FLORIDA LEASCO LLC V DEPT OF TREASURY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FLORIDA LEASCO, LLC,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2002
APPROVED FOR
PUBLICATION
March 22, 2002
9:10 a.m.
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 225119
Michigan Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-264860
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Respondent-Appellee.
Updated Copy
July 5, 2002
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Saad, P.J., and Whitbeck, J.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, Florida Leasco, LLC, appeals as of right from the Tax Tribunal's order
dismissing its petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Tax Tribunal dismissed petitioner's appeal as
untimely because it was sent by certified mail within, but received one day after, the thirty-fiveday deadline set by MCL 205.22(1). We reverse.
This appeal presents an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. In re
MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). The only
statutory provision providing any guidance with regard to what constitutes a "filing" is MCL
205.735, which, in pertinent part, provided as follows at the time that petitioner filed its appeal in
this case:1
(2) The jurisdiction of the tribunal in an assessment dispute is invoked by
a party . . . filing a written petition on or before June 30 of the tax year involved.
Except in the residential property and small claims division, a written petition is
1
The statute has since been amended by 2000 PA 165, effective June 20, 2000. We decide this
appeal without reference to that amendment or appellant's argument that it indicated the
legislative intent behind the prior incarnation of the statute effective here.
-1-
considered filed by June 30 of the tax year involved if it is sent by certified mail
on or before June 30 of that tax year. In the residential property and small claims
division, a written petition is considered filed by June 30 of the tax year involved
if it is postmarked by first-class mail or delivered in person on or before June 30
of the tax year involved. All petitions required to be filed or served by a day
during which the offices of the tribunal are not open for business shall be filed by
the next business day. In all other matters, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is
invoked by a party in interest, as petitioner, filing a written petition within 30 days
after the final decision, ruling, determination, or order that the petitioner seeks to
review.
This statutory section is ambiguous. The first three sentences, which speak of "an
assessment dispute" and "the residential property and small claims division," suggest that its
terms are limited to property tax disputes, which are not at issue here. The fourth and fifth
sentences, which speak of "all petitions" and "all other matters," suggest that its application is
more general, including the sales and use tax appeal at issue here.
In any event, the second and third sentences of this section provide the only statutory
indication available regarding when a "filing" occurs, i.e., in certain cases, when it is "sent by
certified mail" or, in other cases, when it is "postmarked by first-class mail or delivered." The
specific question presented is whether the Legislature intended, through this ambiguously drafted
section, that a filing would be effective, in any case, upon a certified mailing (the more stringent
of the mailing options), rather than only upon an actual delivery.
In amending the statute to allow these "filing by mailing" alternatives, the Legislature
specifically stated that its intent was to "codif[y] the petition filing provisions of Rule 201 . . . of
the Michigan tax tribunal." 1985 PA 95, ยง 2. Rule 201, as in effect in 1985, provided in relevant
part that "[a] petition shall be considered filed when mailed by certified mail . . . or when
delivered in person," for all matters, not just property tax matters. 1979 AC, R 205.1201.
Appellee concedes that the 1985 amendments of the statute were enacted in response to General
Motors Corp v Detroit, 141 Mich App 630, 634; 368 NW2d 739 (1985), where our Court
concluded that, in the absence of a statutory definition otherwise, "filing" occurs upon delivery
rather than upon mailing.
Because the statute is ambiguous, we may consider this enacted statement of legislative
intent and this legislative history in its interpretation. Joe Panian Chevrolet, Inc v Young, 239
Mich App 227, 234; 608 NW2d 89 (2000). We conclude that, in contrast to the decision in
General Motors, supra, and consistent with the referenced Rule 201, the Legislature intended
that filing would be effective, in any event, upon either a certified mailing or actual delivery of a
petition to the Tribunal. Because appellant sent its petition by certified mail within the thirtyfive-day deadline applicable here, the Tax Tribunal had jurisdiction over the appeal.2
2
In light of this conclusion, we need not consider whether the Tax Tribunal was equitably
estopped from asserting that appellant's petition was not timely filed.
-2-
We reverse the order of the Tax Tribunal dismissing appellant's petition.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
-3-
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