CHARLES A RICE JR V AUTO CLUB INSUR ASSN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHARLES A. RICE, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
UNPUBLISHED
April 26, 2002
APPROVED FOR
PUBLICATION
June 21, 2002
9:20 a.m.
No. 226910
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-812836-NF
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
a/k/a ACIA,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee,
and
FORD MOTOR COMPANY and ROUGE STEEL
COMPANY,
Updated Copy
September 13, 2002
Defendants.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) appeals as of right the trial court's
judgment awarding plaintiff, Charles Rice, $64,217.65 in no-fault personal injury protection
(PIP) benefits after the trial court granted plaintiff 's motion for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Rice cross appeals as of right, challenging the trial court's decision to deny
him attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
judgment to be entered in favor of ACIA.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Defendant Ford Motor Company employed Rice, who drove Ford's fuel truck to supply
diesel fuel to other equipment. One of the pieces of equipment that Rice fueled was Rouge Steel
Company's Klein steel hauler, a large, motorized machine, mounted on wheels, that carries 350
tons of molten metal and a one-hundred-ton ladle. The Klein steel hauler operator uses the
-1-
machine to transport full and empty ladles between buildings within the work area, never on a
highway.
As on other days, Rice had to fuel the Klein steel hauler on March 19, 1997. Rice
approached the Klein steel hauler with the fueling truck. Rice and the Klein steel hauler operator
flashed their lights at each other to indicate that they were ready to proceed with fueling. Rice
set the parking brake on the fuel truck, stepped out of the vehicle, and removed a ladder from the
J-hooks. He took the ladder to the Klein steel hauler, where he rested it near the fuel tank. Rice
turned on the fuel pump and removed the hose from the fueling truck. At this time, the fuel truck
was running in order to operate the pump for the fuel. Rice ascended the ladder with the hose,
unscrewed the cap for the fueling port, inserted the hose in the fueling port, and began
distributing the diesel fuel with the handle regulator. As Rice described it, the fuel system has a
"little catch where you set the thing," similar to the latch setting at some gas stations. Ordinarily,
the Klein steel hauler fueling process took about twenty to thirty minutes.
As Rice was "putting the fuel cap down, getting ready to screw the fuel cap on," he saw
the headlights of the Klein steel hauler come on and heard the engine "rev up." The last thing
Rice remembered before he awoke on the ground was having his right hand on the fuel cap on
the tank and his left hand holding the hose onto the bar of the ladder. Rice, who did not
remember falling, regained consciousness to discover that the Klein steel hauler was gone. The
Klein steel hauler operator ran toward Rice and apologized, explaining that he had fallen asleep
and forgotten that Rice was fueling the machine. Rice received worker's compensation benefits
for his serious physical injuries.
Rice then sued to recover no-fault PIP benefits from Rouge Steel, Ford, and ACIA, the
no-fault insurer for Rice's personal automobile. The three defendants moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), raising several statutory arguments. Defendants
first claimed that Rice did not sustain an accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle as required in MCL
500.3105(1). Second, they claimed that the way Rice used the Klein steel hauler was unrelated
to the vehicle's transportational function because the parked fueling truck was operating merely
as a fueling station. Consequently, the parked vehicle exceptions in MCL 500.3106 that might
otherwise allow coverage did not apply because Rice's injury did not come as a direct result of
physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the fueling truck and no loading or
unloading was taking place. Finally, they claimed that Rice could not recover under MCL
500.3106(2) because he was entitled to worker's compensation benefits and there was no
evidence that "another vehicle" was involved in the accident.
The trial court denied defendants' motion, concluding that whether Rice was in contact
with a permanently attached hose and was engaged in unloading remained material and disputed.
The trial court also reasoned that the Klein steel hauler could be considered a "vehicle" within
the meaning of MCL 500.3106(2)(b), which meant that receiving worker's compensation did not
prevent Rice from receiving no-fault PIP benefits. Subsequently, the parties stipulated the
dismissal of Rouge Steel and Ford as parties.
Rice also moved for summary disposition, though under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10),
essentially making the same arguments he had asserted in response to defendants' motion for
-2-
summary disposition: the fuel truck was a motor vehicle being used as a motor vehicle because
refueling is inherently related to all vehicles' transportational function; the circumstances in this
case fit within MCL 500.3106(1)(b) because he was in direct contact with equipment
permanently mounted to a motor vehicle at the time of the accident; or the circumstances in this
case fell within MCL 500.3106(2)(a) because he was in the process of unloading a motor vehicle
at the time of the accident. Further, Rice claimed that receiving worker's compensation benefits
did not bar the instant lawsuit because of language in MCL 500.3106(2)(a). The trial court
granted Rice's motion, determining that there was no genuine dispute concerning whether
"plaintiff was involved in the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle including unloading and
in connection with another vehicle being the Klein." Having stipulated with regard to the facts,
the parties then agreed to allow the trial court to decide the amount of the judgment. The trial
court entered a judgment for Rice in the total amount of $64,217.65, but denied Rice's request for
attorney fees pursuant to MCL 500.3148(1).
II. Summary Disposition
A. Standard Of Review
We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary disposition.1
This standard of review is also particularly relevant because we must construe and apply a
number of statutes to resolve whether the trial court erred in granting plaintiff 's motion for
summary disposition.2
B. Legal Standards
In ruling on Rice's motion for summary disposition, the trial court cited both MCR
2.116(C)(9) and (10). In fact, the trial court's statements on the record at the hearing on the
motion for summary disposition make clear that it actually granted Rice's motion pursuant to
subrule C(10). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
underpinnings of a claim other than an amount of damages, and the deciding court considers all
the evidence, affidavits, pleadings, admissions, and other information available in the record.3
The deciding court must look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, who must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt.4 Only if there is no factual
dispute, making the moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law, would summary
disposition be appropriate.5 However, the nonmoving party must present more than mere
1
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
2
See Adams v Linderman, 244 Mich App 178, 184; 624 NW2d 776 (2000).
3
MCR 2.116(G)(5); Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).
4
Atlas Valley Golf & Country Club, Inc v Village of Goodrich, 227 Mich App 14, 25; 575 NW2d
56 (1997).
5
See Auto Club Ins Ass'n v Sarate, 236 Mich App 432, 437; 600 NW2d 695 (1999).
-3-
allegations in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute,
making trial necessary.6
The process of applying a statute intersects with this legal standard for summary
disposition at the point where the trial court considers whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In other words, the trial court must understand what the law is in
order to determine which party is entitled to judgment when there is a settled factual record.7
These rules of interpretation and application are well-known:
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the purpose
and intent of the Legislature in enacting the provision. . . . The first criterion in
determining intent is the specific language of the statute. If the statutory language
is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted
and courts must apply the statute as written.[8]
As the Supreme Court in Macomb Co Prosecutor v Murphy9 stated:
In considering a question of statutory construction, this Court begins by
examining the language of the statute. We read the statutory language in context
to determine whether ambiguity exists. If the language is unambiguous, judicial
construction is precluded. We enforce an unambiguous statute as written. Where
ambiguity exists, however, this Court seeks to effectuate the Legislature's intent
through a reasonable construction, considering the purpose of the statute and the
object sought to be accomplished.[10]
Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its
plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used.11
Further, the language must be applied as written.12 Accordingly, we apply these rules to the
sections of the no-fault statutes at issue in this case in order to determine whether the trial court
erred in concluding that the facts left no material dispute concerning whether Rice was entitled to
no-fault PIP benefits.
6
MCR 2.116(G)(4); Etter v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 179 Mich App 551, 555; 446 NW2d
500 (1989).
7
See, generally, Kent v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 240 Mich App 731, 737-744; 613 NW2d
383 (2000) (interpreting statute in order to determine whether trial court erred in granting
summary disposition).
8
Id. at 736 (citations omitted).
9
Macomb Co Prosecutor v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 158; 627 NW2d 247 (2001).
10
Citations omitted.
11
Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 22, n 1; 614 NW2d 183 (2000), citing Western Michigan
Univ Bd of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828 (1997).
12
Camden v Kaufman, 240 Mich App 389, 394; 613 NW2d 335 (2000); Ahearn v Bloomfield
Charter Twp, 235 Mich App 486, 498; 597 NW2d 858 (1999).
-4-
C. No-Fault PIP Benefits Generally
Like most statutory schemes regarding insurance, the no-fault provision dealing with PIP
benefits is somewhat complex. The starting point for any analysis is MCL 500.3105(1), which
states that "[u]nder personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for
accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter." The key language in MCL
500.3105(1) splits the analysis for determining whether no-fault PIP benefits are available into
two broad steps. In the first step, we must determine whether the injury at issue is covered, i.e.,
that it is "accidental" and "bodily" and "aris[es] out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . ." In the second step we must determine whether
coverage for injuries that fit this definition is, nevertheless, excluded under other provisions in
the no-fault act and whether an exception to an exclusion would save the claim.
For a short time, Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America,13 controlled eligibility
for PIP benefits, and suggested that the analysis described above was unnecessary when the
motor vehicle at issue was parked. Instead of examining the facts of the case in light of the
language in MCL 500.3105(1), Putkamer instructed that "the determination whether the injury is
covered by the no-fault insurer generally is governed by the provisions of subsection 3106(1)
alone,"14 although the Supreme Court acknowledged the language of MCL 500.3105(1) in the
three-part test it articulated.15 The Court, however, retreated from this alternative analytical
approach when, in McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass'n,16 it reaffirmed the principle that "an injury
[must] be closely associated with the transportational function of a vehicle before coverage is
triggered . . . ."17 More recently, in Morosini v Citizens Ins Co of America (After Remand),18 the
Court endorsed McKenzie and rejected the premise that no-fault PIP benefits are available when
a motor vehicle is "incidentally involved" in the circumstances giving rise to an injury. Thus,
from our perspective, the two-step analysis provided in the plain language of MCL 500.3105(1)
applies in this case.
D. Step One: MCL 500.3105
There is no dispute that the injuries Rice sustained were both "accidental"19 and "bodily"
within the meaning of MCL 500.3105(1). Nor is there a question that the fueling truck fit the
definition of a motor vehicle in MCL 500.3101(2)(e). ACIA, however, contends that Rice was
not using a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle at the time of the accident. Because the fuel truck
13
Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626; 563 NW2d 683 (1997).
14
Id. at 632.
15
Id. at 635-636.
16
McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 458 Mich 214; 580 NW2d 424 (1998).
17
Id. at 220.
18
Morosini v Citizens Ins Co of America (After Remand), 461 Mich 303, 310; 602 NW2d 828
(1999).
19
See MCL 500.3105(4).
-5-
was acting as a fueling station at the time of the accident, ACIA argues, it was too far removed
from its transportational function to be considered more than incidentally involved in the
accident. Rice counters that providing fuel for other vehicles is inherently related to the
transportational function of a motor vehicle; without fuel trucks like the one he was operating,
Rice suggests, no one could ever operate a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. Rice also notes that
the Supreme Court in McKenzie commented that "a vehicle need not be moving at the time of an
injury for the injury to arise out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, i.e., out of its
transportational function."20
The inherent value of fueling trucks is manifest. However, we do not agree with Rice
that the tangential relationship between providing fuel to other vehicles and transporting the fuel
in a motor vehicle means that every act of refueling is necessarily related to the transportational
function of the motor vehicle carrying the fuel. That line of reasoning is an attempt to resurrect
Bialochowski v Cross Concrete Pumping Co,21 a case a majority of the justices of the Supreme
Court soundly criticized and explicitly renounced in McKenzie.22
In Bialochowski, the plaintiff sued for no-fault PIP benefits when the pump on a parked
and stabilized cement truck that was pouring cement in an elevated area exploded, causing a
boom to fall on him.23 The Bialochowski Court noted that motor vehicles are designed and
intended to be used for many different purposes and, as long as the injury occurred while the
vehicle was being used for one of these intended purposes, the motor vehicle fits within the
definition in MCL 500.3105(1).24 The McKenzie Court, however, declared this multi-purpose
theory of motor vehicle use "antithetical to the language of ยง 3105,"25 essentially overruling
contrary precedent like Gordon v Allstate Ins Co.26
No one contests that the core purpose of a fueling truck is to transport fuel to other
machinery, like the Klein steel hauler. Yet, there is no practical difference between pumping
fuel and pumping cement when it comes to examining the underlying activities of the motor
vehicle. Even if we were to agree that fuel has a special relationship to a motor vehicle's
transportational function, we see no indication in the language of MCL 500.3105 that a motor
vehicle's use as a motor vehicle depends at all on the substance being transported. If it did, the
McKenzie Court might have seen the inherent relationship between cement trucks and road
construction, roads being specially related to the transportational function of motor vehicles.
The Court did not, however, identify any significance in the load that might be carried in a motor
vehicle involved in an injury. In other words, the no-fault act does not make the character of the
20
McKenzie, supra at 219, n 6.
21
Bialochowski v Cross Concrete Pumping Co, 428 Mich 219; 407 NW2d 355 (1987).
22
McKenzie, supra at 223-225.
23
Bialochowski, supra at 222-223.
24
Id. at 228-229.
25
McKenzie, supra at 224.
26
Gordon v Allstate Ins Co, 197 Mich App 609; 496 NW2d 357 (1992).
-6-
load carried in or delivered by a motor vehicle relevant to whether a motor vehicle was used as a
motor vehicle at the time of an accident leading to bodily injury.
We are mindful that a motor vehicle need not necessarily be in motion, nor does an
injured individual necessarily need be a passenger in the motor vehicle, for it to be considered in
use as a motor vehicle within the meaning of MCL 500.3105(1). Individuals walking past a
parked vehicle and suffering injury because of repairs being performed on the vehicle,27 rescuers
injured while saving occupants from vehicles wrecked while in operation,28 and others have been
found to be entitled to no-fault PIP benefits. Indeed, MCL 500.3106 provides explicit exceptions
to the general exclusion of coverage for parked vehicles that reflect special circumstances in
which a parked vehicle is distinguishable from other nonmoving objects.29
Nevertheless, the problem in this case is that at the time Rice sustained his injuries, he
had virtually no physical or practical connection to the fueling truck. He was standing on a
ladder that was leaning against the Klein steel hauler. The Klein steel hauler, not the fuel truck,
moved, causing him to fall. That he was holding the fuel hose from the fuel truck at the time he
fell was completely coincidental. Critically, Rice does not claim that the Klein steel hauler,
which was directly involved in his accident, was a motor vehicle used as a motor vehicle. Nor is
it apparent that the Klein steel hauler was designed for operation on a highway or was actually
operating on a highway at the time of the accident in order to fit the definition of a motor vehicle
under the no-fault act.30 We know that the circumstances present in Bialochowski are
insufficient to warrant no-fault PIP benefits. Indeed, the circumstances in this case are even less
legally compelling than Bialochowski because the motor vehicle in this case (the fuel truck),
unlike the motor vehicle in Bialochowski (the cement truck), did not malfunction or otherwise
cause Rice's injuries. Under the facts here, we are satisfied that the fuel truck's relationship to
the accident as a whole was merely coincidental and that its transportational function had no
connection to the accident at all. Thus, the fuel truck was not being used as a motor vehicle at
the time of the accident.
Because Rice failed to pass the analysis in step one, we need not proceed to step two in
which we would determine whether the parked vehicle exclusions to no-fault PIP benefits barred
coverage in this case or if any of the exceptions to the exclusions would save coverage.
III. Attorney Fees
A. Standard Of Review
Rice claims that he was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to MCL 500.3148(1) because
ACIA unreasonably denied him coverage. Therefore, he contends, the trial court erred in
denying him these fees as part of his award. We review a trial court's decision that an insurer did
27
See McMullen v Motors Ins Corp, 203 Mich App 102, 103, 105-107; 512 NW2d 38 (1993).
28
See McKenney v Crum & Forster, 218 Mich App 619, 623-624; 554 NW2d 600 (1996).
29
See Miller v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633, 639-641; 309 NW2d 544 (1981).
30
See MCL 500.3101(2)(e).
-7-
not unreasonably refuse or deny payment of benefits to determine if the trial court committed
clear error.31
B. Unreasonable Delay
MCL 500.3148(1) provides:
An attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee for advising and representing a
claimant in an action for personal or property protection insurance benefits which
are overdue. The attorney's fee shall be a charge against the insurer in addition to
the benefits recovered, if the court finds that the insurer unreasonably refused to
pay the claim or unreasonably delayed in making proper payment.[32]
Though the trial court granted Rice's motion for summary disposition, signaling its view that he
had proper grounds for benefits, it nonetheless concluded that Rice was not entitled to attorney
fees because there was a legitimate dispute concerning the statutory requirements in this case.
"When determining whether attorney fees are warranted for an insurer's delay to make payments
under the no-fault act, a delay is not unreasonable if it is based on a legitimate question of
statutory construction, constitutional law, or factual uncertainty."33 Our analysis leading to the
opposite, substantive result in this case only underscores that a real statutory dispute existed.
Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in making this finding and denying Rice attorney fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for judgment to be entered in favor of
ACIA. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
31
See Attard v Citizens Ins Co of America, 237 Mich App 311, 317, 318; 602 NW2d 633 (1999).
32
Emphasis added.
33
Attard, supra at 317.
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.