MICHAEL JACKSON V DEPT OF CORRECTIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL JACKSON,
FOR PUBLICATION
September 7, 2001
9:05 a.m.
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 220192
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 99-089868-AA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, and PAROLE BOARD,
Respondents-Appellees.
Updated Copy
November 26, 2001
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Michael Jackson, who is serving a parolable life sentence for second-degree
murder, MCL 750.317, appeals by leave granted the circuit court's denial of his petition for a writ
of mandamus requesting the circuit court to enter an order directing the Parole Board to prepare,
consider, and follow parole guidelines in his statutorily mandated interview, MCL 791.234(6)(a).
We affirm.
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a new "hearing"1 because the parole guidelines of
MCL 791.233e (§ 33e) are applicable to any prisoner, such as petitioner, who is eligible for
parole consideration pursuant to MCL 791.234(6) (subsection 34[6]). According to petitioner, §
33e imposes an absolute duty on the Parole Board to prepare and consider guidelines at the time
of interviewing prisoners for parole, including prisoners under consideration pursuant to
subsection 34(6).
Parole eligibility is governed by statute and the interpretation and application of statutes
is reviewed de novo. In re Parole of Johnson, 235 Mich App 21, 22-23; 596 NW2d 202 (1999),
citing MCL 791.234 and People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998). With
regard to interpreting statutes, our Supreme Court has explained that "the primary goal of judicial
1
In his petition for a writ of mandamus, petitioner states that a member of the Parole Board
interviewed him for parole eligibility in 1993 and 1998, but in each instance the Parole Board
determined that it had "no interest" in initiating further proceedings.
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interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Webb,
supra at 273-274. "As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in
the statute." Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). Judicial
construction is not permitted where a statute is unambiguous. Id. at 236.
Here, in arguing that parole guidelines should have been prepared and considered during
his statutorily mandated interview under subsection 34(6)(a), petitioner relies on the language of
subsections 33e(1) and (5), which provide in relevant part:
(1) The department shall develop parole guidelines that are consistent
with section 33(1)(a) [MCL 791.233(1)(a)] and that shall govern the exercise of
the parole board's discretion pursuant to sections 34 and 35 [MCL 791.234 and
791.235] as to the release of prisoners on parole under this act. The purpose of
the parole guidelines shall be to assist the parole board in making release
decisions that enhance the public safety.
* * *
(5) The department shall promulgate rules . . . , which shall prescribe the
parole guidelines. . . . Until the rules take effect, the director shall require that the
parole guidelines be considered by the parole board in making release decisions.
After the rules take effect, the director shall require that the parole board follow
the parole guidelines.
Petitioner claims that because subsections 33e(1) and (5) direct that guidelines are to be
considered and are to apply to prisoners under parole consideration pursuant to § 34, and because
subsection 34(6) applies to him, parole guidelines should have been prepared for him for use
during his interview.2 To the contrary, respondents argue that the Parole Board is not required to
prepare parole guidelines for petitioner because "the decision not to advance [petitioner] to a
public hearing is not a 'release decision.'" Further, respondents claim that the language of
subsection 33e(1), using the conjunctive "and" when referring to "sections 34 and 35," means
that the prisoner's parole consideration must be governed by both these sections, but petitioner's
parole consideration is not because § 35 is in conflict with subsection 34(6).
We need not address the majority of the arguments made on appeal because a
fundamental predicate has not been met in this case. In order for § 33e to apply, the Parole Board
must be confronting a "release" decision. MCL 791.233e(1) and (5). Upon review of § 33e, it is
apparent that parole guidelines are required when the Parole Board is exercising its discretion "as
to the release of prisoners on parole" and are to be considered and used to assist the Parole Board
"in making release decisions." MCL 791.233e(1) and (5). Clearly, the Legislature limits the
time when parole guidelines are to be prepared and utilized to "release" decisions. For a prisoner
2
Without extensive analysis specific to the parole process for prisoners serving parolable life
sentences, petitioner simply concludes that parole guidelines are required to be prepared and
utilized at the initial interview.
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serving a parolable life sentence, "the 'release decision' occurs only after the prisoner has
proceeded through the initial interview, avoided judicial veto, and advanced through a public
hearing to the ultimate decision of the Parole Board at which time the Parole Board either grants
or denies parole." Gilmore v Parole Bd, 247 Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).
Moreover, "[u]ntil all the statutory conditions are met, the Parole Board lacks the discretion to
parole a prisoner." Johnson, supra at 26. Accordingly, petitioner was not entitled to have parole
guidelines prepared and used during the initial statutorily mandated interview, where the Parole
Board neither makes a release decision nor exercises its discretion to parole a prisoner.
On the basis of the clear statutory language, we hold that parole guidelines need not be
prepared for prisoners serving parolable life sentences until the Parole Board is faced with the
decision whether to release the prisoner on parole. Under the statutory scheme for prisoners
serving parolable life sentences, that decision is not confronted until after the prisoner has been
interviewed, has avoided judicial veto, and has advanced through a public hearing. Petitioner is
entitled to no relief.3
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
3
Because our holding does not recognize or confer any legal right to petitioner, it is unnecessary
to discuss his remaining claims.
-3-
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