JOHN ABELA V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN ABELA and BARBARA ABELA,
FOR PUBLICATION
July 15, 2003
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 236238
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-018213-CK
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
September 12, 2003
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Murphy and Jansen, JJ.
MURPHY, J. (concurring).
I concur with the majority that we are required to conclude that warranty claims arising
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 USC 2301 et seq., may be subject to
valid binding arbitration agreements in light of the holdings in Davis v Southern Energy Homes,
Inc, 305 F3d 1268 (CA 11, 2002), and Walton v Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F3d 470 (CA 5,
2002). We are bound by the authoritative holding of a federal appellate court concerning
interpretation of a federal statute absent a conflict among the various federal appellate circuits.
Ann Arbor Housing Comm v Wells, 240 Mich App 610, 614 n 4; 618 NW2d 43 (2000). A
review of federal appellate case law reveals no conflict with the holdings in Davis and Walton,
supra, although there has been a split of authority in the federal district courts and in state courts
as acknowledged by the majority.
I also concur with the majority that plaintiffs' claim under Michigan's lemon law, MCL
257.1401 et seq., is precluded by the doctrine of preemption, which is predicated on the
Supremacy Clause, US Const, art VI, cl 2, and which mandates state courts to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 USC 1 et seq., regardless of state
law to the contrary, unless the state law concerns the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally. Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681, 686-688; 116 S Ct 1652;
134 L Ed 2d 902 (1996); see also DeCaminada v Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 232 Mich App 492,
498; 591 NW2d 364 (1998).
I write separately to merely voice my disagreement with the federal appellate court
rulings on the interpretation of the MMWA and the FAA. I agree with the dissenting opinion of
Chief Judge King in Walton, supra at 480. After a very reasoned analysis, Chief Judge King
concluded:
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Accordingly, because I find that Congress has not "directly spoken to the
precise question" whether binding arbitration clauses in written warranties
governed by the MMWA are enforceable, and because the FTC's construction of
the statute is eminently reasonable, I would defer to the Commission's expertise
and affirm the district court's judgment refusing to compel arbitration of the
Waltons' written warranty claims. [Id. at 492.]
If we were not obligated to apply the majority opinion from Walton and the holding in
Davis, I would conclude that the MMWA, as reasonably interpreted by the FTC,1 precludes the
application of binding arbitration agreements to claims arising under the MMWA for the reasons
set forth by Chief Judge King in Walton, supra at 480-492.
I concur.
/s/ William B. Murphy
1
Federal Trade Commission.
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