C & T TRANSPORT INC V YORK TOWNSHIP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
C&T TRANSPORT INC., a Michigan
Corporation; GOTTS READY MIX, a Michigan
corporation; MILAN VAULT, a Michigan
corporation; and THE AGGREGATE CARRIERS
OF MICHIGAN, a Michigan non-profit
corporation,
UNPUBLISHED
June 21, 2002
APPROVED FOR
PUBLICATION
August 16, 2002
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 227898
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 99-010655-CE
v
YORK TOWNSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Updated Copy
October 25, 2002
Before: Owens, P.J., and Sawyer and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a trial court order granting defendant township's motion
for summary disposition. Plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance
requiring certain commercial vehicles passing through the township to use designated "truck
routes." We affirm.
MCL 257.726 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Local authorities and county road commissions with respect to
highways under their jurisdiction, except state trunk line highways, by ordinance
or resolution, may do any of the following:
(a) Prohibit the operation of trucks or other commercial vehicles on
designated highways or streets.
(b) Impose limitations as to the weight of trucks or other commercial
vehicles on designated highways or streets.
-1-
(c) Provide that only certain highways or streets may be used by trucks or
other commercial vehicles.
Relying on this statutory provision, defendant enacted York Township Ordinance No. 75, which
required, in pertinent part, commercial vehicles in excess of 10,001 pounds to use designated
truck routes when passing through the township.
Plaintiffs, as nonresident operators of commercial vehicles subject to the ordinance, filed
a complaint alleging that the ordinance created "an unreasonable prohibition against the
operation of commercial motor vehicles in York Township." Plaintiffs noted that the designated
truck routes added several miles to their trip through York Township, and that the added time
and distance imposed a financial burden that would threaten their competitiveness in the
marketplace. As such, plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin defendant from enforcing the
ordinance. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erroneously failed to consider the
reasonableness of the ordinance. We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for
summary disposition. Diehl v Danuloff, 242 Mich App 120, 122; 618 NW2d 83 (2000).
Similarly, we review de novo conclusions of law. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456;
608 NW2d 97 (2000).
In People v Armstrong, 73 Mich 288, 292-293; 41 NW 275 (1889), our Supreme Court
opined:
Where the legislature, in terms, confers upon a municipal corporation the
power to pass ordinances of a specified and defined character, if the power thus
delegated be not in conflict with the Constitution, an ordinance passed pursuant
thereto cannot be impeached as invalid because it would have been regarded as
unreasonable if it had been passed under the incidental power of the corporation,
or under a grant of power general in its nature. In other words, what the
Legislature distinctly says may be done will not be set aside by the courts, unless
in conflict with the constitution, because they may deem it unreasonable. But
where the power to legislate on a given subject is conferred, but the mode of its
exercise is not prescribed, then the ordinance passed in pursuance thereof must be
a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid. [Emphasis
added.]
Here, MCL 257.726(1) represents a plain example of the Legislature "distinctly" saying what a
township may do; that is, townships, with respect to highways within their jurisdiction, may
"[p]rohibit the operation of trucks or other commercial vehicles on designated highways or
streets" or "provide that only certain highways or streets may be used by trucks or other
commercial vehicles." Plaintiffs do not contend that MCL 257.726(1) conflicts with any
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constitutional provision. Consequently, the trial court was not required to consider the
reasonableness of the ordinance.1 Armstrong, supra at 292-293.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
1
To be sure, if the Legislature had not enacted MCL 257.726(1), and defendant enacted the
ordinance solely on the basis of the power conferred by Const 1963, art 7, ยง 29, the
reasonableness of the ordinance could be challenged. Alternatively, if the Legislature had
vaguely empowered defendant to "regulate commercial vehicle traffic," the trial court would
have been required to consider the reasonableness of the ordinance. Armstrong, supra at 292293. However, where, as here, the Legislature plainly indicated, by statute, the measures by
which local authorities may regulate commercial vehicle traffic, absent a challenge to the
constitutionality of the underlying statute, an ordinance enacted pursuant to the statute may not
be challenged as unreasonable.
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