PEOPLE OF MI V SAMUEL MILTON THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
July 13, 2004
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245668
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 02-003858-FH
SAMUEL MILTON THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra and Schuette, JJ.
BANDSTRA, J.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of causing a serious impairment of a
body function while resisting an arrest, MCL 750.81d(3), and was sentenced as a fourth-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to twenty to forty years of imprisonment. His primary argument
on appeal is that the injuries suffered by the police officer were not serious enough to support a
conviction under that statute. We conclude that they were and affirm defendant's conviction. In
addition, we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing a minimum sentence in excess
of the applicable guidelines range.
Background Facts
While driving his pickup truck with the headlights off in the middle of the night,
defendant was stopped by a police officer. Asked to provide his driver's license, registration, and
proof of insurance, defendant said he did not have them and, when asked his name, defendant
said he was dyslexic and could not spell. The officer asked defendant to step out of the truck,
but defendant instead attempted to start the vehicle and leave. The officer reached into the truck
with his right arm to prevent defendant's escape and became entangled in the steering wheel as
defendant drove the truck away. The truck carried the officer along in this fashion for some
distance and then appeared to be headed directly toward a tree. The officer renewed his efforts
to extricate himself and was successful, sliding across the pavement and striking his head against
a curb. The truck continued down the street. Defendant later stated that he had been on parole at
the time, that he did not want to go back to jail, and that he did not care what he did to try to get
away.
Defendant's challenge to his conviction centers on the injuries suffered by the officer. In
addition to various scrapes, bruises, and abrasions, the officer's left knee was sprained and a
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vertebral bone in his neck was broken. The sprain to the left leg was described by the officer's
treating physician as "severe." The officer was unable to walk without crutches for several
weeks and missed approximately 2-1/2 months of work. However, the treating physician opined
that the leg injury was completely healed at the time of defendant's trial. The bone that was
broken in the officer's neck did not involve any nerve components and thus, fortunately, the
extreme injuries that could have occurred (paralysis or death) did not result. However, the
treating physician testified that there was a fifty-fifty possibility that future problems could
develop as a result of the broken vertebral bone.
1. MCL 750.81d(3)—"Serious Impairment of a Body Function"
Standard of Review
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the officer suffered
a "serious impairment of a body function" under MCL 750.81d(3). The question here turns on
the interpretation of that statutory phrase, a matter we review de novo. People v Davis, 468
Mich 77, 79; 658 NW2d 800 (2003).
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is "'to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature.'" People v Weeder, 469 Mich 493, 497; 674 NW2d 372 (2004), quoting
People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275 (2002). "If a statute is clear, it must be
enforced as plainly written." People v Spann, 250 Mich App 527, 530; 655 NW2d 251 (2002).
"However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, judicial construction is
proper to determine legislative intent." Id. "Statutory language should be construed reasonably,
keeping in mind the purpose of the act." Id. "When terms are not expressly defined by statute, a
court may consult dictionary definitions." Id. "Words should be given their common, generally
accepted meaning, if consistent with the legislative aim in enacting the statute." Id.
Analysis
Defendant was convicted under MCL 750.81d(3), which provides:
An individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or
endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing
his or her duties causing a serious impairment of a body function of that person is
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine
of not more than $10,000, or both.
At issue here is whether defendant caused "a serious impairment of a body function" as required
by this section. MCL 750.81d(7)(c) specifies that this term is to be defined as it is in MCL
257.58c, which provides:
"Serious impairment of a body function" includes, but is not limited to, 1
or more of the following:
(a) Loss of a limb or loss of use of a limb.
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(b) Loss of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb or loss of use of a foot, hand,
finger, or thumb.
(c) Loss of an eye or ear or loss of use of an eye or ear.
(d) Loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function.
(e) Serious visible disfigurement.
(f) A comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days.
(g) Measurable brain or mental impairment.
(h) A skull fracture or other serious bone fracture.
(i) Subdural hemorrhage or subdural hematoma.
(j) Loss of an organ.
On appeal, both parties note the similarity between this statutory scheme's use of the
phrase "serious impairment of a body function" and the no-fault act's use of the phrase "serious
impairment of body function." MCL 500.3135(1). Defendant argues that the two statutes should
be considered together under the doctrine of "in pari materia" because they "relate to the same
subject or share a common purpose," citing People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884
(1998). Both parties rely on precedents construing the no-fault act provision to argue for their
interpretation of the criminal statute at issue here.1 We begin our analysis by rejecting that
approach.
The two statutes do not relate to the same subject or share a common purpose. The nofault act provides a system of civil compensation and liability for automobile accidents; the
statute at issue here prohibits and criminalizes assaultive behavior while resisting an arrest. The
two statutes have nothing to do with one another and the doctrine of in pari materia does not
apply.
Further, if "'a statute supplies its own glossary, courts may not import any other
interpretation but must apply the meaning of the terms as expressly defined.'" People v Brown,
249 Mich App 382, 385; 642 NW2d 382 (2002), quoting People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695,
703; 635 NW2d 491 (2001). As noted above, the criminal statute here does provide its own
definition of a "serious impairment of a body function." Moreover, that definition is
significantly different than the definition of "serious impairment of body function" in the no-fault
act. For example, the no-fault act's definition requires that such an impairment must be
"objectively manifested," MCL 500.3135(7), a requirement that does not appear in the criminal
1
The parties cite, and we could find, no precedents analyzing the criminal statute's definition of
"a serious impairment of a body function."
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statute. MCL 257.58c. Similarly, the no-fault act limits the "serious impairment" definition by
specifying that the body function affected must be an "important" one and that the impairment
must "affect[] the person's general ability to lead his or her normal life." MCL 500.3135(7). In
contrast, the criminal statute's definition of a "serious impairment" has no such limitations. It is
clear that the category of injuries that constitute a "serious impairment of a body function" under
the criminal statute is broader than the category of injuries constituting a "serious impairment of
body function" under the no-fault act. Thus, the no-fault act definitions and precedents
construing it are not helpful.
We turn instead to the language of the criminal statute at issue here. We first note that
the listing of injuries within the statute is not exhaustive, but that, instead, a "'serious impairment
of a body function' includes, but is not limited to" the listed injuries. The specific injuries
suffered by the officer here are not within the statutory listing and the question presented is
whether they nonetheless constitute serious impairments of body functions within the meaning of
the statute.
Although it is not directly applicable,2 we find helpful the ejusdem generis canon of
statutory construction. Under this canon, the scope of a broad general term following a series of
items is construed as including "things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those
specifically enumerated . . . ." Weakland v Toledo Engineering Co, Inc, 467 Mich 344, 349; 656
NW2d 175 (2003), quoting Huggett v Dep't of Natural Resources, 464 Mich 711, 718-719; 629
NW2d 915 (2001). Thus, to determine whether injuries to the officer here constitute serious
impairments of a body function under the statute, we consider their similarity to injuries within
the statutory list.
We first note that an injury need not be long-lasting to be considered a "serious
impairment." The listing includes "[a] comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days" without
requiring any lasting effect of that comatose state. MCL 257.58c(f). Thus, for example, a
person who is rendered comatose for eighty hours, but who then revives without any continuing
disability has suffered a "serious impairment of a body function" under the statute.
We further note that the definitional listing includes "loss of [the] use of a limb." MCL
257.58c(a). The statute here does not specify the length of time such a loss must be suffered. On
the one hand, it does not require that the loss of use be long-lasting or permanent. On the other,
it does not specify that any lost use, for no matter how short a time, is sufficient.
In light of these considerations, we conclude that the trial court properly decided that the
injury to the officer's left leg constituted a "serious impairment of a body function" under the
statute. The officer lost the use of that limb almost completely for several weeks while he was
2
As noted, this canon is usually applied in situations where a broad term follows a series of
specific items. Nonetheless, the canon seems applicable here; if the "including, but not limited
to" language of the statute were deleted and a broad term like "other injuries" were added to the
listing, we would discern no difference in the statutory meaning.
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on crutches and, to a more limited extent, during the several months that he was unable to return
to work. This impairment was certainly less extreme than what would have been the case had
the officer been rendered comatose. But it was far more long-lasting than the three days that
would have been sufficient had a comatose state resulted. We conclude that this lesser
impairment, itself within the statutory list, suffered for a much greater time than required for a
more serious injury within the list, is properly considered as falling within the "serious
impairment" category.
With respect to the officer's broken neck bone, we note that the statutory listing includes
"a skull fracture or other serious bone fracture." MCL 257.58c(h). Further, hemorrhages or
hematomas that are "subdural" are listed as constituting serious impairments. MCL 257.58c(i).
Such a "subdural" injury is one that is "[l]ocated or occurring beneath the dura mater" which is,
in turn, defined as the membrane "that covers the brain and the spinal cord." The American
Heritage Dictionary (2d college ed, 1982). Thus, the statutory listing considers any hemorrhage
or hematoma that involves the spinal cord to be a "serious impairment." We conclude that this
same special status should be afforded bone fractures if they involve the spinal column; any
vertebral bone fracture is properly considered a "serious impairment of a body function" under
the statute.3
In sum, the injuries to the officer's leg and spinal cord were both properly considered
"serious impairment[s] of a body function" under MCL 257.58c. Accordingly, we affirm
defendant's conviction under MCL 750.81d(3).
2. Departure Sentence
Scoring of the sentencing guidelines in this case resulted in a recommended minimum
sentence range of 50 to 200 months. Defendant does not contest that scoring. However, the trial
court departed upward from the guidelines sentence range and sentenced defendant to a
minimum term of 240 months. Defendant contends that the trial court did so improperly by
relying on characteristics already considered in computing the guidelines sentence range.
Whether a trial court appropriately articulated a substantial and compelling reason for a
departure from the sentencing guidelines is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 265-266; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). With respect to the argument
defendant raises here, MCL 769.34(3)(b) provides that a court "shall not base a departure on an
offense characteristic or offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the
3
We note defendant's argument that the fracture itself was not, fortunately, as "serious" as it
could well have been according to the officer's treating physician. Defendant argues that,
therefore, the officer's fracture was not "a skull fracture or other serious bone fracture" under
MCL 257.58c(h). We disagree. Any skull fracture, regardless of its seriousness, qualifies and,
for the reasons stated above, we conclude that, similarly, any bone fracture within the spinal
column qualifies, regardless of its seriousness. Further, we note that there is testimony in the
record that the bone fracture could result in continuing problems for the officer in the future.
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appropriate sentencing range unless the court finds . . . that the characteristic has been given
inadequate . . . weight."
We do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. None of the offense
variables scored against defendant took into account the trial court's finding that defendant
showed a "complete disregard" for the officer's life. While points were scored under offense
variable 7 (OV 7) on the basis of a finding that defendant treated the officer with "terrorism,
sadism, torture, or excessive brutality," that does not amount to consideration of defendant's
having a complete disregard for the officer's life. Further, defendant makes no argument that the
offense variable scoring considered in any fashion whatsoever the thirty-four misconduct
citations he received previously while in prison. We conclude that there were substantial and
compelling reasons for the departure sentence imposed against defendant.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Bill Schuette
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