RAYMOND A WOLF JR V GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RAYMOND A. WOLF JR.,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 11, 2004
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247809
WCAC
LC No. 02-000353
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Donofrio, JJ.
DONOFRIO, J.
Defendant General Motors Corporation appeals, by leave granted, the Worker's
Compensation Appellate Commission's (WCAC) order affirming a magistrate's award of benefits
for a mental disability. The order was entered following a remand from the Supreme Court.
Because plaintiff 's perception of the employment events were reasonably grounded in fact or
reality, we affirm.
Plaintiff was a management supervisor for defendant. Plaintiff supervised between
thirty-five and thirty-nine production employees. According to plaintiff, the stress and pressure
associated with the position caused him to suffer from disabling depression.
Plaintiff filed a petition for, and was granted, an open award of benefits for a mental
disability. On appeal, the award was affirmed by the WCAC. This Court denied defendant's
application for leave to appeal in an unpublished order, entered April 18, 2001 (Docket No.
230444). Subsequently, our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded this
matter to the magistrate for consideration in light of Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465
Mich 732; 641 NW2d 567 (2002). 466 Mich 871 (2002).
Robertson reversed prior precedent, Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schools, 445 Mich 23;
517 NW2d 1 (1994), and set forth a new analysis for determining entitlement to benefits for
mental disabilities. Essentially, Robertson held that Gardner was inconsistent with the plain
language of MCL 418.301(2), which states that mental disabilities are compensable only when
"arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof." Gardner had
held that where a claimant seeks benefits for a mental disability, the focus is on whether an
actual employment event occurred, and the claimant's perception of that event, even if
misconstrued, was of no consequence. Robertson reversed this holding, concluding that, under
-1-
the plain language of MCL 418.301(2), an analysis of the claimant's perception of events is
required, and that benefits are appropriate only where, under an objective standard, the claimant's
perception is grounded in fact or reality, not delusion.
On remand, the magistrate concluded that Robertson does not change the outcome of this
case. The magistrate, finding plaintiff 's account of events credible, determined that plaintiff 's
job involved stress at all levels, from subordinates to superiors, and that the stressors encountered
by plaintiff were real events that reasonably translated into depression.
Defendant appealed the magistrate's decision to the WCAC, where, in a 2-1 decision, the
magistrate's decision was affirmed. The WCAC majority concluded that the magistrate's
analysis "precisely" fulfilled the requirements imposed by Robertson. However, the dissenting
commissioner opined that the magistrate failed to engage in the type of objective analysis of
plaintiff 's employment situation that is required by Robertson.
This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal the WCAC's decision. The
WCAC must review the magistrate's decision under the "substantial evidence" standard, while
this Court reviews the WCAC's decision under the "any evidence" standard. Mudel v Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 701; 614 NW2d 607 (2000). Review by this Court
begins with the WCAC's decision, not the magistrate's Id. If there is any evidence supporting
the WCAC's factual findings, and if the WCAC did not misapprehend its administrative
appellate role in reviewing the magistrate's decision, this Court should treat the WCAC's factual
findings as conclusive. Id. at 709-710. This Court reviews de novo questions of law in any
WCAC order. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). A
decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal if it is based on erroneous legal reasoning or the
wrong legal framework. Id. at 401-402.
The issue presented in this case is one of law. Defendant does not challenge the facts as
found below, but, instead, argues that the magistrate and the WCAC did not properly apply the
law to those facts. In particular, defendant contends that, under the facts of this case, Robertson,
mandates a denial of benefits. We do not find that the WCAC misapplied the law.
Here, plaintiff sought benefits for a mental disability. His entitlement to such benefits is
governed by MCL 418.301(2), which states:
Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not
limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if
contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant
manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual
events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof.
The first case to address MCL 418.301(2) was Gardner, supra. Gardner considered, in
particular, the second sentence of the statute and expressed an inability to harmonize the phrases
"actual events of employment" and "unfounded perceptions thereof." Gardner, supra at 43. The
Court stated that, because, to some degree, many, if not all, mental disabilities are based on
"unfounded perceptions" of "actual events," the statute "makes little sense." Id. at 43-44. The
Court went on:
-2-
Where the first part of the provision states that certain work-related mental
disabilities shall be compensable, the last part excludes the vast majority of all
mental disabilities, those based on unfounded perceptions of actual events. What
the legislative right hand gives, the left takes. [Id. at 44. (emphasis in original).]
Gardner ultimately concluded, "The statute, by excluding 'unfounded perceptions' of the actual
events of employment, excludes situations in which the claimed events never occurred (i.e.,
where they are imagined, hallucinatory or delusional)." Id. at 49. In essence, Gardner held that,
under the second sentence of MCL 418.301(2), the key is whether actual events of employment
occurred; a claimant's perception of those events, no matter how badly misconstrued, was
irrelevant.
Recently, in Robertson, our Supreme Court overruled Gardner. As mentioned, according
to Robertson, Gardner was inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 418.301(2). The Court
stated that, contrary to Gardner, the plain language of the statute "requires a distinct analysis
concerning a claimant's perception or apprehension of the actual events of employment."
Robertson, supra at 750. The Court indicated that the perception must be "founded," that is,
"based or grounded in fact." Id. The Court concluded:
[T]o satisfy the mental disability requirements of the second sentence of §
301(2), a claimant must demonstrate: (a) that there has been an actual
employment event leading to his disability, that is, that the event in question
occurred in connection with employment and actually took place; and (b) that the
claimant's perception of such actual employment event was not unfounded, that is,
that such perception or apprehension was grounded in fact or reality, not in the
delusion or the imagination of an impaired mind. [Id. at 752-753.]
The Robertson Court then went on to state that when determining whether a claimant's
perceptions were "founded," an objective standard is applied, i.e., "the factfinder must assess the
factual circumstances in terms of how a reasonable person would have viewed them." Id. at 755.
The Court made a point to note that there is a distinction between a claimant's perception of an
event and a claimant's reaction to that event, and it is only the former that is evaluated
objectively. The Court indicated that while a claimant's perception of an event must be
objectively based in fact, because a claimant with a psychological disability cannot be expected
to react to events in the same manner as a normal, healthy, individual, the claimant's reaction
may be atypical, and is therefore viewed subjectively. Id. at 754 n 10.
The Court summarized:
Thus, in applying the proper statutory test, the factfinder must first
determine whether actual events of employment indeed occurred. Then, in
analyzing whether a claimant's perception of the actual events of employment had
a basis in fact or reality, i.e., the claimant's perception was "founded", the
factfinder must apply an objective review by examining all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the actual employment events in question to determine
whether the claimant's perception of such events was reasonably grounded in fact
or reality. [Id. at 755.]
-3-
Applying Robertson to the instant case, there does not appear to be a dispute that actual
events of employment indeed occurred. The issue is whether plaintiff 's perception of actual
events was, under an objective standard, based in reality. The WCAC essentially concluded that
the magistrate properly found that plaintiff 's own testimony provided sufficient support for the
finding that plaintiff 's perception of the employment events was reasonably grounded in reality.
Plaintiff testified that he was "humiliated" by the behavior of certain coworkers, and that certain
production standards were "stressful." Certainly, the "behavior of certain coworkers" and
"certain production standards" are indeed actual employment events. However, plaintiff 's
characterization of those events as "humiliating" or "stressful" was based on his own subjective
perceptions. The question that must be answered in this case is whether that perception was
founded.
The second prong of the Robertson test requires an objective review of all the facts
surrounding the employment events to determine whether plaintiff 's perception of the coworkers'
behavior as "humiliating," and the production standards as "stressful," was reasonably grounded
in fact. The WCAC affirmed the magistrate's finding of objective reasonableness solely on the
basis of plaintiff 's own testimony and his characterization of the events. Defendant argues that
because the WCAC offered no analysis in regard to how a reasonable person would have viewed
the employment events that were perceived by plaintiff as humiliating and stressful, the WCAC's
analysis failed to sufficiently address the second prong of the Robertson test.
Here, the WCAC concluded that the magistrate, in his fact-finding role, had properly
applied an objective review by examining all the facts and circumstances surrounding the actual
employment events in question and then determined that plaintiff 's perception of the events were
reasonably grounded in fact or reality. The WCAC stated in its opinion, "[w]e believe it
unnecessary to remand the case simply for the magistrate to attach the label 'reasonable' to events
as plaintiff described them when the magistrate has accepted them as actual fact." The
magistrate found that the events that occurred during the course of plaintiff 's employment were
significant and real events. The magistrate also found, while engaging in an objective review of
all the facts and circumstances, that plaintiff 's perception of those real events was also grounded
in fact or reality. Because we agree with the WCAC that when the magistrate found the events
plaintiff described, as well as his perceptions of them, were actual facts, it follows that a
reasonable person must then find that both the events and plaintiff 's perception of them truly
existed or were "reasonably grounded in fact or reality."
In other words, we are not persuaded by defendant's view of the second prong of the
Robertson test because, essentially, defendant urges us to read a third element into the Robertson
test—a further inquisition requiring, in effect, outside corroboration. We agree that whether
plaintiff 's job was "high-pressure" and "stressful," and whether certain events were
"humiliating," is a matter of perception that, according to Robertson, must be evaluated by an
objective review of all the facts and circumstances of the employment events. However, we do
not agree that Robertson requires something more than an objective evaluation of the claimant's
perception of the events. Defendant argues that the magistrate offered no indication that an
objective evaluation was undertaken because, although the magistrate did state that plaintiff 's job
presented "objective" stressors, the magistrate offered no other evidentiary support for this
finding other than the magistrate's findings based on plaintiff 's own testimony.
-4-
Where defendant is misled is that, as the WCAC correctly pointed out, "it is only
necessary for the magistrate to decide whether plaintiff is credible regarding the occurrence of
the events and his reaction to those events." Under Robertson, the magistrate is charged with
determining how a "reasonable person" would have perceived the events that plaintiff perceived
as "humiliating" and "stressful." But, this test requires only that the magistrate determine if
plaintiff 's "perception of such events was reasonably grounded in fact or reality." Our Supreme
Court counseled that the inquiry ultimately seeks to ensure that the purpose of the statute is
fulfilled, i.e., that compensation apply to "mental disabilities that arose out of actual events of
employment, not to those that were attributable to the mere imaginings of the employee."
Robertson, supra, at 755 n 11. Hence, the magistrate's inquiry and application of Robertson was
proper and we find no error because, in conducting his objective evaluation, the magistrate
sought to determine if the events and plaintiff 's reactions were real and actual, and not delusional
or imaginary.
We find that the magistrate correctly applied Robertson, and affirm the WCAC's
conclusion that the magistrate properly applied an objective review, by examining all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the actual employment events in question, and determined that
plaintiff 's perception of the events was reasonably grounded in fact or reality.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.