PEOPLE OF MI V BENNY JOHNSON JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 6, 2001
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212482
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-156672-FC
BENNY JOHNSON, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Kelly and Whitbeck, JJ.
O’CONNELL, P.J.
A jury convicted defendant of two counts of kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581,
and one count of domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2); MSA 28.276(2). He appeals as of right.
We affirm.
I. Facts
Complainant in this case testified that she dated defendant for about six weeks, but ended
the relationship the week before the events at issue. She had a three-year-old son, who was not
related to defendant, for whom she had arranged defendant’s mother to baby-sit while
complainant was at work. After the completion of her work day on September 26, 1997,
complainant arrived at defendant’s mother’s house to pick up her son, when she noticed a police
car parked outside the house. As she approached the house she saw and heard defendant telling
some police officers that everything was all right and that they could not enter the house. After
the police left, complainant took her son to her car, and defendant followed and entered the car
on the passenger side. Defendant’s mother asked complainant to take defendant somewhere for a
little while to cool off because a fight had occurred earlier.
After running some errands and getting dinner, complainant returned to defendant’s
mother’s house to drop defendant off. Defendant, however, stayed in the car and wanted to talk
with complainant about their relationship. After complainant told defendant that she did not
want to get back together, defendant’s demeanor changed. He became agitated and began
questioning her about who had given her the money for a down payment on her new home.
When complainant told him that it was none of his business, defendant took the car keys and
refused to give them back unless she told him who gave her the money. At that point,
complainant left the car and went into the house to call her brother for a ride home. In response,
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defendant threatened to kill complainant’s brother if she called him.
frightened, and her son began crying.
Complainant became
Complainant left the house with her son to find a pay phone to call her brother. Shortly
thereafter, defendant caught up with her and told her that he was not through with her and that he
was going to make her suffer. When complainant started walking in another direction, defendant
shoved her, blocked her way, and threatened her with a stick. Complainant went back to
defendant’s mother’s house with the hope of making a phone call. However, when complainant
tried to get the phone, defendant, who seemed to be delusional, was yelling at his mother, who
was telling him to leave complainant alone.
Complainant and her son then went back outside because complainant was afraid that
defendant was going to hit his mother. Running to the next block, she sought a place to hide.
Defendant, however, caught up with her and threatened to kill her if she did not get into the car.
She complied, and defendant drove to a gas station. Once there, defendant took the keys and got
out of the car. Complainant testified that she tried to escape, but was not able to get her son out
of the back seat before defendant returned.
Defendant then drove to a party store, asked an individual who he knew to buy him some
beer, and drove back to his mother’s house. Defendant drank the beer in his mother’s driveway
and told complainant that she could have her keys back if she had sex with him. After initially
refusing, complainant complied with defendant’s demand so that she could take her son home.
Afterward, defendant refused to return the keys to the car and laughed at complainant, telling her
that he was not done with her and that she was going to die that night.
Defendant then demanded that complainant take him to her new house. Because of his
threats, complainant agreed to do so. All three slept on the floor together that night, defendant
with his arm around the complainant’s son to prevent complainant from seeking help.
The next morning, defendant woke complainant up and demanded that she take him to
work. Along the way, a Warren police officer pulled the vehicle over. Complainant stated that
she did not alert the police officer about her situation because she was afraid that defendant
would hit her with an empty beer bottle that was in the car. Afterward, she continued to drive to
defendant’s place of employment and dropped defendant off between two trailers. Defendant
went into one of the trailers, about ten feet away. As complainant was attempting to back out,
defendant returned and got back into the car. He told her that everything was fine, and that his
boss said that he could take the day off. He directed her to move the car to the front of the plant
so that he could collect his paycheck. When complainant parked the car, defendant took the keys
and told her that he was not done with her yet. Complainant thereafter ran from the car,
approached a moving truck, and screamed for help. The driver allowed complainant to use his
cellular phone to call her sister. When she saw that defendant had taken her son from the back
seat of the car and was walking away, complainant left the truck and ran towards them.
Defendant refused to return her son to her unless she agreed to drive him to his brother’s house.
Our of fear and concern for her son, she agreed.
At defendant’s direction, complainant began driving around. When defendant became
unhappy about complainant’s driving, he grabbed the wheel and turned into a parking spot. He
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grabbed her, flipped her over, slammed her into the passenger seat, and began to choke her.
Complainant’s son begged defendant not to kill his mother. Eventually defendant stopped.
During the struggle, complainant’s kicking cracked the car’s windshield. After visiting
two repair shops and a fast-food restaurant, defendant eventually calmed down and they agreed
that she would drop him off at his mother’s house. When they arrived, defendant’s mother came
out and told defendant that the police were looking for him and that complainant’s mother was
waiting for her at the police station. En route to the station, defendant instructed complainant to
tell the police that they had merely had a lover’s quarrel and that a stone had hit the windshield at
defendant’s place of employment. At the police station, complainant spoke with the officers and
told them what had happened, made a written statement, and went to a hospital. Complainant
also testified that she was five weeks’ pregnant with defendant’s child at the time of the incident,
and that defendant knew it. At one point during the incident, defendant threatened to punch her
in the stomach.
The prosecution charged defendant with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I),
MCL 750.520b(1)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f), felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, two
counts of kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581, and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2);
MSA 28.276(2). The jury acquitted him of the CSC I and felonious assault charges, but
convicted him of both counts of kidnapping and domestic violence. The trial court sentenced
defendant as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to concurrent prison terms
of ten to thirty years for each of the kidnapping convictions and ninety-three days for the
domestic assault conviction.
II. Juror 457
Defendant first contends that he is entitled to a new trial because one of the members of
the jury did not reveal until after trial that she had been a complainant in a domestic violence
prosecution. According to defendant, the juror concealed facts from the court which, if she had
revealed them, would have led defense counsel to challenge her for cause. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion for new trial on the issue. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
new trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Jones, 236 Mich App 396, 404; 600 NW2d 652
(1999). We find no error requiring reversal.
During voir dire, the jurors learned that one of the charges against defendant was
domestic violence involving an assault and battery. The trial court then asked the jury, “Now
that you have heard all of the charges in this case do you know of any reason why you should not
serve as a juror in this case?” None of the jurors responded. When the trial court then asked;
“Are there any among you who have been previously a victim of a crime,” Juror 457 responded,
“I have been assaulted.” The following colloquy then occurred:
THE COURT: By virtue of that experience, would you be thinking about that
experience and would it interfere with your ability to listen to the facts of this case
and decide this case from the evidence here?
JUROR: No, I can keep it separate.
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THE COURT: Okay. You can keep it separate, good. Anyone else?
When the prosecutor questioned the prospective jurors, she asked whether they would have any
difficulty sitting on a jury where the defendant was charged with felonious assault and assault
and battery domestic violence. None of the jurors responded.
When defense counsel questioned the jurors, he asked, “Has anyone in this jury box every
[sic] been where you felt you were threatened with some type of weapon?” Juror 457 responded
that she had been hit in the head with a gun as a teenager, but stated that she could put it aside.
When defense counsel asked whether any of the prospective jurors had “something weighing so
heavily on your mind right now that you might not be able to give full attention to this case” and
“wouldn’t want themselves sitting as a juror if they were the Defendant in a case,” Juror 457 did
not respond. The trial court also asked each of the newly seated jurors if there were any reasons
why they should not serve as a juror in the case. Defense counsel, after requesting the court to
remove one juror for cause and exercising six peremptory challenges, expressed satisfaction with
the jury.1
After trial, and before the sentencing hearing, defendant moved for a new trial on the
basis of juror bias, contending that Juror 457 did not reveal during voir dire that, at the time of
the trial, she was a complainant in a domestic violence case and that the same special unit in
Oakland County was prosecuting that case. In response, the prosecutor stated that a new trial
was not warranted because Juror 457 revealed during voir dire that she had been the victim of an
assault and thus had not knowingly given false or misleading answers. The prosecutor
emphasized the juror’s statement that she could remain unbiased, and that defense counsel did
not question her further. The prosecutor, who was not involved in Juror 457’s domestic violence
case, further asserted that she had not cooperated with the prosecution in the case against her
husband. In reply, defense counsel contended that he had learned that the juror had told the
assistant prosecuting attorney assigned to her case that she was ready to convict defendant even
before the trial began. The trial court observed:
As to the issue of juror bias, this Court finds such argument without merit.
The defendant argues that he was denied an impartial jury panel as a result of
Juror #457’s bias. There has been no showing that the Juror knowingly
concealed, mislead [sic] or gave false information during voir dire. In fact, when
the Juror notified the Court that she was the victim of an assault, the Defense
Counsel did not conduct further inquiry and failed to exercise a preemptory [sic]
challenge or challenge for cause. Moreover, as a result of the disclosure by Juror
#457, this Court asked whether the Juror could remain fair and impartial. Juror
#457 responded that she could.
1
Notably, when responding to the trial court’s inquiry regarding the composition of the jury
shortly before the jury was sworn, defense counsel replied that she was “very satisfied” with the
jury panel.
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We agree with the trial court and decline to reverse on this issue. Our review of the
record did not reveal, as defendant asserts, that Juror 457 “concealed” information from the trial
court. When the court asked the juror whether she had “been previously a victim of a crime,” she
responded, “I have been assaulted.” When defense counsel asked the juror whether anyone had
ever threatened her with a weapon, she admitted that someone had hit her on the head with a gun
when she was a teenager. The juror did not, however, reveal that she had made allegations of
domestic violence against her husband in the past.2 Nevertheless, in our view, the juror’s history
as a victim of domestic violence was there for defense counsel to discover through further
questioning. Defendant correctly argues that jurors have a duty to reveal relevant information,
even though the information is personal or embarrassing. People v DeHaven, 321 Mich 327,
334; 32 NW2d 468 (1948). Nevertheless, Juror 457 truthfully answered the trial court’s
question. That defense counsel did not ask more specific questions to learn the full details of the
juror’s past experiences did not, in our view, constitute concealment on her part.3
2
Apparently, she later denied to authorities that the episode ever happened, she recanted at a
preliminary examination, bonded her assailant, and was uncooperative with the prosecutor.
3
Our dissenting colleague opines that defense counsel inquired with reasonable diligence into
Juror 457’s background. Our review of the record, however, indicates to the contrary. We
simply do not consider defense counsel’s failure to inquire further, on learning that the juror had
been the victim of violence in the past, as diligent. We are not of the opinion, as the dissent
suggests, that defense counsel was required to read the juror’s mind or “engage in a far-flung
fishing expedition.” However, follow-up questioning regarding the juror’s response that she had
been assaulted would have been appropriate. For the same reason, we reject the dissent’s
assertion that the juror’s admission that she had been assaulted in the past “gave no clue” that
further inquiry was necessary.
The cornerstone of our dissenting colleague’s argument regarding due diligence is that
“[t]here is no evidence that any additional questioning during voir dire would have revealed that
[J]uror 457 could have been challenged for cause.” Post at 11. We strenuously disagree with
this line of reasoning. The dissent fails to recognize that defendant had ample opportunity to
challenge Juror 457 for cause solely on the basis of her candid admission that she had been
assaulted in the past. Alternatively, defendant could have challenged Juror 457 for cause if he
had posed further inquiry regarding the nature of the admitted assault. In our view, granting
defendant a new trial under these circumstances, where he (1) neglected to exercise a challenge
for cause, and (2) expressed satisfaction with the jury as impaneled, would be tantamount to
allowing defendant to build error into the jury selection process. This we will not do. See
generally, People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 466; 552 NW2d 493 (1996)
(an expression of satisfaction with the jury as impaneled may waive a defendant’s right to
challenge the composition of the jury); People v DePlanche, 183 Mich App 685, 691; 455 NW2d
395 (1990) (defendant failed to show he was denied right to an impartial jury where defense
counsel expressed satisfaction with the jury panel and failed to take appropriate action to remove
jurors defendant claimed were not impartial); People v Acosta, 16 Mich App 249, 250; 167
NW2d 897 (1969) (defendant who announced satisfaction with the jury at close of voir dire
(continued…)
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This is not a case, as in DeHaven, supra, where jurors answered questions falsely and
otherwise failed to disclose information that would have revealed their relation to a person who
had committed a crime that was similar to the one for which they were to sit as jurors. Moreover,
this case is distinguishable from People v Hannum, 362 Mich 660, 667; 107 NW2d 894 (1961),
where our Supreme Court stated: “That the lack of disclosure of the pertinent fact can be
attributed to failure to expressly ask the prospective juror about it can hardly be thought to have
insured an impartial trial . . . .” In the present case, the court did ask the potential jurors whether
any of them had ever been the victim of a crime, and Juror 457 answered truthfully that she had
been the victim of assault in the past.4
(…continued)
waived any error relating to trial court’s refusal to give requested instruction to venire); People v
Russell, 182 Mich App 314, 326; 451 NW2d 625 (1990) (Sawyer, J., dissenting) (defendant who
“affirmatively demonstrated” satisfaction with the jury panel by failing to use peremptory
challenges and “explicitly stat(ing) to the trial court that he was satisfied with the jury,” waived
issue relating to composition of jury) rev’d 434 Mich 922; 456 NW2d 83 (1990) for the reasons
set forth in Sawyer, J.’s dissent.
4
We reject the dissenting opinion’s suggestion that Juror 457 was not forthright. We recognize
that in certain circumstances, a juror’s wilful failure to disclose relevant information may warrant
a new trial. However, in the instant case Juror 457, on being questioned by the trial court and
defense counsel, disclosed that she was assaulted in the past. Consequently, Juror 457 cannot be
said to have concealed or misrepresented any information sought by either the trial court or
defense counsel. In our view, the dissent’s veiled implication that Juror 457 was less than
forthright is untenable.
Moreover, the dissent’s attempt to analogize the present case to DeHaven, supra and
Hannum, supra is patently unsuccessful. For instance, in DeHaven, the juror at issue was related
to an individual who had been convicted of statutory rape. DeHaven, supra at 331. While being
questioned during voir dire, the juror gave false and misleading answers. For example, after the
trial court pointedly asked the juror about “anything that has happened to any members of your
family that would make you feel different about this case than others?” the juror, despite
knowing his cousin was convicted of a crime identical to that of which the defendant was
charged, responded in the negative. Id. at 330. Similarly, when specifically asked if his
knowledge of any other case would influence his verdict, the juror responded in the negative. Id.
Similarly, in Hannum, supra, one of the jurors, when filling out a required questionnaire asking
specifically about employment status, deliberately failed to disclose that he was a township
police officer. This information was not discovered during voir dire. Hannum, supra at 666.
Conversely, the instant case presents no such evidence of purposeful deceit on the part of a juror.
Interestingly, the dissent accords little weight to the fact that Juror 457 clearly admitted to
being assaulted on two different occasions. That Juror 457 did not articulate specifically that she
was the victim of a domestic assault is attributable more to defendant’s failure to specifically
question her in this regard, rather than to any intentional concealment on her part.
A necessary implication of the dissent’s argument is that assault and domestic assault are
(continued…)
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Finally, under the facts of this case, the juror’s promise to keep the matters of her
personal life separate from defendant’s case was sufficient to protect defendant’s right to a fair
trial. See Patton v Yount, 467 US 1025, 1034-1035; 104 S Ct 2885; 81 L Ed 2d 847 (1984)
(distinguishing between jurors with fixed opinions and those without fixed opinions); Irvin v
Dowd, 366 US 717, 723; 81 S Ct 1639; 6 L Ed 2d 751 (1961) (“It is sufficient if the juror can lay
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.”);
People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 248-252; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). Jurors are presumptively
competent and impartial, and the party alleging the disqualification bears the burden of proving
its existence. People v Collins, 166 Mich 4, 9; 131 NW 78 (1911); People v Walker, 162 Mich
App 60, 63; 412 NW2d 244 (1987). In light of defendant’s failure to further question the juror
after she admitted that she had been the victim of assault in the past, and the juror’s statement
that she could keep her personal life separate from defendant’s case, defendant did not meet his
burden of proving the juror’s disqualification.5
(…continued)
distinct and separate entities. We find this line of reasoning baffling. By its very nature, the
crime of domestic assault is comprised of an assault. See MCL 750.81(2); MSA 28.276(2).
Juror 457 clearly admitted to being assaulted. The dissent’s persistence in maintaining this
illusory distinction is meritless. We find no cognizable difference between assault and domestic
assault.
Had Juror 457 deliberately chosen to withhold information like the jurors in DeHaven,
supra and Hannum, supra, she presumably could have done so. However, in our view, Juror
457’s answers reflect a layperson’s concerted effort to truthfully answer the trial court’s
questions in open court while not divulging sensitive and no doubt embarrassing details that are
too often associated with domestic assault matters. In our view, the dissent does a great
disservice to the average civilian juror’s attempts to properly answer questions put to her during
the voir dire process by criticizing Juror 457’s choice of words with the benefit of hindsight.
5
Our dissenting colleague devotes considerable effort to a discussion of MCR 2.511(D)(13), and
criticizes us for failing to do the same. The dissent, however, disregards certain principles basic
to our jurisprudence: (1) defendant bears the burden of proving a juror’s disqualification,
Collins, supra at 9; Walker, supra at 63; (2) our review of a trial court’s rulings on challenges for
cause on the basis of bias, as well as a court’s ruling on a motion for new trial, is for an abuse of
discretion, People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 521; 616 NW2d 710 (2000); Jones, supra at
404; (3) a “trial court’s determination of a juror’s ability to render an impartial verdict is reversed
only where an appellate court finds a clear abuse of discretion,” People v Johnson, 103 Mich App
825, 830; 303 NW2d 908 (1981); and (4) reviewing courts give great deference to the superior
ability of the trial court in matters relating to credibility, Id.; People v Eggleston, 149 Mich App
665, 671; 386 NW2d 637 (1986). In our opinion, jurors with real life experiences, who
acknowledge that they can be free of bias and prejudice, can and do make excellent jurors, and
the trial court was in the best position to make this determination. Lee, supra at 251.
The dissent suggests that under 2.511(D), a party may challenge a juror for cause at any
time during the proceedings. Post at __. However, even a cursory reading of that rule reveals
that it governs the jury selection process. Post-verdict biases or prejudices are not determined by
(continued…)
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During the hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial, defense counsel asserted that the
juror “apparently told the prosecutor assigned to her case that she was ready to hang [defendant]
before the trial even began . . . .” When the trial court questioned defense counsel regarding the
source of the statement, he responded only that the statement was true “according to what I was
told.” The prosecutor denied that the juror ever made such a statement to him. Defendant seizes
on this discussion as further evidence for the need to reverse and remand for a new trial. Even if
we were to disregard that the alleged statement was not a matter of record, we would
nevertheless decline to accept defendant’s argument. A juror may not impeach his or her verdict
(…continued)
use of a jury selection court rule. The dissent has employed this court rule, along with its
assertion that Juror 457 withheld relevant information, in an attempt to justify its conclusion. We
decline to follow the dissent’s invitation to rely on dicta, analogy, and implication, to create a
new rule of law that would allow defendant in this case to now challenge the juror for cause.
While we admire the dissent’s tenacity, we find its reasoning to be unsupported. While a
defendant may move for a new trial pursuant to MCR 2.611, we decline to hold that he may
challenge a juror for cause after the jury has rendered its verdict when he failed to adequately
utilize the challenge for cause process in the first instance.
A review of footnote 54 in our dissenting colleague’s opinion demonstrates that he has
inferred from our opinion the proposition that juror bias may be addressed only during voir dire.
We find this to be an incorrect statement of the prevailing law in Michigan. Rather, it is clear
that allegations of juror bias that result from a juror’s deliberate withholding of pertinent
information may serve as grounds to challenge the jury’s verdict at any point in the proceedings.
See Hannum, supra and DeHaven, supra. That we decline to reverse defendant’s convictions
under the present circumstances, where he (1) failed to exercise challenges for cause at the proper
procedural interval, and (2) expressed unequivocal satisfaction with the jury as impaneled,
should not be interpreted as suggesting that we are not cognizant of this well-settled proposition.
In its goal to reverse the lower court, the dissenting opinion minimizes the juror’s
admission that she had been assaulted. We cannot ignore her answers to the court’s questions,
and we will not presume that the juror’s past assaults precluded her from rendering a fair and
impartial verdict. We recognize that People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 7-9; 577 NW2d 179
(1998), states that a defendant is entitled to relief when a juror that he could have challenged for
cause was allowed to serve on the jury. However, defense counsel in this case did not meet its
burden of establishing the grounds for a challenge for cause during the voir dire process, and we
concur with the trial court’s conclusion that the juror did not lie or conceal any information. The
trial court, who was in the best position to assess the juror, accepted her statement that she would
keep her personal life separate from defendant’s trial. We cannot accept a process that would
excuse a defense attorney for failing to ask follow-up questions and thereby plant the seeds for a
motion for new trial after his or her client is convicted. Therefore, assuming, without deciding,
that Juror 457 was “interested in a question like the issue to be tried,” MCR 2.511(D), defense
counsel did not meet its burden of establishing that the juror was removable for cause. Our
conclusion is limited to the facts of this case and we do not foreclose the possibility of a contrary
result under different factual circumstances.
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through testimony or affidavit. Beaubien v Detroit United Railway, 216 Mich 391, 397-398; 185
NW 855 (1921); People v Stimer, 82 Mich 17, 19; 46 NW 28 (1890). As our Supreme Court
explained in People v Pizzino, 313 Mich 97, 105; 20 NW2d 824 (1945), “[t]o permit this would
open the door for tampering with the jury subsequent to the return of their verdict.” Therefore,
even if the juror had reduced the alleged double-hearsay statement to affidavit form, or had she
provided testimony to the same effect, the trial court could not have considered it.6 The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for new trial.7
Moreover, we do not conclude that defense counsel’s failure to make a further inquiry
into the matter rose to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, we note that an
attorney’s decisions relating to the selection of jurors generally involve matters of trial strategy,
Huls v Lockhart, 958 F2d 212, 214-215 (CA 8, 1992); Palacio v State, 333 SC 506, 516-517;
511 SE2d 62 (1999); People v Hebein, 111 Ill App 3d 830, 848; 444 NE2d 782 (1982), which we
normally decline to evaluate with the benefit of hindsight, People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316,
331-332; 614 NW2d 647 (2000). Second, Juror 457 informed the court that she could keep her
personal life separate from defendant’s case, and answered affirmatively when the court asked
whether she could be fair and impartial. Based on the juror’s assurances, and the trial court’s
acceptance of her assurances, we see no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case
would have been different. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
2d 674 (1984); People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).8
6
We acknowledge that a narrow exception exists to the general rule that a juror may not impeach
his or her verdict. A juror may impeach his or her verdict where the evidence involves a matter
inhering in the verdict and concerns overt acts, accessible to all the jurors. People v Budzyn, 456
Mich 77, 91; 566 NW2d 229 (1997); People v Graham, 84 Mich App 663, 666; 270 NW2d 673
(1978). This exception does not apply in the present case, however, because the allegation, that
the juror had decided defendant’s guilt before the trial began, involved her alleged subjective
feelings, and therefore were not within the jury’s knowledge. Defendant does not allege that the
juror shared her alleged preconceived opinion with any other jurors.
7
Our colleague in dicta implies that defendant is entitled to a new trial because he was “actually
prejudiced” by the juror in question. We disagree. The dissent’s finding of actual prejudice is
based solely on the double-hearsay statement allegedly made by Juror 457. The statement the
dissent points to as evidence of actual prejudice is one allegedly made by Juror 457 to one
prosecutor, repeated to another, and presented to the trial court by defense counsel during the
hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial. We agree with the trial court that this doublehearsay statement is insufficient to demonstrate actual prejudice. Other than defense counsel’s
unsubstantiated allegations, there is no record evidence to demonstrate that Juror 457 intended to
convict defendant regardless of the evidence. In our view, the double-hearsay statement does not
serve to overcome the well-settled presumption of impartiality accorded to jurors.
8
In Part IV of his opinion, our dissenting colleague accuses us, among other things, of failing to
address the relevant law, overlooking a court rule, and ignoring defendant’s arguments on appeal.
The dissent further claims that we are endorsing a process that effectively permits jurors to avoid
“speak[ing] the truth.” Post at 14 (footnote and emphasis omitted). Perhaps most offensive is
the dissent’s claim that we have adopted a rule that precludes a defendant from ever seeking a
new trial after voir dire on the basis of subsequently discovered evidence of bias. A review of
(continued…)
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III. Other Issues
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due
process of law in denying his request for a court-appointed investigator. We disagree.
Defendant’s claim rests on his speculation that an investigator would have retraced the events
during the relevant period and would have found witnesses to testify that defendant did not
commit the acts that the prosecution alleged. Defendant’s claim relies on pure conjecture. He
therefore did not show that, under the facts and circumstances of the case, an investigator was
necessary to afford him due process, or that the trial court’s ruling substantially prejudiced him.
Mason v Arizona, 504 F2d 1345, 1352-1353 (CA 9, 1974) (requiring defendant to show that the
denial “substantially prejudiced” him); People v Blackburn, 135 Mich App 509, 520-521; 354
NW2d 807 (1984).
Finally, we disagree with defendant that the trial court erred in barring evidence to
establish that complainant had herpes. Before trial, the prosecutor moved to exclude any
evidence that defendant had transmitted herpes to complainant. The trial court granted the
motion, apparently concluding that the evidence was irrelevant. Defendant’s theory at trial was
that complainant made false allegations against him in retaliation for her contracting the disease.
Therefore, the evidence would have been relevant for purposes of establishing that complainant
was biased and had fabricated her testimony. Nevertheless, in our view, when balanced against
the inflammatory nature of the evidence – complainant’s alleged contraction of a sexually
transmitted disease – we conclude that the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed any
probative value. See MCL 750.520j(1)(a), (b); MSA 28.788(10)(1)(a), (b). Further, our review
of the record indicates that defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined complainant over a twoday period in an attempt to impeach her testimony and discover whether she fabricated her
testimony. Defendant’s inability to introduce evidence of complainant’s alleged contraction of
the disease from defendant did not significantly hamper his attempt to attack complainant’s
credibility as a witness.
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the court’s ruling excluding evidence of
complainant’s alleged disease violated the Confrontation Clause, US Const, Am VI. Because
defendant did not raise this argument below, our review is for plain error that affected
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Based on our foregoing analysis, we do not conclude that the trial court’s ruling materially
(…continued)
the majority opinion reveals that these accusations are completely unfounded.
-10-
restricted defendant’s right to confrontation and therefore we find no error requiring reversal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
I concur in the result only.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
-11-
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