LEXUS FINANCIAL SERVICES INC V TROMBLY TINDALL PC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LEXUS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
FOR PUBLICATION
March 30, 2004
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellee,
v
No. 243472
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-218597-PD
TROMBLY TINDALL, P.C.,
Defendant/Counter-plaintiff,
MICHAEL E. TINDALL,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/Appellant,
v
Updated Copy
June 18, 2004
CITY OF HARPER WOODS and
HARPER WOODS POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and O'Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
O'CONNELL, J.
Appellant Michael Tindall challenges the trial court's determination that his claim against
appellee Lexus Financial Services, Inc., should go to arbitration. We reverse in part and affirm
in part.
Appellant argues that he never signed an arbitration agreement with Lexus, so his claim
belongs in the circuit court. We agree. We recognize that the trial court's order effectively
granted summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(7). Therefore, we review de novo this
and the other legal questions presented. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817
(1999).
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Appellant's law firm signed a lease for a Lexus vehicle, and the lease included an
agreement to arbitrate. The firm defaulted on payments and Lexus repossessed the vehicle with
the help of the police and notwithstanding appellant's desperate and clumsy attempt to keep it in
his possession. When Lexus sued the firm for payments owed, appellant personally countersued,
alleging that Lexus violated his constitutional rights. Appellant then moved to send Lexus's
claims to arbitration pursuant to the lease, but refused to arbitrate his counterclaims. When the
trial court gave him the choice of having all the claims either tried or arbitrated, appellant agreed
to arbitration. Appellant also accepted the car in return for his firm placing in escrow overdue
payments and future payments as they became due. He now appeals the court's decision that he
must arbitrate his personal claims together with his firm's claims.
When parties have agreed to settle their disputes through federal arbitration, federal
policy requires trial courts to compel arbitration and dismiss all arbitrable claims. Kauffman v
Chicago Corp, 187 Mich App 284, 287, 292; 466 NW2d 726 (1991). A court may only compel
arbitration, however, when the parties have expressly agreed to arbitrate their dispute. Horn v
Cooke, 118 Mich App 740, 744; 325 NW2d 558 (1982). While appellant eventually agreed to
arbitrate his claims, it was only when faced with the Hobson's choice of either arbitrating all the
claims or trying all the claims, and neither of those options would have been proper. Because we
do not find a binding agreement between Lexus and appellant to arbitrate, appellant's personal
claims will remain in the trial court. His firm's claims, as well as Lexus's, will go to federal
arbitration. While we recognize that appellant's claims, if they possess any legal merit, may be
theoretically resolved by the result of the underlying arbitration, the arbitrator's decision alone
might not resolve appellant's claims and cannot legally bind him. Horn, supra. Therefore, we
must reverse the portion of the trial court's order that sent appellant's personal claims to
arbitration.
We will not disturb, however, the trial court's equitable attempt to maintain the status quo
by establishing an escrow account pending the arbitrator's decision. Trombly Tindall, P.C.,
abandoned its challenge to this escrow order by failing to brief the issue.1
We also note that appellant's constitutional claims appear to be spurious, and we
recommend that the trial court scrutinize them for any merit. If they lack merit, we suggest
dismissing them completely and considering sanctions that would properly deter such an abuse
of the court's resources and a waste of its time. Sanctions against appellant might also include an
appropriate monetary amount that would deter him from abusing the "seven-day rule" by
submitting orders that fail to comport in good faith with the court's verbal instructions. We make
1
The dissent has requested publication of this opinion in order to address the
bankruptcy/standing issue. We believe the issue may have merit; unfortunately, the issue was
not raised or decided in the lower court nor was it raised in the briefs or at oral argument. Under
these facts, we decline to address an issue that has not been briefed. After adequate briefing, the
parties may address this issue on remand.
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no decision on the propriety of these actions, leaving that determination to the trial court, which
has become most familiar with appellant and his legal tactics.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for disposition consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Fort Hood, J., concurred.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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