PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY MICHAEL STANLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
July 31, 2001
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 227682
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 97-071504-FH
ADAM PETER RAHILLY,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 229762
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004608-FH
DANIEL HARNS,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 229829
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000304-FH
TIMOTHY MICHAEL STANLEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Updated Copy
October 12, 2001
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Hood and Griffin, JJ.
HOOD, J.
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In these consolidated appeals, the prosecution appeals by leave granted from the trial
courts' orders removing or exempting defendants from the registration provisions of the Sex
Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq. We reverse and remand.
In Docket No. 227682, defendant Adam Peter Rahilly pleaded guilty to a charge of
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e (contact). The complainant and defendant
were college students. Defendant asked the complainant if he could kiss her, and she said no.
Defendant touched the complainant's breast. The complainant fell asleep with defendant behind
her. When she woke up, defendant was on top of the complainant and digitally penetrated her.
Defendant stated that he had been drinking and did not recall the incident. Defendant was
sentenced as a youthful trainee to twenty-four months' probation pursuant to the Youthful
Trainee Act (YTA), MCL 762.11 et seq. Defendant registered in accordance with the provisions
of the SORA. After he successfully completed the terms of his probation, defendant filed a
motion to have his name removed from the SORA registry. The trial court granted the motion.
In Docket No. 239762, defendant Daniel Harns pleaded guilty to a charge of fourthdegree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e, and indecent exposure, MCL 750.335a.
Defendant exposed himself to several girls under the age of six years old at his parents' home
where his mother ran a baby-sitting service. Additionally, defendant removed the clothing of a 41/2-year-old girl and touched her vagina. Following the completion of ten months on an
electronic tether and three years on probation while assigned to the status of youthful trainee
pursuant to the YTA, defendant moved for an exemption from registration under the SORA, and
the trial court granted the motion.
In Docket No. 229829, defendant Timothy Michael Stanley pleaded guilty to a charge of
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e and aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a.
Defendant grabbed the complainant's hand and forced it onto his genitals, then assaulted the
complainant's boyfriend. Defendant was sentenced to six months' probation and assigned to the
status of youthful trainee pursuant to the YTA. The trial court granted defendant's motion to
exempt him from registration under the SORA. We granted the prosecution's applications for
leave to appeal in each case and consolidated the appeals.
The prosecution argues that there is no provision for removal from the SORA registry on
the basis of participation in and completion of the requirements of the YTA. We agree.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v Nimeth, 236
Mich App 616, 620; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). When resolving disputed interpretations of statutory
language, it is the function of the reviewing court to effectuate the legislative intent. People v
Valentin, 457 Mich 1, 5; 577 NW2d 73 (1998). When the language of the statute is clear, the
Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written.
Id. We presume that every word has some meaning, and we must avoid any construction that
would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460
Mich 278, 285; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). The Legislature is presumed to be aware of and legislate in
harmony with existing laws when enacting new laws. Walen v Dep't of Corrections, 443 Mich
240, 248; 505 NW2d 519 (1993). The omission of a provision from one part of a statute that is
included in another part of a statute must be construed as intentional. That is, we "cannot assume
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that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another
statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there." Farrington v Total
Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Two statutes that relate to the same
subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together. People v
Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998). The goal of the in pari materia rule is to give
effect to the legislative purpose found in the harmonious statutes. Id. When two statutes lend
themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that construction should control. Id.
The YTA provides a mechanism for individuals who commit certain crimes between the
time of their seventeenth and twenty-first birthdays to be excused from having a criminal record.
People v Bobek 217 Mich App 524, 529; 553 NW2d 18 (1996), citing People v Dolgorukov, 191
Mich App 38, 39; 477 NW2d 118 (1991). Pursuant to MCL 762.11, an individual within the
restricted age range may plead guilty of a specified offense, and the court having jurisdiction may
assign the individual to the status of youthful trainee. Once having assigned the individual to the
status of youthful trainee, the court may commit the individual to custodial supervision for not
more than three years in a specially designated Department of Corrections facility, place the
individual on probation for not more than three years, or commit the individual to the county jail
for not more than one year. MCL 762.13. Thus, the individual assigned to youthful trainee
status is nonetheless punished for the crime committed. The individual assigned to youthful
trainee status derives a benefit from the status if he successfully completes the punishment
imposed. MCL 762.14 provides in relevant part:
(1) If consideration of an individual as a youthful trainee is not terminated
and the status of youthful trainee is not revoked as provided in section 12 of this
chapter [MCL 762.12], upon final release of the individual from the status as
youthful trainee, the court shall discharge the individual and dismiss the
proceedings.
(2) An assignment of an individual to the status of youthful trainee as
provided in this chapter is not a conviction for a crime and, except as provided in
subsection (3), the individual assigned to the status of youthful trainee shall not
suffer a civil disability or loss of right or privilege following his or her release
from that status because of his or her assignment as a youthful trainee.
* * *
(4) Unless the court enters a judgment of conviction against the individual
for the criminal offense under section 12 of this chapter, all proceedings regarding
the disposition of the criminal charge and the individual's assignment as youthful
trainee shall be closed to public inspection, but shall be open to the courts of this
state, the department of corrections, the department of social services, and law
enforcement personnel for use only in the performance of their duties.
In 1994, our Legislature enacted the SORA that required convicted sex offenders to
register with local law enforcement agencies. People v Pennington, 240 Mich App 188, 191; 610
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NW2d 608 (2000). In 1999, the SORA was amended. It continued to provide a database for law
enforcement officers to track the whereabouts of sexual offenders. However, it expanded the
notification provisions to allow public access to information regarding sex offenders. Id.; MCL
28.728(2). Specifically, the public could either utilize the SORA database to identify registered
sex offenders by zip code, which search reveals the name of the offender, and the offender's
address, physical description, and the offense involved, or search the SORA database by name of
the offender. Id.
The Legislature amended the YTA to account for the creation of the SORA. Specifically,
MCL 762.14(3) provides:
An individual assigned to youthful trainee status for a listed offense
enumerated in section 2 of the sex offenders registration act is required to comply
with the requirements of that act.
Additionally, while MCL 762.14(2) provides that the assignment of an individual to youthful
trainee status does not result in a conviction, for purposes of the SORA, assignment to youthful
trainee status, in fact, constitutes a conviction. MCL 28.722(a)(ii) defines convicted as "[b]eing
assigned to youthful trainee status under sections 11 to 15 of chapter II of the code of criminal
procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 762.12 to 762.15." In fact, MCL 28.724(5) provides that the
sentencing court may not enter an order of disposition or assign an individual to youthful trainee
status until it determines that the individual is registered with the local law enforcement or
sheriff 's department, or the Department of State Police. Once registered, the individual must
comply with the SORA for a period of twenty-five years following the person's date of the initial
registration or for ten years following the person's release from a state correctional facility,
whichever is longer. MCL 28.725(6).
In accordance with the cited rules regarding statutory construction, we presume that the
Legislature was aware of the YTA when it enacted the SORA. Walen, supra. In this case, the
presumption is buttressed by the fact that each statutory act references the other. Despite the
plainly expressed language of the statutes requiring registration by individuals with YTA status,
the trial courts ordered the removal or exempted defendants' names from the SORA registry. The
trial courts concluded that compliance with the SORA led to absurd results and deprived
defendants of the "second chance" offered by the YTA. While some case law provides that
statutes should be construed to prevent absurd results, injustice, or prejudice to the public
interest, People v Stephan, 241 Mich App 482, 497; 616 NW2d 188 (2000), citing McAuley v
General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998); cf. People v McIntire, 461
Mich 147, 155-160; 599 NW2d 102 (1999) (rejecting the "absurd result" mode of statutory
construction ), a sex offender's compliance with both the SORA and the YTA does not lead to
absurd results. If an individual successfully completes YTA status, the court shall discharge the
individual and dismiss the proceedings. MCL 762.14(1). Despite having committed a crime, the
individual is not deemed as having been convicted of a crime for purposes of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. MCL 762.14(2). Thus, the individual derives a benefit from YTA status.
For example, the individual, for purposes of providing a history in applying for employment,
need not list the offense as a conviction. However, the Legislature has concluded that law
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enforcement agencies and the public should, nonetheless, continue to be apprised of the
individual's whereabouts for purposes of tracking the offender and for the safety of the public.
Thus, the individual is still provided a benefit by having YTA status, but is not excused from the
registration procedures of the SORA. This interpretation, in accordance with the plain, expressed
language of the two statutes, does not lead to absurd results, but rather indicates that the public
interest is paramount to full suppression of the information surrounding the individual's offense
and his current location. Webb, supra.
Defendants argue that registration in the SORA registry should be limited to the time
necessary to complete the terms of the sentence imposed until the youth is discharged from
youthful trainee status. This construction is contrary to the plain language of the statutes. MCL
762.14(3) provides that registration shall occur in accordance with the procedures set forth in the
SORA. The SORA provides that the term of the registration shall occur for twenty-five years
from the time of registration or ten years following the person's release from a state correctional
facility, whichever is longer. MCL 28.725(6). There is no exception to this time frame for
youthful trainee status. We cannot assume that this was an inadvertent omission by the
Legislature. Farrington, supra. Accordingly, defendants' argument is without merit.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Griffin, J., concurred.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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