PEOPLE OF MI V MARK DAVID SESSIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 18, 2004
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 251836
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 03-013545-AR
MARK DAVID SESSIONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Fitzgerald, JJ.
BANDSTRA, P.J. (dissenting).
While agreeing with the majority's statement of the principles that guide us in this
statutory construction case, I come to a different conclusion regarding the meaning of the statute.
The analysis I present here, when compared with that of the majority, illustrates that the
statute is not as "clear" or "straightforward" as the majority suggests; instead, judicial
construction is necessary. People v Weeder, 469 Mich 493, 497; 674 NW2d 372 (2004). The
majority presents a plausible construction of the language, but certainly not one required by the
words of the statute. Most notably, the majority's interpretation seems to read the statute's
"completed" as if it said "complied with" instead. In contrast to the majority's interpretation, I
would conclude that the language in MCL 750.224f(1)(c) means that, once probation has been
discharged, "all conditions of probation" have been "successfully completed" because there are
simply no conditions remaining. That remains the case and subsection c remains satisfied
regardless of any failure to comply with conditions of probation that might have occurred earlier,
while probation was still in effect.
That construction of subsection c of the statute is at least as plausible as that of the
majority. Further, it seems to comport better with the full statute and the manner in which it is
structured. In its main part, subsection 1 says that the felon in possession offense can occur
"until the expiration of three years after" the listed "circumstances." In subsections a and b, the
listed circumstances involve points in time when prior offenders complete aspects of their
penalties, i.e., when all fines have been paid and when all terms of imprisonment have been
served. My interpretation of the language in subsection c has it refer to a similar point in time,
i.e., when probation has been completed. That should be the triggering event under subsection c
without regard to any prior failure to comply with conditions imposed during the probationary
period.
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Finally, I do not find that the "intent" of the legislation as referenced by the majority
provides any assistance in interpreting the language at issue here. Anyone formerly convicted of
a felony could be considered to have a disregard for ordered society and to be a threat to public
safety. Nonetheless, the Legislature through the statute clearly provides that those felons can
legally possess weapons under certain circumstances. The "intent" of the statute affords no
assistance whatsoever in determining when or how the probation provision at issue here is to be
satisfied.
I would affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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