CENTRAL CEILING & PARTITION INC V PRIMEAU HOMES INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CENTRAL CEILING & PARTITION, INC.,
FOR PUBLICATION
January 29, 2002
9:15 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225378
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-810597-CH
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
KITCHEN SUPPLIERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
CAPPY HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING,
INC.
Updated Copy
April 12, 2002
Intervening-Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
PRIMEAU HOMES, INC.,
Defendant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Wilder and Cooper, JJ.
NEFF, P.J.
Defendant Michigan Department of Commerce appeals as of right the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion for summary disposition and entry of judgment of $21,280 in favor of
plaintiff Central Ceiling & Partition, Inc. (Central), $4,054 in favor of defendant Kitchen
Suppliers, Inc. (KSI), and $6,915 in favor of intervening plaintiff Cappy Heating and Air
Conditioning, Inc. (Cappy) with respect to their claims against the Homeowner Construction
Lien Recovery Fund. We affirm.
-1-
I
The facts in this case were stipulated before the trial court. Defendant general contractor
Primeau Homes, Inc., failed to pay its subcontractors,1 Central, KSI, and Cappy, for materials
and work performed on several homes under Primeau's contracts with the owners for home
improvements. The subcontractors sought recovery from the Homeowner Construction Lien
Recovery Fund under the Construction Lien Act, MCL 570.1101 et seq. Pursuant to MCL
570.1111(1), Central, KSI, and Cappy each presented liens to the Wayne County Register of
Deeds for recording within ninety days of the last furnishing of labor or materials for the
improvements. However, Wayne County failed to formally "record" the liens by assigning them
a liber and page number until sometime later, after the ninety-day period had passed.
Defendant sought summary disposition of the subcontractors' lien fund claims under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that the liens were not recorded within the ninety-day period as
required by the Construction Lien Act, MCL 570.1111(1). The trial court denied defendant's
motion and instead granted judgment in favor of the subcontractors, concluding that there was
substantial compliance with the act's requirements and the subcontractors were entitled to
recovery from the lien fund. The court reasoned that the subcontractors presented their liens for
recording within the required ninety-day period and obtained date stamps on the filings, and any
delay by Wayne County staff in entering the filings in the record books was beyond the
subcontractors' control; thus, there was compliance with the ninety-day requirement.
II
This Court reviews de novo as a question of law a trial court's grant of a motion for
summary disposition. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). A
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a
claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). We consider all relevant
documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.; Ardt, supra.
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
III
To recover under the Construction Lien Act, a claimant must record the lien within ninety
days of the last date of furnishing material or labor:
Notwithstanding section 109 [MCL 570.1109], the right of a contractor,
subcontractor, laborer, or supplier to a construction lien created by this act shall
cease to exist unless, within 90 days after the lien claimant's last furnishing of
labor or material for the improvement, pursuant to the lien claimant's contract, a
claim of lien is recorded in the office of the register of deeds for each county
1
For ease of reference, we refer to Central, KSI, and Cappy as "subcontractors," disregarding any
technical distinction between material suppliers and service contractors.
-2-
where the real property to which the improvement was made is located. A claim
of lien shall be valid only as to the real property described in the claim of lien and
located within the county where the claim of lien has been recorded. [MCL
570.1111(1).]
Defendant contends that the lien claims filed by Central, KSI, and Cappy were not timely
because even though they were filed by the subcontractors and accepted by the Wayne County
Register of Deeds office within the ninety-day period, the register of deeds office did not
formally record the liens until after the ninety-day period had passed. We disagree.
The Construction Lien Act contains a substantial compliance provision, MCL
570.1302(1):
This act is declared to be a remedial statute, and shall be liberally
construed to secure the beneficial results, intents, and purposes of this act.
Substantial compliance with the provisions of this act shall be sufficient for the
validity of the construction liens provided for in this act, and to give jurisdiction
to the court to enforce them.
The substantial compliance provision does not necessarily apply to all requirements of the
act. Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Cos—Midwest Inc, 461 Mich 316, 321; 603 NW2d
257 (1999). The scope of the provision must be determined case by case by analysis of logically
relevant factors, such as
the overall purpose of the statute; potential for prejudice or unfairness when the
apparent clarity of a statutory provision is replaced by the uncertainty of a
"substantial compliance" clause; the interests of future litigants and the public; the
extent to which a court can reasonably determine what constitutes "substantial
compliance" within a particular context; and, of course, the specific language of
the "substantial compliance" and other provisions of the statute. [Id. at 321-322.]
In applying these factors, the Court in Northern Concrete Pipe observed that provisions outlining
the requirements for filing certain information with public officials or those providing for notice
are the types of provisions to which a substantial compliance provision may suitably be applied.
Id. at 323. We agree, and so conclude, on the facts before us.
Pursuant to the Construction Lien Act's substantial compliance provision, MCL
570.1302(1), the subcontractors' actions of properly filing the lien claims with the register of
deeds, and acceptance by the register of deeds office, constitutes substantial compliance with the
act's requirement that a claim of lien be recorded within ninety days. Accordingly, the
subcontractors' rights were not subject to the automatic extinguishment provision of § 111 and
did not cease to exist.
Of the six liens at issue, all were timely filed and accepted. Central's liens were subject to
a last date of furnishing of October 3, 1997, and were filed with the register of deeds on
December 17, 1997. KSI's lien was subject to a last date of furnishing of June 11, 1997, and was
-3-
filed with the register of deeds on August 27, 1997. Cappy's liens were subject to a last date of
furnishing of September 18, 1997, and were filed with the register of deeds on December 5,
1997.
Unfortunately, the claims of lien were not formally recorded within the register of deeds
office for more than thirty days after they were filed and accepted. Central's claims of lien were
filed and accepted on December 17, 1997, but not formally recorded until February 2, 1998.
KSI's claim of lien was filed and accepted on August 27, 1997, but not formally recorded until
September 30, 1997. Cappy's claims of lien were filed and accepted on December 5, 1997, but
not formally recorded until January 23, 1998. Attributing the delays within the register of deeds
office to the subcontractors, as suggested by defendant, would lead to absurd and unfair results.
No lien claimant would ever know the number of days that would be "deducted" from the
statutorily prescribed ninety-day period because the lag time between the filing and acceptance,
and formal recording, would vary case by case. One lien claimant might be subject to a thirtyday period while another might be subject to a sixty-day period, and yet another to an eightyninety-day period, merely because of variances in formal recording times within the registers of
deeds offices. We cannot sanction this result, which wholly negates the Legislature's concept of
a ninety-day period expressed in the statute and has great potential for prejudice or unfairness.
Northern Concrete Pipe, supra at 321-322.
We recognize that the Construction Lien Act's specified ninety-day period in § 111 is not
subject to a substantial compliance interpretation. Id. at 323. The ninety-day deadline means
precisely ninety days. Id. However, just as the Legislature could not have intended that ninety
days be stretched to ninety-one or one hundred days or more, id., neither could the Legislature
have intended an arbitrary reduction of the ninety-day deadline to fifty-six or forty-three days or
less, to allow for the internal office time involved in recording each particular claim of lien.
Such idiosyncratic calculations would wreak chaos on the construction lien system.
We hold that filing within the ninety-day statutory period, and acceptance of a lien claim
by the register of deeds, substantially complies with the act's requirement of recording the lien
claim. Our holding leaves no uncertainty that the filing and acceptance must occur within the
ninety-day period; it can reasonably be determined whether the requirement has been met in a
particular context. Id. at 322, see also id. at 318 (a lien may be improperly filed and thus not
accepted, in which case the requirement may not be met).
The dissent's analysis would be well taken if the standard under the Construction Lien
Act was one of strict compliance, but it is not. The Legislature expressly adopted a standard of
substantial compliance to secure the beneficial results of the act: "[s]ubstantial compliance . . .
shall be sufficient for the validity of the construction liens . . . ." MCL 570.1302(1).
The strict compliance premise of the dissent reads the holding of Northern Concrete Pipe,
supra, too broadly. The question in that case was limited to the ninety-day deadline and whether
a lien that was not properly filed by the contractor within the ninety-day period could
nevertheless be timely. Id. at 318, 321. As framed by the Court, the question was "whether the
'substantial compliance' provision here is applicable to the ninety-day filing requirement." Id. at
321. Observing that "[a] precise deadline is not well suited to an analysis of what constitutes
-4-
'substantial compliance,'" the Court declined to expand the deadline to accommodate the
contractor's failure to supply a complete legal description for the lien filing until some 120 days
after the last date of furnishing. Id. at 318, 323. We cannot view the circumstances in the
present case as within the holding of Northern Concrete Pipe. The Construction Lien Act's
substantial compliance standard and the Legislature's express directive that the act "shall be
liberally construed to secure the beneficial results, intents, and purposes of this act" distinguishes
it from other statutes and subsequent interpretations by the courts relied on by the dissent. MCL
570.1302(1).
Application of the substantial compliance provision in this circumstance comports with
the Construction Lien Act's purpose of "protecting the rights of lien claimants to payment for
wages and materials."2 Old Kent Bank of Kalamazoo v Whitaker Constr Co, 222 Mich App 436,
438-439; 566 NW2d 1 (1997). It also coincides with previous court decisions that have
examined the recording requirement, in which the recording requirement was tacitly understood
to require that the claimant file the lien with the register of deeds. See Northern Concrete Pipe,
supra at 318, 322 ("a lien must be filed within ninety days after the last date when materials or
services are supplied," and "[a]bsent strict compliance with the ninety-day filing requirement of
MCL 570.1111(1) . . . ."); see also Superior Steel Systems, Inc v Nature's Nuggets, Inc, 174 Mich
App 368, 370; 435 NW2d 492 (1989) ("Delene filed its construction lien on October 7, 1986."
Further, the Northern Concrete Pipe Court referred to a "ninety-day deadline for filing a
construction lien," id. at 320, stating that the "lien was eventually accepted for filing," id. at 318.
In this case, the liens were filed and accepted within the ninety-day period and were therefore
timely.
Affirmed.
Cooper, J., concurred.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
2
Further, application of the substantial compliance provision does not work against the purpose
of protecting homeowners from paying twice for services, Old Kent Bank of Kalamazoo v
Whitaker Constr Co, 222 Mich App 436, 439; 566 NW2d 1 (1997), because the claims asserted
are against the recovery fund.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
