Marquis v. Marquis
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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 828 September Term, 2006 DAV ID D. M ARQU IS v. MAR Y H. M ARQU IS Hollander, Krauser, Barbera, JJ. Opinion by Barbera, J. Filed: September 12, 2007 18C040000161 In July 2 004, the C ircuit Co urt for St . Ma ry s C ounty granted Mary H. Marquis, appellee ( Wife ), an absolute d ivorce from D avid D. Marq uis, appellant ( Husban d ). In the judgment of divorce, the court ordered Wife to receive 50 percent of the marital portion of Hus band s m ilitar y retirement benefits on an if, as, and when received basis[.] The court further directed that it would retain jurisdiction in the case for the purposes of a Constituted Pension O rder ( CPO ).1 Upon Husband s retirement from military service, the parties disagreed about whether Wife s portion of Husband s retirement benefits would be calculated before or after statutory, regu lator y, or elective deductions were applied. Wife filed a petition for contempt, alleging that Husband was in default of the divorc e decre e beca use, inter alia, he failed to c onsent to Wife s proposed CPO. Following a hearing on the petition, the master issued a rep ort recommending that the court find Husband in contempt. Husband thereafter filed exceptions to the master s recommendations and petitioned for a hearing on the exceptions. The co urt did not conduct a hearing. The court entered an order finding Husband in contem pt and requiring him to sign Wife s proposed CPO and pay $2,333.00 in attorney s fees to W ife. Husband timely appeale d. He pres ents eight questions for our consideration, which 1 In her brief, Wife points out that throughout the proceedings the parties, the master and the court improperly referred to the CPO as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ( QDRO ). A QDRO is a domestic-relations order that creates or recognizes the existence of an alternative payee s right to receive all or a portion of th e payments to a pension-plan participant. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 414(p) (2002, 2007 Supp.). A CP O is a similar order applicable to military retirement pay. See 10 U.S.C .A. § 1408 (1998, 20 06 Supp .); Collins v. Collins, 144 M d. App . 395, 42 5-26 (2 002). we have consolidated into three: I. Did the court err by finding Husband in contempt of court for failing to sign Wife s proposed CPO? II. Did the court err b y entering a C PO that modif ied the parties final judgment of absolute divorce? III. Did the c ourt err by granting Wife s mo tion to dismiss Husban d s request for a hearing on his exceptions to the master s recommendations? For the reason s set for th below , we af firm the circuit co urt s jud gmen t. FACTS The parties married on August 8, 1986. Three children were born of the marriage: David Marquis, born September 30, 1988; Lindly Marquis, born July 7, 1990; and Matthew Marq uis, born Septem ber 5, 19 91. Before the parties married, Husband entered into the United States Navy. He continued to serve in the Navy during the parties marriage. The record indicates that Husband anticipated retiring on December 1, 2006, and, upon his retirement, Husband was eligible to receive military retir emen t benef its. On July 21, 2004, the parties divorced by a consent judgment of absolute divorce. In the judgment, the parties agreed that Wife would receive a 50 percent portion of the marital share of H usband s military retiremen t benefits. Th e judgme nt read, in pa rt: ORDERED, that the parties agree that [Wife] will receive a portion of [Husband s] retirement fr om the U nited State s [sic] Navy on an if, as, and when received basis with the numerator being 197 months, being the total -2- amount of mon ths married, th e denom inator being the total months earned towards the retirement div ided by one half[.] The court further ordered that it shall retain jurisdiction in this matter for the purposes of a Qualified D omestic Relations O rder [( QDRO )] and/or a Qualifying Retirement Orde r[.] Following the divorce, both parties filed contempt petitions containing allegations related to , inter alia, alimony, child su pport, and the sale of the parties real property. The dispos ition of t hose iss ues is no t raised in this app eal. On June 16, 2005, counsel for Wife mailed to counsel for Husband a proposed CPO that implemented the terms of the parties judgment of divorce. Husband did not sign the proposed CPO, but he returned the draft to Wife with suggested changes. After incorporating the suggested changes , counsel fo r Wife ag ain sent the proposed CPO to counsel fo r Husban d for signa ture. Paragra ph 5B o f the propo sed CPO read: Military Benefits. [Wife] shall receive Fifty Percent (50%) of a fraction of [Husba nd s] military retirem ent benef its. The fractio n shall have as its numerator 197 and shall have as its denominator [Husband s] total months of creditable service for purposes of retired pay. [Wife s] share shall be credited with fifty percent (50%) of the same fraction of any future cost-of-living increas es with respec t thereto . For purposes of this Order, military retirement benefits means retired pay actually paid to which [Husband] would be en titled based on length of active duty or reserve military service and all payments paid or payable under the provisions of Chapter 36 or Chapter 61 of Title 10 of the United States Code, before statutory, regulatory, or elective deductions are applied. It also include s all amo unts tak en by [H usban d] in lieu of retire ment b enefits . (Some emp hasis added.) -3- Husband did not sign and return the proposed CPO. On August 24, 2005, Wife mailed the proposed CPO to Husband for signature a third time. In a cover letter accompanying the proposed CPO, counsel for Wife warned counsel for Husband that Wife would file a petition for contempt if Husband did not sign the propo sed CP O. Ag ain, Hu sband did not sign the CPO . On September 28, 2005, Wife filed a petition for contempt. She alleged that Husband was in default of the divorce judgment because he failed, inter alia, to sign the proposed CPO. On November 15, 2005, Wife s petition for contempt came on for a hearing be fore a master. Both parties we re represented by counsel. The master first addressed allegations contained in the petition that are not relevant to the present appeal. Regarding the proposed CPO, Husband informed the master that he sought to change the words military retirement benefits in Paragraph 5B of the proposed CPO to disposable militar y retired pay. The master deferred a rgumen t on issues rela ting to the C PO to pe rmit the parties to obtain expert witnesses. The ma ster stated that, in the event he foun d Husband s proposed changes to the CPO would h arm Wif e s rights as es tablished in the judgment for divorce, Husban d would be held in conte mpt an d order ed to pa y attorney s f ees and expert w itness fe es. Two weeks after the hearing, Husband, through c ounsel, ma iled to Wife s counsel a letter requesting that the word before in Paragraph 5B of the proposed CPO be changed to after. In ef fect, such a change w ould allow Wife s 5 0 percent o f the marital share of -4- Husband s military retirement pay to be calculated after statutory, regulatory, or elective deductions were taken from Husband s payments. In other words, Wife s share would be calculated from the amount of retirement pay that Husband actually receives, rather than from the gross amount before statutory, regulatory, or elective deductions are applied. On January 10, 2006, the parties held a hearing be fore the m aster to address the allegations contained in Wife s petition for c ontempt re lating to the proposed CPO. Husband was not represented by counsel at that hearing. Wife s exp ert witness, Wendy Widmann, was qualified as an expert in the area of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders including those orders dealing with the division of military benefits under Maryland law. She testified that Husband s proposal to change before to after in Paragraph 5B of the proposed CPO would reduce Wife s portion of Husband s military retirement benefits by limiting her share of retirement benefits to Husband s disposable retired pay. She testified that such a limitation was n ot supp orted b y the judg ment f or divo rce. Wife testified at the hearing about the counsel and expert witness fees she incurred in filing the con tempt p etition. Husband also testified at the hearing. He testified that, if the language of the proposed CPO were cha nged fro m befo re to after, he wou ld not take a ny action to reduce Wife s one-half share of his retirement benefits. He further argued that the judgment of divorce did not require him to cooperate in signing Wife s proposed CPO, and that his failure to sign the order did not render him in contempt of court. Husband did not present an expert witness. -5- Following the close of Husband s case, the master set forth his findings. He stated, in part: The Court find s that [Hu sband], in h is testimony and presentation to the Court on today s da te, agrees that it w as always his intent that his wife receive or his form er wife receive her po rtion of his military retirement benefit based on the [Bangs] formula. That being the numerator being one hundred and ninety seven months over the denominator being the total number of mo nths ea rned. *** The Court finds the difference between military retirement benefits and disposable retired p ay is signif icant. That disposable retired pay allows the military service me mber to take certain exclusions that in fact would reduce the base amoun t of his retirement that [Wife] w ould be eligible for. The master noted that in two cases, Dexter v. Dexter, 105 M d. App . 678, cert. denied, 341 Md. 27 (199 5), and Potts v. Po tts, 142 Md. A pp. 448 , cert. denied, 369 Md. 181 (2002), this Court recognized that, absent an agreement by the parties, a service member should not be allowed to reduce his potential retirement benefits by electing a disability portion or by electing other exclusions. The m aster found that chang ing the word be fore to after would permit Husband to take certain exclusions including elected deductions that would in fact reduce the base amount o f his retireme nt and w ould impac t [Wif e s] pro perty righ ts. He recommended that the court find Husband in contempt for his failure to authorize W ife s proposed CPO. He also recommended that the court set the purge amount at $2,333.00, which includes $2 ,083.00 in W ife s expert w itness fees an d $250.0 0 in Wife s attorney s fees. -6- On January 18, 2006, Husband filed exceptions to the master s recommendations. He argued, inter alia, that the recom mendatio ns provide Wife w ith relief that was not granted in the parties judgment of divorce. He further asserted that the master s recommendation that he pay Wife s expert witness fees is punitive. Wife f iled a response to Hu sband s exceptions, arguing that Husband failed to act in good faith in negotiating the terms of the CPO and that the evidence and testimony adduced at trial supported the master s findings. On February 14, 2006, Husband filed a request for a hearing on the exceptions, and the court scheduled a he aring for March 14, 2006. On February 27, 2006, Wife filed a motion to strike Husband s request for a hearing, arguing that Husband s request was untimely pursuant to Maryland Rule 9-208(i)(1). That same day, the court continued the hearing on Husband s exceptions until April 13, 2006. Two weeks later, the court set the matter f or a hea ring on May 4, 2 006. On April 3, 2006, Wife filed a second request to continue the hearing on Hu sband s exceptions. The court granted the request and continued the hearing until May 23, 2006, but a hearin g was never c onduc ted. On May 11, 2006, the master filed a written report setting forth his recommendations. That same day, the court entered three o rders. In the first order, the court struck Hu sband s petition for a hearing on the ground that the petition was not timely filed. In the second order, entitled Constituted Pension Order, the court directed Husband to pay Wife her 50 percent marital sh are o f Hu sban d s m ilitar y retireme nt be nefi ts before any statuto ry, -7- regu lator y, or elective dedu ctions we re applied. T he court sig ned a third o rder in wh ich it found Husband in contempt of court for failure to authorize Wife s proposed CPO, ordered Husband to sign the CPO, and ordered that Husband could purge himself of contempt by paying $2,333.00 to Wife. Husban d noted a tim ely appeal. 2 DISCUSSION I. Husband raises a number of arguments in support of his contention that the court erred in finding him in c ontem pt for fa iling to sig n Wif e s prop osed C PO. H e argue s, inter alia, that the court erred in accepting the master s recomm endations because th e master relied solely on misleading expert testimony, improperly excluded exhibits demonstrating his good faith efforts to cooperate in drafting a CPO, and failed to advise him of his right to counsel at the January 10, 2006 hearing. Husband further argues that the court abused its discretion by finding him in contempt because no statute or court order required him to sign W ife s proposed CPO. He also contends that the cou rt erred in failing to rule on his exception s to the master s recommendations. He argues, moreover, that the court erred in setting the purge amou nt. We addres s each c ontentio n in turn . 2 Husband s notice of appeal states that he appeals to the M aryland Court of Special Appeals the Order entered in this case on 11 May 2006. The court signed three orders on May 11, 2006 . Wife con tends that it is no t clear from which o rder Hus band app eals. In his brief, Husban d states that he appeals fro m all three orders issued on May 11, 2006. We a re satisfied that all of Husband s appellate claims are properly before us. See B & K Rentals and Sales Co., Inc. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127 , 133-34 (1990). -8- We begin by briefly summarizing Maryland law relating to civil contempt proceedings. A civil contempt proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit a nd to com pel obedie nce to orde rs and dec rees primar ily made to benefit such parties. State v. Roll a nd Scho ll, 267 Md. 714, 728 (1973); accord Bahena v. Foster, 164 Md. App. 275, 286 (2005). [C]ivil contempt proceedings are generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future compliance, and a penalty in a civil contempt must provid e for pu rging. Bahe na, 164 Md. App. at 286 (internal quotation marks om itted). Civil contempt need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citation and internal quotatio n mark s omitte d). The failure to obey a court order may precipitate the initiation of contempt proceedings. See id. [O]ne may not be held in contempt of a court order, however, unless the failure to c omply with th e court orde r was or is willful. Id. at 287. The order must be sufficiently definite, certain, and specific in its terms so that the party may understand precisely what conduct the order requires. Droney v. Droney, 102 Md. App. 672, 684 (1995 ). The decision to h old a party in contem pt is vest ed in the trial cou rt. See Bien enfeld v. Bennett-W hite, 91 Md. App. 488, 514, cert. denied, 327 M d. 625 (19 92). This C ourt will only reverse such a decision upon a showing that a finding of fact upon which the contempt was imposed was clearly erroneous or that the court abused its discretion in finding particular behavior to be contemptuous. Droney, 102 Md. A pp. at 683-84; see also Bie nenfeld, 91 -9- Md. App. at 514. A. Husband s primary challenge on appeal relates to the trial court s acceptance of the master s recommendations. He argues that the court erred in accepting the master s recommendations beca use the m aster relied so lely on misleadi ng expert testimo ny, improper ly excluded exhibits, and failed to advise him of his right to co unsel at the January 10, 2006 hearing. W e find no m erit in any of tho se comp laints. Husband takes issue with the testimony offered by Wif e s expert, Ms. Widmann, concerning 10 U.S.C. § 1408 . That sectio n, entitled Pa yment of retired or retainer pa y in compliance with court order, addresses the payment of child support and alimony from a retired service member s retirement pay. Regarding § 1408, Ms. Widmann testified: [T]he statute says that [] an order that does not limit the am ounts paid to disposab le retired pay is an acceptable order to the military. It says that in the statute specifically. Husband claims that Ms. Widmann s statement is false or at least misleading in light of 10 U .S.C. § 140 8 (e)(5), wh ich provide s: A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposab le retired pay available for payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or sub paragraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be con sidered to b e irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section b y the p ayment to the spouse or former spouse of the maximum -10- amount of disposable retired pay permitted under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B ) of paragraph (4). [3] 3 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) defines the term disposable retired pay. That section states: The term disposa ble retire d pay means the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less am ounts which-(A) are owed by that member to the United States for previous overpayme nts of retired pay and for recoupments required by law resu lting from entit leme nt to retired pay; (B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a court-marital or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; (C) in the case of a memb er entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using the percentage of the me mber's disab ility on the date when the member was retired (or the date on which the mem ber's name was placed on the tempo rary disability retired list); or (D) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion o f suc h me mbe r's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order under this section. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) provides: The total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable under all court orders pursuant to subsection (c) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired pay. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(4)(B) provides: (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section a nd all legal pro cesses purs uant to section 459 of th e Social Se curity Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with respect to a member may not exc eed 65 pe rcent of the amount o f the retired p ay payable to such membe r that is considered under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that is payable by the United States. -11- (Emp hasis ad ded.) We do not agree with Husband that Ms. Widmann s statement regarding § 1408 was false or misleading. M s. Widma nn testified th at an order th at does no t limit the amo unts paid to disposable retired pay is an acceptab le order[.] That statement does not contradict section (e)(5), which provides that an order directing the payment of an amount exceeding disposable retired pay sha ll not be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason . Wife a grees th at the m ilitary, pursu ant to sta tute and regulati on, will not p ay a former spouse directly more th an 50% of disp osable retired p ay pursu ant to C ourt O rder. The regulations, howeve r, do not pro hibit a military mem ber from directly making payments that exceed 50 percent of disposable retired pay. See 10 U.S.C . § 1408(e) (6) ( Noth ing in this section sha ll be construed to relieve a mem ber o f liab ility fo r the paym ent o f alim ony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitte d unde r parag raph (1 ) or sub paragr aph (B ) of par agraph (4). ). Husband also takes issue with Ms. W idmann s contention that the CPO proposed by Wife contains all language required by federal regulation. He argues that the order violates federal regulation because it does not provide specifically for payment of a fixed amount expressed in U.S. dollars or payment as a percentage or a fraction of disposable retired pay. At the hearing, Ms. Widmann testified that it is infrequent that an award [of military retirement benefits to a former sp ouse] is stated as a fixed dollar am ount. She stated: The -12- more common m ethod of expressing the former spouse s award is in the percentage of the member s disposable retired pay. When asked how the amount of Wife s award was stated in the proposed CPO, Ms. Widmann responded, It s divided as a percentage . . . because it s one half a fraction, the numerator being one ninety seven over the denominator being the total months served . So its es sentially a p ercenta ge aw ard. Husband has not convinced us that Ms. Wid man n s te stimony w as false or that the proposed CPO fails to contain all the language required by federal regulation.4 As for Husb and s claim that the cou rt erred in acc epting the master s report and recommendations because th e master relied solely on exp ert testimony, no thing in the record supports Husband s assertion. The master heard testimony not on ly from Wife s expert, Ms. Widmann, but also from Husband and Wife. The master s report and recommendations do not ind icate that he relied on ex pert testimon y only and failed to consider other testimony and evidence offered by the parties. Husband also argues that the court erred in accepting the master s recommendations because the master erroneously refused to admit two defense exhibits into evidence. He contends that the exh ibits show th at he acted in good faith and cooperated with the drafting of a CPO. B oth exhibits, which w ere letters from Husb and s counsel to W ife s counsel, set forth Husband s requested changes to Wife s proposed CPO. The first letter, dated July 1, 2005, detailed severa l specif ic chan ges to th e propo sed CP O. The second letter, dated 4 We note, moreover, that both parties direct us to 32 C.F.R. § 63.6, which was removed in Octo ber 200 1. See 66 Fed. Reg. 53 958 (October 2 5, 2001). -13- November 29, 2005, requested only the change of the word before to after in Paragraph 5B of the pro posed CPO . Counsel for Wife objected to the admission of the July 1, 2005 letter on the ground that it was not re levant. The master susta ined the ob jection, but a sked Husband to testify about the in formation contained in the letter. Hu sband testifie d: [F]rom the first time my attorney has was notified by [Wife] about the trying to draft a constituted military pension order, there s been numerous communications back and forth between attorneys. . . . The attorneys have worked diligently trying to come up with language that both parties wo uld accep t. Regarding the November 29, 2005 letter, the master heard extensive evidence on Husband s request to change the w ord before to af ter in Paragraph 5B of the proposed CPO. The master received into evidence Defense Exhibit 2, a letter dated November 30, 2005, that wa s substa ntially simila r to the N ovem ber 29, 2 005 lette r. Both letters were addressed from Husb and s counsel to W ife s coun sel, and both letters set forth Hu sband s request to change the word before to after. Wife s expert witness, Ms. Widmann, testified that, in the November 30, 2005 letter, counsel for Husband requested to change the word before to the word after[.] And Husband testified that he agreed to give on every single thing requested in the pension order with the exception of one word. Because the master heard evidence on the contents of the July 1, 2005 and November 29, 2005 letters, Husband has not persuaded us that the master s refusal to admit the two exh ibits into evidence, prejudiced him and thereby created error requiring reversal of the order of -14- contem pt. See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004). Husband further challenges the court s acceptance of the master s recommendations on the groun d that the m aster did no t advise him of his right to counsel. He argues that the master deprived h im of due process in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by allow ing him to act as his own attorney at the January 10, 2006 hearing without notifying him of his right to coun sel. We have mentioned that Husband was represented by counsel at the first hearing before the master, but not the second.5 Before Husband testified at the second hearing, the master stated: I m running the Court, you re not so listen to me. You actua lly are right now a lawyer. So I need you to come up here. Now, this is highly unorthodox, but we re go ing to act ually h ave swe ar you in as a law yer and you can tell the truth . Swea r him in. Thereafter, Husband was sworn in and proceeded to a rgue and testif y on his own behalf. He argues on appeal that no provision of the Maryland Constitution or the Maryland Rules a llowed the ma ster to sw ear him in as an attorney. Wife responds that Husband was informed of his right to counsel in the petition for contemp t.6 She contends that Husband had ev ery opportunity to avail himself of an 5 Husb and ha s repres ented h imself a t every pro ceedin g since then. 6 The contempt petition included a page that restated the notice in the form required by Maryland Rule 15-206(c) when incarceration to compel the court s order is sought. That notice informs th e alleged co ntemnor o f the allegatio n that he sho uld go to jail until the court s order is obeyed; he has a right to be represented by counsel and the benefits of counsel; the Public Defender may provide a lawyer; he should not delay in obtaining a -15- attorney s representatio n if he so d esired. She co rrectly asse rts, moreover, that Maryland Rule 15-206(e)(1), which addresses waiver of the right to counsel, applies only to a hearing before a judge where incarceration is sought and does not apply to the January 10, 2006 hearing before the m aster.7 lawyer; and failure to be present at the hearing on the petition will subject him to arrest. The petition in this ca se did n ot requ est incar ceration . 7 Maryland R ule 15-20 6(e)(1) prov ides: (e) Waiver of counsel if incarceration is sought. (1) Applica bility. This section applies if incarceration is sought and applies only to court hearings before a judge. (2) Appearance in Court Without Counsel. (A) If the alleged contemnor appears in court without coun sel, the court shall make certain that the alleged contemnor has receive d a copy of th e order con taining notice of the right to counsel or was advised of the contents of the notice in accorda nce with R ule 9-208 (d); (B) If the alleged contemnor indicates a desire to w aive coun sel, the court sh all determine, after an examination of the alleged contemnor on the record, that the w aive r is kn owing and volun tary; (C) If the alleged contemnor indicates a desire to have counsel an d the court finds that the alleged contemnor received a copy of the order containing notice of the right to co unsel or w as advised of the con tents of the n otice pursu ant to Rule 9-208 (d), th e court shall p ermit the alleged contemnor to explain the appearance without co unsel. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the alleged c ontemno r s appeara nce witho ut counse l, the court sha ll continue the action to a later time and advise the alleged conte mnor that if counsel does not e nter an app earance b y that time, the actio n will proce ed with the alleged contemnor unreprese nted by coun sel. If the court finds that there is no meritorious reason for the alleged contemnor's appearance without counsel, the court m ay determine th at the alleged contemnor has waived counsel by failing or refusing to obtain counsel and may proceed with the hearing. -16- We agree with Wife. The master swore in Husband so that he could prov ide testimony under oath. The master did not, however, deprive Husband of due process by allowing him to proceed pro se. The petition for c ontempt in formed H usband o f his right to counsel, and, in fact, it en couraged Husban d to seek leg al repre sentatio n at on ce. Husband evidently was aware of the right, for he was represented by counsel at the November 15, 2005 hearing before the master. He therefore cannot successfully complain that either he had no notice of his right to counsel or that the master erred by allowing him to proceed without co unsel. B. Husband also tak es issue with th e court s conte mpt fin ding be cause, h e argue s, the specific and unambig uous lang uage of th e judgme nt for abso lute divorce did not com pel him to consent to a CPO or to cooperate in the drafting of a CPO. He argues that Wife used contempt proceedings to force him to consent to an order that was not required by the divorce decree . We di sagree . It is well settled that, where cooperation is necessary to the performance of a condition [in a contract], a duty to cooperate w ill be implied[.] Dexter, 105 Md. App. 678, 684 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Dexter, the parties entered into an agreement upon their divorce rega rding military retirement benefits that was incorporated into their divorce decree. The agreement entitled the Wife to forty-seven and a half percent -17- (47.5%) of the [Husband s] military pension . . . on a monthly basis as, if, and wh en it is paid by the Department of the Army to the [Husband]. Id. at 679. Shortly after Husband was placed on retirement, he voluntarily waived his righ ts to Army retirem ent benef its in order to qualify for greater benef its throu gh the V eterans Adm inistratio n ( VA ). Id. at 680. The statute providing for VA benefits pro hibits division of the ben efits to a former spouse; thus, in waiving the Army benefits, the Husband effectively deprived the Wife of any benefits. Id. The trial court ruled that, under the parties agreement, the Husband could not pursue the VA benefits and at the same time deprive the Wife of the benefits she bargained for under t he agre emen t. Id. at 683. We affirmed the trial court and held that each party had an oblig ation to t ake rea sonab le steps to bring th e agree ment to fruition . Id. at 684. In the present case, the consent judgment of divorce specifically provides that Wife shall receive an expressly stated percentage portion o f Hu sban d s m ilitar y retirement benefits on an if, as, and when received basis. Pursuant to the consent judgment, the Husband has an obligation to act in good faith and to deal fairly with the other party . . . and an obligation to cooperate when necessary to the performance of a condition. Id. at 685 (quoting P.V. Properties, Inc. v. Rock Creek Village Ass ocs. Ltd. P ship, 77 M d. App. 77, 86-87 (1988)). There is no merit to Hu sband s arg ument tha t he was n ot required to cooperate with the drafting and signing of a CPO that accurately reflects the consent judgmen t. C. -18- Husband next argues that the court erred in finding him in contempt because it did not rule on his exceptions to the master s recommendations. He argues that the exceptions set forth errors by the master and the court s orders do not reflect its consideration of the excep tions or i ts indep enden t determ ination o f the issu es. The court order granting Wife s motion to strike Husband s petition for a hearing reads: THIS MAT TER, h aving come bef ore the Co urt by Motio n, and all matters having been c onside red, it is . . . ORDERED that the [W ife s] Mo tion to Strike the [Husband s] Petition for a Hearing on [H usband s] Exceptions to Rec ommen dations of M aster is hereby granted; and it is further ORDERED that the Court finds that [Husband s] Request for Hearing was not timely filed and that an Order based on the Report and Recommendations of the Master shall be signed concurrently herewith. Exceptions to the recommendations of a master warrant an independent consideration by the trial court. Kierein v. K ierein, 115 Md. App. 448, 453 (1997). The court must exercise its independent judgment, consider the allegations[,] and decide each such question. Id. at 454 (citation and internal quotation ma rks omitted). The trial court may consider additional testimony or independently consider the report and recommendations of the master. The trial court should defer to the fact-finding of the master where the fact-finding is supported by credible ev idence, and is not, therefo re, clearly erroneous. Id. at 453 (quoting Wenger v. Wenger, 42 Md. App. 596, 602 (1979)). The court, however, need not give a litany of its reasons for accepting and adopting the fact finding, conclusions, and -19- recommendations of the master. Kierein, 115 Md. App. at 455-56. Moreover, [t]rial judges are presum ed to kn ow the law an d to app ly it proper ly. Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 426 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we presume judges know th e law and apply it even in the absence of a verbal indication of having considered it. Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 50, cert. denied, 343 M d. 334 (19 96). A jud ge is not required to set out in in timate detail each and every step in his or her thought process. Kirsner v. Edelmann, 65 Md. App. 185, 196 n.9 (1985 ). We find no merit in Husband s assertion that the court fa iled to exercis e its independent judgment or to consider Husband s exceptions to the master s recommendations. As we have mentioned, Wife presented expert testimony at the January 10, 2006 hearing that Husba nd s proposed changes to the CPO would negatively affect her prope rty rights, as set forth in the consent judgm ent. Husband, for h is part, presented no expert testimony to the contrary. The master therefore based his report and recommendations on Wife s undisputed expert testimo ny. Because the report and recommend ations were supported by credible ev idence, the c ourt s defe rence to tho se findings was not c learly errone ous. See Kiere in, 115 M d. App . at 453. The court stated in the May 11, 2007 order granting Wife s request to strike Husband s untimely request for a hearing on the exceptions that it had considered all matters . In so doing , the court w as not requ ired to set out in intimate detail each and every -20- step of its tho ught pr ocess. Kirsne r, 65 Md. App. at 196, n.9. We therefore reject as meritless Husband s contention that the court s orders do not reflect its consideration of the exceptions or its independent determination of the issues. D. Fina lly, Husband challenges the court s finding of contempt by arguing that the court erred in imposing the purge amount. He contends that the court failed to comply with Maryland Rule 15-2 07(d)(2) by no t specifying in a written ord er the sanction for the contemp t. Rule 15-2 07(d)(2) pr ovides: When a court or jury m akes a find ing of con tempt, the co urt shall issue a written order that specifies the sanction impo sed for the contem pt. In the case of a civil contem pt, the order sh all specify how the contempt may be purged. In the case of a criminal contempt, if the sanction is incarceration, the order shall specify a determinate term and any c ondition under which the sanction may be suspended, modified, revoked, or terminated. Wife responds that, at the November 15, 2005 hearing, the parties agreed to postpone the proceedings related to the military retirement payments to allow both parties to obtain expert witnesses. S he states that th e parties pos tponed the proceedin gs with the express stipulation that, if the expert testimony showed that Husband s pro posed change s were unreason able or would harm Wife s rights as established under the jud gment fo r absolute divorce, then Husband would be held in contempt and ordered to pay a purge amount measu red by W ife s ex pert wi tness s f ees and couns el s fee s. The transcript of the hearing reveals that the master indeed informed Husband that he would be required to pay Wife s counsel fees if he were found in contempt. In the presence -21- of Husb and s cou nsel, the ma ster stated to W ife s coun sel: Well, in the future the issue is over the Q DRO , so what you need to do . . . is you have your clie nt identify it, and offer it as an exhibit. Then we ll have [Husband s attorney] tell us what [is] wrong with it. Now, if what she says is wrong w ith it is legitimate an d reasona ble, then w e re not going to mark the QD RO do wn as a c ontemptib le issue. We re go ing to straighte n it out and get it sign ed. If [attorney for Husband s] issue is unreasonable, then we re go ing to talk about lawyer fees. And we re going to talk about lawyer fees I m going to try to figu re out w ho refu sed to a pprov e it. The court contin ued: [H ]ere s the bo ttom line, if his p osition is determined to be unreasonable, he s going to pay those lawyer fees. The master thus informed Husband that if his reasoning for refusing to sign the proposed CPO was unjustified, then the court wo uld find him in contempt and require him to purge the contempt by paying Wife s counsel fees. Husband s argument that the court erred by failing to specify in a written order the sanction for contempt is also without merit. At the January 10, 2006 hearing, Wife testified about the attorney s fees that she incurred in bringing the con tempt p etition. Thereafter, on May 11, 2006, the court issued an order that specifically states Husband may purge him self of contempt by paying the sum of $2,333.00 on or before July 10, 2006[,] which included $2,083 .00 in ex pert wi tness fe es and $ 250.00 in additi onal atto rney s fe es. II. Husband next conte nds that the c ourt abuse d its discretion b y ordering him to sign the CPO proposed by Wife, bec ause it both modified the parties judgment of absolute divorce and was contrary to 10 U.S.C. § 1408. He presents no argument in his brief to support those -22- assertions. We do not agree with Husband that the court s CPO modified the parties judgment of absolute divorce. The divorce judgment states specifically that Wife shall receive a portion of Hu sband s military re tiremen t benef its on a n if, as, an d whe n receiv ed basi s. The May 11, 2006 CPO issued by the court ensures that Wife will receive the benefits she bargain ed for u nder th e conse nt judg ment o f divor ce. Husband, moreover, has not explained how he believes the CPO violates 10 U.S.C. § 1 408. Wif e s expert w itness testified that the CPO is consistent with 10 U.S.C. § 1408, and Husband has presented no argument to the contrary, either at trial or on appeal. We stated in Sodergren v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory that [i]t is not our function to seek out the law in support of a party s appellate contentions. 138 Md. App. 686, 707 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We decline to attempt to fashion coherent legal theories to support appellant s sweeping claims. Id. (citation and inte rnal qu otation m arks om itted). III. Lastly, Husband contends that the court erred by not holding a hearing on his exceptions to the master s recommendations. He argues that Wife s motion to strike Husband s request for a hearing on the exceptions was untimely filed and the court therefore erred in grantin g the m otion. Wife responds that Husband s request for a hearing on the exceptions was itself not -23- timely filed. She contends that Maryland Rule 9-208(i) permitted the court to rule on Husb and s e xceptio ns with out con ducting a hearin g. Maryland R ule 9-208 (i) provides: Hearing on exceptions. (1) Generally. The court m ay decide exceptions without a hearing, unless a request fo r a hearing is filed with the exceptions or by an opposin g party within ten days after service of the exceptions. The exceptions shall be decided on the evidence presented to the master unless: (A) the excep ting party sets forth w ith particularity the ad ditional evide nce to be offered and the reasons why the evidence was not offered before the master, and (B) the court determines that the additional evidence should be considered. If additional evidence is to be considered, the court may remand th e matter to the master to hear and consider the additional evidence or conduct a de novo hearing. (2) When hearing to be he ld. A hearing on exceptions, if timely requested, shall be held within 60 days after the filing of the exceptions unless the parties otherwise agree in writing. If a transcript cannot be complete d in time for the scheduled hearing and the parties cannot agree to an extension of time or to a statement of facts, the court may use the electronic recording in lieu of the transcript at the hearing or continue the hearing until th e transcript is completed. (Emp hasis ad ded.) We agree with Wife that Husband s request for a hearing was not timely filed pursuant to Rule 9-208 (i)(1). On January 18, 2006, Husb and filed exceptions to the master s report and recommendations without a request for a hearing. He did not request a hearing within ten days after the exce ptions we re filed; it was not until 27 d ays after he filed his exceptions that he requested a hearing. Moreover, Wife s response to the exceptions, which was filed on February 3, 2006, also did not include a request fo r a hearing. A s neither party requested a hearing on the exceptions within ten days after service of the exceptions, the -24- court d id not er r in ruling on the e xceptio ns with out con ducting a hearin g. Husband s argumen t that Wife s motion to strike the request for a hearing was not timely filed does not persuade us. Regardle ss of the un timeliness of Husban d s motion to strike the request for a hearing, Husband s request was itself untimely. The court, therefore, could properly deny the request for a hearing pursuant to R ule 9-208(i). JUD GM ENT AFF IRM ED. APP ELL ANT TO P AY T HE C OST S. -25-
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