PEOPLE OF MI V CLEVELAND MOORER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
July 17, 2001
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 221855
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009038
CLEVELAND MOORER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
September 28, 2001
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and O'Connell, JJ.
O'CONNELL, J.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction, following a jury trial, of second-degree
murder, MCL 750.317. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of forty to eighty-five years'
imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316, in
connection with the suffocation death of his twenty-one-month-old son, Antonio. In a signed
statement given to the police and introduced into evidence at trial, defendant admitted
suffocating Antonio by holding his hand over his son's nose and mouth until he stopped crying.
Defendant later led the police to an abandoned house where Antonio's burned body was found in
a plastic garbage bag.
Following the preliminary examination, defendant filed a motion requesting that the
circuit court quash the district court's bindover on the first-degree murder charge. This motion
was denied and defendant was tried on the first-degree murder charge. At the close of the
prosecution's proofs, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal with regard to the
first-degree murder charge. After denying the motion, the trial court instructed the jury that it
could find defendant guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, or not guilty. The jury convicted defendant of seconddegree murder.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the district
court's bindover on the first-degree murder charge. Specifically, defendant contends there was
insufficient evidence of premeditation introduced at the preliminary examination to support the
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first-degree murder charge. Defendant does not dispute that the jury verdict of second-degree
murder was supported by the evidence. Therefore any error in the sufficiency of the proofs at the
preliminary examination is considered harmless. People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 600-601; 460
NW2d 520 (1990); People v Johnson, 427 Mich 98, 116; 398 NW2d 219 (1986); see also People
v Meadows, 175 Mich App 355, 359; 437 NW2d 405 (1989).
Defendant also contends that reversal is warranted because the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal of the first-degree murder charge. Defendant does
not dispute that the charge of second-degree murder was properly submitted to the jury.
Accordingly, any error arising from the submission of the first-degree murder charge to the jury
was rendered harmless when the jury acquitted defendant of that charge. People v Graves, 458
Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). As our Supreme Court observed in Graves:
[A] defendant has no room to complain when he is acquitted of a charge
that is improperly submitted to the jury, as long as the defendant is actually
convicted of a charge that was properly submitted to the jury. Such a result
squares with respect for juries. Further, not to adopt this view is to countenance a
misuse of judicial resources by automatically reversing an otherwise valid
conviction. [Id. at 486-487.]1
Finally, defendant challenges the trial court's departure from the recommended guidelines'
range in imposing sentence. In defendant's view, the trial court imposed a sentence that was
disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and the offender. We disagree.
1
Likewise, we reject defendant's assertion that the record contains persuasive indicia of jury
compromise to the extent that a harmless error analysis is not applicable. Defendant points to
Graves, arguing that reversal is warranted on the basis of jury compromise because the jury twice
requested that the trial court repeat the instructions pertaining to the four alternate charges on
which the jurors could have convicted defendant. In our opinion, "clear record evidence of
unresolved jury confusion" as contemplated by Graves is not presented on this record. Id. at 488.
Significantly, the trial court instructed the jurors that they were not to compromise their
views to reach a verdict. It is well settled that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions not
to compromise their views. Id. at 485; see also People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 351; 524 NW2d
682 (1994). Further, after the verdict was rendered and the jury was polled, each juror affirmed a
verdict of second-degree murder. See People v Ramsey, 422 Mich 500, 517; 375 NW2d 297
(1985) (Brickley, J.). On this record, we are not persuaded that the jury's request that the trial
court repeat the pertinent instructions is evidence of unresolved jury confusion. That the jury
asked questions during deliberations is not necessarily indicative of jury compromise. See, e.g.,
People v Clark, 172 Mich App 1, 5; 432 NW2d 173 (1988). We therefore decline defendant's
invitation to engage in "judicial speculation" regarding whether the jurors compromised their
views in spite of an express direction by the trial court to the contrary. Johnson, supra at 116, n
15.
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We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich
App 511, 525; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). A trial court's sentence is an abuse of discretion if it
violates the principle of proportionality, which requires that a sentence be proportionate to the
seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). In the present case, the trial court departed from the
recommended guidelines' range in imposing a sentence of forty to eight-five years'
imprisonment.2 Although a trial court is permitted to deviate from the guidelines, a trial court's
departure from the guidelines' recommended range based on factors already accounted for in the
guidelines is subject to close scrutiny on appeal. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 79; 601
NW2d 887 (1999).
When presented with a departure from the sentencing guidelines, our initial consideration
is "whether the case involves circumstances that are not adequately embodied within the
variables used to score the guidelines." Milbourn, supra at 659-660. As our Supreme Court
recognized in Milbourn, in certain cases important considerations may arise at sentencing that are
not contemplated by the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 660. One such example is the prior
relationship between the offender and the victim. Id. Specifically, the Milbourn Court, speaking
through Justice Brickley, opined:
Perhaps the clearest example of such a factor is the prior relationship, if
any, between the victim and the offender. . . . A prior relationship between a
victim and an offender can be a very mitigating circumstance or a very
aggravating circumstance, depending upon the history of interaction between the
parties. [Id. at 660-661 (emphasis supplied).]
With the foregoing principles in mind, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in departing from the sentencing guidelines' recommended range. Contrary to
defendant's assertion on appeal, the trial court articulated on the record "the special
characteristics of the offense [and] the offender" that justified its departure from the guidelines'
range. People v Crear, 242 Mich App 158, 170; 618 NW2d 91 (2000). Moreover, the trial court
properly considered the "severity and nature of the crime and the circumstances surrounding the
criminal behavior" in fashioning defendant's sentence. People v Rice (After Remand), 235 Mich
App 429, 446; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Specifically, the trial court noted the father-son
relationship between defendant and Antonio and expressed its concern that defendant committed
such a horrific crime on his own child. The court also took into account the "reprehensible"
manner in which Antonio's body was burnt and discarded in a plastic garbage bag in a vacant
house following his death. Further, the trial court properly considered Antonio's young age in
relation to the seriousness of the offense. See generally People v Kowalski, 236 Mich App 470,
474; 601 NW2d 122 (1999).
2
The sentencing guidelines' recommended a sentence in the range of ten to twenty-five years'
imprisonment.
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We are also satisfied that the sentence imposed by the trial court is proportionate to the
seriousness of the circumstances underlying this offense and the offender. Milbourn, supra at
636. "[T]he 'key test' of proportionality is not whether the sentence departs from or adheres to
the recommended range, but whether it reflects the seriousness of the matter." People v Houston,
448 Mich 312, 320; 532 NW2d 508 (1995). Testimony at trial revealed that after defendant and
Antonio's mother quarreled, defendant took Antonio from their home without her consent, and
kept the child from her for over a month, refusing to divulge Antonio's whereabouts. By his own
admission, defendant smothered his twenty-one-month-old son. Antonio's killing occurred after
his mother informed defendant that she did not want to continue their relationship. Evidence at
trial revealed that Antonio's body was doused with gasoline, set aflame, placed in a garbage bag,
and left in a vacant house. Further exacerbating the heinous details of this crime, defendant
initially lied to both the police and Antonio's mother when questioned about the child's
whereabouts.3 The trial court properly considered these factors in imposing sentence. People v
Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 98; 617 NW2d 721 (2000). Under these circumstances, the trial
court's imposition of sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
3
Defendant initially told the police and Antonio's mother that he placed the child in a taxicab to
send him to a family member's home and had not seen him since that time.
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