Jennifer v. Dept. of Corrections

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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 426 September Term, 2006 DAVE SHAWN JENNIFER v. STATE OF MARYLAND, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORREC TIONAL SERVICES, AND DIVISION OF CORRECTION Krauser, Woodward, Wenn er, Willia m W. ( Ret., specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Krauser, J. Filed: September 26, 2007 While working in the kitchen of the Central Laundry Facility of the Maryland Division of Correction, prison inmate Dave Shawn Jennifer was attacked and injured by fellow prisoner and co-worker, Stanley B. Taylor. Jennifer brought an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Taylor for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and against the State of Maryland1 for violations of Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, but his suit proved unavailing. Holding tha t Jennifer s exclusive remedy against the S tate lay with the Sundry Claims B oard, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and thereafter entered a default judgment against Taylor. On appeal, Jenn ifer claims that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because his injury neither arose out of his employment nor was accidental : two conditions that must be met, he insists, before Sundry Claims Board review can be obtained. B ecause w e find that Je nnifer s inju ry did indeed a rise out of h is employme nt, and because w e conclude that the B oard s jurisdiction is not limited to injuries that are accidental, at least as that term is interpreted by Jennifer, 2 but includes injuries caused by the willful acts of third parties, we hold that Jennifer s exclusive remedy lies with the 1 In suing the State of Maryland, Jennifer specifically named the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and the Division of Correction. 2 Jennifer suggests that accidental should be defined narrowly so that it excludes injuries caused b y the willful acts o f third parties. B ut, as we sh all later discuss, this term has been defined in other statutory co ntexts, notab ly the Worke rs Comp ensation A ct, to include such injuries. Sund ry Claims Board . Acco rdingly, w e shall af firm the judgm ent of th e circuit c ourt. Background On Au gust 23, 20 02, Jennife r was w orking in the Central L aundry Fac ility with fellow inmate Stanley B. Taylor, where he received a wage for the work he performed.3 On that August day, Jennifer asked the dietary officer on duty in the kitchen for permission to have a hamburger. The officer agreed and directed Taylor to serve Jennifer the food he requested. But Taylor refused and, according to Jennifer s complaint, [a] heated argument erupted between Taylor and the officer. It ended when Taylor stated that he would rather throw [the hamburger] on the floor than give it to [Jennifer], and then pr oceed ed to do precise ly that. The office r then o rdered Taylor to leave th e kitche n. The next day, Taylor was again assigned to work in the kitchen. Although the two prisoners were placed in different areas of the kitchen and given separate duties, at some point Taylor approached [Jennifer] from behind, holding a large spatula used to stir large pots a nd struc k him in the hea d with i t. Taylor was, at that time, according to Jennifer s complaint, under care by [the State] for mental health problems ... related to [his] violent disposition, but had, at that point, exha usted the m edication h e was tak ing for that c ondition. D espite reque sts to 3 Jennifer was paid $.95 per day for his work, according to the affida vit of Pam ela Sorenson, facility administrator and custo dian of rec ords of the Central L aundry Fac ility of the Maryland Division of Correction. 3 [prison officials] for additional medicine, none, the complaint averred, was provided. Discussion Jennifer contends that the circuit court erred in holding that his sole remedy against the State lay with the Sundry Claims Board ( the Board ) and, on that basis, entering summ ary judgm ent for t he State . Because this case was disposed of on a motion for summary judgment, our task would n ormally be to determine if there is a ge nuine disp ute of ma terial fact and , if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goldstein v. Miles, 159 Md.App. 403, 422 (2004) (quoting Crews v. Hollenbach, 126 Md.App. 609, 624, 730 A.2d 7 42 (19 99), aff'd, 358 M d. 627, 751 A.2d 48 1 (2000)). B ut, since neithe r party alleges that there are any material facts in dispute, we confine our review of that motion to whether summary judgment was correctly entered as a matter of law, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. B errett, 395 Md. 439, 450-451 (2006) (citing Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 M d. 649, 658 , (2005); Todd v. MTA, 373 M d. 149, 154 (2003); Beyer v. Morgan State U niv., 369 M d. 335, 359 (2002)), tha t is, whethe r the trial court w as legally correct in gra nting su mmar y judgm ent. Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 143 Md. App. 1, 10 (2002) (quoting Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591 (1990)). We conclude that it was. -2- The Sundry Claims Board Act4 ( SCBA ) provides that the compensation authorized by that act is the exclusive remedy against the State for a claim, § 10308(c)5 , made by an individual, who while an inmate in the Patuxent Institution, the Baltimore City Detention Center, or a correctional facility in the Division of Correction: (1) was engaged in work f or w hich wag es or a stip ulate d sum of m oney was paid by a correctional facility; and (2) sustained a permanent partial disability or permanent total disability: (i) as a result of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of work for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by a correctional facility; and (ii) that incapacitated [the claimant] or materially reduced [his or her] earning power in that type of wo rk. § 10 -304. See Dixon v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 175 Md. A pp. ____, No. 11 07, Sept. Term, 200 6 (filed July 5, 2007). Although Jenn ifer does not dispute that his injury occurred in the cours e of his employment, while he was engaged in work for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by a correctional facility, and that he sustained a permanent partial disability or total disability, id., he maintains that, because his injury neither a[rose] out of his work nor was accidental, id., it did not fall within the exclusive province of the 4 The SCBA is currently codified as §§ 10-301 - 310 of the Maryland Code, Correc tional S ervices Article ( 1999) . 5 Maryland Code, Correctional Services, § 10-308. Claim payments. (...) (c) The compensation authorized under this subtitle is the e xclusive rem edy against the State for a claim that falls within the jurisdiction of the Board. -3- Board . Arising Out Of The SCBA does not explicitly define the phrase arising out of. Nor have our appellate courts considered the meaning of this phrase in the context of that act. But they have repeatedly considered its import in other statutory settings, notably § 9-101(b) of what is now entitled the Workers 6 Compensa tion Act ( WC A ), 7 which em ploys this locution, as the SCBA does, in defining compensable claims. Section 9-101(b) of the WCA states that an in jury covered b y that act is one th at arises out of and in the course of the claimant s emp loyment. (Emphasis add ed.) Jennifer maintains, however, that it would be error for us to assume that the legislature intended that the phrase, arising out of, be given the same meaning in the SCBA that it has been given in the WCA. He claims that, where the legislature intended that phrases commo n to both ac ts would h ave the sam e meanin g, it expressly said s o in the SCBA. To illustrate his point, he invokes § 10-301(c) and § 10-301(d) of the SCBA, which respectively state that permanent partial disability and permanent total 6 Originally called the Workmens Compensation Act, this statute was renamed the Workers Compensation Act in 1984, pursuant to Chapter 279, Acts of 1984, which provided: [T]he term workmen's compensation is to be revised to read workers' comp ensatio n. The terms are synonymous. See Maryland Cod e (1957, 1985 R epl. Vol.), Art. 101, § 14A. 7 The M aryland Wo rkers Com pensation A ct is currently codified at, §§ 9-101 - 9-308 of the M aryland C ode, L abor an d Emp loyment A rticle (19 99). -4- disability shall have the same meanings in the SCBA that they have in the WCA.8 But this argument is misleading. The SCBA relies on the WCA for the definitions of permanent partial disability and permanent total disability because those locutions, unlike arising out of, are expressly defined in that act. In other words, the reason that the SCB A does n ot refer to the WCA s definition o f arising ou t of is simply be cause it contain s no suc h defin ition. If those sections of the SCBA provide little support for Jennifer s position, the legislative history of the SCBA provides even less. In fac t, as we shall see, that history compels u s to conclud e that the ph rase, arising o ut of, wa s placed in th e SCB A to conve y the sam e mean ing that i t does in the W CA. Before th e legislature en acted the S CBA , the WC A gove rned claim s made b y all workers, including inmates at Maryland s correctional facilities, for injuries arising out of and in th e course o f their emp loyment. 9 See Md. C ode (193 9), Art. 101 , § 14. But, in 1961, inmate claims were removed from the WCA for all workers with the passage of 8 Section 10-301(c) of the SCBA provides: Permanent partial disability has the same meaning given under Title 9, Sub title 6, Part IV of the L abor an d Emp loyment A rticle, which corresponds to the particular WCA provision specifying the terms of compensation to be awarded for permanent partial disabilities. And § 10-301(d) of the SCBA states: Permanent total disability has the same meaning given under Title 9, Subtitle 6, Part V of the Labor and Employment Article, which is the WCA provision specifying the terms of comp ensatio n to be a warde d for p erman ent total d isabilities . 9 The phrase arising out of was inserted into that act in 1939. -5- the SCBA.10 That act esta blished a se parate boa rd, the Sun dry Claims B oard, to han dle claims for compe nsation made by prison inm ates for work-related injuries. To be more precise, its purp ose, in the w ords of the act, was to amend[ ] the comp ensation law s to remove th erefrom re ferences to the paymen t of work men s co mpensa tion to certain prisoners an d inmates o f penal institu tions ... [and] cre at[e] a Sun dry Claims B oard to provide for the payment of claims for injuries to certain prisoners in this State, and relating generally to the payment of workmen s compensation benefits and to the payment of other claims for injuries incurred by prisoners and inmates of [Maryland] penal institutions. See Md. Code (1957, 1961 Supp.), Art. 41, § 188A.11 In 1993, the SCBA w as amended and the phrase, arising out of, was added so that t he ac t now expressly required tha t a prison er s i njury aris[e] out of and in the course of wo rk to fa ll within the exc lusive ju risdiction of the S undry C laims B oard. See 1993 Md. Laws, Chap. 133.12 (Emp hasis ad ded.) Re-codif ied in 1999 as §§ 10-3 01 - 10-31 0 of the M aryland Cod e, the statute currently provides, as we stated earlier, that the Board shall administer benefits . . . to an 10 The SCBA was enacted by the Maryland General Assembly as 1961 Md. Laws, Chaps. 440, 719, and was later codified under Md. Code (1957, 1961 Supp.), Art. 41, § 188A . 11 In 1986, the SCBA was renumbered, without substantive changes, so that it now occup ies § 4-7 01 of A rt. 41 of the M aryland C ode. 12 The act was later re-codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1990 Repl. Vol., 1993 Supp.), § 4-701(a) (I). -6- individual who, while an inmate in the Patuxent Institution, the Baltimore City Detention Center, or a correctional facility in the Division of Corrections: (1) was en gaged in w ork for w hich wag es or a stipulate d sum of money w as paid by a correctional facility; and (2) sustained a perman ent partial disab ility or permanen t total disability: (i) as a result of a pe rson al inj ury arising out o f and in the course of w ork for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by a correctional facility; and (ii) th at inc apac itated the individu al or mate rially r educed t he in dividual's earning power in that type of work. § 10-3 04. (Em phasis a dded.) After defining what is compensable in § 10-304, the SCBA goes on to list, in § 10308(a)13 , what factors may be considered by the Board as to whether a claim should be compensated and, if so, in what amount, stating: In determining wh at compensation, if any, to allow a claimant, the Board shall consider: (1) the goo d faith of th e claimant; (2) the possibility that the alleged injury was self-inflicted or not accidental; (3) th e ext ent a nd nature of t he in jury; (4) th e deg ree o f disabili ty; (5) the period of disability or incapacity for other work; and (6) the ordin ary earning po wer of th e claimant. § 10-308(a) (Em phasis added.) The phrase, arising out of was added to the WCA, as we noted earlier, in 1939, 13 Section 10-308(a) was formerly Art. 41, § 188A(e) of the SC BA. See Dept. Of Public Safety & Correctional Servs. v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533 (1980). -7- when prisone r comp ensatio n claim s were still cove red by tha t act. See Md. Cod e (1939), Art. 101, § 14. That phrase was thereafter interpreted by our appellate courts in the context of that act and that interpretation applied to all workers see, e.g., Livering v. Richardson's Restaurant, 374 M d. 566 (20 03); Mulready v. Univ. Research Corp., 360 Md. 51 (2000); and Montg omery C ounty v. Sm ith, 144 Md. App. 548 (2002) including prison in mates. See Gray v. Dept. of Correction, 230 Md. 508 (1963). Later, after the SCBA was pass ed, this langu age was added to m ore specific ally define com pensable injuries. In so doing, the legislature, we presume, was aware of the interpretation that our appellate courts had previously placed on that language in interpreting the WCA and consequently added that language with the expectation that it would be given the same interpre tation w hen it w as judic ially constr ued in th e conte xt of the SCB A. See Del Marr v. Montg omery C ounty, 169 Md. App. 187, 212 (2006) ( [T]he Legislature is presumed to be aw are of th e interpr etation th at the co urts ha[ ve] plac ed upo n its ena ctmen ts. ). We further presume the legislature intended statutes that affect [the] same subject matter to blend into [a] consistent and harmonious body of law. That is to say, various consistent and related enactments, although made at different times and without reference to one another, nevertheless should be harmonized as much as possible. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93 (1990) (citing Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 47 1, 481 (1990); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 M d. 48, 56 (19 86); Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 10, 497 A.2d 142, 146 (1985)). Given that the SCBA and the WCA affect -8- the same subject ma tter and are consistent and related , we conclude tha t the legislature intended them to blend into [a] consistent and harmonious body of law. Bricker, 321 Md. at 93 (other citations omitted). To achieve that end, we must give the phrases they share, su ch as a rising ou t of, the same m eaning in both acts. Still, hoping to persuade us to do otherwise, Jennifer cites Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Servs. v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533 (1980), for the proposition that the WCA provides n o guidanc e in such m atters. But a rev iew of tha t case leads u s to question its relevan ce. In LeVan, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court had erred in applying the WCA specifically, Art. 101, § 36(4)(a)14 to calculate an award for a claimant s back injury under the SCBA when the latter act had a specific provision namely, Art. 41 § 188A(e) setting forth the factors that should be considered in determining the amount of compensation that should be awarded15 . In subs tituting th e facto rs set fo rth in A rt. 101, § 36(4)(a) of the WCA for those expressly stated in Art. 41 § 188A(e) of the SCBA, the 14 That particular provision of the WCA specified that the Comm ission shall tak e into consideration, among other things, the nature of the physical injury, the occupation, experience, training and age of the injured employee at the time of injury. Md. Code (1957, 1979 Repl. V ol.), Art. 101, § 36(4)(a). 15 Those specific factors, as listed in the SCBA, were the good faith of the claimant, the possibility that the alleged injury was self-inflicted or other than accidental, the extent and nature of the injury, the degree of disability, the period of any disability or incapacity for other work, and the ordinary earning power of the claimant. Art. 41, § 188A(e) (later recodifie d as § 1 0-308 (a) of th e Mar yland Co de, Co rrection al Serv ices Ar ticle). -9- circuit court rendered a significant part of that act meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nu gato ry and thereby violated a cardinal rule of statutory construction. See, e.g ., Government Employees Ins. Co. and GEICO v. Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland, 332 Md. 124, 132 (1993) (citing Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 38 0, 387 (1992); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 M d. 534, 538 (1990); Kindle y v. Go vernor of Md ., 289 Md. 620, 625 (1981); Moberly v. Herboldsheimer, 276 Md. 211, 217 (1975)). (It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, in construing two statutes, enacted at different times and not referring to each other ... neither statute should be read ... so as to render the other ... mean ingless, s urplusa ge, sup erfluou s or nug atory. ). But that is clearly not what either party is requesting us to do here. To the contrary, we are not being asked to ignore the plain language of the SCBA in favor of competin g languag e in the W CA bu t to determin e whethe r a phrase, w hich both a cts share, should be given the same interpretation in the SCBA that we have given it in that act s legislative p redecesso r and now counterpa rt, the WC A, in light of the comm on goals and his tory of tho se two acts. Th us, LeVan is simply not applicable to the instant case. The phrase arises out of in § 9-101 of the WCA has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals as requir[ing] not that the performance of an employment-related task be the direct or physical cause of the injury, but, more broadly, that the injury be incidental to the employment, such that it was by reason of the employment that the employee was exposed to the risk resulting in the injury. Liverin g v. Rich ardson 's -10- Restaurant, 374 Md. 566, 574-575 (2003). In other words, [a]n injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed [the employee] in the position where he [or she] was in jured. 16 Id. at 575 (citations omitted). Illustrative of this principle is Mulready v. Univ. Research Corp., 360 Md. 51, 53, 66 (2000). In that case, an employee s injury caused by her slip and fall in her hotel bathtub, which occurred while she was attending a seminar in Canada on behalf of her employer, was held to arise out of her employment under the WCA because it occurred as a r esult of a n act ivity reasonably incidental to the travel that th e emp loyer requ ired. (Emphasis add ed.) Conversely, in Montg omery C ounty v. Sm ith, 144 Md. App. 548, 551 (2002), an off-duty injury suffered by a correctional officer while he was playing basketball at the detention center where he worked was held not to have arisen out of his employment becau se such recrea tional ac tivities w ere not inciden t to his jo b as a pr ison gu ard. Id. at 578. In so holding, w e explained that [a]n inju ry arises out of th e employm ent if it would n ot have oc curred bu t for the fact th at the emp loyee's job require d the emp loyee to 16 This is commonly known as the positional-risk test, which Maryland has adopted to determine whether an injury arose o ut of emp loyment. It is considere d more lib eral than the increased risk test, wh ich requires th at the emp loyee be expo sed to a qu antitatively greater degree of risk than the general public. Livering, 374 Md. at 575 (citing Mulready, 360 M d. at 66) . -11- be in the place where he was injured. Smith, 144 Md. App. at 577 (citing Mulready, 360 Md. at 66). Since the o fficer s job did not require him to be on the basketba ll court where he wa s injured , his inju ry, we co nclude d, did no t satisfy tha t test. Id. But Jenn ifer s injury does . Certainly, he w ould not h ave suffe red the injury he did but for the fact that the c onditions an d obligation s of the em ployment pla ced [him ] in the position where he was injured. Livering, 374 M d. at 574-75 . At the time th e assault took place , Jennifer w as required by his employer, th e Central L aundry Fac ility, to be in the kitchen . His presen ce there pro vided Ta ylor, who had also been a ssigned to w ork in the kitchen that day, with the opportun ity to assault him a s well as the instrumen t with which to carry ou t that attac k. Thu s, Jennif er s inju ry was in cidenta l to his w ork. Because a reaso nably incidental relationship betwee n the injury and the claimant s work is sufficient, in itself, to establish that an injury arose out of employment, we conclu de that J ennife r s injury sa tisfied th at requir emen t. Mulready, 360 Md. at 53, 66 (2000). Althoug h Jennifer appears to c oncede th is very point, 17 he claims th at the assault was motivated by Taylor s animosity toward him and that it therefore could have occurred anywhere. Relying on Gray v. Dept. of Correction, 230 M d. 508 ( 1963) , Jennifer argues that his injury did not arise out of his employment. In Gray, a prisoner 17 Jennifer states in his brief, as he did in his opposition to the State s motion for summary judgmen t below, tha t his injury on the serving line w as merely incid ental to his work. -12- was injure d under w hat Jennife r claims w ere analog ous circum stances: that is, as a result of being assaulted while working in the laundry at a Maryland penitentiary. Because the Gray Court f ound th at the pri soner s injuries d id not a rise out o f his w ork, w e must , Jennifer claims , reach the same result here. But, apart fr om the fa ct that in both Gray and the insta nt case the c laimant and his assailant were inmates at a Maryland prison when the claimant was injured, the two cases have few m aterial facts in common . Indeed, in rejecting recovery under the Sundry Board Claims Act, the Gray Court stressed that a clear inference could be drawn from the evidence that [the prisoner] was injured as the result of a fight with another inmate that had previously occurred outside of work and in retaliation for a homosexual advance by [the injured prisoner]. Id. at 512. In contrast, Jennifer has offered no basis from which an inference may be drawn that his injury was the product of a prior confrontation unre lated to his wo rk ac tivity. Indeed, the only explanation Jennifer offers in his complaint for the assault was that Taylor w as unde r care by [the S tate] for me ntal health pro blems, relatin g to his violent disposition ; that he had exhausted the medication he was taking for that problem; and that the State had failed to provide him with additional medication to keep his propensity for violent outbursts in check. There is no suggestion in the complaint that the a ttack ha d anythin g to do w ith any prio r relation ship or c onfro ntation w ith Taylor . And, altho ugh Jenn ifer sugge sts in his brief, as he did in his u nsuccessf ul oppositio n to -13- the State s motion for summary judgment, that Taylor s assault was motivated by animus, he off ers no e xplana tion or b asis for this bald accusa tion. He nce, Gray has no applica bility here. This exception to the compensability of at-work injuries that is, injury-causing assaults triggered by antecedent quarrels unrelated to the parties work did not, we observe, originate with Gray . On the contrary, long before Gray, our state s highest court held th at, where e vidence o f such a q uarrel exists, an y injuries resulting f rom an atwork assault p recipitate d by that q uarrel a re not co mpen sable. See Rice v. Revere Copp er & Bra ss, Inc., 186 M d. 561 ( 1946) . Rice involved a workers compen sation claim brought b y the widow of a utility worker, whose injury and subsequent death resulted from a fellow employee s attack at their mutua l workpla ce. Affirm ing the den ial of that claim below, the Court of Appea ls held that that attack did not arise out of the employee s work because there was evidence that an ante cedent qu arrel, unrelated to the work, [was] the primary cause of the injury. Id. at 566. (Emphasis ad ded). There appare ntly had been bad bloo d, the Court observed, between the injured employee and his attacker, concerning, in part, the injured emplo yee s prio r condu ct at the a ttacker s house . Id. at 565. The Court further noted that the assault was not due to an emotional flare-up generated by friction inseparable from the working conditions, nor was the opportunity for revenge enhanced thereby. Id. at -14- 568.18 In contrast, Taylor s attack on Jennifer clearly was generated by friction inseparable from [their] working conditions, specifically, the friction caused by the prison off icial ordering Taylor to serve his co-wo rker, Jennife r, a hambu rger, while b oth were working in the prison kitchen. Moreover, Taylor s opportunity for revenge was enhanc ed by those w orking co nditions, as h is job placed him in close proximity to Jenn ifer a nd provided him with the to ol with w hich to ca rry ou t the a ssau lt. An d, fin ally, as we have pointed out, there was no claim of a prior confrontation between Jennifer and Taylor, only the whisper of a suggestion that there had been animosity between the two.19 Thus, unlike in Gray and Rice, the assault that injured Jennifer was not triggered 18 Other state c ourts have reached the same conclusion and held assaults by coemployees may be considered to arise out the injured employees work and, thus, be compen sable under the relevant workers com pensation statutes unless suc h attacks are unconnected with the employment, or ... for reasons personal to the assailant[s] and the one[s] assaulted, or ....[when] the employm ent is no t the cau se of th e assau lt. See, e.g ., Sanderson Farm s, Inc., v. Ja ckson, 911 So.2d 98 5, 990 (Miss. Ap p. 2005) (Emp loyee s injuries from assault by co-employee did not arise of out employment where assault arose from argument between employee and co-employee regarding personal loan that was unrelated to work); Pecoraro v. Russell-Miller Milling, Co., 9 A.D.2d 992, 993 (N.Y.A.D. 1959) (Employee s injuries from assault by co-employee did not arise of out employment where employee died as result of injuries he sustained when struck by fellow employee because of disagre ement arising over a pe rsonal bet.) See also Velasquez v. Industrial Commission, 41 Colo.App. 20 1, 203 (Colo. Ct. A pp. 1978) (Em ployee s injuries from assault by co-employee did not arise of out e mpl oyment when the animosity or dispute that culminate[d] in [the] assault [was] imported into the employment from claimant s domestic or private life, and [was] not exacerbated by the employment. ) (quoting 1A L arson, T he Law of Wo rkmen s Com pensat ion § 11 .21). 19 While Jennifer claims that the assault was motivated by Taylor s animosity toward him, no where does Je nnifer m ention a ny basis f or that co ntention . -15- by an antece dent quarre l, unrelated to the work, but was inseparable from the parties work ing con ditions a nd thus did, in fa ct, arise out of his emp loyment. Accidental Injury Anticipating that we might reach this conclusion, Jennifer argues, in the alternative, that, even if his injury arose out of his em ployment, the circuit court nonetheless erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on the grounds that the Sundry Claims Board was his exclusive remedy because, according to Jennifer, § 10308 20 of the SCBA covers only an accidental injury and not an injury that was inflicted 20 Maryland C ode, Corre ctional Serv ices, § 10-30 8. Claim p ayments (a) In determining what compensation, if an y, to allow a claimant, the Bo ard shall consider: (1) the goo d faith of th e claimant; (2) the poss ibility that the alleged injury was self -inflicted or n ot accidenta l; (3) th e ext ent a nd nature of t he in jury; (4) th e deg ree o f disabili ty; (5) the period of disability or incapacity for other work; and (6) the ordin ary earning po wer of th e claimant. (b)(1) The Governor shall include money to pay a claim that is approved by the Board in the State budget for the fiscal year that follows the fiscal year in which the Board approves the claim. (2) The Board shall pay to the claimant or the claimant's representative any compensation approve d by the Boa rd and inclu ded in the S tate budge t. (c) The compensation authorized under this subtitle is the e xclusive rem edy against the State for a claim that falls within the jurisdiction of the Board. (d) An inmate working under the supervision of Maryland Correctional Enterprises in the Federal Prison Industry Enhancement Program: (1) is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Board; and (2) shall be admin istered benefits as provided under Title 9 of the Labor and Employment -16- by the willful act of a third party, as his was. But, as the S tate points ou t, the term ac cidental is de fined in the WCA to expressly include an injury caused by the willful or negl igent ac t of a thir d perso n. 21 (Emp hasis ad ded.) T hat def inition o f accid ental p redates the ena ctmen t of the S CBA . And, as we previously observed in interpreting the phrase, arising out of which, like the term accidental, is ensconced in both statutes the legislature is presumed to be aware of the interpretation that this Court has placed upon its enactments, Del Marr, 169 M d. App. at 2 12. We m ust therefore assume th at in inserting th e term acc idental in the SCBA, the legislature expected that it would carry the same meaning in the SCBA that it does in the WCA , that is, to include an injury caused by the willful acts of a third party. Indeed, there is no indication in the text or history of § 10-308 that the General Assem bly intend ed othe rwise. Under the WCA , an injury to an employee inflicted by a third person in the course Article. 21 The following provision was added to the definition of accidental injury under the 1951 amendment to the WCA, then codified as Maryland Code, 1951, Art. 101, § 68 (6): Injury , Personal Injury , Accidental Injury and Accidental Personal Injury means only injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such occupational disease or infection as may naturally result both from, including frost-b ite and s un-stro ke resu lting fro m we ather co ndition s, and includes an injury caused by the wilful or negligent act of a third person directed against an employe e in the cou rse of emp loyment. (Empha sis added). We wish to point out that, in the current version of this act, the spelling of wilful has been changed to willful. See § 9-10 1 of the Marylan d Cod e, Labo r and E mploym ent Art icle. -17- of the employment, either willfully or negligently, is compensable if the danger of such injury was an incident of the special conditions of the employment[,] that is, if it arose out of the e mploym ent. 22 Edgew ood Nu rsing Ho me v. M axwell, 282 Md. 422, 425 (1978) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160, 165 (1967)). That may be so, Jennifer acknowledges, but he insists that the scope of the term accidental, in the context of the SCB A, is na rrowe r and co vers on ly an injury from a n accid ental ca use. To bolster his argument, Jennifer cites one particular part of § 10-308(a) of the SCBA, which states that, [i]n determining what compensation, if any, to allow a claimant, the Board shall consider ... the possibility that the alleged injury was selfinflicted or n ot accidenta l. From this s tatement, Jen nifer draw s the questio nable conclusion that any injury which is not accidental falls outside the purview of the Sundry Claims Board. We heartily disagree. Section 10 -308(a), in its en tirety, states: 22 Other state courts have similarly held that an injury caused by a third party s assa ult may arise out of the victim s employment and hence be comp ensable un der the app licable workers comp ensatio n statute . See, e.g., Plummer v. Landmark Communications, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 73, (Va. 19 88) (Injury suffered by route carrier of newspapers, who was shot by an unknown assailant at 2.00 a.m. w hile waiting to obta in he r sup ply of new spap ers f or de liver y, arose out of and in the course of her employment; hence her exclusive remedy for the injury was under the W CA) ; Seymour v. Rivera Appliances Corp., 271 N.E.2d 224 (N.Y. 1971) (Death of employee caused by two co-workers shooting him, the day after the decedent intervened on behalf of one of the two w orkers when the two engaged in a dispute during an afternoon break, arose out of and in course of his employment; hence employee s death was compen sable under the WCA); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. v. Cady, 278 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1979) (Injury sustained by an emplo yee from an on-the-job assault by a deranged co-employee arose out of employment within the meaning of workers' compensation law). -18- In determining wh at compensation, if any, to allow a claimant, the Board shall consider: (1) the goo d faith of th e claimant; (2) the possibility that the alleged injury was self-inflicted or not accidental; (3) th e ext ent a nd nature of t he in jury; (4) th e deg ree o f disabili ty; (5) the period of disability or incapacity for other work; and (6) the ordin ary earning po wer of th e claimant. (Emphasis add ed.) The plain language of that provision clearly does not preclude recovery for nonaccidental injuries, but only requires that the Sundry Claims Board consider the possib ility that the a lleged in jury was self-inf licted or not acc idental, a s one o f six fac tors, in deciding whether and at what level to compensate a claimant for an injury he has sustaine d. Moreover, reading § 10-308(a), not as a set of discrete phrases, but as a whole, considering the interrelationship or connection among all of its provisions, as the canons of statu tory cons truction advise us to do , see Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 (1996 (citing Vest v. G iant Fo od Stor es, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 466-467 (1993)), we conclude that not accide ntal is a catch -all phrase an d, in that capa city, refers to injuries w hich, while not technically self-inflicted, are ones which the claimant played some role in bringing about. For example, the Board may take into account whether the claimant provoked the assault or sparked the confrontation which caused his injuries. And since, in this case, -19- there is no cla im that Jenn ifer did anythin g to precipitate Taylor s attack , that provision is of no relevance here. Finally, Jennifer asks us to consider M aryland Code of R egulations ( COM AR ), 12.05.01.06B.(4)23 , which implements the SCBA, for the proposition that only accidental injuries are co vered by that a ct. But Jenn ifer s reliance on CO MAR 12.05.01.0 6B is misplaced. It states: Compensation provided for in [the SCBA] ... shall be payable for injuries 23 COM AR 12 .05.01.06. C ompens ation states in f ull: A. The schedule in this reg ulation is published as an ad junct to the criteria set forth in Correctional Services Article, Title 10, Subtitle 3, Annotated Code of Maryland. The schedule is not intende d to limit the discretion of the Boa rd and its applic ation of the criteria set out in Correctional Services Article, Title 10, Subtitle 3, but is intended as a guideline in settin g evalua tion for a particula r inju ry. B. Compensation provided for in Correctional Services Article, Title 10, Subtitle 3, Annotated Code o f Maryland , shall be payable for injuries sustained by prisoners engaged in work under the following circumstances: (1) The prisoner shall be housed in the Patuxent Institution or an institution under the Division of Correction. (2) The prisoner shall sustain a "permanent partial disability" as provided by the Workers' Compensation Law, Article 101, Annotated Coded of Maryland. (3) The injury shall incapacitate or materially reduce the prisoner's earning power in "extrahazardous" work. (4) The inju ry cannot be self-inflicted or result from activities other than work for which wages or a stipulated sum are paid by the institution. (5) The Board shall arrive at the ordinary earning power of the claimant as set forth in Correctional Servic es Artic le, Title 1 0, Sub title 3, Annotated Cod e of M arylan d, by a consideration of the claim ant's employm ent before incarceration , the nature o f the skills involved in the institutional employment after release from the institution, or actual employment in the case o f inmates a lready released . A consid eration of "ordin ary earning power" shall be limited to any adjustment the Board determines to be appropriate in a case when obtaining employment after incarceration at a given rate would be possible but for the redu ction in ea rning power or incapa cities resultin g fro m the inju ry. -20- sustained b y prisoners eng aged in w ork unde r the follow ing circum stances: ... (4) The injury cannot be self-inflicted or result from activities other than work for which wages or a stipulated sum are paid by the institution. This provision contains nothing that suggests that injuries inflicted by third parties are not covered by the SCBA. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. -21-

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