WAYNE CNTY BD OF COMMISSIONERS V WAYNE CNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, THE COUNTY OF
WAYNE, RICARDO A. SOLOMON, KAY
BEARD, ROBERT B. BLACKWELL and JEWEL
WARE,
FOR PUBLICATION
September 24, 2002
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiffs,
v
No. 241521
THE WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, WAYNE DORAN, THE STATE
OF MICHIGAN, JOHN ENGLER, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, GREG
ROSINE, EDWARD MCNAMARA, RAYMOND
WOJTOWICZ, THOMAS NAUGHTON and
LESTER ROBINSON,
Defendants.
WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, THE COUNTY OF WAYNE,
RICARDO A. SOLOMON, KAY BEARD,
ROBERT B. BLACKWELL and JEWEL WARE,
No. 242406
Plaintiffs,
v
THE WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT
AUTHORITY,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant,
and
WAYNE DORAN, THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
JOHN ENGLER, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
-1-
TRANSPORTATION, GREG ROSINE, EDWARD
MCNAMARA, THOMAS NAUGHTON and
LESTER ROBINSON,
Updated Copy
December 6, 2002
Defendants,
and
RAYMOND WOJTOWICZ,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff.
Before: Hood, P.J., and White and O'Connell, JJ.
HOOD, P.J.
Plaintiffs, who commenced this original action1 pursuant to 2002 PA 90 (MCL 259.108 et
seq.) and MCR 7.206, seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the context of their constitutional
challenge to Act 90. Plaintiffs object to the transfer by Act 90 of operational jurisdiction of two
airports from Wayne County to a statutorily created airport authority. Defendant Raymond
Wojtowicz, the Wayne County Treasurer, filed a cross-complaint seeking in part a declaration
regarding the procedures for the transfer of money and assets pursuant to Act 90. This Court
directed the parties to file cross-motions for summary disposition.
2
We hold that plaintiffs' Headlee violation claim regarding the requirement of Act 90 that
a county continue to employ airport employees who choose not to transfer to the airport authority
is not ripe for adjudication and thus do not decide this issue. Plaintiffs may raise this claim in
future litigation should the number of airport employees who choose not to transfer prove to be
more than de minimis. With regard to plaintiffs' claim that the employee pensions constitute an
unfunded new activity under Headlee, we observe that under Act 90, subsection 117(1)(d), the
airport authority assumes, and is responsible for paying, the pensions. Finally, we hold that
plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that Act 90 is unconstitutional as alleged in
the remaining counts of their amended complaint. Accordingly, we grant summary disposition in
1
This Court is authorized to hear certain original actions. Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit
Judges, 465 Mich 559, 566; 640 NW2d 567 (2002).
2
Jurisdiction for this original action is provided for in Act 90 itself:
The validity of the creation or incorporation of the authority shall be
conclusively presumed unless questioned in an original action filed in the court of
appeals within 60 days after the creation or incorporation of the authority under
this chapter. The court of appeals has original jurisdiction to hear an action
under this subsection. The court shall hear the action in an expedited manner.
The state transportation department is a necessary party in any action under this
subsection. [Act 90, subsection 110(4) (emphasis supplied)].
-2-
favor of defendants and dismiss plaintiffs' claims, except for the Headlee claim relating to the
transferring employees, with prejudice.
I
History
Signed by the Governor in March of 2002, Act 90 amended the Michigan Aeronautics
Code, adding chapter VIA, "the public airport authority act," MCL 259.108 to 259.125c. In part,
Act 90 created an airport authority to manage and oversee the Detroit Metropolitan Airport
(Metro Airport) and Willow Run Airport.3 Plaintiffs initiated the instant action against
defendants4 to preclude that authority from managing the airports.
Appearing as plaintiffs are the Wayne County Board of Commissioners and four
individual commissioners,5 as well as the County of Wayne. The Board of Commissioners
(hereafter the commission) is the legislative body of Wayne County. Wayne County was
organized as a charter county pursuant to the state constitution, Const 1963, art 7, § 2, and
pursuant to statute, MCL 45.1. The Wayne County Home Rule Charter, adopted in November of
1981 and effective in 1983, sets forth the powers of the commission. Under the charter, the
commission has the authority to, among other things, adopt resolutions, appropriate funds, levy
taxes, authorize borrowing, approve county contracts, approve appointments made by the county
executive, override a veto of the county executive by a 2/3 majority, approve rules of county
departments, and exercise powers granted by law to other counties unless expressly prohibited.6
In 1927, 1927 PA 182, gave Wayne County the authority to acquire land for Metro
Airport, which was established in 1928. Before the enactment of Act 90, the county operated
Metro Airport under the authority of the Michigan Aeronautics Code, MCL 259.1 et seq.7
3
For ease of reference, this opinion will refer primarily to Metro Airport, although the airport
authority oversees Willow Run as well.
4
For ease of reference, certain defendants in the instant action will be referred to as "the state
defendants," which include: the state of Michigan, the Governor of Michigan (John Engler), the
Michigan Department of Transportation, and the Michigan Department of Transportation
Director (Greg Rosine). Other defendants, "the county defendants," include: the Wayne County
Airport Authority (the WCAA), the Wayne County Airport Authority Chairman (Wayne Doran),
the Wayne County Executive (Edward McNamara), the Wayne County Chief Financial Officer
(Thomas Naughton), and the Wayne County Airport Authority Director (Lester Robinson). The
Wayne County Treasurer (Raymond Wojtowicz) has filed a cross-complaint.
5
Those commissioners include: Ricardo Solomon, Chairman of the Commission; Kay Beard,
Vice-Chair; Jewell Ware, Vice-Chair Pro Tem; and Robert Blackwell, Chairman of the
commission's Committee on Airports.
6
See County Charter, § 3.115 and MCL 46.11.
7
For a time, the Wayne County Road Commission operated Metro.
-3-
Plaintiffs note that the value of the property and assets of Metro Airport and Willow Run Airport
exceeds $2.1 billion and the annual revenue exceeds $200 million.8
In the 1990s, allegations of mismanagement of Metro Airport arose. In 1999, the state
Legislature created a five-member joint committee9 to investigate the mismanagement. In
October of 2001, the committee10 issued a 200-page report11 identifying general problems, which
included improper procedures for airport contracts,12 auditing discrepancies,13 a management
culture with questionable ethical conduct,14 and difficulties with the airport police.15
As a result of that report, the Michigan Legislature introduced bills to address the
mismanagement issues. Before that legislation was passed, the county executive, the Governor,
and business leaders reportedly agreed on the creation of a new authority to operate the airport.16
Apparently, that agreement culminated in Senate Bill 690 which, in turn, was adopted by the
Legislature as Act 90.17
8
Note that the airports are funded completely by landing fees, concessions, parking, rental, and
other revenues generated from airport activities. Report of the Michigan Senate Detroit Metro
Airport Review Committee, October 25, 2001, p 1.
9
The committee consisted of five senators—two Democratic and three Republican.
10
The two Democratic senators on the committee ultimately declined to sign the report but the
three Republicans senators included their signatures as approving it.
11
The full report may be found at www.senate.state.mi.us/gop/airportreport/fullreport.pdf.
12
For example, the Waterland Trucking, Inc., employee parking lot expansion contract involved
substantial change orders, initiated by Airport management: "Ten change orders totaling over
$250,000 (45 percent of the original lump sum amount) were added to the contract for a total
price of over $803,000. Amazingly, three of the ten change orders were issued after the October
19, 1997, completion date." Neither the original contract, nor the change orders, were approved
by the commission. Report of the Michigan Senate Detroit Metro Airport Review Committee, p
183.
13
The senate report reflects that "[t]he Commission consistently approves Airport budgets that
do not reflect the Airport's actual expenditures. For example, in Fiscal Year 1995-96, the
Commission appropriated $295,767,450, yet the Airport maintains it spent only $143,766,538."
Senate Report, p 82.
14
As one example, the investigator learned that county employees regularly failed to timely
submit annual disclosures of conflict of interest, and although this is an offense meriting
sanctions, the investigator could not determine whether any county employee had been
disciplined. Senate Report, pp 57-58.
15
For instance, three airport police officers were assigned to security detail for the Wayne
County Executive. Senate Report, p 95.
16
See the House Legislative Analysis, SB 690, March 12, 2002.
17
The House passed Act 90 with a vote of seventy-five yeas and thirty-one nays; the Senate
passed it with twenty-eight yeas, eight nays and two excused absences. Therefore, each house
passed the bill with more than a two-thirds vote.
-4-
Act 90
Act 90 adds a chapter, the "public airport authority act," to the Michigan Aeronautics
Code. As indicated in the revised title of the act, Act 90 provides for the incorporation of "public
airport authorities" (PAAs) and provides for the transfer of airport management to PAAs. PAAs
automatically will be created for only "qualified airports," which are those with ten million or
more enplanements18 in a twelve-month period,19 Act 90, subsection 109(n). A local government
with airports that are not "qualified," may declare an intention to incorporate a PAA, subsection
110(3).20 A PAA will be considered a public agency of the local government: "Except as
otherwise provided under this chapter, an authority created under or pursuant to this section shall
be a political subdivision and instrumentality of the local government that owns the airport and
shall be considered a public agency of the local government for purposes of state and federal
law," subsection 110(1).21 A PAA also appoints the airport manager, subsection 110(1).
A PAA, in turn, is governed by a board that consists of seven members, subsections
109(d), (e). The Governor appoints two board members, the executive officer of the local
government (in this case, the Wayne County Executive) appoints four members and the local
government that owns the airport (in this case, the commission) appoints the final board member,
subsection 111(2). The initial appointees will be allotted terms of two to eight years,
respectively, with later full-term appointments to be six years, subsection 112(1), and board
members may not serve more than two terms, subsection 112(2). In general, board members may
not have ties to the airport or a conflict of interest, subsection 111(5). The board appoints a chief
executive officer, who then appoints a chief financial officer, who will be responsible for
receiving all monies. Subsections 111(8), (9). Other sections of Act 90 pertain to board
18
"Enplanements" essentially parallel the number of passengers. The statute defines an
enplanement as "a domestic, territorial, or international revenue passenger who boards an aircraft
at an airport in scheduled or nonscheduled service of aircraft in intrastate, interstate, or foreign
service and includes an in-transit passenger who boards an international flight that transits an
airport in the United States for nontraffic purposes," Act 90, subsection 109(g).
19
Plaintiffs assert that Metro Airport currently is the only "qualified" airport in Michigan
(Amended Complaint, p 8, ¶ 27). It had sixteen million enplanements in 2001. House
Legislative Analysis, SB 690, March 12, 2002.
20
If a local government declares such an intent, the local government must hold a public hearing
before a PAA may be created, subsection 110(3), which is not true for Metro Airport because Act
90 automatically creates the PAA in Wayne County.
21
Plaintiffs, however, contend that Act 90 "expressly states that the newly created airport
authority is a separate public corporation and agency of the state of Michigan." Plaintiffs did not
provide a citation for that conclusion, but stated in oral argument that a PAA cannot be a county
agency because Act 90, § 116 gives PAAs greater powers than those conveyed to other local
agencies under the Wayne County Charter. The plain language of § 110, however, provides that
PAAs are local agencies, which is discussed further in the opinion.
-5-
meetings and various policies.22 Act 90 also sets forth the financial aspects of PAAs, including
methods of raising revenue and bonds.23
Once a PAA is created, the local government that owns the airport must not impede the
PAA's exercise of powers, must refrain from selling or transferring airport facilities without the
PAA's consent, must cure any defects in title to airport facilities, must grant any necessary
easements or licenses, and must maintain the airport roads, subsection 118(3). Further, if the
PAA so requests, the local government must provide transitional services regarding the airport
operation until the PAA assumes those services; the PAA will pay the government for those
services, subsection 118(4). When operational jurisdiction has been transferred to a PAA, the
legislative body of the local government may, with the PAA's consent, pledge its full faith and
credit for the obligations of the PAA, advance funds to the PAA, and grant or convey real or
personal property to the PAA, subsection 125(1).
Finally, § 125c is a severability clause and provides:
If any portion of this chapter or the application of this chapter to any
person or circumstances is found to be invalid by a court, that invalidity shall not
affect the remaining portions or applications of this chapter, which can be given
effect without the invalid portion or application, as long as the remaining portions
are not determined by the court to be inoperable; and to this end, this chapter is
declared to be severable. [Act 90, § 125c.]
The Transfer
In August of 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an airport
operating certificate to the WCAA, thus setting in motion the "approval date"24 process pursuant
22
Section 113 sets forth the parameters of the board's meetings. Subsections 114(1), (2), (3)
discuss auditing and an auditing committee, as well as procedures for the selection and retention
of a certified public accounting firm. Subsections 114(4), (5) discuss the duties of a PAA's chief
executive officer. Subsection 114(6) involves contracting policies; subsection 7, leasing;
subsection 8, minority businesses; subsection 9, conflicts of interest; and subsection 10, an ethics
manual. Section 115 discusses the budget and section 116 identifies a PAA as a public body and
sets forth the powers of a PAA.
23
A PAA may raise revenue, but may not levy a tax or special assessment, § 120. Under § 122, a
PAA may issue self-liquidating bonds. A PAA also may borrow money or issue municipal
securities, § 123. PAA-issued bonds and other indebtedness are free from taxation, § 124.
Under § 125a, a PAA may enter into an interest rate exchange or swap, with certain conditions.
Section 125b discusses bonds.
24
Act 90 defines "approval date" as
the effective date of the issuance by the [FAA] to the authority assuming
operational jurisdiction of an airport of a certificate under part 139 of chapter 14
of the code of federal regulations with respect to the airport, and the concurrence
by the FAA of the designation of the authority as a sponsor of the airport,
(continued…)
-6-
to Act 90. On the approval date, the WCAA assumed the operational jurisdiction of Metro
Airport, which, under statute, includes "the exclusive right, responsibility, and authority to
occupy, operate, control, and use the airport and the airport facilities . . . ." Act 90, subsection
117(1)(a). That right includes "operational jurisdiction" over airport facilities.25 Act 90,
subsection 117(3)(a). Further, the WCAA acquired all contracts with airlines, tenants,
concessionaires, leaseholders, and others; financial obligations; cash balances and office
equipment, subsection 117(4).
Under Act 90, the transfer of authority from the county to the WCAA may not impair any
contracts with airlines, vendors, tenants, bondholders, or certain other parties, subsection 118(1).
Upon the transfer, the WCAA assumed all further costs and responsibility arising from the
control of the airport, "except as otherwise required under obligations retained by the local
government under this chapter or as otherwise agreed by the local government." Act 90,
subsection 118(2).
Once the transfer occurred, county employees working at Metro Airport could choose to
transfer to the WCAA for employment. Those employees who choose not to transfer to the
WCAA "shall be reassigned" within the county. For one year, the county may not reduce the pay
or benefits of any county employee into whose position a county employee who was previously
employed at the airport is reassigned. Act 90, subsection 119(2). The parties dispute the number
of county employees who work at Metro and who have declined to transfer to the WCAA.
Defendants claim that the number is two; plaintiffs claim that the number ultimately could be as
high as seven hundred given that employees have one year in which to make their decision.
The Federal Suit
Meanwhile, on April 22, 2002, plaintiffs26 filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In addition to the defendants to this action, plaintiffs
also named as defendants in the federal suit the FAA and its administrator, Jane Garvey. That
case, however, was dismissed pursuant to an order of June 25, 2002, signed by United States
District Judge John Corbett O'Meara, who granted plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal and
dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint without prejudice.27
(…continued)
including the FAA's approval of the assignment of existing grant agreements to
the authority. [Act 90, subsection 109(c).]
25
Such facilities "includ[e], but [are] not limited to, all terminals, runways, taxiways, aprons,
hangars, aids to air navigation, emergency vehicles or facilities, parking facilities for passengers
and employees, and buildings and facilities used to operate, maintain, and manage the airport,
subject to any liens . . . ." Act 90, subsection 117(3)(a).
26
Note that Wayne County was not named as a party plaintiff in the federal suit.
27
At the time this opinion was drafted, the federal case was pending, because plaintiffs had filed
a motion to alter or amend the dismissal in response to the possibility that the federal court would
award attorney fees to defendants.
-7-
The Instant Suit
On May 24, 2002, plaintiffs filed the instant original action in this Court, Docket No.
241521. In plaintiffs' amended complaint, they allege: the transfer of authority will impair the
county's contractual obligations to bondholders contrary to the state and federal constitutions
(count I); Act 90 is contrary to the Headlee amendment of the Michigan Constitution because it
requires new activities that are unfunded (count II); the transfer to the airport authority will cause
the county to default on contractual obligations to third parties (count III); certain directives to
county officials under Act 90 constitute a prior restraint on political speech (count IV); Act 90 is
constitutionally invalid given the limited power of the Legislature over local units of government
(count V); Act 90 contravenes the Michigan Constitution, which prohibits the lending of credit
by the county to any public or private agency (count VI); Act 90 is invalid under the Title-Object
Clause where Act 90 interferes with the Revenue Bond Act of 1933 (count VII); Act 90 is invalid
under the Michigan Constitution as special or local legislation (count VIII); and the Federal
Aviation Act preempts Act 90 (count IX). Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare Act 90 invalid and
enjoin the transfer of funds to defendants, to declare unenforceable the directives of Act 90
regarding the actions of Wayne County officials, and to declare Act 90 unconstitutional.
The Cross-Complaint
Defendant Raymond Wojtowicz, the Wayne County Treasurer, filed a cross-complaint on
June 28, 2002, Docket No. 242406, seeking in part a declaration regarding the procedures for the
transfer of money and assets pursuant to Act 90. Wojtowicz alleges that the instant suit
challenges not only Act 90, but his right to transfer money and assets to the WCAA (CrossComplaint, ¶ 11). Wojtowicz states that he faces the potential of civil and criminal sanctions if
he transfers assets to the WCAA in the event that any of the alleged defects are established in the
instant litigation (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 12).
Expedited Proceedings in this Court
Pursuant to Act 90's mandate, this Court proceeded to give expedited consideration to the
cases, which it consolidated. In the first seven weeks the cases were pending, the parties filed a
dozen motions. The Court thereafter ordered that the cases proceed to a full hearing and held a
status conference on August 8, 2002. On that date, the Court issued a scheduling order, with oral
argument to occur on September 24, 2002. The Court held an additional status conference on
September 3, 2002.
The Bypass
In the interim, on August 19, 2002, the Governor sent an executive message to our
Supreme Court, requesting it to authorize this Court to certify the questions raised in the instant
litigation. The Supreme Court thereafter issued an order directing this Court to accelerate its
briefing and oral argument schedule in order to deliver its opinion no later than September 24,
2002. In re Executive Message from the Governor, 467 Mich 1209 (2002).
II
-8-
This action invokes myriad standards of review. Plaintiffs have asked this Court to rule
on the constitutionality of Act 90. Review of the constitutionality of a statute presents a question
of law. Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 Mich 1, 5; 626 NW2d 163 (2001). A party challenging the
facial constitutionality of a statute must establish that no circumstances exist under which it
would be valid. Taylor v Gate Pharmaceuticals, 248 Mich App 472, 477; 639 NW2d 45 (2001),
lv gtd 466 Mich 889 (2002). "'The fact that the . . . [a]ct might operate unconstitutionally under
some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient . . . .'" Council of Organizations & Others
for Ed About Parochiaid, Inc v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 568; 566 NW2d 208 (1997) (quoting
United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 [1987]). In this case,
then, the panel must determine whether Act 90 is capable of any construction that would make it
constitutional. See Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Dep't of Treasury, 239 Mich App 70,
76; 608 NW2d 141 (1999), aff 'd 463 Mich 995 (2001). A party challenging the facial
constitutionality of a statute faces an extremely rigorous standard. Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v
Michigan, 459 Mich 291, 310; 586 NW2d 894 (1998).
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116.
Defendants have raised MCR 2.116(C)(8), which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff 's claim on
the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief may be
granted. Koenig v South Haven, 460 Mich 667, 674; 597 NW2d 99 (1999). The court must grant
the motion if no factual development could justify the plaintiff 's claim for relief. Id.
The parties likewise rely on MCR 2.116(C)(10). In deciding a motion pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), we consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence
submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v Rozwood,
461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Where the proffered evidence fails to establish
a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
at 120. A litigant's mere pledge to establish at trial that a genuine issue of material fact exists is
not sufficient to overcome summary disposition. Id.
III
A
The parties have raised interesting issues regarding whether plaintiffs have the legal
capacity to sue, whether plaintiffs have standing on each issue,28 and whether Wayne County
should remain as a party plaintiff. Those procedural issues, however, do not affect the ultimate
question of the constitutionality of Act 90. We therefore decline to rule on defendants' motions
28
Judge O'Connell notes that, in his view, plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims under
count I, the impairment of contracts, because plaintiffs cannot show the requisite harm.
Likewise, plaintiffs do not have standing, in his opinion, to bring count III, the impairment of
third-party contracts. Judge O'Connell also is of the opinion that Wayne County should be
dismissed as a party plaintiff to this lawsuit. Under the present factual circumstances, the Wayne
County Board of Commissioners has neither the capacity nor the standing to represent the entity
known as Wayne County.
-9-
to dismiss on those grounds. Given our Supreme Court's mandate in In re Executive Message
from the Governor, supra, this Court will proceed immediately to an analysis of the
constitutional issues.
B
In count I of their amended complaint, plaintiffs assert that the transfer of authority to the
WCAA will impair Wayne County's obligations to bondholders, which is contrary to the federal
and state constitutions. We disagree.
Plaintiffs contend that the commission has enacted ordinances to borrow funds to
improve the facilities at Metro Airport and that the funds are to be repaid through the "revenues
produced by the County's operation and management of [Metro and Willow Run] Airports." The
county thereafter issued municipal bonds, which remain outstanding. Plaintiffs assert that a
condition of those bonds is that the county would "not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise dispose
of all or any part of the properties constituting the Airport."
In arguing that Act 90 is unconstitutional, plaintiffs rely on the following provision: "No
bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted."
Const 1963, art 1, § 10 (emphasis supplied). See also US Const, art I, § 10. Plaintiffs allege that
Act 90 will interfere with the county's obligations under contract in two ways: (1) it will cause a
breach of the county's commitment to the bondholders because the county no longer will have
control over the revenues that are the primary source of repayment for the bonds and (2) it will
cause the county to breach its pledge not to sell, transfer, assign, or otherwise dispose of the
property while the bonds are outstanding (Amended Complaint, p 15, ¶ 54). We begin, however,
with the presumption that the legislation is constitutional. Ray Twp v B & BS Gun Club, 226
Mich App 724, 728; 575 NW2d 63 (1997). Thus, plaintiffs have the burden of proving that Act
90 violates the constitution.
In examining Contract Clause claims, this Court has adopted the federal balancing
approach, which weighs the extent of the impairment on the rights and obligations of the
contracting parties against the state's police power to regulate in the public interest. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Michigan v Governor, 422 Mich 1, 21; 367 NW2d 1 (1985). It requires courts
to undertake the following analysis:
1—The first inquiry is "whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship" . . . .[29]
2—A critical factor to be considered in determining the extent of the
impairment is "whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been
regulated in the past. . . ."
29
"[T]he severity of the impairment determines the height of the hurdle the act must clear."
Ludington & N R Co v Epworth Assembly, 188 Mich App at 25, 41; 468 NW2d 884 (1991).
-10-
3—If the impairment is minimal, then there is no unconstitutional
impairment of contract and our inquiry may end at this step.
4—If, however, the impairment is severe, then there are two further
inquiries, both of which must be affirmatively shown to justify the legislative
impairment:
a) Is there a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the
regulation, and
b) If there is a legitimate public purpose, are the means adopted to
implement the legislation reasonably related to the public purpose? [Id. at 23.]
Legislation regarding the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties must be based
on reasonable conditions and serve a legitimate public purpose. Ludington & N R Co v Epworth
Assembly, 188 Mich App 25, 41; 468 NW2d 884 (1991). One aim of Act 90 is the improved
operation of Michigan's airports, which qualifies as a legitimate public purpose. In its specific
application here, Act 90 removed management control of Metro Airport from the county (and the
commission) and placed control with the WCAA. Given plaintiffs' concession that Metro
Airport had been poorly managed in the past,30 the attempt by Act 90 to cure the management
deficiencies at Metro would be a legitimate public purpose.
Plaintiffs argue that the transfer to the authority by way of §§ 117 and 118 of Act 90
impairs their contract with the bondholders because the county no longer has control of the
source of revenue to repay the bonds where it has transferred the airport to the WCAA. The
following sections of Act 90 are pertinent:
(c) The authority assumes, accepts, and becomes liable for all of the
lawful obligations, promises, covenants, commitments, and other requirements in
respect of the airport of the local government that owns the airport, under the
operational jurisdiction of the authority, whether known or unknown, contingent
or matured, but excepting any full faith and credit pledge of the local government
in respect of bonds issued by the local government for airport purposes . . . . [Act
90, subsection 117(1)(c).]
* * *
(2) Upon the transfer of operational jurisdiction over an airport pursuant
to section 117, a local government shall be relieved from all further costs and
responsibility arising from or associated with control, operation, developments,
and maintenance of that airport, except as otherwise required under obligations
30
Plaintiffs stated in their motion: "The[] audits [prompted by the commission] . . . revealed a
pattern of mismanagement and corrupt practices [at Metro]."
-11-
retained by the local government under this chapter or as otherwise agreed by the
local government. [Act 90, subsection 118(2).]
Although Act 90 requires the transfer, it also provides that the PAA—in this case the
WCAA—accepts the liability for those bonds. Thus, both the revenue and the obligations under
the bonds are transferred to the WCAA. Therefore, with respect to the bonds, we cannot
conclude that Act 90 operates as a substantial impairment of contract. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
supra, holds that if the impairment is minimal, then the analysis ends—no constitutional
impairment exists.
Further, we are not convinced that the transfer of the operational jurisdiction from
plaintiffs to the WCAA is, as plaintiffs complain, "directly contrary to the express contractual
commitment made by the County to . . . existing bondholders." The pledge not to transfer airport
property was meant to ensure that assets necessary to generate the revenue remain dedicated to
that purpose. That fact has not changed: the airport property will remain subject to airport
purposes and the revenue will continue to fund the bonds. Plaintiffs simply have not shown that
the bondholders have a contractual entitlement to retain the commission as the airport manager,
as distinguished from a new agency controlled by the board as set forth by the statute.
We do not find dispositive United States Trust Co v New Jersey, 431 US 1; 97 S Ct 1505;
52 L Ed 2d 92 (1977), a case on which plaintiffs rely, because in that case the New Jersey
legislature attempted to repeal a condition of the bonds that barred the use of port revenues to
fund passenger rail service. In contrast, Act 90 does not operate to change a condition of the
bonds so that airport revenue could be used to finance, for example, subway mass transit. Thus,
United States Trust involved a change in the permissible use of revenues in relation to the bonds,
a matter of vital concern to the bondholders. This case does not involve the repeal of a promise
regarding the use of revenue and is not brought by bondholders.
Assuming arguendo that the contract is substantially impaired, plaintiffs still do not
prevail. As plaintiffs characterize it, the alleged impairment to the bonds here cannot be
maintained if "an evident and more moderate course would serve [the Michigan Legislature's]
purposes equally well." See 431 US 29. Considering that plaintiffs themselves admit that Metro
has been poorly managed for years, and that plaintiffs were the entities responsible for operating
Metro for those years, the Legislature's transfer of operational jurisdiction meets the test in
United States Trust. Further, the Contract Clause cases consider whether the industry at issue has
been regulated in the past. Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra at 23. It is axiomatic that the airline
industry is highly regulated at the federal, state, and local levels. The same may be said of
municipal bonds. Accordingly, plaintiffs have been playing in a field subject to many previous
regulations.
C
Plaintiffs next assert, in count II of the amended complaint, that Act 90 imposes an
"unfunded" requirement that violates the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 29. In their
motion, plaintiffs rely on the second sentence of § 29:
-12-
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion
of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local
Government by state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of
any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required
by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state
appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any
necessary increased costs. The provision of this section shall not apply to costs
incurred pursuant to Article VI, Section 18. [Const 1963, art 9, § 29 (emphasis
supplied).]
The purpose of this sentence31 was to ensure that the state would fund any new activity or fund
any increase in the level of any activity required by the state. Wayne Co Chief Executive v
Governor, 230 Mich App 258, 265; 583 NW2d 512 (1998). In other words, Headlee focuses on
state-mandated activities requiring local funding. Detroit Mayor v Michigan, 228 Mich App 386,
401; 579 NW2d 378 (1998), aff 'd in part and vacated in part 460 Mich 590; 597 NW2d 113
(1999). Specifically, the above sentence becomes operational only by "a mandate that requires
local units to perform an activity that the state previously did not require local units to perform or
at an increased level from that previously required of local units." Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v
Michigan, 460 Mich 590, 606; 597 NW2d 113 (1999).
Our Supreme Court has interpreted that the Legislature intended the Headlee Amendment
to apply only to increases in the level of those services and activities that state law mandates in
the first instance. Livingston Co v Dep't of Management & Budget, 430 Mich 635, 643; 425
NW2d 65 (1988). The Legislature intended § 29 to impose an obligation on the state in relation
to each unit of local government with respect to mandated activities as well as new requirements.
Schmidt v Dep't of Ed, 441 Mich 236, 251; 490 NW2d 584 (1992). The Headlee Amendment
was intended to limit legislative expansion of requirements placed on local government
spending, to limit excessive government spending, and to lower taxes at both the state and the
local level. Mahaffey v Attorney General, 222 Mich App 325, 341; 564 NW2d 104 (1997).
Plaintiffs first take issue with Act 90, subsection 119(2), which requires the county to
reassign airport employees who do not elect to transfer to the WCAA. As previously indicated,
the parties dispute the number of nontransferring employees. Indeed, any number would be
purely speculative where the employees have a year in which to choose to transfer. We therefore
decline to address this issue at this time because it is not ripe. See Straus v Governor, 459 Mich
526, 544; 592 NW2d 53 (1999). Plaintiffs may raise this issue at a future date should the number
of nontransferring employees prove significant.
Plaintiffs then argue that Act 90, subsection 119(3) is unfunded because it requires the
county to contribute to the pensions of WCAA employees until the WCAA forms its own
31
The sentence has been referred to as a Prohibition-of-Unfunded-Mandates Clause, or POUM.
Adair v Michigan, 250 Mich App 691, 694; 651 NW2d 393 (2002).
-13-
pension plan. Defendants conceded at oral argument that, under Act 90, subsection 117(1)(d),32
the WCAA assumes unfunded obligations relative to pensions. Accordingly, we declare that the
WCAA is responsible for funding the employee pensions pursuant to Act 90, subsection
117(1)(d).
Next, plaintiffs assert that Act 90, subsection 118(3)(c) impermissibly requires the county
to assume the costs of airport title insurance, legal fees, and acquisition costs. To support their
allegations regarding the title and the transfer, plaintiffs merely argue: "Again, these are new
activities or services for which no appropriation or disbursement has been made." Plaintiffs have
failed to demonstrate that they are entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law on this
point. Maiden, supra. It is logical to conclude that, as owner of the airport, the county has been
responsible for title insurance, legal fees, and acquisition costs since the inception of Metro,
which would mean that the insurance, fees, and costs were not new activities. Moreover,
plaintiffs have not shown that Act 90 differs from what state law required of local units in 1978
regarding airport title insurance, legal fees, and acquisition costs, as is required under a Headlee
analysis, see Judicial Attorneys Ass'n, supra, 460 Mich 606-610.
Plaintiffs also contend that an unfunded activity results from the following passage of Act
90, subsection 111(9):
The treasurer of any local government receiving or having custody of
money or other property belonging to an authority under this chapter shall
promptly transfer the money and other property to the custody of the chief
financial officer of the authority.
Plaintiffs argue that the transfer increases the burden on general fund revenues to pay for fixed
obligations that were incurred in part in reliance on airport revenues. Plaintiffs do not, however,
explain or demonstrate how the Headlee Amendment is implicated by this provision of Act 90.
D
Plaintiffs next argue in count III of their complaint that Act 90 will cause the county to
default on obligations to third parties in violation of the Impairment of Contracts Clause. As we
decided in relation to plaintiffs' count I, we conclude that Act 90 does not operate to impair the
county's contracts.
Plaintiffs contend that the establishment of the airport authority will deprive the county of
revenue and contributions previously promised to pay contracts and other obligations incurred for
services and for capital improvements to support airport operations. According to plaintiffs, Act
90 permits, but does not require, the airport authority to honor those obligations. (Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 69-70.)
32
That section provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he authority assumes unfunded obligations to
provide pensions or retiree health insurance . . . ." Act 90, subsection 117(1)(d).
-14-
With respect to existing contracts, the statute requires the WCAA to honor those
contracts. Act 90 provides for the assumption of liabilities by the airport authority. See, e.g.,
subsection 118(1), which provides: "The transfer of the operational jurisdiction over an airport
to the authority may not in any way impair any contracts with airlines, vendors, tenants,
bondholders, or other parties in privity with the local government that owns the airport . . . ." See
also subsection 117(1)(c), cited in footnote 45, infra. Therefore, Act 90 plainly states that the
transfer will not impair contracts.
Plaintiffs appear to further assert that the transfer will result in lost revenues to the
county, which will then result in the county's failure to meet its contractual obligations to third
parties. We note that plaintiffs' claims under this issue are purely speculative. Plaintiffs claim
that Act 90 would "sever" the airport from the county, which "will likely cause the County to
default on obligations to its creditors." Plaintiffs have not provided specific facts to support this
allegation, but merely allege that at some future date the county might be unable to meet its
financial obligations. Without more, plaintiffs have not shown they are entitled to summary
disposition. See Latham v Nat'l Car Rental Systems, Inc, 239 Mich App 330, 336; 608 NW2d 66
(2000).
Moreover, plaintiffs have not described an impairment of the obligation of contract; they
have merely asserted that the legislation may have collateral economic consequences to the
county. The same is true respecting plaintiffs' contention that the county "may" lose $17.2
million in revenues "if" the airport chooses to obtain from elsewhere certain services now
provided by the county. Plaintiffs produce no substantiation for their claim that the WCAA will
choose to obtain those services elsewhere or, more importantly, that the WCAA's choice would
interfere with a specific contract.
Plaintiffs also complain that certain services provided by county departments will not be
reimbursed. Plaintiffs rebuff defendants' reliance on subsection 118(4), which provides:
At the request of an authority, a local government that owns a qualified
airport over which operational jurisdiction has been transferred to an authority
shall provide the authority with transitional services previously performed by the
local government and related to the operation of the qualified airport until the date
the authority elects to assume these services. The reasonable cost of these
services shall be paid by the authority. [Act 90, subsection 118(4) (emphasis
supplied).]
Plaintiffs appear to be arguing that the WCAA may choose not to retain the county's services or
may not fully reimburse it. These arguments do not fall within the constitutional protection of
the Impairments of Contracts Clause. The county has no constitutional right to be the chosen
vendor for airport services and the enactment of Act 90 does not automatically mean that the
county would not be paid or would be underpaid.
Plaintiffs argue that Act 90 interferes with services provided by Information Technology
and Imaging & Office Technology. Plaintiffs have not, however, shown an impairment of a
specific contract. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that an impairment of contracts occurs where
-15-
the county purchased hardware and software on its assumption that it would retain operation and
management control of Metro.
E
Plaintiffs next raise a First Amendment claim, arguing that provisions of Act 90 that
direct county officials to take certain actions upon penalty of criminal and civil prosecution
constitute a prior restraint on political speech (Amended Complaint, count IV, p 20, ¶¶ 74-76).
We reject this claim.
Plaintiffs cite a portion of subsection 110(2) as an example of the violation of their right
to free speech:
Officials and employees of the local government and the authority shall
actively cooperate with the local government, the authority, this state, and the
federal government to the end that the FAA will recognize the authority as the
sponsor of the qualified airport, and to obtain FAA approval of the transfers
contemplated by this chapter.
Insofar as this section relates to the FAA, plaintiffs' argument on this point is moot: the FAA has
given its approval and has recognized the WCAA as the sponsor of Metro.
Plaintiffs next cite the following subsection of Act 90:
(9) If a local government previously acted as a sponsor and action by, or
concurrence of, the local government is required to complete a project related to
the airport or airport facilities, the local government shall not withhold, condition,
or delay concurrence with any authority action necessary to complete the project
in accordance with obligations under applicable federal law, regulations, and
assurances associated with accepting grants from the FAA or any other agency of
the United States or this state. [Act 90, subsection 116(9).]
Plaintiffs also complain about the transfer, under § 117, of rights, title, and interest in the
fixtures, equipment, materials, furnishings, and other personal property owned and used by the
airport to the WCAA. Finally, plaintiffs refer to subsection 118(3), which provides:
(3) A local government that owns an airport for which an authority has
been created or incorporated under this chapter shall comply with all of the
following:
(a) Refrain from any action that would impair an authority's exercise of the
powers granted to the authority under this chapter or that would impair the
efficient operation and management of the airport.
(b) Refrain from any action to sell, transfer, or otherwise encumber or
dispose of airport facilities owned by the local government for which operational
-16-
jurisdiction has been transferred without the consent of the authority and, where
necessary, the [FAA].
(c) Take all action reasonably necessary to cure any defects in title to
airport facilities over which an authority has been transferred operational
jurisdiction.
(d) At the request of an authority that has been transferred operational
jurisdiction of an airport owned by the local government, grant any license,
easement, or right-of-way in connection with the airport to the extent the authority
has not been empowered to take these actions.
(e) Upon creation or incorporation of an authority and before the approval
date, conduct operations of the airport in the ordinary and usual course of
business.
(f) Maintain and repair, including providing snow removal for, any road
providing ingress and egress to the airport over which responsibility for
maintenance and repair is retained by the local government pursuant to agreement
or law. [Act 90, subsection 118(3).]
These provisions of Act 90 are simply incomparable to cases involving core political speech
issues, e.g., Buckley v American Const Law Foundation, Inc, 525 US 182; 119 S Ct 636; 142 L
Ed 2d 599 (1999) (involving the circulation of ballot-initiative petitions), or McIntyre v Ohio
Elections Comm, 514 US 334; 115 S Ct 1511; 131 L Ed 2d 426 (1995) (regarding the
distribution of anonymous leaflets opposing a tax levy). In contrast, Act 90 does not implicate
plaintiffs' free speech rights under the First Amendment; hence, we decline plaintiffs' invitation
to rule that Act 90 burdens their core political speech.
F
In count V, plaintiffs next contend that Act 90 is invalid under the constitution because
the local government, not a PAA, is to have control over public places such as airports. Plaintiffs
first argue that the Legislature did not have the power to create a local unit of government, a
PAA, to manage airports. Plaintiffs do not acknowledge Const 1963, art 7, § 27, which provides
in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution the legislature
may establish in metropolitan areas additional forms of government or authorities
with powers, duties and jurisdictions as the legislature shall provide. [Const
1963, art 7, § 27 (emphasis supplied).]
Consequently, the Legislature had the power to create PAAs in metropolitan areas.
-17-
In tandem with this argument, plaintiffs contend that PAAs are not actually local
government units, but instead are state agencies. We refer to subsection 110(1) of Act 90, which
provides:
[A]n authority created under or pursuant to this section shall be a political
subdivision and instrumentality of the local government that owns the airport and
shall be considered a public agency of the local government for purposes of state
and federal law. [Act 90, subsection 110(1) (emphasis supplied).]
In interpreting statutes, courts give effect to the intent of the Legislature by reviewing the plain
language of the statute itself. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 443;
596 NW2d 164 (1999). The plain and unambiguous language of Act 90 indicates that a PAA is a
unit of the local government, not of the state.
Plaintiffs, however, assert that the WCAA is not a county agency because airport
employees must choose to be employees of the WCAA and cannot remain county employees
while working at the airport. Plaintiffs give no authority for their proposition that the transfer of
employees necessitates that the WCAA is a state agency. This Court will not search for authority
to support a party's position. See Great Lakes Div of Nat'l Steel Corp v Ecorse, 227 Mich App
379, 425; 576 NW2d 667 (1998).
Also, plaintiffs argue that if the WCAA was a county agency, no need would exist to
transfer licenses, certificates, property, and funds from the county to the WCAA. The plaintiffs'
argument notwithstanding, the transfer of operating certificates and funds is logical where the
WCAA, not the county, is the entity managing Metro Airport. The fact that the WCAA holds the
certificates, licenses, property, and funds reflects an efficient operation, and does not mean that
the WCAA is a state agency. The goal of Act 90, the efficient operation of Michigan's airports,
would be impeded if the county retained operating certificates where the WCAA is managing
Metro Airport.
Plaintiffs also contend that the WCAA is an agency of the state because the governing
officers of the WCAA were not elected by popular vote, citing Metropolitan Police Bd of Detroit
v Bd of Auditors of Wayne Co, 68 Mich 576; 36 NW 743 (1888).33 Taken to its logical
conclusion, that argument would mean that any agency would be a state agency where the
members were appointed rather than elected, a result this Court rejects.
Plaintiffs also claim that Act 90 violates art 7, § 29 of the Michigan Constitution, which
provides:
No person, partnership, association or corporation, public or private,
operating a public utility shall have the right to the use of the highways, streets,
alleys or other public places of any county, township, city or village for wires,
33
Metropolitan Police Bd involved a local police board in Detroit that drew funds from the
county to work in several townships outside the jurisdiction of Detroit. Id. at 581.
-18-
poles, pipes, tracks, conduits or other utility facilities, without the consent of the
duly constituted authority of the county, township, city or village; or to transact
local business therein without first obtaining a franchise from the township, city
or village. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution the right of all
counties, townships, cities and villages to the reasonable control of their
highways, streets, alleys and public places is hereby reserved to such local units of
government. [Const 1963, art 7, § 29 (emphasis supplied).]
Earlier cases from this Court have interpreted the "reasonable control" phrase in this
constitutional provision and have determined that the control exercised by local units of
government is limited and not exclusive. For example, defendants cite Jones v Ypsilanti, 26
Mich App 574; 182 NW2d 795 (1970), where the defendant city disputed that it had
jurisdictional control over the sidewalk abutting a state trunkline highway where the plaintiff
slipped and fell. The Jones defendant relied on Const 1963, art 5, § 28, which established the
state highway commission and gave the commission control over highways. The plaintiff in
Jones, however, argued that Const 1963, art 5, § 28 should be considered together with Const
1963, art 7, § 29, which led to the conclusion that the state's control was paramount—but not
exclusive. Jones, supra at 578-579.
The Jones Court then quoted the following passage from Allen v State Hwy Comm'r, 338
Mich 407, 415; 61 NW2d 625 (1953):
"The reasonable control of streets reserved to cities under the Constitution
. . . does not give them exclusive control, preventing the State from assuming any
control over State trunk line highways running through cities." [Jones, supra at
580.]
The Jones Court subsequently concluded:
Reading the two constitutional provisions relating to control of highways
with reference to each other and in light of existing law when the provisions were
framed, we believe that municipalities were meant to retain reasonable control
over state trunkline highways located within their boundaries so long as that
control pertains to local concerns and does not conflict with the paramount
jurisdiction of the state highway commission. [Id.]
Likewise, here the county retains reasonable control over its roads and public places. That
control, however, is not exclusive and must give way to matters of statewide concern, including
Metro Airport. See also Erwin Twp v Gogebic Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs, 265 Mich 115, 119; 251
NW 357 (1933), holding that when provisions of the constitution regarding control over roads
are read together, no conflict occurs; the provisions regarding local control and state control are
harmonious.
Returning to the constitutional provision at issue, even assuming arguendo that Const
1963, art 7, § 29 applies here to the roads and public places connected with Metro Airport, the
cases cited by plaintiffs are not dispositive. Consider Dearborn v Michigan Turnpike Authority,
-19-
344 Mich 37; 73 NW2d 544 (1956), which addressed the constitutionality of the turnpike act in
conjunction with the "North-South Turnpike." Our Supreme Court quoted Allen, supra, which
considered the phrase "reasonable control" in the above constitutional provision:34
"The right to reasonable control of their streets is not a gift of an arbitrary
prerogative to the cities, villages and townships. The reasonableness of the city's
control of its streets is not to be within the final determination by the city in all
cases, for that in practical effect could erase the word 'reasonable' from the
constitutional provision. The reasonableness may be determined in accordance
with the State legislature's interpretation in some instances provided that such
interpretation can be approved by the court." [Id. at 53 (quoting Allen v State Hwy
Comm'r, supra at 415-416).]
That passage indicates that the county does not have an absolute privilege regarding the use of its
roads. Instead, the Legislature has authority, in some instances, to determine the reasonableness
of a county's control of its streets. In Act 90, the Legislature determined that the entity managing
the airport should have control of the airport property, easements, rights of access, and
appurtenances. Where airports are governed by state regulation in the Michigan Aeronautics
Code, it logically follows that the Legislature would be the proper body to determine which
entity, the county or the WCAA, should have control over the airport roads.
Further, it is curious that plaintiffs cited in their favor Detroit, Wyandotte & Trenton
Transit Co v Detroit, 260 Mich 124; 244 NW 424 (1932), where our Supreme Court ruled that
the city could not regulate jitneys, which are small automobiles or buses that follow a regular
route and transport passengers, because the city's regulation interfered with the state's
jurisdiction. While the Court acknowledged that the city had a right of "reasonable control" over
its streets, the Court observed that the state had taken control of the regulation of this area and
thus the ordinance was invalid. Id. at 129.
Likewise, here the Legislature has the power to regulate the powers and duties of counties
in relation to highways and airports pursuant to Const 1963, art 7, § 16, which provides in
pertinent part:
The legislature may provide for the laying out, construction, improvement
and maintenance of highways . . . and airports by the state and by the counties . . .
and may authorize counties to take charge and control of any highway within their
limits for such purposes. The legislature may provide the powers and duties of
counties in relation to highways . . . and airports . . . . [Const 1963, art 7, § 16.]
Accordingly, the county's attempt to retain control of the streets related to the airport and airport
facilities must yield to the Legislature's power to regulate airports under the constitution.
34
At that time, the section at issue was contained in art 8, § 28.
-20-
G
1
Plaintiffs argue in count VI of their amended complaint that Act 90 is invalid because a
county may not lend credit to any private or public agency or "an autonomous agency created by
the state." The Michigan Constitution provides that "[t]he credit of the state shall not be granted
to, nor in aid of any person, association or corporation, public or private, except as authorized in
this constitution." Const 1963, art 9, § 18. The prohibition against the lending of credit applies
to counties as political subdivisions and instrumentalities of the state. See Advisory Opinion on
Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, 430 Mich 93; 422 NW2d 186 (1988); Oakland Co Drain
Comm'r v Royal Oak, 306 Mich 124, 142; 10 NW2d 435 (1943). The purpose of this section is
to ascertain that the state, which generally cannot borrow, does not accumulate unauthorized
debts by guaranteeing the debts of others. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1966 PA 346,
380 Mich 554, 564; 158 NW2d 416 (1968).
This Court reiterated the following principles in conjunction with the lending of credit:
Our Supreme Court has held that where the state acquires or transfers
something of value, Const 1963, art 9, § 18 is not violated. Alan v Wayne County,
388 Mich 210, 325; 200 NW2d 628 (1972). Courts will respect the judgment of
the Legislature unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Alan, pp 326-327.
Const 1963, art 9, § 18 is violated only when the state creates an obligation legally
enforceable against it for the benefit of another. Sprik v Regents of the Univ of
Mich, 43 Mich App 178, 190-191; 204 NW2d 62 (1972). [Petrus v Dickinson Co
Bd of Comm'rs, 184 Mich App 282, 297; 457 NW2d 359 (1990).]
Plaintiffs complain that Act 90 violates the lending of credit provision because it requires
the county to transfer to the WCAA all beneficial use and income of property acquired and used
in conjunction with airport operations. With respect to the revenue bonds, however, the
obligation followed the transfer of the revenues and no lending of credit occurred. Moreover, in
enacting Act 90, the state did not create an obligation legally enforceable against the county for
the benefit of the WCAA. See Petrus, supra.
With regard to the airport hotel bonds, which are secured by the county's pledge of full
faith and credit, which obligation is not assumed by the WCAA under Act 90, plaintiffs conceded
at oral argument that in the initial transaction they received value, $6.2 million, for the county's
full faith and credit pledge. Given that value, the initial transaction did not constitute a lending
of credit, a fact admitted by plaintiffs. This Court declines to find that Act 90 operates as a
lending of credit regarding the airport hotel bonds where the initial transaction did not constitute
a violation of that constitutional provision.
2
Plaintiffs also argue that Act 90 operates as a "taking" pursuant to Const 1963, art 10, § 2.
The state and federal constitutions prohibit the taking of private property for public use without
-21-
just compensation. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 10, § 2; Adams Outdoor Advertising v East
Lansing (After Remand), 463 Mich 17, 23; 614 NW2d 634 (2000). The paramount issue is
whether the County's property is "private" for purposes of the Taking Clause.
Plaintiffs contend that their property is private because it is held in a "proprietary
capacity" and cite Mayor of Detroit v Park Comm'rs, 44 Mich 602; 7 NW 180 (1880), for the
proposition that the state may not take such municipal property. A "proprietary capacity" is
defined as including the "functions of a city or town when it engages in a business-like venture as
contrasted with a governmental function." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed). Even considering
the facts most favorably to plaintiffs, they have not shown that their operation of Metro Airport
was in a private, or proprietary, capacity.35 Further, plaintiffs never addressed defendants'
contention that the property cannot be held in a proprietary capacity where the county is bound by
law to pledge all revenues generated by Metro to the operation of Metro.
The airport was established under the former act, which states that airports are to benefit
the public. Additionally, the constitution itself provides that the Legislature may provide for the
laying out, construction, and maintenance of airports, as it may with highways, thereby indicating
that airports are held in a public rather than a proprietary capacity. See Const 1963, art 7 § 16.
H
Plaintiffs assert in count VII of their amended complaint that Act 90 is invalid under the
Title-Object Clause. The Title-Object Clause provides: "No law shall embrace more than one
object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage
through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and
not alone by its title." Const 1963, art 4, § 24.
Plaintiffs allege that Act 90 implicitly amends the Revenue Bond Act (RBA), MCL
141.101 et seq., because Act 90 does not indicate in its title that it amends the RBA (Amended
Complaint, p 27, ¶ 108). Generally, the "purpose of the [title-object] clause is to prevent the
Legislature from passing laws not fully understood, to ensure that both the legislators and the
public have proper notice of legislative content, and to prevent deceit and subterfuge." Phinney v
Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 552; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). The goal of the clause is notice, not
restriction of legislation. Pohutski v Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 691; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).
In People v Kevorkian, 447 Mich 436, 453; 527 NW2d 714 (1994), our Supreme Court
explained that three challenges may be brought against statutes on the basis of Const 1963, art 4,
§ 24: (1) a "title-body" challenge, which indicates that the body exceeds the scope of the title, (2)
35
As exhibits, plaintiffs submitted airport balance sheets and a budget from the airport
department. Those documents, without more, do not demonstrate that the county operated Metro
as a business-like venture. Also, to the extent that plaintiffs have cited case law from sister
jurisdictions holding that airports are proprietary, we decline to follow those decisions from other
jurisdictions because they are not binding. See Adams Outdoor Advertising v East Lansing, 439
Mich 209, 234, n 43; 483 NW2d 38 (1992).
-22-
a "multiple-object challenge," which indicates that the body embraces more than one object, and
(3) a "change of purpose challenge," which indicates that the subject matter of the amendment is
not germane to the original purpose. In the instant case, plaintiffs have not indicated a specific
challenge, so the following analysis examines all three types of challenges.
With regard to a title-body challenge, this Court has indicated that the title of an act must
express the general purpose or object of the act. People v Cynar, 252 Mich App 82, 84; 651
NW2d 136 (2002). The revised title of Act 90 provides, with the added or amended language in
italics:
An act relating to aeronautics in this state; providing for the development
and regulation thereof; creating a state aeronautics commission; prescribing
powers and duties; providing for the licensing, or registration, or supervision and
control of all aircraft, airports and landing fields, schools of aviation, flying clubs,
airmen, aviation instructors, airport managers, manufacturers, dealers and
commercial operation in intrastate commerce; providing for rules pertaining
thereto; prescribing a privilege tax for the use of the aeronautical facilities on the
lands and waters of this state; providing for the acquisition, development, and
operation of airports, landing fields, and other aeronautical facilities by the state,
by political subdivisions, or by public airport authorities; providing for the
incorporation of public airport authorities and providing for the powers, duties
and obligations of public airport authorities; providing for the transfer of airport
management to public airport authorities, including the transfer of airport
liabilities, employees, and operational jurisdiction; providing jurisdiction of
crimes, torts, and contracts; providing police powers for those entrusted to enforce
this act; providing for civil liability of owners, operators and others; making
hunting from aircraft unlawful; providing for repair station operators lien;
providing for appeals from rules or orders issued by the commission; providing
for the transfer from the Michigan board of aeronautics to the aeronautics
commission all properties and funds held by the board of aeronautics; providing
for a state aeronautics fund and making an appropriation therefor; prescribing
penalties; and making uniform the law with reference to state development and
regulation of aeronautics.
The gist of plaintiffs' contention is that Act 90 implicitly amends the RBA in such a manner that
the purpose exceeds the scope of the quoted language.
Plaintiffs claim that the provisions of Act 90 conflict with the RBA, which provides in
part that "[t]he bonds authorized hereunder shall not be subject to any limitations or provisions
contained in the laws of the state of Michigan, pertaining to public corporations or in the charters
of public corporations, as now in force or hereafter amended, other than as provided for in this
act." MCL 141.111. Plaintiffs have not shown, however, that Act 90 subjects the airport bonds
to limitations. Rather, Act 90 merely grants rights to PAAs for the issuance of bonds and their
repayment and sets forth procedures regarding bonds, as illustrated below.
-23-
The provisions of Act 90 that plaintiffs assert are relevant36 to the Title-Object Clause are
§§ 120, 122-125b.37 Because the analysis of this issue best begins with § 122, we analyze the
sections of Act 90 out of their numerical order. Section 122 of Act 90 permits the WCAA to
issue self-liquidating bonds to assist in operating the airport. The RBA provides that a public
corporation may issue bonds,38 to make public improvements,39 on transportation systems.40
Thus, if the WCAA is a "public corporation" under Act 90, it may issue bonds to improve the
airport pursuant to the RBA in such a manner that Act 90 would not amend the RBA and the
body of Act 90 would not exceed the scope of its title.
The RBA defines a "public corporation," in part, as "an authority created by or under an
act of the legislature," MCL 141.103(a). Therefore, the WCAA is a public corporation because
the Legislature created it as a political subdivision of the local government that owns the airport,
Act 90, § 110. The title of Act 90 indicates that PAAs have the authority to manage airports.
The title need not refer to every detail of the act; rather, "[i]t is sufficient that 'the act centers to
one main general object or purpose which the title comprehensively declares, though in general
terms, and if provisions in the body of the act not directly mentioned in the title are germane,
auxiliary, or incidental to that general purpose . . . .'" Livonia v Dep't of Social Services, 423
Mich 466, 501; 378 NW2d 402 (1985) (citations omitted). Where the management of the airport
includes financial matters such as bonds, the bonds are sufficiently related to the act so that the
title of Act 90 does not exceed its scope.
Section 120 provides in pertinent part: "The revenues raised by an authority may be
pledged, in whole or in part, for the repayment of bonded indebtedness and other expenditures
issued or incurred by the authority." Act 90, subsection 120(1). As indicated above, PAAs are
"public corporations" that can issue bonds under the RBA. It therefore follows that PAAs have
the power to pledge revenue to repay those bonds.
Section 123 provides that "[t]he authority may borrow money and issue municipal
securities in accordance with an exercise of all of the powers conferred upon municipalities by
the revised municipal finance act, 2001 PA 34, MCL 141.2101 to 141.2821." Section 124 states:
"All bonds or other evidences of indebtedness issued by an authority under this chapter, and the
interest thereon, are free and exempt from all taxation within the state, except for transfer and
36
In addition to the specific provisions listed below, plaintiffs have cited other provisions
generally. Because plaintiffs have failed to challenge those provisions specifically, we refuse to
discuss them in detail. See Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra at 24, n 23. In any event, we have
examined those provisions and do not find them indicative of a violation of the Title-Object
Clause.
37
Plaintiffs list the provisions, but do not specifically state why those provisions implicitly
amend the RBA.
38
MCL 141.107.
39
MCL 141.104.
40
MCL 141.103(b).
-24-
franchise taxes." Those provisions simply do not reflect limitations on the bonds issued pursuant
to the RBA, so plaintiffs' argument with respect to them fails.
Section 125 authorizes the legislative body of any local government that owns an airport
over which operational jurisdiction has been transferred to pledge its full faith and credit behind
any obligation or evidence of indebtedness of the PAA or advance funds or convey property to
the PAA. Plaintiffs do not explain how that section operates as an amendment of the RBA.
Section 125a states that PAAs may, to effectively manage their debt service, agree to an interest
rate exchange provided that the agreement states that it is "payable from general funds . . . from
any available money or revenue sources . . . securing the obligation or evidence of indebtedness
in connection with the agreement." Finally, section 125b contains five subsections regarding the
liability of the PAAs for the outstanding bonds, notes, or other indebtedness.
All these sections set forth procedures regarding airport indebtedness, which includes
bonds. To require the title of Act 90 to reflect all those procedures would result in an
unworkably long and unwieldy title. As indicated in Livonia v Dep't of Social Services, supra, a
general title is sufficient; the title need not contain every detail of the act.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Blades v Bd of Water Comm'rs of Detroit, 122 Mich 366; 81 NW
271 (1899), is misplaced. The Court described the amended legislation in Blades as "radical"
and "virtually abolishing the water rate system." Id. at 378. The amending provision changed
the system from water rates to taxation by taxing businesses while providing free water to the
majority of the city. The Court held that the Title-Object Clause was violated because the title
did not reflect the rate system changes but only reflected the transfer of authority:
The fair inference to be drawn from this title is that the object is to take
away the possession of the waterworks, and its control and management, from the
board of water commissioners, and transfer them to the city, and that the body of
the act would contain only such provisions as were essential to accomplish that
object. [Id. at 379.]
In contrast to Blades, here the title of Act 90 reflects its purpose—to provide for the
transfer of airport management to PAAs. Plaintiffs have not shown that the body of Act 90
contains provisions that are not essential to accomplish that object. Further, plaintiffs have not
shown that the amendments of Act 90 represent the "radical" type of changes present in Blades.
Plaintiffs also direct this Court to the lengthy discussion of amendment by implication in
Alan v Wayne Co, 388 Mich 210; 200 NW2d 628 (1972). Distinguishing this case from Alan,
however, is that the Alan Court determined that the legislation at issue there did, in fact, purport
to create an exception to the RBA without expressing that in the title. Id. at 270. The Court then
embarked on an extended analysis41 of the Legislature's duties where it intends to amend a
41
The analysis came complete with a footnote detailing the history of the printing press to
illustrate the principle that constitutional duties may not be avoided merely because "it might be a
lot of work to comply with the constitution." Id. at 283 and n 55.
-25-
previous act. Id. at 270-288. In this case, as previously discussed, Act 90 does not amend the
RBA. Indeed, as shown, it comports with that act. Accordingly, plaintiffs' arguments fail under
Alan.
With respect to the "multiple-object challenge," which indicates that the body embraces
more than one object, the reason for limiting the objective of an act to a single purpose is to
avoid bills addressing "diverse subjects that have no necessary connection." Mooahesh v Dep't of
Treasury, 195 Mich App 551, 564; 492 NW2d 246 (1992), disagreed with on other grounds in
Silverman v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 445 Mich 209; 516 NW2d 54 (1994). A statute
may authorize activities that further the general purpose of the act without violating the one
object constitutional limitation. Kuhn v Dep't of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 388; 183 NW2d 796
(1971).
One purpose of Act 90 was to facilitate the operation of Michigan airports by creating
PAAs to manage airports that have a certain number of enplanements. In managing the airport,
the PAA necessarily must raise revenues, which can be done in a variety of ways. See generally
Mooahesh, supra at 566. That one method of raising revenue is the issuance of bonds does not
give rise to the conclusion that Act 90 impermissibly embraces more than one object and amends
the RBA.42 Where the title of Act 90 indicates the broad purpose of providing for the control and
operation of airports, the title of Act 90 does not exclude the issuance of bonds, particularly
where the title refers to "the acquisition, development, and operation of airports." The act may
include all matters relevant to its object, as well as all provisions that directly relate to, carry out,
and implement the principal object. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389
Mich 441, 465; 208 NW2d 469 (1973). The aims of the RBA and Act 90 are not so diverse that
they have "no necessary connection," Tucker v Allied Chucker Co, 234 Mich App 550, 558; 595
NW2d 176 (1999) (citation omitted), so that we cannot conclude that the title of Act 90 violates
the multiple object principle.
With regard to the "change of purpose challenge," which examines whether the subject
matter of the amendment is germane to the original purpose, plaintiffs have not shown that the
subject of Act 90 is unrelated to the original purpose of the law. The purpose of the Michigan
Aeronautics Code, of which Act 90 is a part, appears to be to provide uniform guidelines for the
operation of Michigan airports. Act 90 relates to the management and operation of Michigan
airports. The fact that Act 90 also creates PAAs to do so does not represent a change in the
general purpose of the original law.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that Act 90 violates the Title-Object Clause because it affects
only Wayne County, although Wayne County is not named in the title (Amended Complaint, p
28, ¶ 110). Although Metro Airport currently is the only airport affected by Act 90, the statute
does not limit its application to Metro Airport alone. Act 90 is based on the number of
enplanements; presumably, another airport in the future could meet the requisite number of
42
Moreover, as pointed out by the county defendants, the Michigan Aeronautics Code already
provided for the issuance of bonds before the enactment of Act 90. See MCL 259.131.
-26-
enplanements so as to be subject to Act 90. Accordingly, where Act 90 may at some future date
apply to an additional airport, the title of Act 90 does not violate the Title-Object Clause by
failing to identify that it currently applies only to Metro Airport.
I
In count VIII of their complaint, plaintiffs argue that Act 90 is constitutionally unsound
because it is a local or special act that was not approved by a majority of the electors voting in
the county. The constitutional provision at issue states as follows:
The legislature shall pass no local or special act in any case where a
general act can be made applicable, and whether a general act can be made
applicable shall be a judicial question. No local or special act shall take effect
until approved by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in each house
and by a majority of the electors voting thereon in the district affected. Any act
repealing local or special acts shall require only a majority of the members elected
to and serving in each house and shall not require submission to the electors of
such district. [Const 1963, art 4, § 29.]
Our Supreme Court recently discussed the local act provision in Michigan v Wayne Co
Clerk, 466 Mich 640; 648 NW2d 202 (2002). The statute at issue in that case, 2002 PA 432,
provided that a city of over 750,000 residents as determined by federal census, with a city council
of nine at-large members, should place a particular question on the ballot for the election of
August 6, 2002. The statute did not refer to Detroit by name; however, only the city of Detroit
met the population criterion. The Detroit City Council argued that Act 432 violated Const 1963,
art 4, § 29 because it was a local act that applied only to Detroit.
Our Supreme Court first noted that it previously had upheld population-based statutes
where other cities or counties could qualify for inclusion if their populations changed. Wayne Co
Clerk, supra at 642. The Court then observed that a statute fails as a general act where it cannot
apply to other units of government. Id. at 643. Applying this analysis, our Supreme Court
stated:
In this case, the statute plainly fails to qualify as a general act. Even if
another city reaches a population of 750,000, and has a nine-member at-large
council, Act 432 would not apply because of its requirement that the proposition
appear on the ballot at the August 6, 2002, election. No other city can meet that
requirement because there will be no new census before that date. [Id.]
The requirement of Act 90 of a certain number of enplanements may be analogized to the
population requirement of Act 432. Unlike Act 432 in Michigan v Detroit City Council,
however, here the enplanements requirement of Act 90 does not contain a time deadline. Thus,
other airports can qualify for inclusion under Act 90 if their number of enplanements increases to
the requisite level on some future date.
-27-
We also examine the analysis regarding population-based local acts included in Airlines
Parking, Inc v Wayne Co, 452 Mich 527, 550-551; 550 NW2d 490 (1996) (Cavanagh, J.,
dissenting):
"The principles upon which [population-based laws] have been sustained
as general laws or defeated as local acts are well established in this State and
elsewhere.
"The first test to be applied is whether population has a reasonable relation
to the purpose of the statute. In Mulloy v Wayne Co Bd of Supervisors, 246 Mich
632, 635 [225 NW 615 (1929)], the distinction is pointed out:
"'Clearly, because of its provision as to population, the act applies to
Wayne county only. If it is a reasonable and logical basis of classification,
considering the subject of legislation, unquestionably a specified population may
be made the test of the applicability of a general legislative act; and under such
conditions that act will not be construed to be invalid as local legislation. But
where the subject of legislation is such that population has no obvious relation to
the purpose sought to be accomplished, an attempt to make the application of the
legislative act dependent on the population is unwarranted and amounts to local
legislation. Attorney General ex rel Dingeman v Lacy, 180 Mich 329 [146 NW
871 (1914)].'
* * *
"The second test of a general law, based upon population, is that it shall
apply to all other municipalities if and when they attain the statutory population.
It must have--an open end through which cities are automatically brought within
its operations when they attain the required population." [Airlines Parking, supra
at 550-551 (quoting Dearborn v Wayne Co Bd of Supervisors, 275 Mich 151, 155
156; 266 NW 304 [1936]).]
Turning to the case at bar, the first test is whether the number of enplanements has a
reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute. The legislative purpose behind Act 90 was to
address management and contracting issues at Metro Airport (see House Legislative Analysis);
the purpose was met by the creation of PAAs to manage Michigan's busiest airports. The number
of enplanements has a reasonable relation to the purpose of Act 90, for it would be irrational to
require the appointment of a PAA to manage a tiny airport serving a small population with an
insignificant number of enplanements. Thus, the number of enplanements has an obvious
relation to the purpose of the legislation.
Additionally, Act 90 meets the second test outlined above. Other Michigan airports,
when they reach the requisite number of enplanements, will qualify under the statute. Act 90
consequently has "an open end through which [airports] are automatically brought within its
operations when they attain the required [enplanements]."
-28-
Plaintiffs, however, contend that Act 90 automatically creates only the WCAA, while all
other airport authorities under Act 90 are created by the vote of the legislative body of the local
unit that owns the airport, citing subsection 110(2). That section provides in part:
(2) For a local government that owns or operates a qualified airport on the
effective date of this chapter, there is created an authority on the effective date of
this chapter. For a local government that operates an airport that becomes a
qualified airport after the effective date of this chapter, there is created an
authority on the date the airport becomes a qualified airport. [Act 90, subsection
110(2) (emphasis supplied).]
The plain language of the statute belies plaintiffs' argument: once an airport becomes a
"qualified airport," an authority automatically is created. With regard to the vote of the
legislative body, plaintiffs apparently are confusing subsection 110(2) with the section governing
airports that are not "qualified" airports, as illustrated in subsection 110(3):
(3) A local government that owns or operates an airport that is not a
qualified airport may, by resolution, declare its intention to incorporate an
authority. . . . [I]f the legislative body of the local government intends to proceed
with the incorporation of the authority, it shall adopt, by majority vote of its
members, a resolution incorporating the authority. [Act 90, subsection 110(3)
(emphasis supplied).]
Thus, the legislative body may vote for an authority only in relation to an airport that is not a
qualified airport. As previously discussed, Act 90 is open-ended in such a manner that in the
future another airport could become qualified so that the statute may apply someday to an airport
other than Metro. Where plaintiffs acknowledge that another airport will qualify in the future
and where Act 90 does not have a cutoff date similar to that in Detroit City Council, supra,
plaintiffs have not shown that Act 90 is a local act.
J
Finally, in count IX of the amended complaint, plaintiffs assert that the Federal Aviation
Act, 49 USC 47101 to 47153, preempts Act 90. We hold that no conflict preemption exists,
where plaintiffs can comply with Act 90 by transferring operational jurisdiction to the WCAA
and at the same time meet their assurances obligation under federal law by retaining ownership
of Metro Airport.
As a threshold matter, we reject defendants' assertion that no private cause of action
exists here, citing, inter alia, Northwest Airlines, Inc v Kent Co, 955 F2d 1054, 1058-1059 (CA 6,
1992).43 A court's decision regarding private rights of action must be consistent with legislative
intent while furthering the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. Gardner v Wood, 429
43
Note that Northwest Airlines references 49 USC 2210, which was the previous version of the
statute plaintiffs reference here, 49 USC 47107.
-29-
Mich 290, 301; 414 NW2d 706 (1987). Although Congress apparently intended that no private
right of action exist under 49 USC 47101 et seq., that does not defeat plaintiffs' claim here that
Act 90 is preempted by the federal law. Plaintiffs' action is not brought pursuant to federal
aviation law; rather, they are asserting that Act 90 is unsound under the state and federal
constitutions.
Under the Supremacy Clause, US Const, art VI, cl 2, federal law preempts state law in
three circumstances: (1) where Congress has expressed an intent to preempt state law, (2) where
state law regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended to occupy exclusively, and (3) where
state law actually conflicts with federal law. Grand Trunk W R Co v City of Fenton, 439 Mich
240, 243-244; 482 NW2d 706 (1992). A general presumption exists against federal preemption.
Duprey v Huron & E R Co, Inc, 237 Mich App 662, 665; 604 NW2d 702 (1999). Courts will
find preemption only where it is the clear and unequivocal intent of Congress. Martinez v Ford
Motor Co, 224 Mich App 247, 252; 568 NW2d 396 (1997).
Plaintiffs suggest that Act 90 presents a "textbook case" of "conflict preemption," which
occurs where a state law is impliedly preempted because it actually conflicts with federal law.
Thus, a state law is preempted where a private party cannot possibly comply with both state and
federal requirements. English v General Electric Co, 496 US 72, 78-79; 110 S Ct 2270; 110 L
Ed 2d 65 (1990). "Congressional intent is the cornerstone of preemption analysis." Ryan v
Brunswick Corp, 454 Mich 20, 27; 557 NW2d 541 (1997). The determination of preemption
involves statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. Konynenbelt v Flagstar Bank, FSB,
242 Mich App 21, 27; 585 NW2d 300 (2000).
Plaintiffs state that the county has made assurances to the FAA when applying for various
federal airport grants. They argue that those assurances are binding on Wayne County, as a
"sponsor"44 of the grant, see 49 USC 47108(a). Plaintiffs assert that Act 90, subsection
117(1)(c),45 which requires the county to transfer all grant agreements to the WCAA, would
require the county to breach its assurances as a sponsor of the federal grant agreements.
44
A "sponsor" is defined as "a public agency [e.g., a political subdivision] that submits to the
Secretary under this subchapter an application for financial assistance . . . ." 49 USC 47102(15),
(19).
45
Subsection 117(1)(c) provides that on the approval date, the following shall occur:
"The authority assumes, accepts, and becomes liable for all of the lawful
obligations, promises, covenants, commitments, and other requirements in respect
of the airport of the local government that owns the airport under the operational
jurisdiction of the authority, whether known or unknown, contingent or matured,
but excepting any full faith and credit pledge of the local government in respect of
bonds issued by the local government for airport purposes, and shall perform all
of the duties and obligations and shall be entitled to all of the rights of the local
government in respect of the airport under any ordinances, agreements, or other
instruments and under law. Consistent with this chapter, this assumption
includes, and there shall be transferred to the authority, all licenses, permits,
(continued…)
-30-
Plaintiffs refer to the following assurance as the general type of assurance they have given
to the FAA over the years:
5(f). If an arrangement is made for management and operation of the
airport by any agency or person other than the sponsor or an employee of the
sponsor, the sponsor will reserve sufficient rights and authority to insure that the
airport will be operated and maintained in accordance with Title 49, United
States Code, the regulations and the terms, conditions and assurances in the grant
agreement and shall insure that such arrangement also requires compliance
therewith. [62 Fed Reg 29764 (emphasis supplied).]
Thus, plaintiffs state that the transfer of airport operations to the WCAA precludes their
reservation of authority to ensure that Metro will be operated in accordance with federal law.
Plaintiffs are correct that the county remains responsible for ensuring that federal
guidelines are met. In a letter dated August 7, 2002, from David Bennett, FAA Director, Officer
of Airport Safety and Standards, to plaintiff Solomon, Bennett stated that Wayne County is not
being relieved of its obligations with regard to outstanding assurances. The sponsor here is the
county. Under the act, the county, through the county executive and the commission, appoints a
majority of the WCAA board members. Further, the statute itself requires that the WCAA
assume all the county's duties, liabilities, responsibilities, and obligations as sponsor of the
airport.46 Thus, we conclude that the county has reserved sufficient rights and authority to ensure
that the airport will be operated and maintained in accordance with federal requirements.
Further supporting the conclusion that the county has retained sufficient rights and
authority pursuant to federal law is the fact that Act 90 requires that the FAA approve of the
transfer of the grat agreements before such a transfer may occur.47 The FAA approved the
(…continued)
approvals or awards related to the airport, all grant agreements, grant pre
applications, the right to receive the balance of any funds payable under the
agreements, the right to receive any amounts, including PFCs, payable to the local
government on the approval date and amounts paid to the local government after
the approval date, as well as the benefit of contracts and agreements, and all of the
local government's duties, liabilities, responsibilities and obligations as sponsor of
the airport, except for any obligation or liabilities contested in good faith by the
authority."
46
There is a statutory exception that presumably applies to obligations contested in good faith
with the FAA.
47
"Approval date" means the effective date of the issuance by the federal
aviation administration to the authority assuming operational jurisdiction of an
airport of a certificate under part 139 of chapter 14 of the code of federal
regulations with respect to the airport, and the concurrence by the FAA of the
designation of the authority as a sponsor of the airport, including the FAA's
(continued…)
-31-
transfer to the WCAA, as illustrated in a letter from Bennett, dated August 7, 2002, to the Wayne
County Executive.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that the county also must approve such a transfer, stating that
the federal statute "strongly suggests that such a transfer is prohibited without Wayne County's
consent." Plaintiffs do not cite a particular section of the federal act with that plain language.
Instead, plaintiffs point to 49 USC 47108(a), which indicates that the FAA's offer of a grant to a
sponsor becomes a binding agreement once the sponsor accepts in writing. Contrary to plaintiffs'
assertion, that section does not hold that a sponsor must approve when legislation transfers grant
agreements subject to FAA approval. Accordingly, plaintiffs' preemption argument fails.
Conclusion
In sum, we decline to rule on plaintiffs' Headlee claim as related to nontransferring
employees and dismiss that claim without prejudice. Having resolved all remaining claims in
favor of defendants, we dismiss plaintiffs' remaining claims with prejudice. Given the resolution
of the above issues, we decline to further address the cross-complaint.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
(…continued)
approval of the assignment of existing grant agreements to the authority. [PA 90,
subsection 109(c) (emphasis supplied).]
-32-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.