EMMETT CHASTAIN V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EMMETT CHASTAIN,
FOR PUBLICATION
December 27, 2002
9:20 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 222502
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 93-4415-NP
ON REMAND
Updated Copy
February 28, 2003
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hood and Sawyer, JJ.
WILDER, P.J.
This case is before this Court on remand from our Supreme Court, which vacated this
Court's judgment and directed reconsideration and clarification of a specific portion of our prior
opinion1 in lieu of granting leave to appeal. 467 Mich 888 (2002). On reconsideration, we
affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
A. The Accident
On March 25, 1991, plaintiff Emmett Chastain, an employee of Cashman Equipment
Company (Cashman), located in Elko, Nevada, was given two boxes of parts to deliver to
another Cashman employee. That employee worked out of Cashman's Round Mountain Gold
Mine Office. As was standard with such deliveries, plaintiff was to meet the Round Mountain
employee in Eureka, Nevada,2 at which time the boxes would be given to the Round Mountain
1
Chastain v Gen Motors Corp, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
November 30, 2001 (Docket No. 222502).
2
It appears that Eureka was the halfway point between Elko and Round Mountain. In any event,
it is undisputed that this was the city in which Elko and Round Mountain Cashman employees
would meet to exchange parts being delivered to the other location.
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employee. In order to reach Eureka, plaintiff was provided with a company-owned 1988
Chevrolet C/K pickup truck, one of several trucks used for deliveries.
Plaintiff testified that, before beginning the trip, he gave the truck a cursory look to "make
sure [the] tires were inflated," that the gauges looked good, and that "everything" looked all right
with the truck. Plaintiff also testified that he went to a gasoline station in order to "fill up" the
truck, put his seat belt on, and began the trip. In order to reach Eureka, plaintiff began driving
south on State Highway 278 at a speed of sixty miles an hour. At the time plaintiff began the
trip, the weather was clear and dry. However, sometime during the trip it began to snow, causing
plaintiff to slow to a speed of approximately fifty miles an hour. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff lost
control of the truck. According to plaintiff, the truck began to slide toward the opposite lane of
traffic, then began traveling backwards, eventually going off the road, where it hit a roadway
marker and a shallow embankment, rolled over, and began hitting things in a "very violent"
manner. The plaintiff also testified that he was ejected from the truck through the driver's side
window, landing on the ground on his back. Plaintiff found himself unable to move his legs and
seek assistance. He remained on the side of the highway until he was discovered by Jerry
Sestanovich, a local rancher.
After being on the scene for about ten minutes, Sestanovich was able to stop a passing
truck and ask the driver to call for help. Approximately ten minutes later, officers from the
Lander County Sheriff 's Department and the Eureka County Sheriff 's Department, as well as
emergency medical personnel, arrived at the scene. It is undisputed that upon their arrival,
plaintiff, either voluntarily or in response to questions asked of him, informed them that he had
been wearing his seat belt and therefore was confused and concerned about how he ended up
outside the truck.
B. Plaintiff 's Injuries
Plaintiff was treated at the scene by, among others, Dr. Rod Phillips. Dr. Phillips noticed
that while plaintiff appeared to be conscious and alert, he was complaining of pain in his neck
and abdomen and that his legs were cold and numb. Dr. Phillips also noticed that plaintiff was
ashen in color, having trouble breathing, spitting blood, and had a large contusion on his back
between his T-10 and T-12 vertebrae. On the basis of these symptoms and complaints, Dr.
Phillips believed that plaintiff probably suffered a spinal cord injury. Accordingly, after plaintiff
was stabilized, his neck and back were immobilized and he was transported by ambulance to the
Eureka Airport, where he was then taken by plane to the Washoe Medical Center. At the
Washoe Medical Center, Dr. Phillips' initial assessment was proved to be correct—plaintiff had
fractured his spine between the T-11 and T-12 vertebrae. Plaintiff then underwent a surgical
procedure known as a bilateral fusion in which Harrington Rods were inserted in order to
stabilize his spine. Despite these medical efforts, plaintiff was rendered a paraplegic, being
unable to use his legs or feel any sensation below his waist. In addition to the loss of use of his
legs, plaintiff, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the accident, was left sexually
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dysfunctional. He also has a neurogenic bladder,3 cardiovascular problems, and decubitus ulcers.
As a result, plaintiff requires attendant care to assist him with his daily routine.
C. Accident Investigation
The official accident investigation was conducted by Officer John Schweble of the
Nevada Highway Patrol, who arrived at the scene approximately 2 1/2 hours following the
accident. At that point, plaintiff had been taken to the hospital and no one was present at the
scene.4 Officer Schweble examined the accident scene and truck, took photographs and
measurements, and drew a diagram. After returning to Eureka, he also conducted interviews
with people who came to the aid of plaintiff immediately after the accident.
In examining the truck, Officer Schweble determined that the lack of tread on the rear
tires approached illegal levels. Officer Schweble also noted, on the basis of the witness
statement of Sestanovich, that plaintiff was driving approximately fifty miles an hour and that the
road conditions were snowy and icy at the time of the accident.5 Therefore, Officer Schweble
concluded, on the basis of the conditions of both the weather and the tires, that plaintiff was
driving at an unsafe speed, causing the truck to hydroplane and the plaintiff to lose control. He
also concluded, and was permitted to testify at trial, that plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt at
the time of the accident. Officer Schweble reached this conclusion even though he never
interviewed plaintiff, never touched, examined, or tested the seat belt, and had been informed by
Officer Mark Salopek, of the Eureka County Sheriff 's Department, that plaintiff told him and
others at the scene that he was wearing the seat belt at the time of the accident.
D. The Complaint, Discovery Requests, and Trial
3
A "neurogenic bladder" is defined as: "A urinary bladder functioning improperly or with
difficulty because of a lesion (injury or disorder) somewhere in the nervous system. Similarly, a
"cord bladder" is defined as: "A urinary bladder functioning improperly because of a lesion
(injury or disorder) in the spinal cord which affects the nerve mechanism controlling the
bladder." Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine & Word Finder (2000), p B-128.
In addition to the cord or neurogenic bladder, plaintiff lost control of his bowel functions
as well. As a result, in order to have a bowel movement, plaintiff must insert a suppository and
then digitally stimulate his rectum.
4
This is true even though officers from the Lander and Eureka County Sheriff 's Departments
were at the scene while plaintiff was still present.
5
That the road was snowy and icy was also corroborated by the witness statement and testimony
of William Hicks, who was the state highway employee responsible for plowing the road at the
time of plaintiff's accident.
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In September 1993, plaintiff filed the instant complaint against defendant and AlliedSignal, Inc.6 Specifically, plaintiff 's complaint alleged that the seat belt, known as a Joint
Development Company (JDC) buckle, was defective and that because of this defect, the buckle,
instead of restraining him, released either before or after the accident, causing him to be ejected
from the truck. Plaintiff contended that the buckle released either because it was "false latched"7
or because it was subject to inertial release.8
Before trial, on March 30, 1998, more than three years after the end of discovery, plaintiff
filed a motion to compel discovery. That motion requested production of the following
materials: (1) crash and sled tests conducted by General Motors in which the JDC buckle was
found unlatched at the conclusion of the tests; (2) General Motors test incident reports (TIRS)
that noted an unlatching problem with the JDC buckle, especially TIRS for post-1993 C/K
vehicles; (3) over 150 consumer reports of problems related to the JDC buckle; (4) documents
pertaining to preliminary evaluations, engineering analyses, and the recall of some C/K trucks,
including documents relating to the discovery of the conditions leading to the recall; and (5)
GM's "lawsuit list."
Plaintiff 's motion was heard on April 13, 1998. However, in lieu of deciding the issue,
the trial court assigned the case to another judge in the hopes that it could be settled. After
settlement proved to be impossible, the motion was again heard by the trial court. Because the
trial court believed that the requested information was irrelevant, the request was denied.9 Thus,
the case was scheduled for trial.
At trial, plaintiff called, among numerous witnesses, an engineering expert who testified
that the seat belt was defectively manufactured and that, as a result of this defect, the seat belt
was more likely to release because of either "false latch" or inertial release. Specifically,
plaintiff 's expert, Stephen R. Syson, testified that a particular part of the seat belt latch, known as
the banana slot or "L" shaped space is to have a maximum radius of two-tenths of a millimeter
and that the banana slot of the seat belt on the driver's side of plaintiff 's truck, however, had a
radius of approximately one millimeter. Therefore, according to plaintiff 's expert, because the
6
Plaintiff and Allied-Signal reached a settlement before trial; accordingly, Allied-Signal is not a
party to this appeal. The claim was brought against both defendant and Allied-Signal because the
seat belt in question had been designed, tested, and manufactured by Allied-Signal on behalf of
defendant.
7
"False latch" means that a seat belt buckle appears to be properly latched; however, for various
reasons, the seat belt is not properly latched and therefore releases when force is applied.
8
"Inertial release" means that because of the force and acceleration of a crash, parts within the
seat belt are moved, causing it to release from the lock.
9
Specifically, the court stated that it did not "think there was relevance because I don't think it
would come in under 407 [subsequent remedial measures], and I'm going to deny your request."
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radius of the banana slot was about five times larger than it should have been, the seat belt had a
higher probability of being false latched or coming unlatched because of inertial release.
Syson also testified that he was able to false latch the seat belts in the truck driven by
plaintiff about one out of three times he attempted to do so.10 Syson went on to testify that
according to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 209, if a seat belt is false latched it is
supposed to unlatch whenever the force upon it is five pounds or less; however, the seat belts in
plaintiff 's truck were, according to Syson's tests and testimony, able to withstand anywhere from
six to over fifty pounds of force before the tongue would separate from the buckle. Syson
indicated during his testimony that this was unsafe because it meant that a falsely latched seat
belt could remain buckled until the time someone is involved in an accident, only then to release
during the accident, causing injury to the occupant.
In contrast to plaintiff 's theory, defendant sought to rebut plaintiff 's contention that
plaintiff 's seat belt was defective or that it could have come unlatched during an accident.
Defendant called expert witnesses to testify that the seat belt was not defective and that, even if it
was defective, plaintiff 's seat belt would not have come unlatched during this accident. Thus,
defendant's main defense was that plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the
accident. In an effort to prove this, defendant not only called Officer Schweble to testify that, in
his opinion, plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt, but also called witnesses to testify that if
plaintiff had been wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident, plaintiff would have suffered
injuries to the left side of his arm, his left armpit, and the left side of his neck. In addition,
defendant relied on the testimony of plaintiff 's own witnesses to prove the supposition that there
would have been noticeable marks on plaintiff 's body if he had, in fact, been wearing the seat
belt at the time of the accident.
On March, 15, 1999, the jury returned a verdict, voting five to one in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Officer Schweble's Testimony
In its order of remand, the Supreme Court instructed us to reconsider and clarify the
portion of our prior opinion addressing the trial court's decision to admit Officer John Schweble's
lay opinion testimony, in which he opined that plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt at the time
of his injury. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated:
The Court of Appeals is directed to clarify whether or not it found error in
the trial court's evidentiary ruling in question and, if so, to determine whether the
10
Syson testified that it is possible to attempt to achieve a false latch by holding down the seat
belt release button while inserting the seat belt latch into the buckle.
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error was harmless under the appropriate harmless-error test applicable to civil
cases, i.e., whether declining to grant a new trial, set aside a verdict, or vacate,
modify, or otherwise disturb a judgment or order "appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice." See MCR 2.613(A). Also see Cox v Flint
Board of Hospital Managers, 467 Mich 1, 15 (2002).
Before trial, plaintiff moved in limine to exclude Officer Schweble's opinion testimony
that plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident on the basis that he was not
qualified to render an expert opinion in this area. The trial court denied plaintiff 's motion, ruling
that the officer could offer his lay opinion on this subject under MRE 701. During trial, Officer
Schweble testified that in his opinion, plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt, and plaintiff
objected that there was insufficient foundation for the officer to provide his testimony in this
regard.11 The trial court admitted Officer Schweble's opinion testimony over plaintiff 's
objection.
11
Officer Schweble testified at trial as follows:
Q. Can you tell the jury what your opinion is about whether the plaintiff
was wearing a seat belt?
A. As I indicated on my report that I indicated that I felt that he—that they
were not used that day.
Q. Now, what was it that you based that opinion on?
A. Because the defendant was ejected from the vehicle and the seatbelts
were there, you know, and the vehicle—I looked at them, I didn't test them, but
they looked like they were in workable order and that's where I formulated my
opinion because he was ejected.
* * *
Q. Did you take that information [that plaintiff had stated to other
individuals that he was wearing his seat belt] into account when you developed
your opinion that you didn't believe that he had a seat belt on?
* * *
A. I took it into account but I just went from the facts that I found at the
scene, from the evidence at the scene and that's what I formulated my opinion on
that he wasn't wearing it.
* * *
(continued…)
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On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly admitted Officer Schweble's
testimony in violation of MRE 701. That rule provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Plaintiff argues that Officer Schweble's testimony was not "rationally based on the perception of
the witness." On reconsideration, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting Officer
Schweble's opinion testimony, because his testimony was based on his perceptions at the scene of
the accident.
(…continued)
Q. Does your past experience serve as the basis for your opinion here?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Can you tell us what it is about your past that had some affect [sic] on
your opinion here?
A. Because I have had other incidents where I have investigated accidents
where people have said they have their seat belt on and after questioning them a
little bit they have admitted that they didn't.
Q. Is that one of the reasons that you concluded, based on what you saw at
the scene, that the plaintiff wasn't wearing his seat belt?
* * *
A. Yes, I did.
* * *
Q. Trooper, can you tell us why it is that you did not just take the word of
the plaintiff that was related to you from these other witnesses and rely on that and
just say, okay, I'll say he was belted?
* * *
A. Because I was just going by physical evidence at the scene.
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As this Court recently stated in Bachman v Swan Harbour Assoc, 252 Mich App 400,
438; 653 NW2d 415 (2002):
The decision whether to admit evidence is within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. . . .
An abuse of discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the
facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or
excuse for the ruling made, Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App
185, 188; 600 NW2d 129 (1999), or the "result is so palpably and grossly
violative of fact and logic that it evidences perversity of will, a defiance of
judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias," Barrett v Kirtland Community
College, 245 Mich App 306, 325; 628 NW2d 63 (2001).
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we cannot state that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting Officer Schweble's opinion that plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt.
Officer Schweble testified that he based his conclusion on the physical evidence on the scene,
including his observations that plaintiff had been ejected from the vehicle and that the seat belt
was in the retracted position and appeared to be in working order.
Plaintiff asserts that this Court's decision in Miller v Hensley, 244 Mich App 528; 624
NW2d 582 (2001), required exclusion of Officer Schweble's testimony. We disagree, because
Miller is distinguishable from the present case. In Miller, this Court found that the trial court had
improperly admitted the opinion testimony of two police officers who stated that the plaintiff
motorist was at fault for the accident at issue because she entered the intersection on a yellow
light. Id. at 531. The officers in Miller did not observe the accident, however, and based their
conclusion only on statements made to them by witnesses to the collision. Id. The Court
concluded, "Because the officers' testimony that plaintiff was at fault for the collision was not
rationally based on their own perceptions, the testimony was not admissible under MRE 701."
Id.
Rather than Miller, we find that the facts in the instant case are more analogous to the
facts in Richardson v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 213 Mich App 447, 455-456; 540 NW2d 696
(1995), and Mitchell v Steward Olford & Sons, Inc, 163 Mich App 622, 629-630; 415 NW2d 224
(1987), where this Court held permissible the admission of police officers' lay opinion testimony
regarding fault in automobile accidents even though the officers did not observe the actual
collisions. Richardson, supra at 455; Mitchell, supra at 629-630. In each of these cases, this
Court held that police officers were permitted to testify about their conclusions regarding such
factors as vehicle speed and position derived from the officers' observations of skid marks
created at accident scenes, because the officers' conclusions were rationally based on the officers'
perceptions. Richardson, supra at 455; Mitchell, supra at 629-630.
Similarly, Officer Schweble's opinion was rationally based on his perception of the
evidence that he found at the scene of the accident. We disagree with plaintiff 's contention that
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Officer Schweble formed his opinion on the basis of his past experience in investigating
automobile accidents and his awareness that on occasion, people who, in the course of accident
investigations, initially said they were wearing seat belts later admitted that they had not been
wearing them. A careful examination of Officer Schweble's testimony establishes that although
his opinion in this case was consistent with conclusions he had drawn in other cases he had
investigated, his past experience did not form the basis of his opinion testimony. Plaintiff
correctly argued that, because Officer Schweble was not offered as an expert witness, his
testimony about his past investigative experiences and how they related to his investigation of
this accident was inadmissible on the basis that such testimony was collateral to the officer's lay
opinion. However, the trial court's error in admitting this portion of Officer Schweble's
testimony is not of a kind or sort that the failure to disturb the judgment in this case would be
inconsistent with substantial justice. Therefore, the error in admitting this portion of the
testimony was harmless. MCR 2.613(A); Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 15;
651 NW2d 356 (2002).
B. Special Jury Instruction
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested special
jury instruction. We disagree. We review a trial court's decision regarding jury instructions for
an abuse of discretion. Joerger v Gordon Food Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173; 568 NW2d
365 (1997). When a party so requests, a court must give a standard jury instruction if it is
applicable and accurately states the law. MCR 2.516(D)(2). Nonetheless, we will not find error
requiring reversal if, on balance, the trial court adequately and fairly conveyed the applicable law
and theories of the parties to the jury. Stevens v Veenstra, 226 Mich App 441, 443; 573 NW2d
341 (1997).
Plaintiff 's requested jury instruction stated: "I charge you under Michigan law that an
automobile manufacturer like General Motors Corporation is liable for negligence in
manufacture or inspection of parts of an automobile directly related to its safe operation even if
the defective part was supplied by others." In lieu of the special instruction, the trial court
provided the jury with the following jury instruction, modeled after the first paragraph of SJI2d
15.05: "If you decide that defendant General Motors Corporation was negligent and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a defense that the conduct of
Allied[-]Signal, who is not a party to this suit also may have been a cause of this occurrence."
The court did not provide the jury with the second paragraph of SJI2d 15.05.
After reviewing the record in the instant case, it is apparent that plaintiff requested the
special jury instruction only in the event that the trial court decided to instruct the jury with the
second paragraph of SJI2d 15.05. The record also reveals that plaintiff agreed with the trial
court's jury instructions as given. Thus, because plaintiff acquiesced in the trial court's decision
to provide only the first paragraph of SJI2d 15.05 in lieu of the special jury instruction, plaintiff
is not entitled to any relief with regard to this issue. Hilgendorf v Saint John Hosp & Medical
Ctr Corp, 245 Mich 670, 683, 696; 630 NW2d 356 (2001); Dresselhouse v Chrysler Corp, 177
-9-
Mich App 470, 477; 442 NW2d 705 (1989). Further, because the trial court also instructed the
jury pursuant to SJI2d 25.31, and provided the jury with plaintiff 's theory of the case, which
pointed out that since defendant chose Allied-Signal to design and manufacture the seat belts in
plaintiff 's truck, defendant was responsible for any defect in those buckles, it is evident that the
jury was not misled or confused by the failure to give plaintiff 's requested jury instruction and
that it was adequately and fairly conveyed the applicable law and the theories of the parties.
Hilgendorf, supra at 696, quoting Grzesick v Cepela, 237 Mich App 554, 559; 603 NW2d 809
(1999); Stevens, supra at 442. Accordingly, because we are unable to find error that is
inconsistent with substantial justice, the jury verdict will not be reversed. Hilgendorf, supra at
696.
C. Discovery Requests
Plaintiff further contends that the trial court erred in denying his discovery request that
defendant be compelled to produce all crash and sled tests documents where the JDC buckle
released during the test and also erred in denying plaintiff 's discovery request for all civil claims,
consumer complaints, and incident reports filed against defendant alleging that a JDC buckle
opened during an accident. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the information regarding these
tests is relevant because the tests involved the exact type of seat belt plaintiff 's truck was
equipped with at the time of the accident and that, even if inadmissible as a subsequent remedial
measure under MRE 407, the information should have been discoverable. Again, we disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a discovery request for an
abuse of discretion. Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 614; 572 NW2d 679
(1997); Mercy Mt Clemens Corp v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 219 Mich App 46, 50; 555 NW2d 871
(1996).
Here, plaintiff sought to discover tests and documents pertaining to vehicles
manufactured several years after the truck plaintiff was driving on the day in question. In
addition, the test results requested by plaintiff did not pertain to accidents similar to the one in
which plaintiff was involved.12 Thus, it is impossible for us to conclude that had defendant
provided plaintiff with the requested material, plaintiff would have been able to find evidence
that made it more probable that plaintiff 's seat belt was negligently designed. See MRE 401. In
addition, because plaintiff never indicated how the requested material was substantially similar to
plaintiff 's accident, the court was within its discretion to deny the discovery request. See
Haberkorn v Chrysler Corp, 210 Mich App 354, 368-369; 533 NW2d 373 (1995).
We also note that a trial court is within its discretion to limit discovery when it becomes
excessive or abusive. In re Hammond Estate, 215 Mich App 379, 387; 547 NW2d 36 (1996);
12
The recall involving 1994-95 C/K pickups dealt with concerns involving seat belts releasing in
frontal collisions, not rollover accidents. In addition, the seat belts involved in the recall
involved energy management loops that were not present on plaintiff 's seat belt.
-10-
Hartmann v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc, 194 Mich App 25, 29; 486 NW2d 53 (1992). Here,
the additional discovery was requested eight years after the accident, almost five years after the
complaint was filed, and more than three years after discovery was closed. In addition, the trial
had been adjourned several times previously, plaintiff had indicated at the April 13, 1998, motion
hearing that he was almost ready for trial, and it is apparent that plaintiff sought the extra
discovery in an effort to open a new theory of the case. We are unable to find an abuse of
discretion from these facts.
Finally, the fact that the trial court ostensibly denied the discovery request on the basis of
MRE 407 has no effect on our determination. Because the trial court reached the right result, this
Court should not reverse the trial court's decision regarding this discovery request. See
Hilgendorf, supra at 685, n 8, citing Glazer v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432, 437; 506 NW2d 570
(1993).
III. Conclusion
In sum, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff 's discovery
requests, did not err in refusing to read plaintiff 's special jury instruction, did not err in admitting
Officer Schweble's opinion testimony based on his perceptions at the scene of the accident, and
committed harmless error in permitting testimony on collateral matters, we are not persuaded that
the jury verdict was in error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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