court,1 which has
instructed us to reconsider this case in light of the United States Supreme Court's significant
decision in Crawford v Washington, 541 US ___; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). We
hold that Crawford applies retrospectively, requires reversal here, and thus we reverse and
remand for a new trial.
1
In People v Bell, 470 Mich 875 (2004), in lieu of granting defendant leave to appeal, the Court
vacated this Court's previous opinion in this case, People v Bell (On Remand), unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 5, 2002 (Docket Nos. 209269,
209270), and remanded to this Court for reconsideration.
-1-
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case stems from defendant's jury trial convictions, in two separate cases, on three
counts of first-degree felony murder (felony murder)2 and one count of solicitation to commit
arson of a dwelling house.3 The police arrested defendant after Matthew Roberts told them that
defendant hired Roberts to firebomb the victims' house. At trial, Roberts asserted his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination4 and did not testify. Accordingly, the trial court
admitted Roberts's statement to the police that inculpated defendant.5
Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences to this Court and argued that the trial
court erred when it admitted a statement of a nontestifying accomplice that implicated defendant.
Defendant argued that this violated his Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine witnesses
against him. US Const, Am VI. We rejected defendant's argument because of our Supreme
Court's opinion in People v Poole, 444 Mich 151; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), in which the Court
held that the hearsay statements of nontestifying accomplices are admissible if they meet certain
reliability requirements. People v Bell, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued October 6, 2000 (Docket Nos. 209269, 209270). Defendant sought leave to appeal in our
Supreme Court, which remanded this case to us for further explanation of our analysis under
Poole.6 On remand, we complied with the Court's remand order, explained our decision, and
reaffirmed our previous opinion. People v Bell (On Remand), unpublished opinion per curiam of
the Court of Appeals, issued February 5, 2002 (Docket Nos. 209269, 209270).
II. APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD v WASHINGTON
A. The Crawford Decision Generally
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that to admit testimonial evidence
against a defendant, the declarant must be unavailable and the defendant must have had "a prior
opportunity for cross examination" of the declarant. Crawford, supra at ___; 124 S Ct 1374.
The Court in Crawford overruled its previous opinion in Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56; 100 S Ct
2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), which held that such evidence could be admitted if it could be
shown to be reliable. Our Supreme Court's opinion in Poole, upon which we previously relied in
this case, in turn relied upon Roberts. Poole, supra at 162-163.7 In Crawford, the Supreme
Court reasoned that "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is
2
MCL 750.316(1)(b).
3
MCL 750.157b; MCL 750.72.
4
US Const, Am V.
5
The trial court originally ruled, at defendant's preliminary examination, that it would not admit
Roberts's statement, but it later reversed itself at trial and admitted this evidence.
6
However, the Court otherwise denied leave. People v Bell, 465 Mich 923 (2001).
7
Clearly, this explains our Supreme Court's decision to order us to reconsider this case.
-2-
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the
Sixth Amendment prescribes." Crawford, supra at ___; 124 S Ct 1371.
Though the Supreme Court in Crawford "[left] for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,'" Id. at ___; 124 S Ct 1374, it also stated that
"[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under
even a narrow standard."8 Id. at ___; 124 S Ct 1364.
B. Retrospective Application
This Court has previously noted that Crawford should be applied retrospectively. People
v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124, 135 n 10; ___ NW2d ___ (2004), citing Powell v Nevada, 511
US 79, 84; 114 S Ct 1280; 128 L Ed 2d 1 (1994). In Powell, the United States Supreme Court
held that "'a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all
cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.'" Powell, supra at 84, quoting
Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314, 328; 107 S Ct 708; 93 L Ed 2d 649 (1987). Accordingly, we
hold that Crawford applies retrospectively here because this case was pending on appeal when
the Supreme Court decided the case.
C. Application to the Facts of this Case
Here, Roberts was arrested and interrogated by the police in connection with these
crimes. During the course of this interrogation, Roberts gave a statement that implicated
defendant. Therefore, this statement was clearly testimonial. Moreover, defendant did not have
an opportunity to cross-examine Roberts, because Roberts chose to exercise his Fifth
Amendment right not to testify at trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford
compels us to hold that the trial court's decision to admit Roberts's statement violated defendant's
Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine witnesses against him.
D. Harmless Error
However, "when a trial court commits an error that denies [a defendant's] constitutional
rights under the Confrontation Clause . . . we need not reverse if the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." McPherson, supra at 131-132, citing People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657,
690; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
8
We respectfully disagree with our concurring colleague that a police interrogation is not
testimonial. We instead agree with the rationale articulated by Justice Scalia in Crawford in
which he said: "That interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not change the
picture either. . . . The involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial
evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the peace."
Crawford, supra at ___ ; 124 S Ct 1365.
-3-
Here, the primary evidence supporting the solicitation and felony-murder convictions is
Roberts's inadmissible statement. Therefore, we cannot say that this constitutional error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See McPherson, supra at 131.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
-4-
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