PATRICK WYSOCKI V KENNETH FELT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK WYSOCKI,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 20, 2001
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 221989
Keweenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000346-NI
RUTH KIVI,
Defendant,
and
KENNETH FELT, Personal Representative of the
Estate of DAVID FELT,
Defendant-Appellee,
Updated Copy
February 1, 2002
and
MARK SUTINEN,
Defendant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Smolenski and Whitbeck, JJ.
WHITBECK, J.
Plaintiff Patrick Wysocki appeals as of right a jury verdict of no cause of action.
Wysocki sued defendants, alleging negligent design and construction and premises liability after
he suffered injuries when, while intoxicated, he broke through a deck railing and fell. The jury
found that Wysocki was fifty percent or more at fault because of intoxication, barring his
recovery under MCL 600.2955a. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
The parties have entered into a stipulated statement of facts for the purposes of this
appeal, a practice that we strongly encourage and for which we commend them. We summarize
those facts here. In mid-May of 1997, Wysocki was injured while on premises owned by Ruth
Kivi and leased by David Felt. Wysocki's injury involved a home deck and railing that was
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constructed in 1993 on those premises. Specifically, Wysocki was leaning on the railing, which
had been constructed in 1993 by carpenter Mark Sutinen at the request of Kivi. Apparently, the
railing gave way. At the time of the accident, Wysocki had a blood alcohol content of 0.21
percent.
Wysocki sued Kivi on a premises liability theory, Felt on a premises liability theory, and
Sutinen on a negligence theory. The case went to trial in early August of 1999. Defendants
proposed a jury instruction to the trial court, based upon the intoxication statute.1 The
intoxication statute reads as follows:
It is an absolute defense in an action for the death of an individual or for
injury to a person or property that the individual upon whose death or injury the
action is based had an impaired ability to function due to the influence of
intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and as a result of that impaired
ability, the individual was [fifty percent] or more the cause of the accident or
event that resulted in the death or injury. If the individual described in this
subsection was less than [fifty percent] the cause of the accident or event, an
award of damages shall be reduced by that percentage.[2]
The first question on the verdict form was "Did [Wysocki] have an impaired ability to function
due to the consumption of alcohol?" The second question on the verdict form read, "Was
[Wysocki's] impaired ability due to the influence of intoxicating liquors [fifty percent] or more
the cause of the accident that [Wysocki] claims resulted in his injury?" and "If your answer is
yes, do not answer any further questions." The jury answered "yes" to each of these questions
and returned a no cause of action verdict. Wysocki now appeals.
1
MCL 600.2955a(1).
2
MCL 600.2955a(2)(b) defines "impaired ability to function due to the influence of intoxicating
liquor or a controlled substance" as meaning that,
as a result of an individual drinking, ingesting, smoking, or otherwise consuming
intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, the individual's senses are impaired
to the point that the ability to react is diminished from what it would be had the
individual not consumed liquor or a controlled substance. An individual is
presumed under this section to have an impaired ability to function due to
influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance if, under the standard
prescribed by section 625a of the Michigan vehicle code, Act No. 300 of the
Public Acts of 1949, being section 257.625a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, a
presumption would arise that the individual's ability to operate a vehicle was
impaired.
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II. Equal Protection And Due Process
A. Overview
The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions provide
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.3 In this regard, the Michigan and
federal Equal Protection Clauses offer similar protection.4 This constitutional guarantee requires
that persons similarly situated be treated alike.5 Indeed, this Court has held that the equal
protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions are coextensive.6
Conversely, however, the federal constitution does not require things that are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.7 Stated differently, the courts
have not interpreted the federal constitution to require "absolute equality." Similarly, it is well
established that the equal protection guarantee is not a source of substantive rights or liberties;
rather, it is a measure of our constitutions' tolerance of government classification schemes.8 We
review due process claims similarly to equal protection claims.9
B. Strict Scrutiny
When state legislation creates a classification scheme that is based on suspect factors,
such as race, 10 national origin,11 ethnicity or alienage, 12 or that affects a fundamental interest,13
3
See US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2.
4
Doe v Dep't of Social Services, 439 Mich 650, 670-671; 487 NW2d 166 (1992).
5
Royster Guano Co v Virginia, 253 US 412, 415; 40 S Ct 560; 64 L Ed 989 (1920); El Souri v
Dep't of Social Services, 429 Mich 203, 207; 414 NW2d 679 (1987).
6
Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701, 716; 575 NW2d 68 (1997); People v McFall,
224 Mich App 403, 413; 569 NW2d 828 (1997).
7
Jefferson v Hackney, 406 US 535, 549; 92 S Ct 1724; 32 L Ed 2d 285 (1972); Reed v Reed, 404
US 71, 75; 92 S Ct 251; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971); Tigner v Texas, 310 US 141, 147; 60 S Ct 879;
84 L Ed 1124 (1940).
8
Doe, supra at 661, citing San Antonio Independent School Dist v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 58; 93 S
Ct 1278; 36 L Ed 2d 16 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
9
Syntex Laboratories v Dept' of Treasury, 233 Mich App 286, 292; 590 NW2d 612 (1998).
10
See American States Ins Co v Dep't of Treasury, 220 Mich App 586, 592-594; 560 NW2d 644
(1996); see also Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356; 6 S Ct 1064; 30 L Ed 220 (1886); Strauder v
West Virginia, 100 US 303; 25 L Ed 664 (1880); Bickel, The original understanding and the
segregation decision, 69 Harv L R 1 (1955).
11
See Oyama v California, 332 US 633; 68 S Ct 269; 92 L Ed 249 (1948); American States,
supra at 592-594.
12
See Nyquist v Mauclet, 432 US 1, 8, n 9; 97 S Ct 2120; 53 L Ed 2d 63 (1977); El Souri, supra;
Chan v City of Troy, 220 Mich App 376, 378; 559 NW2d 374 (1996).
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courts apply a high standard of review, labeled "strict scrutiny."14 When courts review a statute
under this strict standard, they uphold the statute only "if the state demonstrates that its
classification scheme has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."15
Courts have rarely sustained legislation under this standard of review.16 Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, laid out the rationale underlying the strict scrutiny analysis in Plyler v Doer:
Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications
as "suspect." Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deepseated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as
incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be
judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law. Classifications
treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. See
McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184, 192; 85 S Ct 283; 13 L Ed 2d 222 (1964);
Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81, 100; 63 S Ct 1375; 87 L Ed 1774
(1943). Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have historically
been "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio
Independent School Dist v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 28; 93 S Ct 1278; 36 L Ed 2d 16
(1973); Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365, 372; 91 S Ct 1848; 29 L Ed 2d 534
(1971); see United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152-153, n 4; 58
S Ct 778; 82 L Ed 1234 (1938). The experience of our Nation has shown that
prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Our response to
that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by
virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or caste"
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.[17]
C. The "Traditional" or "Rational Basis" Test
The "traditional" or "rational basis" test represents the other polar extreme. Under this
standard, courts will not strike down a statute if the classification scheme it creates is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Justice Stewart articulated the test in Dandridge v
Williams:
(…continued)
13
See Harper v Virginia Bd of Elections, 383 US 663, 672; 86 S Ct 1079; 16 L Ed 2d 169
(1966); Neal, supra at 717-718.
14
People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 273; 564 NW2d 93 (1997).
15
Doe, supra at 662, citing Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 216-217; 102 S Ct 2382; 72 L Ed 2d 786
(1982).
16
Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 668; 232 NW2d 636 (1975).
17
Plyler, supra at 216-217, n 14.
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If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." Lindsley v Natural
Carbonic Gas Co, 220 US 61, 78; 31 S Ct 337; 55 L Ed 369 (1911). "The
problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific." Metropolis
Theatre Co v City of Chicago, 228 US 61, 69-70; 33 S Ct 441; 57 L Ed 730
(1913). "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420,
426; 81 S Ct 1101; 6 L Ed 2d 393 (1961).[18]
In Michigan, courts have applied the rational basis test principally to economic and social
legislation.19 Under the traditional or rational basis test, a classification will stand unless it is
shown to be "essentially arbitrary."20 Stated differently, one who attacks an enactment must
show that it is "arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute."21
"Few statutes have been found so wanting in 'rationality' as to fail to satisfy the 'essentially
arbitrary' test."22 Stated positively, the test is that courts must uphold a statutory classification
where it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.23 The rational basis test
"'reflects the judiciary's awareness that "it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the
wisdom and utility of legislation."'"24
D. "Heightened" Or "Intermediate" Scrutiny: The "Substantial Relationship" Test
The Michigan Supreme Court has adopted the United States Supreme Court's definition
of "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny, which involves the "substantial relationship" test:
Under this level of scrutiny, there are two determinations that must be
made. The first question is whether the classification serves an important
governmental interest. The second question is whether the classification is
substantially related to the achievement of the important governmental objective.
18
Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485; 90 S Ct 1153; 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970).
19
See Manistee Bank, supra at 668.
20
Id., citing Lindsley, supra.
21
Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271; 301 NW2d 285 (1981); see also In
re Kasuba Estate, 401 Mich 560, 568-569; 258 NW2d 731 (1977); McAvoy v H B Sherman Co,
401 Mich 419, 453-454; 258 NW2d 414 (1977).
22
Manistee Bank, supra at 668.
23
Doe, supra at 662; American States, supra at 592.
24
American States, supra at 597, quoting Gronne v Abrams, 793 F2d 74, 77 (CA 2, 1986),
quoting Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726, 729; 83 S Ct 1028; 10 L Ed 2d 93 (1963).
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Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197; 97 S Ct 451; 50 L Ed 2d 397 (1976), reh den
429 US 1124 (1977).[25]
E. The Principles of Judicial Deference
There is almost universal agreement that the power of the Legislature is not without
limits. "[T]hat those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written."26
And, as the Michigan Supreme Court stated in Manistee Bank, "[T]hat those limits not be
exceeded, the courts are entrusted with the responsibility to review and the power to nullify
legislative acts which are repugnant to the constitution."27
Nevertheless, courts are to use this authority sparingly. "[U]nder established rules of
statutory construction, statutes are presumed constitutional, and courts have a duty to construe a
statute as constitutional unless unconstitutionality is clearly apparent."28 As the Michigan
Supreme Court stated in Council of Organizations & Others for Education About Parochiaid,
Inc v Governor,29 "When compelled to make a constitutional pronouncement, the court must do
so with great circumspection and trepidation, with language carefully tailored to be no broader
than that demanded by the particular facts of the case rendering such a pronouncement
necessary." Further:
The court will not go out of its way to test the operation of a law under
every conceivable set of circumstances. The court can only determine the validity
of an act in the light of the facts before it. Constitutional questions are not to be
dealt with in the abstract.30
Indeed, "[t]he party challenging the facial constitutionality of an act 'must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid. The fact that the . . . [a]ct might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient . . . .'"31
25
Dep't of Civil Rights ex rel Forton v Waterford Twp Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 425 Mich
173, 191; 387 NW2d 821 (1986) (emphasis in the original).
26
Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L Ed 60 (1803).
27
Manistee Bank, supra at 666.
28
Mahaffey v Attorney General, 222 Mich App 325, 344; 564 NW2d 104 (1997).
29
Council of Organizations & Others for Education About Parochiaid, Inc v Governor, 455
Mich 557, 568; 566 NW2d 208 (1997), citing United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 21; 80 S Ct
519; 4 L Ed 2d 524 (1960).
30
General Motors Corp v Attorney General, 294 Mich 558, 568; 293 NW 751 (1940).
31
Council of Organizations, supra at 568, quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745;
107 S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).
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Thus, we should presume the intoxication statute to be constitutional unless its
unconstitutionality is clearly apparent. Further, in ruling on this constitutional challenge, we
should carefully tailor our language to the particular facts of this case. We are not to go out of
our way to test the operation of the intoxication statute under every conceivable set of
circumstances, nor are we to deal with the constitutional question in the abstract. Rather, we
should recognize that the fact that the intoxication statute might operate unconstitutionally under
some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient.
III. Due Process
A. Wysocki's Position
Wysocki argues that jury instructions based on the intoxication statute violate the Due
Process Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. He contends that, in practical
terms, applying the rules of comparative negligence to those who are less than fifty percent the
cause of an accident, while applying the rules of contributory negligence to those who were fifty
percent or more the cause of an accident, is arbitrary and capricious. In connection with his equal
protection challenge, Wysocki argues that an intermediate level of scrutiny—the "substantial
relationship" test—should be applied to tort recovery actions. He relies on a New Hampshire
case, Carson v Mourer.32
B. Standard Of Review
We review the constitutionality of statutes de novo.33
C. Carson
We conclude that Wysocki's reliance on Carson is misplaced. In that case, the court was
dealing with a statute that required notice provisions and scrutiny of expert witnesses in medical
malpractice actions.34 The New Hampshire Legislature adopted the law to combat the high costs
of litigation in the medical malpractice system.35 However, the Court did not base its decision on
the concept that recovery for injuries is a property right requiring due process protection.
Instead, the court reasoned that the New Hampshire state constitution afforded the court latitude
to offer more protection than the federal constitution, so the court applied an intermediate
scrutiny test, rather than the traditional rational basis test. Further, the court stated that it
routinely applied intermediate scrutiny to socioeconomic regulation as well.36
32
Carson v Mourer, 120 NH 925, 929-930; 424 A2d 825 (1980).
33
Blank v Dep't of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 112; 611 NW2d 530 (2000).
34
Carson, supra at 930.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 932.
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However, Michigan's Due Process Clause is construed only as broadly as the federal
guarantee.37 Further, unlike New Hampshire courts, Michigan courts apply rational basis
analysis to socioeconomic regulation.38 Therefore, we conclude that Wysocki's claim is
reviewable under the rational basis test in Michigan, regardless of the extra protection he may
have been awarded had the tort been committed in New Hampshire. Therefore, the appropriate
standard of review is under the rational basis test.
D. The Legislature's Objective
Rather plainly, the intoxication statute sought to place more responsibility on intoxicated
plaintiffs who are equally or more to blame for their injuries, therefore marking a shift toward
personal responsibility envisioned by overall tort reform. This legislative intent is clear from the
language of the statute itself, which bars recovery for some intoxicated plaintiffs and reduces
recovery for other intoxicated plaintiffs.
The 1995 tort reform package was a series of bills that overhauled the tort system in
Michigan. To this end, the Legislature enacted several laws that abolished joint and several
liability, imposed damages caps on pain and suffering, and—in the intoxication statute—limited
intoxicated plaintiffs' recovery.39
In deciding if the law is arbitrary or capricious, this Court uses the standards set down by
the United States Supreme Court:
Arbitrary is: "[W]ithout adequate determining principle . . . fixed or
arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or
adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance . . .
decisive but unreasoned."
Capricious is:
humorsome."[40]
"[A]pt to change suddenly; freakish; whimsical;
Here, the Legislature did not act without consideration of principles or circumstances in
enacting the intoxication statute. If a plaintiff is half or more at fault because of that plaintiff 's
own voluntary intoxication, then shifting the burden from the defendant to the plaintiff who was
at least or more responsible aligns with beneficial principles and societal circumstances.
37
Syntex Laboratories, supra at 290.
38
Stegeman v Ann Arbor, 213 Mich App 487, 492; 540 NW2d 724 (1995); see also Odonnell v
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 552; 273 NW2d 829 (1979) (challenged
statute must be upheld if it is not arbitrary and is rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
39
See 1995 PA 249, effective March 28, 1996; 1995 PA 161, effective March 28, 1996.
40
United States v Carmack, 329 US 230, 243; 67 S Ct 252, 258; 91 L Ed 209 (1946); see also
Williams v Martimucci, 88 Mich App 198, 201; 276 NW2d 876 (1979).
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E. Drawing The Line
Wysocki argues that the difference between forty-nine percent and fifty percent is
arbitrary. However, the Legislature cannot be restrained to using scientifically exact
formulations of individual circumstances:
Regulation of an ordered society must sometimes, because of the nature of
things, depend on numbers. We do not conceive it within our judicial competence
to hold that four is discriminatory and six is not. Somewhere the municipal
legislative authority must draw a numerical line albeit within reasonable limits.41
In attempting to allocate fault to irresponsible drinkers, the Legislature set the number at fifty
percent or more. We conclude that the Legislature drew the line within reasonable limits.
Further, as we have already noted, statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is
on a plaintiff to show that a statute is arbitrary and capricious.42 Wysocki has stated that the
statute is arbitrary only because it is arbitrary to preclude recovery for those plaintiffs who are
fifty percent or more at fault, while only reducing recovery for those who are less at fault. This
Court need not address inadequately briefed issues:
It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position
or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the
basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then
search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. The appellant himself
must first adequately prime the pump; only then does the appellate well begin to
flow.[43]
In any event, we cannot say that the percentage limit was arbitrary, especially considering that the
Legislature could have completely barred recovery for any type of intoxicated plaintiff by
statutory enactment, and the limitation precluded recovery only for those intoxicated plaintiffs
who were at least equally at fault for their injuries. The fifty percent limit is rationally related to
the government interest of placing responsibility for tortious conduct by intoxicated or drugaffected persons directly on them. We conclude that the intoxication statute is not violative of
due process and, therefore, that jury instructions based on the statute, rather than comparative
negligence, were similarly not violative of due process.
F. The Standard Of Fault
Wysocki argues that due process requires a standard of fault to be used by the jury when
deciding if plaintiff is entitled to damages. He asserts that this standard should be based on the
41
Alexander v Detroit, 45 Mich App 7, 12; 205 NW2d 819 (1973).
42
People v Sleet, 193 Mich App 604, 607; 484 NW2d 757 (1992).
43
Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
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conduct of a "reasonable person" in the same situation. He contends that the statutes
encompassing the 1995 tort reform should be read together and that the other statutes enacted at
that time required fault; therefore, he contends, the intoxication statute should be interpreted to
require fault based on a negligence standard. He concludes that he should be bound only by
comparative negligence principles. We do not agree.
Wysocki essentially contends that the only issue should be whether a plaintiff was
comparatively negligent, regardless of legislative fiat. However, this Court has previously
refused to consider this type of contention. In Thompson v Fitzpatrick,44 this Court held that the
five percent limitation on damages reduction due to the plaintiff 's failure to wear a seat belt
during a collision was not violative of due process or equal protection. There, the plaintiff 's
damages were $250,000, half of which were caused when she was thrown from the vehicle
because of her failure to wear a seat belt.45 However, MCL 257.710e limits reduction of
damages caused by unbelted driver plaintiffs to five percent. The defendants argued that this
limit was applicable only to cases where defendants attempted to limit damages on the basis of
violation of the statute, rather than common-law comparative negligence.46 This Court held that
the statute precluded any attempt for damages limitation at common law and that due process
was not violated in denying the defendants the right to proceed under a common-law theory.47
The seat belt law at issue in Thompson effectively abrogated common-law negligence in
favor of the statutory provision. Here, Wysocki essentially contends that this Court should
ignore its holding in Thompson and allow him to assert a claim at common law rather than
following the plain language of the intoxication statute that specifically allows intoxication being
fifty percent or more the cause of injuries to be an "absolute bar" to recovery. We decline to
adopt such an approach and instead adhere to the reasoning of Thompson.
We note that Thompson also concluded that the seat belt statute did not violate due
process or equal protection when it limited damages reduction to five percent, regardless of the
amount of fault for a plaintiff 's injuries caused by his failure to wear a seat belt.48 In Ullery v
Sobie,49 the trial court found that the plaintiff was sixty percent responsible for her injuries and
that failure to wear a seat belt was about ten percent the cause of that sixty percent.50 This Court
employed a rational basis test to determine that the statute did not violate due process.51 This
44
Thompson v Fitzpatrick, 199 Mich App 5, 6-7; 501 NW2d 172 (1993).
45
Id. at 6.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 6-7.
49
Ullery v Sobie, 196 Mich App 76; 492 NW2d 739 (1992).
50
Id. at 78-79.
51
Id. at 80-81.
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Court also used a rational basis test to hold that the statute did not violate equal protection
because there was a rational reason to differentiate between defendants who were sued by those
wearing seat belts and those who were not.52
The case here is analogous to Thompson and Ullery. In both of those cases, this Court
upheld statutes that abrogated common-law comparative negligence: as a defense in the former,
and as a cause of action in the latter. In those cases, this Court analyzed changes to the tort
system as socioeconomic legislation using the rational basis test. In our view, imposing an
absolute bar to recovery when Wysocki's intoxication was fifty percent or more the cause of his
injuries is rationally related to the legitimate government objective of allocating tort
responsibility more heavily on those who are at fault. Therefore, we conclude that the jury
instruction should not have considered fault and did not violate Wysocki's due process rights.
Wysocki further argues that the statutes of the 1995 tort reform package are in pari
materia and must be read together as one law.53 The goal of judicial interpretation of conflicting
statutes is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.54 Therefore, Wysocki asserts
that the intoxication statute should be interpreted to require only comparative fault. However, in
our opinion, Wysocki wrongly identifies the topic about which the statutes are in pari materia.
The statutes are in pari materia; they relate to the same topic. However, that topic is the
reduction of civil liability. The statutes should be read together to carry out the legislative intent
to limit civil liability of some defendants under certain circumstances and to increase the
significance of some plaintiffs' actions under certain circumstances. While the enactments, for
the most part, are indicative of a comparative fault system, rather clearly the Legislature intended
to exclude intoxicated or drug-affected plaintiffs from that comparative fault system if their fault
was more than fifty percent the cause of their injuries, in the same way as it excluded unbelted
drivers from that system. We conclude, therefore, that Wysocki was not denied due process and
that the intoxication statute cannot be interpreted in a manner that preserves his claim that jury
instructions on the issue of fault should be limited to comparative fault.
IV. Equal Protection
A. Wysocki's Position
Wysocki argues that jury instructions based on the intoxication statute violate the Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. He contends that there are
two specific categories of similarly situated individuals, both of whom have the common element
of having a diminished ability to react. According to Wysocki, the first category consists of
those individuals who have a diminished ability to react because of the consumption of alcohol
52
Id. at 81.
53
People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998).
54
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).
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or drugs. He contends that the second category consists of those who have a diminished ability
to react for whatever other reason (for example, distraction, physical tiredness, mental tiredness,
or generally failing to use due care for their own safety). Wysocki argues that there is no legal
reasoning "that can support the absolute defense in [the intoxication statute] as it pertains solely
to those individuals who have a diminished ability to react due to alcohol or drugs, while other
similarly situated claimants escape this same absolute defense." As we have already noted,
Wysocki argues that the "substantial relationship" test is the proper level of scrutiny.
B. Legal Standard
Wysocki asserts that his equal protection claim should be analyzed using the substantial
relationship test because the right to recover for an injury is an important substantive right.
Where no suspect class is involved, legislation must be sustained under an equal protection
challenge if it is nonarbitrary and rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.55
Intoxicated tortfeasors have not yet been identified as a suspect class and we doubt that they ever
will be. Suspect classes are those that have been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or have been relegated to a position of political powerlessness requiring protection.56
Intoxicated tortfeasors simply do not meet the classification requirements outlined by the United
States Supreme Court. Therefore, in order to demand higher scrutiny, the law must interfere with
a fundamental interest.57
However, as we have already noted, a plaintiff in Michigan does not have a fundamental
interest in existing remedies, regardless of New Hampshire law. Further, this Court has applied
the rational basis test to determine whether comparative negligence principles can be abrogated
statutorily without offending equal protection.58
C. "Similarly Situated"
As we have already noted, Wysocki argues that plaintiffs whose ability to function was
impaired, and whose impairment was fifty percent or more the cause of their injuries, are
similarly situated whether their impairment was due to alcohol or drugs or due to factors other
than alcohol and drugs. Therefore, barring the former from recovery, according to Wysocki,
violates equal protection. We do not agree.
We first observe that intoxicated persons are treated differently than sober persons in
many circumstances. For example, MCL 29.54 specifically states, "A person shall not handle an
explosive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic," while no similar
provisions apply to sober persons. In another example, a sober driver who is involved in an
55
In re Parole of Franciosi, 231 Mich App 607, 613-614; 586 NW2d 542 (1998).
56
San Antonio Independent School Dist, supra at 28.
57
Sleet, supra at 605-606.
58
Ullery, supra at 81.
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automobile accident may be cited for a traffic offense, while an intoxicated driver who does the
same act may be arrested for drunk driving.59 Therefore, it cannot be said that voluntarily
intoxicated plaintiffs who are equally or more the cause of their injuries are situated similarly to
sober plaintiffs. Further, assuming that the two groups were similar, intoxicated people are not a
protected class. The equal protection claim would still fail under a rational basis test because the
intoxication statute is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest: increasing the
responsibility of intoxicated or drug-influenced tortfeasors by reducing or barring their
recovery.60
Equal protection does not require that people in different circumstances be treated the
same.61 Indeed, there is case law to support the contention that those who voluntarily become
intoxicated are not subject to the same protections as those whose infirmity is created by means
beyond their control. When dealing with an intoxicated plaintiff who fell down the stairs at a
tavern, the Michigan Supreme Court, before the advent of current liquor law, held:
[W]e have repeatedly held that one who is active in bringing about the
intoxication may not recover for injuries resulting therefrom. The uniform
holding in this jurisdiction has been that the civil damage provisions in the statute
were for the benefit and protection of innocent parties only.[62]
* * *
It would be doing violence to the [then current] statute to construe it as
providing for the intoxicated person a right of action for an injury caused by
himself.[63]
We note that those who voluntarily become intoxicated have historically been considered to have
put themselves, and others, at risk of injury. We further note that other jurisdictions have
followed the reasoning that intoxicated persons should be limited or barred from recovery under
state dramshop acts.64 We conclude that neither logic nor the law requires that plaintiffs whose
59
MCL 257.625.
60
Other possible legitimate government interests of legislation similar to that at hand may
include discouraging illegal drug use, see People v Hunter, 90 Mich App 1, 3; 282 NW2d 218
(1979), and encouraging temperance, see People v Hoy, 380 Mich 597, 604; 158 NW2d 436
(1968).
61
Weeks v Bd of Trustees, Detroit Retirement System, 160 Mich App 81, 86-87; 408 NW2d 109
(1987).
62
Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58, 60; 8 NW2d 910 (1943).
63
Id. at 62.
64
See, generally, Reget v Bell, 77 Ill 593 (1875); Engleken v Hilger, 43 Iowa 563 (1876);
Sworski v Colman, 204 Minn 474; 283 NW 778 (1939), overruled on other grounds Strobel v
Chicago, R I & P R Co, 255 Minn 201; 96 NW2d 195 (1959).
-13-
ability to function was impaired, and whose impairment was fifty percent or more the cause of
their injuries, be considered similarly situated whether their impairment was due to alcohol or
drugs or due to factors other than alcohol and drugs.
Wysocki also argues, essentially, that forty-nine percent and fifty percent are "similarly
situated" on the spectrum of comparative negligence. He fails to recognize that, inevitably, some
degree of arbitrariness is required to facilitate efficient legislation.65 However, under the
appropriate rational basis test, if any set of facts is known or can be reasonably conceived to
validate the discrimination, then a rational basis for the legislation exists.66 A rationally based
classification need not be precise in its classifications, nor is it void because it results in some
unfairness.67
It is certainly conceivable—indeed, it may be likely—that voluntarily intoxicated
plaintiffs whose intoxication is fifty percent or more the cause of their injuries (in other words,
whose intoxication was more the cause of the injuries than any other cause) may be deterred from
intoxication and injury if they are barred from recovery. Therefore, while the precision with
which the line is drawn may appear somewhat arbitrary, it is reasonably related to the legitimate
government interest of allocating responsibility and preventing injury. It is thus not violative of
equal protection.
V. The Standard Jury Instruction: "A" Versus "The" Cause
Wysocki asserts that the jury instruction based on the intoxication statute violates due
process by using the term "the" instead of "a." He notes that SJI2d 15.01, which contains the
general definition of proximate cause, states:
When I use the words "proximate cause" I mean first, that the negligent
conduct must have been a cause of plaintiff 's injury, and second, that the
plaintiff 's injury must have been a natural and probable result of the negligent
conduct.[68]
Wysocki further notes that SJI2d 15.03 states:
There may be more than one proximate cause. To be a proximate cause,
the claimed negligence need not be the only cause nor the last cause. A cause may
65
Alexander, supra at 12.
66
Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259-260; 615 NW2d 218 (2000).
67
Id. at 260.
68
Emphasis supplied.
-14-
be proximate although it and another cause act at the same time or in a
combination to produce the occurrence.[69]
By contrast, the actual jury verdict form at issue here mirrors the intoxication statute and refers
only to "the" cause of the incident rather than "a" cause:
Was the Plaintiff 's impaired ability due to the influence of intoxicating
liquors [fifty percent] or more the cause of the accident that the Plaintiff claims
resulted in his injury . . . . If your answer is yes, do not answer any further
questions.[70]
This language tracks the language of the intoxication statute, which provides in part:
It is an absolute defense in an action for the death of an individual or for
injury to a person or property that the individual upon whose death or injury the
action is based had an impaired ability to function due to the influence of
intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and as a result of that impaired
ability, the individual was [fifty percent] or more the cause of the accident or
event that resulted in the death or injury.[71]
We first note that the standard jury instructions on which Wysocki relies are based on negligence
arising under common-law comparative negligence principles rather than under statute. We
conclude that the Legislature may, subject to rational basis scrutiny, abrogate common-law
comparative negligence. Further, as we have already discussed, the intoxication statute does not
violate equal protection or due process. Rather self-evidently, jury instructions based on that
statute also withstand constitutional scrutiny. We further conclude that the jury instruction did
not deny Wysocki due process or equal protection. The instruction was an exact reflection of the
law, abrogating comparative negligence. Wysocki's actions were wholly covered under the
intoxication statute and, therefore, he was not entitled to the comparative negligence instructions.
IV. Right To Jury Trial
Wysocki argues that he was denied his right to a jury trial because the jury was prevented
from deciding further issues of fault after it determined him to be fifty percent or more the cause
of his injuries. However, as outlined above, further instructions regarding comparative fault
were not required because, by operation of the intoxication statute, they were rendered moot.
The intoxication statute abrogates common-law comparative negligence and bars any recovery by
Wysocki. Regardless of the percentage of defendant's negligence, if that percentage was under
fifty percent the cause of Wysocki's injuries, it is irrelevant under the intoxication statute. A
69
Emphasis supplied.
70
Emphasis supplied.
71
MCL 600.2955a(1) (emphasis supplied).
-15-
defendant's negligence would only be useful in determining proportional fault if a plaintiff 's
intoxication was less than fifty percent the cause of the accident and the plaintiff was, therefore,
allowed limited recovery under the intoxication statute.
Wysocki also argues that he was denied his right to a jury trial because the jury was not
required to determine damages and comparative fault after initially deciding that he had no cause
for recovery under the statute because of his intoxication. We disagree. We observe that
Wysocki received a jury trial. The jury first determined that he was intoxicated and then at least
fifty percent responsible for his injuries. We conclude that, necessarily, Wysocki had no
damages and comparative fault was not an issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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