JUDY YORK V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDY YORK,
FOR PUBLICATION
September 30, 2004
9:05 a.m.
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FAMILY
INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Respondents-Appellees.
No. 246137
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 01-093971-AA
Official Reported Version
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Sawyer and Saad, JJ.
SAAD, J.
Respondent Family Independence Agency (FIA) employs petitioner Judy York as an
Assistance Payment Worker (APW). Petitioner sought to be reclassified in a higher-paying job
classification, and the Department of Civil Service denied her request. Petitioner filed a
technical appeal within the department, which was also denied. Petitioner appealed that decision
to the Employment Relations Board (ERB), and then to respondent Civil Service Commission
(CSC). Both appeals were denied. Petitioner sought judicial review of the CSC's decision in the
circuit court, which affirmed the CSC's decision. Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave
to appeal the circuit court's order affirming the CSC's decision, which application we granted.1
We affirm the circuit court's order.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner is employed by the FIA as an APW. In July 1995, petitioner and other APWs
sought reclassification from paraprofessional to professional status. After it reviewed the
situation, the Department of Civil Service concluded that none of the duties of an APW was
"professional" in nature, and petitioner's request was denied.
1
York v Civil Service Comm, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 18, 2003
(Docket No. 246137).
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Petitioner then filed a technical appeal of the Department's decision, and argued for the
first time that she should be reclassified as a Social Services Specialist (SSS) or as a Family
Independence Specialist (FIS). The FIS classification was not created until February 1996, and
thus did not even exist at the time petitioner filed her request to be reclassified. For that reason,
the technical appeals officer (TAO) ruled that he could not consider reclassifying petitioner as an
FIS. He further concluded that APWs did not have the relevant education or experience to merit
being reclassified as SSSs.
Petitioner appealed to the ERB, which remanded to the TAO for answers to the question
why some APWs were reclassified as FISs when the FIS position was created, while other
APWs were not. The TAO explained on remand that some of the APWs possessed the necessary
education and experience to warrant reclassification while others did not; in effect, the former
group was promoted as opposed to reclassified.
Petitioner again appealed to the ERB, which affirmed the TAO's denial of petitioner's
reclassification request, but remanded for further study of similarities between the APW and FIS
positions. However, on appeal to the CSC, the CSC affirmed the TAO's decision in its entirety,
and reversed the ERB's remand for further study.
Petitioner then appealed to the Ingham Circuit Court and alleged (1) that the CSC
violated Const 1963, art 11, § 5 and art 6, § 28 when it enforced CSC Rule 2-20B.4, which
provides that TAOs shall not hold hearings when deciding technical appeals; (2) that the CSC
denied petitioner due process, Const 1963, art 1, § 17, when it denied her a hearing on her
request to be reclassified; and (3) that the CSC denied petitioner due process when it reversed
the ERB's order for further study with respect to whether the FIA's APWs were properly
classified. The circuit court ruled that petitioner had no property interest in job reclassification
and that a hearing therefore was not required; that even if the court were to rule that petitioner
had a right to due process, the CSC's appeal process had afforded petitioner due process; and that
the CSC's order had a rational basis. Accordingly, the circuit court entered an order that
affirmed the CSC's decision.
This Court granted petitioner's application for leave to appeal the circuit court's order on
July 18, 2003.2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Article 6, § 8 of the Michigan Constitution provides the standard of review that a circuit
court must apply when reviewing decisions of the CSC:
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative
officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or
2
See n 1, supra.
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quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review
by the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the
determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are
authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same
are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole
record.[3]
In turn, we assess the circuit court's review of a CSC decision to "'determine whether the
lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied
the substantial evidence test to the agency's factual findings.'" Hanlon v Civil Service Comm,
253 Mich App 710, 716; 660 NW2d 74 (2002), quoting Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich
App 226, 234; 559 NW2d 342 (1996).
Whether a party was denied due process as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 17 is, of
course, a constitutional question, and we review constitutional questions de novo. In re Ayres,
239 Mich App 8, 10; 608 NW2d 132 (1999).
III. ANALYSIS
A. CSC Rule 2-20B.4
Petitioner argues that CSC Rule 2-20B.4 violates Const 1963, art 11, § 5 and art 6, § 28.
Rule 2-20B.4 provides:
If the technical appeal is not administratively dismissed, it shall be
referred to a technical appeal officer for disposition. The technical appeal officer
shall conduct an expeditious review of the technical appeal in accord with these
rules and regulations issued by the state personnel director. The technical appeal
officer shall decide the matter based on the departmental records and the written
submissions of any interested persons. The technical appeal officer is not
authorized to conduct a hearing, but may meet with the technical complainant
and other interested persons to review and discuss the appeal. The technical
appeal officer shall issue a written technical appeal decision. [Emphasis added.]
Const 1963, art 11, § 5 provides, in relevant part:
The [CSC] shall classify all positions in the classified service according to
their respective duties and responsibilities, fix rates of compensation for all
classes of positions, approve or disapprove disbursements for all personal
services, determine by competitive examination and performance exclusively on
the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness the qualifications of all candidates for
3
See Hanlon v Civil Service Comm, 253 Mich App 710, 716; 660 NW2d 74 (2002), quoting
Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 232 n 3, and Const 1963, art 6, § 8.
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positions in the classified service, make rules and regulations covering all
personnel transactions, and regulate all conditions of employment in the classified
service.
The CSC has "broad authority to regulate the state classified service." Hanlon, supra at
717-718, citing Viculin v Dep't of Civil Service, 386 Mich 375, 393; 192 NW2d 449 (1971). The
CSC has "absolute" and "plenary power" to "determine, consistent with due process, the
procedures by which a state civil service employee may review his grievance." Id. Michigan's
constitution affords the CSC the freedom "'to adopt any grievance or appellate procedure it finds
appropriate as long as it does so consistently with the requirements of due process since it has
full and absolute power over civil service employees.'" Id., quoting Gibbard v Dep't of Social
Services, 135 Mich App 579, 585; 354 NW2d 263 (1982). "[T]he CSC may provide for
whatever assistance it requires to efficiently perform its duties, including assistance from hearing
boards and administrative officers." Id. at 721. However, "'the final authority and responsibility
remain its own despite these delegations, and its investigative powers in aid of its final decision
remain as broad as its responsibility.'" Id., quoting Groehn v Corporation and Securities Comm,
350 Mich 250, 261; 86 NW2d 291 (1957).
Petitioner maintains that, by denying civil service employees a right to a hearing with
respect to job classification, the CSC effectively has abdicated its responsibility to make fully
informed final decisions. Petitioner also says that absent hearings, the TAO cannot make
meaningful findings of fact and the CSC cannot properly review the decisions of its TAOs.
Petitioner also claims that the absence of hearings makes judicial review of the CSC's decisions
impossible. Petitioner says that these deficiencies resulted in a violation of her due process
rights. Petitioner says that only a full hearing on the record can correct these alleged
inadequacies of Rule 2-20B.4.
While Rule 2-20B.4 expressly prohibits TAOs from conducting hearings in technical
appeals, it clearly requires TAOs to consider "departmental records and the written submissions
of any interested persons," including, presumably, employees seeking technical appeals as
petitioner does here. In asserting that the CSC has somehow abdicated its responsibility with
respect to review of technical appeals, petitioner does not argue that the CSC failed to review the
findings and conclusions of either the ERB or the TAO. Nor does petitioner argue that the TAO
failed to consider any evidence in reviewing her technical appeal—to the contrary, petitioner
states that here there was ample documentation provided by both sides.4
We reject petitioner's claims that Const 1963, arts 6 and 11 require the CSC to hold a
hearing and that render Rule 2-20B.4 is unconstitutional. The language in article 6, "in cases in
which a hearing is required," clearly contemplates situations where courts would review
administrative proceedings that do not require hearings. Logically, then, we must reject
4
However, petitioner contends that the documentation is conflicting, and that the TAO is not
capable of determining the credibility of the documentation without holding a hearing.
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petitioner's claim that this section requires hearings in every case to facilitate CSC or judicial
review.5
Accordingly, we hold that CSC Rule 2-20B.4 does not violate Const 1963, art 11, § 5 and
art 6, § 28.
B. Petitioner's Right to a Hearing
Petitioner maintains that the denial of a full hearing on the record violated her
constitutional right to due process as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 17. "Procedural due
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or
'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment [sic]."6 English v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 263 Mich App ___, ___ ;
___ NW2d ___ (2004), quoting In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 110-111; 499 NW2d 752 (1993),
quoting Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 332, 334; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976) (internal
quotations omitted). Due process requires the "'opportunity to be heard' at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner." Id. at ___, quoting Mathews, supra at 333. "[A]n oral hearing is
not necessary to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Id. at ___.
"Only when the property interest involved was the potential deprivation of
the financial means by which to live has the Court insisted on an evidentiary
hearing . . . . 'Due process can be interpreted to require a hearing to the extent and
only to the extent that a party will have the chance to know and to respond to the
evidence against him, without requiring a hearing "on the record."'" [Id. at ___,
quoting Westland Convalescent Ctr v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 414
Mich 247, 270-271; 324 NW2d 851 (1982) (internal citations omitted).]
To have a protected property interest, one must possess "more than a unilateral expectation to the
claimed interest; the claimant must have a legitimate claim of entitlement." Hanlon, supra at
723.
1. Petitioner's Alleged Property Interest in Reclassification
In Hanlon, the petitioners requested reclassification from the CSC, as petitioner does
here. This Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the petitioners had a property
interest protected by due process because it concluded that the administrative review process that
5
Moreover, were we to hold that a hearing was required, which we do not, we would
nevertheless reject petitioner's demand for a full hearing on the record, for reasons we will
explain in greater detail below.
6
Though petitioner claims a violation of due process under the state, and not the federal,
constitution, state and federal due process protections are generally coextensive. Hanlon, supra
at 722-723.
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the CSC provided for the petitioners' appeal was sufficient to satisfy due process even if this
Court were to have held that the petitioners did have a protected property interest. Hanlon,
supra at 723.
Under Michigan law, civil service employees are guaranteed continued employment
absent just cause for dismissal. This property interest is sufficient to merit due process
protections. Michigan State Employees Ass'n v Dep't of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152, 160-161;
365 NW2d 93 (1984). This serves "the policy favoring a stable public work force." Id. at 162.
Unlike a civil service employee's state-protected interest in continued employment, reclassifying
a current civil service employee from one job classification to another neither deals with job
security nor does it promote a stable work force. Rather, a civil service employee's petition for
reclassification represents that employee's unilateral aspiration for a different job classification, a
quest for which any given employee may or may not possess the requisite education, training,
experience, job performance, or other qualifications. Here, the CSC's denial of petitioner's
request for reclassification does not implicate her job security interests; rather, the denial affects
only her unilateral hope that she might be reclassified into a higher-paying position. This
unilateral expectation or hope for reclassification is not a property interest protected by the
Michigan or federal constitution. See St Louis v Michigan Underground Storage Tank Financial
Assurance Policy Bd, 215 Mich App 69, 74; 544 NW2d 705 (1996), citing Williams v Hofley
Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603, 610; 424 NW2d 278 (1988), citing Arnett v Kennedy, 416 US 134, 165;
94 S Ct 1633; 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974) ("For a property interest in a benefit . . . to exist, a person
must have more than just a need, desire for, or a unilateral expectation of the benefit."); See also
Hanlon, supra at 723, citing Williams, supra, citing Arnett, supra ("To have a property interest
protected requires more than a unilateral expectation to the claimed interest.").
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected property
interest in reclassification.
2. Adequacy of Administrative Proceedings
Because we hold that petitioner has no protected property interest, we also hold that the
due process guarantee to a hearing is not applicable. See Hanlon, supra at 723. Accordingly,
we decline to address the issue whether the circuit court correctly ruled that the appellate
procedures provided by the CSC to petitioner here would satisfy due process.7
7
However, were we to hold that the due process guarantee was applicable here, which we do
not, we would nevertheless reject petitioner's assertion that due process requires a full, trial-like
evidentiary hearing on the record. Petitioner has not alleged that the CSC's denial of
reclassification has deprived her "of the financial means by which to live," nor could she
reasonably do so. Accordingly, we would hold that due process would require a hearing "to the
extent and only to the extent that [petitioner would] have a chance to know and respond to the
evidence against [her], without requiring a hearing 'on the record.'" English, supra at ___. As
(continued…)
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C. CSC's Reversal of the ERB's Order for Further Study of Classifications
Petitioner says that the circuit court should have reversed the CSC's decision to reverse
the ERB's order for further study of the alleged similarities between the APW and FIS
classifications. Petitioner further argues that we should reverse the circuit court and the CSC,
and remand for a hearing to determine whether APWs perform the exact same work as FISs for
lesser pay.
The circuit court concluded that the CSC had a rational basis for its finding that the work
of APWs was not identical to FISs.8 Because this Court has held that it is constitutionally
permissible for the CSC to employ a rational basis standard in its review of the decisions of
TAOs and the ERB, Hanlon, supra at 717-722, and because our review of the record shows that
neither the CSC nor the circuit court acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or abused their
discretion, we conclude that the circuit court correctly applied the law during its review of the
CSC's decision and correctly affirmed the CSC.
Furthermore, petitioner's claim, at its heart, seeks to revise the CSC's classification
system. Petitioner alleges that the APW and FIS classifications are identical, and that all APWs
should be reclassified as FISs. Petitioner asks this Court to reverse the CSC's refusal to do so.
Were we to reverse the CSC as petitioner requests, we would be substituting our judgment with
respect to the classification of civil service employees for the CSC's. This would not only
infringe on the CSC's "absolute," "plenary," and constitutionally mandated authority to classify
its employees, but it would also violate the separation of powers doctrine.
"The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative,
executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this
constitution." [Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v Michigan, 459 Mich 291, 296; 586
NW2d 894 (1998), quoting Const 1963, art 3, § 2.]
Our Supreme Court further stated:
[S]tate employees working for the Legislature are unquestionably under
the exclusive control of the Legislature, those working for the executive branch,
under the exclusive control of the executive branch, and those working for the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, under the exclusive control of the
judicial branch. [Id. at 298.]
(…continued)
stated previously, we decline to address the issue whether the CSC's procedure here would
satisfy this requirement.
8
The court noted that some APWs were reclassified as FISs because their work experience
qualified them for the reclassification, not because their duties are the same. We further note
that while the record shows that some of the job responsibilities of FISs are identical to those of
APWs, FISs have additional job responsibilities that APWs do not have.
-7-
While there is constitutional authority for limited judicial review of the CSC's judicial and quasijudicial decisions with respect to its employees, decisions with respect to administrative matters,
such as the classification of civil service employees, are the sole province of the CSC. The CSC
has the sole constitutional authority to decide whether to revisit its job classification system, and
in reversing the ERB's order, it has declined to do so. This Court may not usurp that authority by
now ordering the Department of Civil Service to hold hearings on the issue of the APW and FIS
classifications, as petitioner asks us to do here.
Moreover, were we to grant petitioner's request, we would create an environment where
the courts of this state would be constantly called on to micromanage and second-guess the
CSC's decisions with respect to the classification of civil service employees. This we cannot do,
especially given the clear constitutional mandate that the CSC be afforded the sole, absolute
power to classify this state's civil service employees.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly affirmed the CSC's decision to
reverse the ERB's order for further study of the APW and FIS job classifications.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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