Commonwealth v. Jaiman

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Defendant was arraigned in the municipal court on drug-related and firearm-related charges. The court gave Defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 and released him on personal recognizance. Defendant subsequently failed to appear at a pretrial hearing and was found to be in default. Thereafter, Defendant was charged with a new crime. At his arraignment on the new charge, the court denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Defendant’s bail, concluding that he was not subject to bail revocation because he had defaulted in the prior matter, was no longer “on release,” and therefore did not commit the new crime during his period of release. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case with directions to vacate the lower court’s ruling for the reasons set forth in Commonwealth v. Morales, also decided today, which held that a defendant on release pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, who defaults for failing to appear and is subsequently charged with committing a new crime, is subject to having his bail revoked.

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NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 5571030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11888 COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVIE JAIMAN. February 3, 2016. Bail. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. This case is before us on a reservation and report from a single justice of the county court. It concerns the same single issue that we address in Commonwealth v. Morales, 473 Mass. (2016), also decided today: whether a court has the authority to revoke a defendant’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, where the defendant was "on release," defaulted by failing to appear, and later was charged with committing a new crime. On January 19, 2011, the defendant was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on charges of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a), possession with intent to distribute marijuana in a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, and possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). The court gave the defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and released him on personal recognizance. After he failed to appear at a pretrial hearing, the court found him to be in default and issued a default warrant. The warrant was still outstanding when the defendant was charged with a new crime, aggravated statutory rape, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23A, in April, 2015. At his arraignment on the new charges, the court denied the Commonwealth's motion to revoke the defendant’s bail on the ground that he was not subject to bail revocation under G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par. Because the defendant defaulted in the prior matter, he was no longer “on release,” and therefore did 2 not commit the new crime "during said period of release." The court did not take any action on the outstanding default warrant. In the new matter, the court set bail in the amount of $10,000, and imposed conditions on his release. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court seeking relief from the denial of its motion to revoke the defendant's bail. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court. In Morales, 473 Mass. at , we address the reasons why we interpret G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par., to mean that a defendant such as one in the circumstances presented here is still “on release” for purposes of bail revocation and why a judge therefore has the authority to revoke the defendant’s bail. For the reasons there stated, and as in that case, we remand the case to the county court where the single justice is directed to enter an order vacating the lower court's ruling and remanding the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Justin Kyle Brown, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.

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