DONNA RACHELL CHOP V GARY MITCHELL ZIELINSKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DONNA RACHELL CHOP,
FOR PUBLICATION
February 16, 2001
9:15 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 213607
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-062703-NI
GARY MITCHELL ZIELINSKI and THE
SUPERSINE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Updated Copy
March 30, 2001
Before: Collins, P.J., and Jansen and Zahra, JJ.
ZAHRA, J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We affirm.
Plaintiff injured her wrist in an automobile accident. The car that she was driving was
registered to her ex-husband and there is no dispute that, at the time of the accident, the car was
uninsured. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging negligence. Defendants moved for summary disposition
on the basis that plaintiff, as an uninsured motorist, was precluded from seeking noneconomic
damages pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c) of Michigan's no-fault act. The
trial court agreed and granted defendants' motion.
We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v
Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Likewise, statutory
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs v
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Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich 590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). In
reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence submitted in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party to decide whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Ritchie-Gamester v Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999); Rollert v Dep't of
Civil Service, 228 Mich App 534, 536; 579 NW2d 118 (1998). All reasonable inferences are
resolved in the nonmoving party's favor. Hampton v Waste Management of Michigan, Inc, 236
Mich App 598, 602; 601 NW2d 172 (1999).
MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c) provides: "Damages shall not be assessed in
favor of a party who was operating his or her own vehicle at the time the injury occurred and did
not have in effect for that motor vehicle the security required by section 3101 at the time the
injury occurred." Pursuant to MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i); MSA 24.13101(2)(g)(i), an "owner" of a
vehicle is defined, in part, as "[a] person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under
a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days." Plaintiff argues that she cannot be
said to have been operating her own vehicle at the time of the accident because her ex-husband
was the title owner of the car that she had merely borrowed.
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the
Legislature's intent. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573
NW2d 611 (1998). If the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute is clear, judicial construction is
neither necessary nor permitted. Cherry Growers, Inc v Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining
Bd, 240 Mich App 153, 166; 610 NW2d 613 (2000). We may not speculate regarding the
probable intent of the Legislature beyond the words expressed in the statute. In re Schnell, 214
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Mich App 304, 310; 543 NW2d 11 (1995). When reasonable minds may differ with regard to the
meaning of a statute, the courts must look to the object of the statute, the harm it is designed to
remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute.
Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799
(1994).
In Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 690; 593 NW2d 215 (1999), this Court
construed subsection 3101(2)(g)(i), holding that the phrase "having the use" means "using the
vehicle in ways that comport with concepts of ownership."
The Court observed that the
subsection's references to renting and leasing implies that "ownership follows from proprietary
or possessory usage, as opposed to merely incidental usage under the direction or with the
permission of another." Ardt, supra at 691 (emphasis in original).
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff 's ex-husband was the title owner of the car plaintiff
was driving when the accident occurred. However, there is also no dispute that plaintiff regularly
used the car from at least the time of her divorce in late April 1997 to mid-September 1997 when
the accident occurred.1 The fact that plaintiff was not awarded legal title of the car pursuant to
the divorce judgment is not dispositive of whether she may be considered an "owner" under the
no-fault act.2 There may be multiple owners of a vehicle for purposes of the no-fault act. Id. at
691-692.
Plaintiff testified during her deposition that she kept the car parked at her apartment
complex, which was a residence she kept separate from her ex-husband, drove the car to and
from work on a daily basis, and used the car for other personal errands. Plaintiff 's use of the car
in such a manner was possessory use that comports with the concepts of ownership. Id. at 690-3-
691. There is no indication that plaintiff used the car under the specific direction of her exhusband or with her ex-husband's permission. Indeed, plaintiff 's own testimony regarding her
regular use of the car reveals that she exercised ownership rights over the vehicle. Plaintiff 's
claim that she merely borrowed the car is not compelling in light of her testimony that she
believed she was awarded the car pursuant to the divorce judgment. Given plaintiff 's deposition
testimony, there is no issue of fact regarding whether plaintiff had possessory use of the car for
more than thirty days before the date of the accident. Thus, she was an "owner" of the car under
the no-fault act.
We reject plaintiff 's argument that she cannot be an "owner" under subsection
3101(2)(g)(i) because that subsection applies only in the context of lease agreements, rental
agreements, or similar transactions. A plain reading of the statutory definition of the term
"owner" indicates that anyone having use of a vehicle pursuant to a lease or otherwise for a
period that is greater than thirty days is considered an owner of the vehicle.
MCL
500.3101(2)(g)(i); MSA 24.13101(2)(g)(i). The phrase "or otherwise" plainly indicates that the
Legislature intended this subsection to apply in situations other than those involving leases or
rentals. See Ardt, supra (considering whether the plaintiff 's son was an "owner" pursuant to
subsection 3101(2)(g)(i) under circumstances not involving a lease, rental, or similar agreement).
Construing subsection 3101(2)(g)(i) to apply in situations not involving lease and rental
agreements comports with the legislative purpose of the no-fault laws "to correct the injustice of
allowing drivers who do not contribute to the no-fault system to recover damages from persons
that do contribute to the system, and to provide an incentive for uninsured motorists to comply
with the requirement that they maintain no-fault automobile insurance." Stevenson v Reese, 239
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Mich App 513, 519; 609 NW2d 195 (2000). By providing that a person who has use of a vehicle
for more than thirty days is said to own the vehicle for purposes of the no-fault act, the
Legislature has required that "users of motor vehicles maintain appropriate insurance for
themselves as indicated by their actual patterns of usage . . . ." Ardt, supra at 690.
Plaintiff next argues that MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c) is unconstitutional.
We disagree. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on
appeal. Stevenson, supra at 516.
In Stevenson, this Court examined the constitutionality of subsection 3135(2)(c). With
respect to equal protection, the Stevenson Court determined that the no-fault act is socioeconomic
legislation subject to a rational basis test. Stevenson, supra at 517. The Court held that "the state
government has a legitimate interest in maintaining a fair, affordable system of automobile
insurance and the preclusion of uninsured motorists' recovery of noneconomic damages is
rationally related to that legitimate governmental objective." Id. at 520. The Stevenson Court,
id., also held that subsection 3135(2)(c) does not violate due process, stating "[subsection
3135(2)(c)] is reasonably related to the legislative objectives of promoting fairness within the nofault insurance system, reducing or restraining insurance premiums, and providing an incentive to
comply with the insurance requirement of the no-fault act."
Plaintiff claims that she was innocently uninsured given that her ex-husband told her the
car at issue was, in fact, insured.
Plaintiff reads a scienter requirement into subsection
3135(2)(c). We refuse to read such a requirement into the statute where it is not within the
manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself. In re S R, 229 Mich App 310,
314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998); In re Schnell, supra at 310. Furthermore, plaintiff had the car in her
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sole possession for such an extended period that she reasonably should have been aware of its
uninsured status. Subsection 3135(2)(c) is constitutional, Stevenson, supra, and plaintiff 's suit
was properly dismissed on the basis that she is precluded recovery of noneconomic damages as
an uninsured motorist.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
According to plaintiff 's deposition testimony, she used the car exclusively during that period
except during July 1997, when her ex-husband took the car to be repaired. It was also suggested
during plaintiff 's deposition that her ex-husband used the car for one additional week sometime
after the divorce. Regardless, plaintiff clearly stated that her ex-husband did not use the car from
the time it was repaired in July 1997 to the time of the accident in mid-September 1997.
2
We note that plaintiff testified during her deposition that the divorce judgment entered in April
1997 required her ex-husband to transfer the title of the car at issue to her. However, a review of
the divorce judgment reveals that plaintiff and her ex-husband were awarded "the automobile
now in his or her name and possession." Given that the car at issue was only in plaintiff 's exhusband's name at the time of divorce, by all indications, he remained titleholder of the car and
was not required to transfer title to plaintiff.
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