ELLEN D MCGHEE V BILL GENE HELSEL SR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ELLEN D. McGHEE,
FOR PUBLICATION
June 1, 2004
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 244125
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 01-000872-NI
BILL GENE HELSEL, SR.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Gage, P.J., and O'Connell and Zahra, JJ.
ZAHRA, J.
Plaintiff, who is not a Michigan resident, was involved in an automobile accident with
defendant in Michigan. Plaintiff alleges that defendant's negligence caused bodily injuries that
seriously impair her ability to function. The issue presented in this case is whether plaintiff, an
uninsured motorist in her home state at the time of the accident, may recover noneconomic
damages for her injuries under Michigan's no-fault insurance act. We hold that under the nofault insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., plaintiff 's status as an uninsured nonresident motorist
does not preclude her from recovering noneconomic damages. We reverse.
I. Facts and Procedure
Plaintiff is a resident of Indiana and her vehicle was registered and licensed in Indiana.
On January 15, 1999, plaintiff was traveling in Michigan when she was involved in an
automobile accident with defendant, a Michigan resident and a holder of a Michigan no-fault
automobile insurance policy. At the time of the accident, plaintiff did not maintain any type of
insurance policy on her automobile. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant
was at fault in the accident and that, in addition to economic damages, she was entitled to
noneconomic damages because the accident caused bodily injuries that resulted in "serious
impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement." MCL 500.3135(1). The trial
court granted summary disposition for defendant in regard to plaintiff 's claim for noneconomic
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damages. The trial court held that the Legislature designed the no-fault act to protect those who
avail themselves of the system, and it would be irrational to allow an uninsured nonresident
motorist to recover noneconomic damages while the no-fault act at the same time precludes an
uninsured resident motorist from recovery of such damages.1
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Rose v Nat'l Auction Group, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 NW2d 455 (2002). This case
also presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we similarly review de novo. Bingham
Twp v RLTD R Corp, 463 Mich 634, 641; 624 NW2d 725 (2001).
B. Discussion
Plaintiff argues that, as an uninsured nonresident motorist, she can recover noneconomic
damages under the no-fault act. We agree. In Colucci v McMillin, 256 Mich App 88, 94; 662
NW2d 87 (2003), this Court set forth the principles of statutory interpretation:
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the Legislature. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396,
411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999); Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, 456
Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). Initially, we review the language of the
statute itself. House Speaker v State Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d
539 (1993). If the statute is unambiguous on its face, the Legislature is presumed
to have intended the meaning plainly expressed and further judicial interpretation
is not permissible. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844
(1992).
"Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go
beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent." Sun Valley Foods
Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). An ambiguity of
statutory language does not exist merely because a reviewing court questions
whether the Legislature intended the consequences of the language under review.
An ambiguity can be found only where the language of a statute as used in its
particular context has more than one common and accepted meaning. Thus,
where common words used in their ordinary fashion lead to one reasonable
interpretation, a statute cannot be found ambiguous.
1
The parties later stipulated that plaintiff had no compensable economic loss damages, so the
trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff 's case in its entirety.
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The provisions of the Michigan no-fault act at issue here are unambiguous. Under MCL
500.3135(1), a motorist can be subject to tort liability for noneconomic damages caused by his
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle if the injured person suffered death, serious
impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. Plaintiff alleges that
defendant's use of his motor vehicle caused her to suffer injuries that meet this statutory
threshold. However, noneconomic "[d]amages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who was
operating his or her own vehicle at the time the injury occurred and did not have in effect for that
motor vehicle the security required by section 3101 at the time the injury occurred." MCL
500.3135(2)(c). Thus, the issue here is whether, at the time of the accident, plaintiff had "the
security required by section 3101."
The security required by ยง 3101 of the no-fault act is as follows: "The owner or
registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for
payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and
residual liability insurance." MCL 500.3101(1) (emphasis added). Because plaintiff 's vehicle
was not required to be registered in Michigan, MCL 500.3101 did not require plaintiff to carry
no-fault automobile insurance. Under MCL 500.3102(1), a nonresident owner or registrant of a
motor vehicle not registered in Michigan must maintain security if the vehicle is operated in
Michigan for an aggregate of more than thirty days in any calendar year. Plaintiff did not exceed
this thirty-day period. Thus, MCL 500.3135(2)(c) does not apply in this case and does not
preclude plaintiff from recovering noneconomic damages.2
In concluding that MCL 500.3135(2)(c) precluded plaintiff from recovering noneconomic
damages, the trial court stated that it is not rational to treat an uninsured nonresident motorist
differently from an uninsured Michigan resident. In essence, the trial court concluded that
allowing plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages in this case would lead to an absurd result.
Our Supreme Court set forth an "absurd result" rule in Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109; 247
NW2d 889 (1976): "[W]e must keep in mind the fundamental rule of statutory construction that
departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would
produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and
policies of the act in question." Our Supreme Court has since criticized and substantially limited,
if not eviscerated, the "absurd result" rule, agreeing "with Justice Scalia's description of such
attempts to divine unexpressed and nontextual legislative intent as 'nothing but an invitation to
judicial lawmaking.'" People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 156 n 2; 599 NW2d 102 (1999),
quoting Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (New Jersey: Princeton
2
MCL 500.3113(c) precludes a nonresident from recovering personal protection insurance
benefits for accidental bodily injury if, at the time of the accident, he was uninsured and an
occupant of a motor vehicle not registered in Michigan. However, this section does not limit the
recovery of noneconomic benefits.
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University Press, 1997), p 21. Thus, whether the plain meaning of a statute may be avoided
because its literal application results in an absurdity remains an open question in Michigan.
What is clear after McIntire, supra, is that the literal application of a statute cannot be set
aside merely because a reviewing court deems the result inequitable, unwise, or unintended.
"Absurd" has been defined as "utterly or obviously senseless, illogical, or untrue; contrary to all
reason or common sense; laughably foolish or false." Random House Webster's College
Dictionary (1997), p 6. A result is not absurd merely because reasonable people viewing a
statute with the benefit of hindsight would conclude that the Legislature acted improvidently.
Courts may not rewrite the plain language of the statute and substitute their own policy decisions
for those already made by the Legislature. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 405;
605 NW2d 300 (2000).
Our application of the unambiguous language of the no-fault act leads to a result whereby
it is financially safer to drive an uninsured out-of-state vehicle in Michigan than it is to drive an
uninsured Michigan vehicle in Michigan. It is possible that this is not the result intended by the
Legislature. Alternatively, this result may reflect an unwise legislative policy choice to ensure
that uninsured nonresident motorists will not be deterred from visiting our state. However
distasteful the result in this case may be to this Court, it is not an absurd result and it does not
give us license to avoid applying the unambiguous language of the no-fault act.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
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