ADVANTA NATIONAL BANK V HOMER W MCCLARTY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR PUBLICATION
June 17, 2003
9:05 a.m.
ADVANTA NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
No. 236259
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-002287-CZ
3 S INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v
HOMER W. MCCLARTY, Trustee in Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Proceeding of RODERICK D.
TENNANT, d/b/a C. L. COUPE CUSTOM
HOMES,
Updated Copy
August 1, 2003
Defendant-Appellee
Before: Gage, P.J., and Wilder and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Advanta National Bank appeals as of right the trial court's grant of summary
disposition to defendant Homer W. McClarty. We affirm.
I
In July 1996, Roderick D. Tennant and his wife purchased vacant real property in
Macomb Township and began construction of a home. Erb Lumber, Inc., provided construction
materials for the property and on March 26, 1998, filed a claim of lien against the property with
the Macomb County Register of Deeds. On July 29, 1998, plaintiff 3 S Investment Group, Inc.,
loaned money to the Tennants and received a mortgage, which was recorded on September 3,
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1998.1 On September 26, 1998, the Tennants executed a mortgage with Advanta to secure a
loan, but the mortgage was not recorded until October 28, 1998. In the meantime, on October 2,
1998, before Advanta's mortgage was recorded, Erb Lumber initiated foreclosure proceedings on
its construction lien in the Macomb Circuit Court and recorded a notice of lis pendens. The only
parties named in this action were Roderick and Donna Tennant and Plymouth Capital Company,
Inc.
On March 8, 1999, the Macomb Circuit Court entered a "Default Judgment and
Judgments of Foreclosure of Construction Lien in Favor of Erb Lumber, Inc." Included within
the judgment was a four-month redemption period. A judicial forfeiture sale was conducted on
June 25, 1999, at which Erb Lumber was the highest bidder and, on July 19, 1999, the trial court
confirmed the sale and Erb Lumber received and recorded the clerk's deed of foreclosure.
On August 19, 1999, Roderick Tennant commenced individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
Thereafter, on motion of the bankruptcy trustee, defendant Homer McClarty, the bankruptcy
court authorized McClarty to borrow money to purchase the subject property from Erb Lumber.
On May 3, 2000, the bankruptcy court directed McClarty to conduct a sale of the property to
Roderick Tennant. The order directing the sale provided that the property was free and clear of
all liens and encumbrances, but also stated that any parties seeking to challenge the construction
lien foreclosure proceedings initiated by Erb Lumber were granted relief from the automatic stay
for the limited purpose of commencing action to challenge the proceedings and establish the
validity of their purported liens.
Thereafter, on June 2, 2000, Advanta and 3 S Investment filed the instant action,
requesting relief from the default judgment and Erb Lumber's construction lien judgment of
foreclosure. McClarty moved for summary disposition, arguing that Erb Lumber was not
required to name Advanta as a party to the foreclosure action because it had no actual or
constructive notice of Advanta's interest in the subject property on the date that it filed its
foreclosure action. Advanta filed a cross-motion for summary disposition, arguing that
subsection 117(4) Construction Lien Act, MCL 570.1117(4), required Erb Lumber to make
Advanta a party to the foreclosure action. Because Erb Lumber did not make Advanta a party to
the action, Advanta argued that its property interest was not extinguished. By way of a written
opinion and order, the trial court granted McClarty's motion for summary disposition, opining
that because Advanta had not obtained its mortgage until six months after Erb Lumber filed its
claim of lien, and because the mortgage was not recorded until approximately one month later
and several weeks after commencement of Erb Lumber's foreclosure action, Advanta's lien
interest was extinguished.
II
1
3 S Investment's claims were resolved through an "order authorizing settlement and
compromise of claims between the estate and 3 S Investment," which the United States
Bankruptcy Court entered on February 26, 2001. It is not a party to this appeal.
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We review de novo a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition.
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Issues of statutory
construction present questions of law that are also reviewed de novo. Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd
Comm'rs v Michigan Prop & Cas Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich 590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
III
A
Resolution of this case requires this Court to interpret § 117 of the Construction Lien Act
(CLA), MCL 570.1101 et seq. In Vugterveen Sys v Olde Millpond Corp, 454 Mich 119, 121;
560 NW2d 43 (1997), the Supreme Court addressed the purpose of the CLA and determined that
the act "was intended to protect the interests of contractors, workers, and suppliers through
construction liens, while protecting owners from excessive costs." Id. Further, the Court stated
that the act should be "liberally construed to effectuate these purposes." Id. The CLA contains a
substantial compliance provision, MCL 570.1302(1), which provides:
This act is declared to be a remedial statute, and shall be liberally
construed to secure the beneficial results, intents, and purposes of this act.
Substantial compliance with the provisions of this act shall be sufficient for the
validity of the construction liens provided for in this act, and to give jurisdiction
to the court to enforce them.
MCL 570.1117(4) states, in relevant part:
[E]ach person who, at the time of filing the action, has an interest in the
real property involved in the action which would be divested or otherwise
impaired by the foreclosure of the lien, shall be made a party to the action.
Advanta contends that this provision required Erb Lumber to make Advanta a party to the
foreclosure action and, because it did not, Advanta's lien was not extinguished.
While a strict reading of MCL 570.1117(4) may support plaintiff 's contention, only
substantial compliance with the statute is required in this case. The Supreme Court held that the
substantial compliance provision does not apply to all requirements of the CLA. Northern
Concrete Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Cos-Midwest Inc, 461 Mich 316, 321; 603 NW2d 257 (1999).
The scope of a statutory "substantial compliance" provision requires an
analysis, on a case-by-case basis, of the following logically relevant factors
among others: the overall purpose of the statute; the potential for prejudice or
unfairness when the apparent clarity of a statutory provision is replaced by the
uncertainty of a "substantial compliance" clause; the interests of future litigants
and the public; the extent to which a court can reasonably determine what
constitutes "substantial compliance" within a particular context; and, of course,
the specific language of the "substantial compliance" and other provisions of the
statute. [Id. at 321-322.]
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In applying these factors in Northern Concrete Pipe, the Court held that the substantialcompliance provision cannot be applied to extend the ninety-day statutory period for filing a
construction lien under the CLA.
Recently, however, this Court held that the substantial-compliance provision applies to
various provisions of the CLA. In Central Ceiling & Partition, Inc v Dep't of Commerce, 249
Mich App 438, 442; 642 NW2d 397 (2002), the majority of a panel of this Court held that the
substantial-compliance provision can be applied to determine if a lien claimant has met the
ninety-day statutory period.2 Also, in Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505; ___
NW2d ___ (2003), this Court interpreted § 110 of the CLA, MCL 570.1110, and held that the
substantial-compliance provision applied to determine whether a party satisfied the notice
requirement of MCL 570.1110(8).
There are, however, no cases determining whether the substantial-compliance provision
applies to MCL 570.1117(4). In this case, the trial court relied on Glanz & Killian Co v Garland
Mfg Co, 53 Mich App 210; 218 NW2d 791 (1974), to construe MCL 570.1117(4) and
determined that substantial compliance with the statute was sufficient to sustain the validity of
Erb Lumber's construction lien on the property. In Glanz, this Court determined whether, under
MCL 570.10, which was repealed by 1980 PA 497, an original mechanic's lien could be enforced
against a party that was not made a party to the original proceedings. Id. at 214. This Court held
that the original mechanic's lien could be enforced against the party who was not made a party to
the original proceedings where the action between the plaintiff and debtor was filed in July 1971
and the defendant had no recorded interest in the property until October 7, 1971.
We find Glanz to be of limited precedential value for two reasons: first, this Court in
Glanz was interpreting MCL 570.10, which was repealed by the current CLA, and, second, the
repealed MCL 570.10 expressly provided that only parties with recorded liens must be named as
parties to the foreclosure.3 In comparison, MCL 570.1117(4) does not differentiate between
naming recorded and unrecorded interests. However, to effect the Legislature's intent through
statutory construction, "the changes in the act must be construed in light of preceding statutes
and the historical legal development of . . . construction liens." MD Marinich, Inc v Michigan
Nat'l Bank, 193 Mich App 447, 452; 484 NW2d 738 (1992). Therefore, Glanz is beneficial in
gaining insight into the Legislature's intent.
2
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in that case on March 23, 2003.
3
MCL 570.10 provided:
Proceedings to enforce such lien shall be by bill in chancery, under oath,
and notice of lis pendens recorded in the office of the register of deeds, shall have
the effect to continue such proceedings. And in such proceedings, the
complainant shall make all persons having rights affected or to be affected by
such liens as recorded in the office of the register of deeds, and all persons
holding like items so recorded, and those having recorded notice of intention to
claim a lien, parties to such action.
-4-
Although it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a clear and unambiguous
statute warrants no further interpretation and requires full compliance with its provision, Tryc v
Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996), "the Legislature
provided an exception to that rule, in the form of the 'substantial compliance' provision."
Northern Concrete Pipe, supra at 320-321. Thus, the substantial-compliance provision can be
used to interpret a clear and unambiguous statute. While the plain language of MCL
570.1117(4) is clear, we find substantial compliance with the statute is consistent with Northern
Concrete Pipe.
In this case, application of the CLA's substantial-compliance provision supports
defendant's contention that notice to all known or recorded interests satisfies MCL 570.1117(4).
Here, substantial compliance with MCL 570.1117(4) would protect the rights of suppliers to
payment for materials by allowing construction liens to be foreclosed without the anxiety of
having to relitigate the merits of the original proceedings because of an unnamed party. See
Pitsch v ESE Michigan, Inc, 233 Mich App 578, 602; 593 NW2d 565 (1999). Conversely, the
rights of contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers to payment for wages and materials would be
hindered if they were required to name unknowable parties to foreclosure actions. Northern
Concrete Pipe, supra at 323. Moreover, concerns of prejudice or unfairness that may follow
from the uncertainty of permitting substantial compliance with MCL 570.1117(4) are minimized
because of mandatory compliance with recording statutes, filing a lis pendens, and following the
CLA's other notice requirements. Id. Finally, MCL 570.1117(4) concerns the requirements for
filing certain information with public officials and those providing for notice, and is the type of
provision to which the substantial-compliance provision may suitably be applied. Id. Analyzing
these factors and reviewing the current statute in relation to its predecessor, we find the
substantial-compliance provision applicable to MCL 570.1117(4). A lien claimant cannot be
made to find every possible party who claims to have some kind of interest in the property.
Instead, a lien claimant can only be required to notify every party who has a known or recorded
interest.4
In this case, Erb Lumber filed its claim of lien against the property on March 26, 1998.
The Tennants executed a mortgage on the property with Advanta on September 26, 1998;
however, the mortgage was not recorded until October 28, 1998. Before Advanta recorded its
mortgage, Erb Lumber initiated foreclosure proceedings on October 2, 1998. In foreclosing its
lien, Erb Lumber followed the procedures of the CLA. The foreclosure action was filed,
pursuant to MCL 570.1118(1), in the county where the property was located. Pursuant to MCL
570.1117(2), a notice of lis pendens was filed with the register of deeds in the county where the
property was located. Public notice of the judicial sale was provided in the Macomb County
Legal News on seven different occasions, and notices were posted in six separate places.
Most significant, in this case, is that there is no evidence that Erb Lumber had actual
notice of any alleged interest Advanta had in the property. Erb Lumber did not have notice at the
time it commenced foreclosure of any possible interest Advanta might have had. There was no
4
We note that other current lien statutes support this position as well. See, e.g., MCL 570.257.
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evidence produced that Erb Lumber learned of Advanta's interest any time thereafter.5
Moreover, Advanta had constructive notice of Erb Lumber's lien at the time it obtained its
mortgage interest. Erb Lumber filed a notice of lis pendens and notice of the foreclosure sale
was adequately published. Considering this, we conclude there was no reason for Erb Lumber to
make Advanta a party to the action between Erb Lumber and the Tennants. Therefore, Erb
Lumber substantially complied with the statute by giving notice to all known or recorded
interests.
B
Plaintiff is correct that it is a basic proposition of mortgage law that a junior mortgagee's
interest in property, if properly recorded before the commencement of proceedings to foreclose a
senior encumbrance, is not cut off by the foreclosure unless it is made a party to the proceedings.
See Avery v Ryerson, 34 Mich 362 (1876). However, the law is not as precise when the junior
mortgagee's interest is not recorded until after commencement of proceedings to foreclose the
senior encumbrance. In an attempt to support its position that its mortgage could not be
extinguished, Advanta cites National Acceptance Co of America v Mardigian, 259 F Supp 612
(ED Mich, 1966), for the proposition that when a junior mortgagee was not a party to the
foreclosure action, it has all the rights under its second mortgage that it would have had if there
had been no foreclosure of the senior mortgage. Id. at 617. In that case, the junior mortgage was
recorded after the senior mortgagee had filed an action to foreclose but before the foreclosure
sale took place. Id. at 614-615. The court held that the junior encumbrancer's right to foreclose
on its mortgage was not cut off by the foreclosure proceedings. Id.
Even if National Acceptance were precedentially binding, it is distinguishable for several
reasons. In that case, the senior mortgagee failed to file a notice of lis pendens. Here, as
previously addressed, Erb Lumber complied with all other provisions in the CLA. It has been
held in Michigan that a party who takes an interest in property that is the subject of a foreclosure
proceeding, and does so after a lis pendens has been properly filed, cannot move to prevent the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale. See Provident Mut Life Ins Co v Vinton Co, 282 Mich 84;
275 NW 776 (1937). More importantly, the junior mortgagee in National Acceptance attempted
to redeem its interest. In this case, Advanta made no attempt to redeem during the applicable
four-month redemption period.6 See MCL 570.1121(3). Most importantly, however, is the fact
5
We note that a minute amount of Roderick Tennant's deposition testimony was presented to the
lower court. During this testimony, Tennant suggested that he may have mentioned Advanta's
mortgage to Erb Lumber at some time, but he could not remember. This testimony was sketchy
and inconclusive as Mr. Tennant could not remember if he had in fact advised Erb Lumber of
Advanta's interest or when he might have done so. Therefore, it is insufficient to establish
knowledge on the part of Erb Lumber.
6
We note that Erb Lumber's construction lien was filed well before the Tennants executed a
mortgage with Advanta. Although Advanta acknowledged that title work was performed on the
property before closing with the Tennants, it has no explanation for why this title work did not
reveal Erb Lumber's lien interest. Further, there is no explanation for why Advanta's mortgage
was not recorded until almost a month after its execution.
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that in National Acceptance, the senior encumbrancer had notice of the junior mortgage for some
time before the judicial sale. Here, there is no evidence that Erb Lumber had notice of Advanta's
interest in the property. In summary, in this case, Erb Lumber properly recorded its lien,
properly initiated foreclosure proceedings, and properly filed a notice of lis pendens. Advanta's
alleged interest in the property was not recorded until after foreclosure proceedings were
initiated and a notice of lis pendens was filed.
It is well established that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale of a second mortgage takes the
property subject to the first mortgage, but the contrary is not true. Bd of Trustees of Gen
Retirement Sys of City of Detroit v Ren-Cen Indoor Tennis & Racquet Club, 145 Mich App 318,
322; 377 NW2d 432 (1985). By operation of MCL 570.1119(3), Erb Lumber had priority, and,
consequently, Advanta's mortgage was junior. MCL 570.1119(3) provides:
A construction lien arising under this act shall take priority over all other
interests, liens, or encumbrances which may attach to the building, structure, or
improvement, or upon the real property on which the building, structure, or
improvement is erected when the other interests, liens, or encumbrances are
recorded subsequent to the first actual physical improvement.
It is undisputed that Advanta's mortgage was recorded after the first actual physical improvement
of the property. The foreclosure of a senior mortgage extinguishes the lien of a junior mortgagee
where the junior mortgagee did not redeem at the foreclosure sale. Swarthout v Shields, 185
Mich 427, 431; 152 NW 202 (1915). Therefore, Erb Lumber's purchase of the property was not
subject to Advanta's junior mortgage, which was extinguished after the four-month redemption
period expired. Advanta claims it was prejudiced by lack of notice of the foreclosure sale.
However, as noted, Erb Lumber published notice of the sale on seven occasions in six different
places. Further, and most importantly, the construction lien was recorded before the mortgage
was executed and a notice of lis pendens was filed before the mortgage was recorded—all of
which provided notice to Advanta. Had Advanta properly checked the records and properly
recorded its mortgage when it was executed, Advanta would have been made a party to the
subsequent proceedings. Under the circumstances, any "prejudice" to Advanta was brought
about by Advanta's own negligence and lack of diligence. Thus, the trial court properly granted
summary disposition to McClarty.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
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