LISA HEALEY & others vs. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE (and a companion case).

LISA HEALEY & others [Note 1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE (and a companion case).

414 Mass. 18

December 10, 1992 - December 23, 1992

Suffolk County

Present: LIACOS, C.J., ABRAMS, LYNCH, O'CONNOR, & GREANEY, JJ.

In an action by recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) who were participating satisfactorily, on a voluntary basis, in a Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program, a training vehicle which the Commonwealth was required by Federal law to create as a condition of its participation in the AFDC program, a judge in the Superior Court properly granted preliminary relief enjoining the Commissioner of Public Welfare from denying child-care services to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, where the plaintiffs demonstrated likelihood of success on their contention that applicable provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sections 301 et seq., as amended by the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988), required the Department of Public Welfare to provide child care to JOBS participants in the plaintiffs circumstances', irrespective of its funding limitations [21-27], and where the plaintiffs showed a substantial risk of irreparable harm to themselves and others similarly situated if preliminary relief were not granted [27-28]. LYNCH, J., dissenting.

CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 19, 1992.

A motion for preliminary injunctive relief was heard by Margot Botsford, J.

CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on November 24, 1992.

Page 19

On transfer of the first action to the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, the cases were reported by Abrams, J.

Douglas H. Wilkins, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Deborah Harris for the plaintiffs.

GREANEY, J. The plaintiffs are recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) who need child care in order to participate in education or training programs approved by the Department of Public Welfare (department), in connection with its "MassJOBS" program. The plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court to challenge the validity of the department's limitation of child care for AFDC recipients, who, like the plaintiffs, are in a department-approved education or training program but whose individual employment or training plan was not approved by the department before September 4, 1992. The plaintiffs claimed that the department's policy violates the provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sections 301 et seq., as amended by the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the department from failing to provide child-care services to AFDC recipients who are participating in approved education or training activities.

A judge in the Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The department appealed from the injunction to the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, Section 118, second par. (1990 ed.), and a stay of the injunction (extending a stay granted by the Superior Court judge) was granted by a single justice of the Appeals Court. The plaintiffs then petitioned a single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, Section 3 (1990 ed.), to vacate the stay. The single justice ordered the action transferred pursuant to G. L. c. 211, Section 4A (1990 ed.), and reserved and reported the merits of the case to the full court. We now affirm the grant of the preliminary injunction.

The facts are undisputed. The Social Security Act, as amended by the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA), requires

Page 20

every State participating in the AFDC program to create a "Job Opportunities and Basic Skills" (JOBS) program to provide training, education, and work opportunities for those receiving AFDC benefits. 42 U.S.C. Sections 681 et seq. (1988). The Massachusetts JOBS program is called MassJOBS. The program is designed to change the nature of the welfare system by creating opportunities for AFDC recipients to further their education and training and ultimately to remove themselves from the welfare rolls by gaining self-sufficiency through meaningful employment. 42 U.S.C. Section 681 (a). 45 C.F.R. Section 250.0 (1992).

Each plaintiff is an AFDC recipient with a minor child or children. Each plaintiff has voluntarily enrolled in an education or training program approved by the department and has sought child care in order to continue her education or training. Each plaintiff has been advised by the department that she will not immediately receive child care because her education or training plan was not approved prior to September 4, 1992. That date is significant because the department has placed AFDC recipients whose employment or training plans are approved thereafter, and who request child care, on a waiting list. When a child-care slot becomes available, it is to be filled from the waiting list. The department's action was taken in anticipation that the funds appropriated this fiscal year for child care may not be sufficient to provide that benefit for all AFDC recipients who meet current criteria for participation in MassJOBS. As a practical matter, the wait-listing policy operates as a denial of child care because there is no indication that child-care slots are becoming available on any regular basis, if at all.

The Superior Court judge applied the traditional test for consideration of a preliminary injunction. A trial court's decision to issue or to deny a preliminary injunction requires "an evaluation in combination of the moving party's claim of injury and its chance of success on the merits. If there is a substantial risk of irreparable harm to the moving party, it must be balanced against any similar risk to the other party in the light of the chance of each party to succeed on the

Page 21

merits." Commonwealth v. County of Suffolk, 383 Mass. 286 , 288 (1981), citing Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609 , 617 (1980). See Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 70 , 72 (1980). "Only where the balance between these risks cuts in favor of the moving party may a preliminary injunction properly issue." Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, supra. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701 , 710 (1990). We first consider whether the plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success, namely whether they have demonstrated that applicable Federal law requires the department to provide child care to MassJOBS participants in their circumstances.

As noted, the FSA requires each State, as a condition of participation in the AFDC program, to create a JOBS program. 42 U.S.C. Sections 681 et seq. As a condition of receiving public support, AFDC recipients in turn are required to participate in a State's JOBS program, 42 U.S.C. Section 602 (a)(19), [Note 2] unless they are exempt from required participation by statute. 42 U.S.C. Section 602 (a)(19)(C). Among those exempt from required participation are the caretakers of children under the age of six years. 42 U.S.C. Section 602 (a)(19)(C)(iii)(II). A State's JOBS program also must permit exempt individuals to volunteer for participation. 42 U.S.C. Section 602 (a)(19)(B)(i)(II). The plaintiffs in this case

Page 22

who have volunteered to participate in MassJOBS and who are involved in the wait-listing policy, are caretakers of children under six years.

Participants in a State's JOBS program are entitled to certain support services necessary for participation, including transportation costs and other work-related expenses. 42 U.S.C. Section 602 (g)(2). A separate provision of the FSA provides that "[e]ach State agency must guaranteechild care in accordance with subparagraph (B) [Note 3] . . . for each individual participating in an education and training activity . . . if the State agency approves the activity and determines that the individual is satisfactorily participating in the activity" (emphasis added). [Note 4] 42 U.S.C. Section 602 (g)(1)(A)(i)(II). The plaintiffs are individuals participating satisfactorily in State-approved education and training activities.

In a cooperative Federal-State program such as AFDC, the States "are given the choice of complying with the conditions set forth in the [Federal legislation creating the program] or forgoing the benefits of federal funding." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11 (1981). See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 135 (1979);

Page 23

Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971). The State, however, must be able to ascertain the extent of its obligations from the terms of the Federal legislation. "[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously." Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1366 (1992), quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, supra at 17. The plaintiffs maintain that the language quoted above, couched as it is in terms of a "guarantee," unambiguously requires the Commonwealth to provide them with child care meeting FSA specifications. We agree.

A "guarantee" requires the guarantor "to become responsible for the fulfillment of" an act, or "to undertake to do or secure something." Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 1110 (2d ed. 1959). A guarantee, like a contractual promise, normally is unconditional unless any limitation is stated explicitly. The FSA makes a State's participation in the AFDC program dependent on its guarantee, or promise, that it will appropriate sufficient funds to provide child care for AFDC recipients who are satisfactorily participating in training or education programs that the State has ascertained are likely to lead to employment. The language of the Federal legislation does not in any respect purport to condition the State's obligation to provide child care on the availability of funds. [Note 5]

The plain language of the Federal law, therefore, appears sufficient to resolve the likelihood of success question which is critical to the injunction. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-432 (1987). It is worth noting as well that legislative history supports the conclusion that the department's

Page 24

obligation to provide child care cannot depend on the amount of its annual appropriation. In this regard, the House conference report states: "The conference agreement provides that the State agency must guarantee child care to the extent it is determined by the agency to be necessary for an individual's employment. The State agency must also guarantee child care for education and training activities (including participation in the JOBS program) if the State agency approves the activity and determines that the individual is satisfactorily participating in the activity" (emphasis added). [Note 6] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2879, 2948.

The department argues, however, that the child-care "guarantee" is only a conditional one, and that the department is free to restrict the provision of child care, or to deny child care altogether, if this result is necessitated by limited State resources. In making this argument, the department points to other provisions of the legislation which provide that the State must,