Chambers v. Cardinal

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HEADNOTE Elizabeth Powers Chambers v. Michael Cardinal, et al., No. 2519, September Term, 2006 REAL PROPERTY; JOINT TENANCY; SEVERANCE; JUDGMENT CREDITOR; JUDGMENT LIEN. Appellant obtaine d a judg ment a gainst h er form er husb and. A t the time , he owned real property in a join t tenancy with his new wife. The property owners entered into a contract of sale and then conveyed the property, by deed, to appellees before appellant sought to execute on her judgm ent. By the do ctrine of eq uitable con version, the c ontract of sa le transferred equitable o wnership to the contract purchasers. Therefore, the judgment debtor no longer held an interest in th e property to which a ju dgment c ould attach . Nor did appellees acquire property encumbered by a lien. REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2519 SEPTEMBE R TERM, 2006 _______________________________ ELIZABETH POWERS CHAMBERS v. MIC HAE L CA RDIN AL, et al. _______________________________ Murp hy, C.J., Hollander, Sharer, JJ. _______________________________ Opinion by Hollander, J. _______________________________ Filed: November 8, 2007 In this case, we must decid e whethe r a judgme nt creditor may levy against real property that was held by the judgment debtor in joint tenancy, and conveyed by the joint tenants to third parties, pursuant to a contract of sale and deed, before execution on the judgmen t. Elizabeth Powers Chambers, appellant, was divorced from Richard Chambers on April 17, 2003. On August 18, 2003, in the course of ongoing dom estic proceedings, appellant obtained a judgment against Mr. Chambers in the amount of $21,950. By that time, Richard Cham bers ha d rema rried. He and his new wife, Alon Cham bers (the Cham bers ), owned a parcel of real property at 336 Oak Knoll Drive in Rockville (the Property ), as joint tenants. The Ch ambers su bsequen tly entered into a contract d ated Octo ber 17, 200 4, to sell the Property to M ichael Card inal and Jam ie M. Gross, appellees. P ursuant to th at contract, they conveyed the Property to appellees, by deed, on Februa ry 8, 2005. As of then, appellant had no t attemp ted to ex ecute o n her ju dgme nt. On June 30, 2006, appellant sued a ppellees in the Circuit Cou rt for Montgom ery Cou nty, seeking a decla rato ry judgment that she had a valid and enforceable lien on the Prop erty. The circu it court grante d appellees Motion to Dismi ss on N ovem ber 28, 2 006. This appeal followed. App ellant presents one question: D id the trial court err as a matter of law when it granted appellee s motion to dismiss? We answer in the negative and shall affirm the circuit cou rt. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY On August 18, 2003, several months after appellant and Mr. Chambers were divorced, appellant obtained a judgment against Mr. Chambers in the amount of $21,950. The judgment arose out of the divorce litigation. By the time that appellant obtained the judgment against Mr. Chambers, he had already remarried. It is undisputed that he and his new wife owned the Prope rty in issue as joint tenants. About a year later, on October 17, 2004, Mr. and Ms. Chambers signed a contract of sale for that Property. Pursuant to that contract, they conveyed the Property to appellees, by deed, on February 18, 2005.1 Appellant filed suit on June 30, 2006, seeking a declaration that she had a valid lien on the Property. In a motion to dismiss filed on August 3, 2006, appellees argued that [b]ecause Plaintiff never executed on the Judgment before the Property was transferred to Defendants, the joint tenan cy was nev er severed . Thus, judg ment nev er attached to the Prop erty. . . . 2 Appellant s opposition to the motion was not filed until August 23, 2006. On that date, the circ uit court, with out having received a ppellant s op position, granted appellees motion, without prejudice.3 That order was docketed August 28, 2006. By that time, appellees had filed, on August 24, 2006, a Reply in Further S upport of their M otion to 1 Appellant has included in the Record Extract a purported copy of the contract between the Chambers and appellees for the sale of the Property. Appellees protest that appellant s inclusion of the contract was imprope r because it was not pa rt of the record below. Although appellees are correct that the contract was not placed in the record below, the contrac t s contents ar e not releva nt to our dete rmination o f the appe al. 2 In addition, appellees urged dismissal of the Complaint because Plaintiff s judgment is more than offset by two judgments against her in favor of Mr. Chambers from the same divorce action. They attached copies of the two jud gments, tota ling $22,55 0. The circu it court did not reach this argument in its ruling on appellees motion. 3 The circuit court issued its orde r [u]pon consideratio n of the M otion to Dismi ss . . . and n o oppo sition the reto. . . . 2 Dismiss. On Sept. 6, 2006, appellant moved to vacate the court s order of dismissal. After argumen t, the court gra nted the m otion to vacate the order of dismissal, and set the case for argument on appellees motion to dismiss. The court heard the motion to dismiss on November 28, 2006. In its ruling granting the motion, the court reaso ned that it was too late, that the judgment had not been executed, and that . . . the defendant purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value. The joint tenancy now could not be severed. The court relied on Eastern Shore Building and Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525 (1969), which the court described as standing for the proposition that a joint tenancy may not be severed when the property is sold before a judgm ent is ex ecuted . II. DISCUSSION Maryland law provides that real property may be held in joint tenancy, a form of common ownership. Md. Code (2003 & 2007 Supp.), § 2 -117 of th e Real Pro perty Article ( R.P. ). See also Cooper v. Bikle, 334 Md. 608 , 621-22 (1994); Eder v. Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 192 (1953). In a joint tenancy, eac h tenant o wns an u ndivided s hare in the w hole estate, has an equal right to possess, use, and enjoy the property, and has the right of survivorship. Downing v. Downing, 326 M d. 468, 4 74 (19 92). Under common law, the creation of a joint tenancy is dependent on the four unities : unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, an d unity of posses sion. Id.; see also Eder, 202 Md. at 192; Chew v. Chew, 1 Md. 163, 171 (1851). That is, the co-owners must have one 3 and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession. Chew, 1 Md. at 171; accord Bruce v. Dyer, 309 Md . 421 , 427 (198 7). A dditiona lly, Maryland provides by statute that a deed, will, or other instrument creating an interest in land does not create a joint tenancy unless the in tention to crea te a joint tenan cy is clearly expresse d. R.P. § 2-1 17; see also Register of W ills for Mon tgomery County v. Madine, 242 Md. 437 , 443-44 n.1 (1966 ). A joint ten ancy can be term inated in a variety o f ways. If the joint tenants convey the real property to another party and no longer own an interest in it, the joint tenancy terminates. Madine, 242 Md. at 441-42. A joint tenancy also ends once there is only a single surviving joint ten ant. Cooper, 334 Md. at 621 ( [I]f property is held by joint tenants and one of the tenants dies, that individual's interest in the property is immediately extinguished. The surviving joint tenant be comes the sole own er of the pro perty pursuan t to the right of survivorship. . . . ). And, a joint tenancy can also be severed if one or more of the four unities is destro yed. Helinski v. Harford Memorial Hosp., Inc., 376 Md. 606, 616 (2003) (citing Eder, 202 Md. at 192 ). Severance occurs voluntarily if a joint tenant takes an action that destroys one of the four unities. This occurs, for example, if one of the joint tenants sells his interest in the prop erty, Alexander v. Boyer, 253 M d. 511, 520 (1969), or m ortgages h is interest, Eder, 202 Md. at 192; o r leases it, Alexander, 253 M d. at 523 . Sev eran ce ca n also occur involuntarily, such as wh en a co urt partitio ns the p roperty by o rder, Eder, 202 Md. at 192, or when a 4 creditor obtains a judgment against one of the joint tenants and levies upon the property in execu tion on the judg ment. Id. at 193. As noted, it is und isputed that, when appellant obtained her judgm ent against Mr. Chambers, the Chambers held the Property as joint tenants. It is also uncontroverted that appellant did not mo ve to levy or ex ecute on h er judgme nt until well after the Chambers conve yed the P roperty to appelle es by dee d. In the leading case of Eder v. Rothamel, the Court made clear that a judgment lien, without levy or execution on the judg ment, does not sever a joint tenancy. . . . Eder, 202 Md. at 193. Indeed, the Court determined in Helinski, 376 Md. at 620 -21, that mere delivery of the writ of execution to the sheriff is not sufficient to sever the joint tenancy and attach the lien. There, the Court found that no severance occurred, and no lien attached, where a judgment debtor died after her creditor had delivered the writ to the sheriff, but before the sheriff execu ted upo n prop erty held in joint ten ancy wit h the de btor. Id. at 620-21. In this case, the circuit court agreed with appellees that appellant s failure to enforce her judg men t prio r to appellees acq uisition o f the Prop erty w as dispositive of her claim. As noted, the circuit court cited Eastern Shore, supra, 253 Md. 525, for the proposition that a joint tenancy may not be severed when the pro perty is sold before a judgm ent is ex ecuted . Appellan t argues, how ever, that Eastern Shore is supportive of Appellant s position. In Eastern Shore, Otho and William S turgis purch ased a parc el of real pro perty as joint tenants . Id. at 527. Some time after the purchase, Otho obtained a bank loan from the 5 Bank of Som erset, up on wh ich he la ter defa ulted. Id. at 528. The bank then obtained a judgment against him, which it did not immed iately attem pt to enf orce. Id. Nearly a year after the bank obtained its judgment, the Sturgises conveyed the real prop erty in fee simp le to two married couples, the Hytches and the Penders, without having executed any prior contract of sale. Id. A mo nth later , the ban k attem pted to le vy on the proper ty. Id. The Eastern Shore Building and Loan Corporation, the Hytches and Penders purchase money mortgagee, interven ed as a d efend ant. Id. The Co urt held that the ban k s judgm ent lien did not attach. It reason ed that, und er these fac ts, [t]here was never a time . . . that Otho and William ever held title to the subject property as tenants in common so that there was no estate in the land wh ich Otho, a lone, held in s everalty to which the lien of a judgment against him alone could attach. Id. at 531. The C ourt ex plained , id. at 530-31 (emph asis in original): [T]he mere entry of a judgme nt against on e of the join t tenants does not destroy any of th e four u nities . . . and hence, until there is an execution on the judgment which will destroy one or more of these unities, there is no severance of th e join t tena ncy. If there is a severance of the joint tenancy by way of an execution upon the ju dgment o f one of th e joint tenants , the judgm ent then becomes a lien upon the interest of the judgm ent debtor in the tenancy in common which then arises. If, however, the judgment creditor does not execute upon the judgmen t against the ju dgment d ebtor-joint ten ant during h is life, the entire joint estate is held by the surviving joint tenant or tenants by survivorsh ip and witho ut any lien of the judgmen t against the property thus held by them. . . . [T]he joint tenants hold per m y et per tout [4] and the 4 This ancient Fre nch legal p hrase, wh ich is often translated by the half and by the whole , Black s L aw Dic tionary 1293 (rev. 4th ed.1968), dates at least to the time of (contin ued...) 6 nature of the tenancy is that [a] judgment lien cannot attach to the estate in joint tenancy until after severance and the creation of a separa te estate in title and possession to which [a] judgment lien can then attach. Appellant suggests tha t Eastern Shore is distinguishable from the instant case because the Sturgises, in Eastern Shore, unlike the C hambers here, conv eyed their jointly held property withou t hav ing e xecu ted a ny prior contract of sale. Id. at 528. Ac cording to appellant, Eastern Shore is in harmony with Register of W ills v. Madine, supra, 242 Md. 437, on which she also relied. She c ontends th at Madine stands for the proposition that although a transfer of property from joint tenants alone does not sever the joint tenancy and allow a judgment against one of them to attach to the property, a contract will destroy the unity of title and destroy the joint tenancy. In Madine, Rose Hutton an d her niece, Helen M adine, held a property known as Woodlands in joint te nancy. Id. at 439-40. The State filed condemnation proceedings against Wood lands, in orde r to acquire it by eminent domain for use as part of a park. Id. at 440. Once the State and the joint tenants had agreed on a purchase price, Hutton and Madine gave the State a fully executed deed to Woodlands, in fee. Id. But, within weeks after the execution of the deed, and before the State had recorded the deed or paid the agreed price, 4 (...continued) Littleton, whose 15th-century treatise on the English law of real property, the Tenures, states that every joint-tenant is seised of the land which he hold eth jo intly per my et per tout; and this is as much to say, as he is seised by every parcel and by the whole, &c., and this is true, for in every parcel, and b y every parcel, and by all the lands an d teneme nts, he is jointly seised with hi s comp anion. Thom as Littleto n, Tenures § 288 (Eugene Wambaugh ed., 1903). 7 Hutton died. Id. The State then tendered the purchase price to Madine, but subtracted an amount of money that H utton h ad ow ed as ba ck taxe s. Id. Madine sought and received a declaratory judgment that she, as the surviving joint tenant of Woodlands, was entitled to the full pur chase p rice for Woo dlands , free of the tax lie n again st Hutto n. Id. at 440-41. The Court of Appeals reve rsed. It determined that the State s tax lien had not severed the joint tenancy in W oodlands , because th e State had not mov ed to enfo rce the lien un til after Hutton s death . Id. at 441. But, the Court went on to hold that the joint tenancy had nevertheless been terminated, not by the mere existence of the tax lien, but by the execution of the d eed of sale. Id. at 446. Th e Court rea soned: [T]he de ed, after deliv ery and prior to recordation, would have operated as a contract to convey which would pass to the State equitable title and the right to formal legal title. Generally it has been held that a contract to c onvey will terminate a joint tenanc y under circum stances in which a transfer of legal title would do so. Id. at 443 ( internal citations omitted ). The Court noted that there was no indication that Hutton and Madin e had inten ded to hold th e proce eds fro m the sa le in join t tenanc y. Id. at 444- 45. It said , id. at 446: [W]hen Miss Hutton and Mrs. Madine delivered the fully executed deed to the State the joint tenancy in the prope rty ended and the ladies held a bare legal title as trustees for the State and the State owed the ladies, as tenants in common, the agreed purchase price. This b eing so, the S tate had fu ll right to offset against the amount it owed Miss Hutton for her part of the purchase price the amou nt she o wed th e State f or inhe ritance ta xes. . . . Appellant seeks further support in Alexander v. Boyer, supra, 253 Md. 511, in which the Court held that an unexercised option contract did not terminate a joint tenancy. In 8 Alexander, two sisters h eld a pie ce of farm land in joint te nancy. Id. at 513-14. They entered into a contract to sell a portion of the land to a third party, Levine, contingent upon rezoning of the land for a townh ouse d evelop ment. Id. at 515. Un der the con tract, if Levine did not successfu lly obtain the rezoning, he would have the option either to purchase the land at the contract price, or to vo id the contra ct, in which c ase the sisters w ould return his deposit if he had made bona f ide eff orts to ob tain the r ezonin g. Id. at 515-16. Levine chose no t to purchase. Id. at 516. In a subsequent lawsuit, it was determined that he wa s not entitled to the retur n of his depos it. Id. Thereafter, one of the sisters died, survived by her husband, whom she named as her sole devise e. Id. She was followed in death by the second sister, who died intestate, leaving her husba nd as h er only he ir. Id. The husband of the predeceased sister sued his brother-inlaw, arguing that the contract with Levine (among other transactions) had severed the joint tena ncy, converting it to a tenancy in common,5 in which the widowers held equal half shares as the heirs of their respective wives. Id. at 516-17. The brother-in-law responded that the joint tenancy had never bee n terminated , and thus h e had com plete ownersh ip of the pro perty as the sole heir of his wife, the last surviving joint tenant, w ho had ac quired com plete owne rship via right of survivo rship up on her s ister s de ath. Id. at 517. 5 A crucial distinction between a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common is the right of survivorship identified with a joint tenancy. Downing, 326 M d. at 475. T enants in common are equally entitled to the use, benefit and possession of the whole common prop erty, provided they do not interfere with the righ ts of their co-te nants to do the s ame. Beesley v. Hanish, 70 Md. Ap p. 482, 492 (1987 ) (internal citations omitted). 9 The Alexander Court reasoned that the option contract co uld not in itse lf, result in a term inati on of the joint tena ncy if [the joint tenancy] had existed on the date of the agreement. Id. at 521 (emphasis ad ded). 6 Of import here, the Court distinguished Madine, stating, id. (emphasis added ): We pointed out in Madine that in Maryland and in accordance with the law generall y, a contract to convey will terminate a joint tenancy under circumstances in which a transfer o f legal title would do so, so that the executed and delivered deed [in Madine] transferred the full equ itable interest in the land (the grantor holding a bare legal title for the benefit of the State) and resulted in a termina tion of th e joint ten ancy. In the instant case, however, the [contract] was an option contract and until the conditions precedent were met and the option was exercised by Dr. Levine, no equitable interest or estate passed to Dr. Levine on which spec ific perf orman ce cou ld be gr anted. . . . Under these circumstances, the [contract] would not impair any of the four unities and would not result in a severance or termination of the jo int te nancy. Accord ing to appe llant, although an unexercised option contract do es not termin ate a joint tenancy, a binding contract of sale does. Summarizing her argument, she asserts: The respective cases upon which the parties to this matter rely are consistent and support Appellant s position. . . . The Court in Eastern Shore differentiated the facts of that case, where there was no prior contract for sale and thus the unity of title was intact until conveyance, from a situation w here there was a contract, as in Madine. In the present case, the contract of October 16, 2004 severed the unity of title and created a tenancy in common between Richard and A lon Ch ambe rs. Appellant s judgment could attach at that point, and transfer to Appellees with the S ubje ct Property. Appellee s respond that Madine is wh olly inapp osite. They reason that in Madine 6 The Court concluded that the joint tenancy had been terminated before the execution of the option c ontract, beca use a prior lea se of a po rtion of the sis ters property to one sister s husband result[ed] in a destruction of the unity of interest. Alexander, 253 Md. at 521-22. Therefore, the Court s consideration of the effect of the option contract was dicta. 10 the Court decided the question of whether parties intended to hold the proceeds of the sale of property as joint tenants. The holding of Madine, therefore, ha s no applica tion in this case, where the question is whether the joint tenancy in which the Property was held was ever severed. (Emph asis in original). Appellees characterize appellant s contention that the contract of sale on th e Rockv ille Property severed the Chambers joint tenancy as an attempt to avoid the explicit holding of Eastern Shore. Noting th at a joint tenan cy is severed w hen one o f the four u nities is destroyed, they argue that it is plainly obvious that a contract of sa le execut ed by both joint tenants does not destroy any of the four un ities because both joint ten ants continue to hold the sam e title and interest a nd the o ther un ities are u naffe cted. (E mpha sis in orig inal). According to appellees, because both joint tenants entered into a contract to sell the Prope rty, it follows that there was no action that destroyed any of the four unities, and the joint tenanc y was ne ver sev ered. (E mpha sis in orig inal). They analogize to the impact of a mortgag e on a join t tena ncy, pointing out that in Downing, supra, 326 Md. at 479 , the Court reaffirmed that a mortgage by a single joint tenant severs the joint tenancy, but concluded that where a ll joint tenants join in the mortgage, none of the unities are destroyed, and there is no reason why the joint tenancy should not continue. Appellant is correct that, bu t for the fact th at Mr. Ch ambers o wned th e Property in joint tenancy with his wife, ap pellant s prop erly indexed and recorded judgment would have attached as a lien on the Property. In Maryland, a creditor obtains a vested interest in the 11 form of a l ien a gain st the debtor's realty at the time of judgment. Van Royen v. Lacey, 262 Md. 94, 100 (1971). See also Md. Code (2006 & 2007 Su pp.), § 11-4 02(b), (c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ( C.J. ) ( If indexed and recorded as prescribed by the Maryland Rules, a money judgment of a court constitutes a lien on the judgmen t debtor s interest in land. . . . ). Moreover, a judgment lien may attach not o nly to real prope rty held by the judgment debtor at the time of entry, but also upon any property he thereafter acquires. Kingsley v. Makay, 253 M d. 24, 28 (1969 ). As indicated, appellant contends that the contract of sale terminated the Chambers joint tenancy. The result, argues appellant, would be that [a]ppellan t s judgme nt lien could . . . be enforced against Richard Chambers s interest in the Subject Property, and the lien would transfe r with th e prope rty to [a]pp ellees. We need n ot resolve appellant s contention. Even assuming, without deciding, that the contract for the sale of the Property termin ated the C hambers joint tenancy, this w ould not aid app ellant. She ov erlooks tha t, regardless of the effect of the contract of sale on the joint tenancy, the contract divested Mr. Chambers of any interest in the Property to which appellant s lien could attach. We explain. In Maryland, [i]t has long b een establish ed that a purchaser of land under a contract of sale acquires, not a legal title, but an equitable title. Kingsley, 253 Md. at 27. This is the doctrine of equitable conversion by which the contract purchaser of realty becomes the equitable owner of the property, w hile the vendor retains a bare legal title. Knight v. 12 Princess Builders, Inc., 393 Md. 31, 49 (2006) (quoting Watson v. Watson, 304 Md. 48, 60 (1985)). See also Eastern Shore, 253 Md. at 530 (quoting Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 188 (1955)) (noting application of the familiar doctrine of equitable conversion ); Sands v. Church of Ascension and Prince of Peace, 181 Md. 536, 544 (1943) (under the doctrine of equitable conversion, real estate is considered for certain purposes as perso nal pro perty, and person al prop erty as real e state ). The effect of a contract of sale is to vest the equitable o wnership of the prop erty in the vende e, subje ct to the v endor s lien fo r unpai d purch ase mo ney, and to leave only the legal title in the vendor pending the fulfillment of the contract and the formal conveyance of the estate. Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 232 (1924). Therefore, once the Chambers contract with appellees became binding (i.e. after the Chambers executed the contract, and any contingencies had been fulfille d), ap pelle es be cam e the equitabl e ow ners of th e Pro perty, although th e Cham bers retained legal title until settlem ent. 7 The result is precisely the same as in Eastern Shore. Simultaneously with the execution of the contract, title to the subject property vested in the grantees. . . . Eastern 7 As we ha ve alrea dy obser ved, see note 1 supra, the contract between the C hambers and appellees is not before us. To the extent that the contract contained any contingencies, equitable title would not have changed hands, and the joint tenancy could not have terminated, if at all, until those contingencies were fulfilled. In Alexander, until the conditions precedent were met, the contract did not impair any of the four unities and would not result in a severance or termination of the joint tenancy. Alexander, 253 Md. at 521. It is not necessary to consider whether the contract in this case contained any contingencies, however, because appellant did not move to enforce her judgment until after the Pro perty had been d eeded to appe llees. 13 Shore, 253 M d. at 531. Lik e the Sturgis es in Eastern Shore, the Cham bers nev er . . . held title to the subject property as tenants in common. . . . Id. To be sure, in Eastern Shore there was no prior contrac t, and therefo re both equitable and legal title transferred togethe r, at the time of sale, whereas here equitable title transferred when the contract became binding; legal title followed when the purchase price and deed changed hands, completing the conveyance. Unfortunately for appellant, the notation in Eastern Shore upon which she relies, that there was no prior contract of sale, is a red herring. For purposes of determ ining w hether a judgm ent lien m ay attach, it i s equita ble title th at matte rs. As the Eastern Shore Court noted, a judgme nt creditor is n either in fact nor in law a bona fide purchaser, and [she] must stand or fa ll by the real, and n ot the appa rent rights of the defendant in the judgment. Eastern Shore, 253 Md. at 530 (quoting Stebbins-Anderson, 208 Md. at 188). After the Chambers executed the contract of sale, Mr. Chambers and Ms. Chambers each held bare legal title. Knight, 393 Md. at 49. As we said in Wolf Organization, Inc. v. Oles, 119 M d. App. 35 7, 369 (19 98), [a] jud gment cre ditor s lien w ill not attach to the ju dgment d ebtor s bare legal title in prop erty. . . . In that circumstance, the legal title is a tec hnicality. O f cours e, a judgment creditor of a debtor holding bare legal title to property cannot attach the equitable interest in the property, as it is vested in another. This principle is deeply embedded in our jurisprudence. It was applied as early as Hampson v. Edelen, 2 H. & J. 64, 66 (Md. 1807), in which the Court said: A contract for land, bona fide made for a valuable consideration, vests the equitable interest in the vendee f rom the tim e of the ex ecution of the contrac t, 14 although the money is not paid at that time. When the money is paid according to the terms of the contract, the vendee is entitled to a conveyance, and to a decree in Chanc ery for a specif ic execution of the con tract, if such conveyance is refus ed. A judgment obtained by a third person against the vendor, [between] the making [of] the contract and the payment of the money, cannot defeat or impair the equitable interest thus acquired, nor is it a lien on the land to affect the right of such [equ itable title holder]. Maryland courts have consistently applied this principle in the intervening two hundred years. See, e.g., Himmighoeffer v. Medallion Industries, Inc., 302 Md. 270, 280 (adopting the quoted language from Hampson, and holding that execution of contrac t of sale vested equitab le title in th e vend ee prior to filing of petitio n for m echan ic s lien, s uch that vendor-debtor s interest in the land could not be reached by the mechanic s lien); Eastern Shore, 253 Md. at 530 ( A judgment creditor stands in the place of his debtor, and he can only take the property of h is debtor sub ject to the equ itable charge s to which it was liable at the time of the rendition of the judgment. ) (internal citations omitted); Kingsley, 253 Md. at 28 ( The lien of a jud gment attac hes only upo n that whic h is the debtor s property at the time it is entered or upon any property he thereaf ter acquires. ); Stebbins-Anderson, 208 Md. at 187 ( It is a general rule that the holder of an equitable title or interest in property, by virtue of an unrecorded contract of sale, has a claim superior to that of a creditor obtaining judgment subsequent to the execution of the contract. ); Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 396 (1931) (adopting the quoted language from Hampson); McMechen v. Marman, 8 G. & J. 57, 73 ( 1836) ( [A] judgm ent [is] a legal lien upon a n equita ble estat e in land s. . . . ); Galeano v. Galeano, 21 Md. App. 208, 211 (197 4) ( It is well established in this State that 15 a lien of a judgment creditor does not attach to bare legal title held . . . as security for an outstan ding de bt. ). Several of the cases cited above make ref erence to th e judgme nt lien attachin g to property held by the debtor at the time ju dgmen t is entered . See, e.g ., Kingsley, 253 Md. at 28. The Cham bers owned the Property at the time appellant s judgment was entered, but the fact that they owned the Property as joint tenants distinguishes this case. The gen eral rule is that a judgment attaches upon proper entry as a lien on the debtor s real property. In the case of joint tenancy (and the related form of marital common ownership, tenancy by the entireties), the time at which a judgment is entered may differ from the time at which the judgment attac hes to the debtor s real p rope rty. At the time judgment is entered, a judgment debtor who is a joint tenant does not hold the kind of property to which a judgment lien can attach, i.e. a separately held equitable interest in real property. The debtor only comes to hold such a property interest when that interest is created by the act of executing on the judgmen t, which severs th e joint ten ancy. In this case, Mr. Chambers never solely held an e quitable intere st in the Prop erty; it was held jointly. Therefore, there never existed any interest in the Property to which appellant s judgment lien could attach. Madine is not to the contrary. The Madine Court described the situation before it in terms wholly consistent with the foregoing analysis: [W]hen Miss Hutton and Mrs. Madine delivered the fully executed deed to the State the joint tenancy in the property ended and the ladies held a bare legal title as trustees for the State and the State owed the ladies, as ten ants 16 in comm on, the agreed purchase price. Madine, 242 M d. at 446. Th e State wa s able to deduct the taxes owed by Hutton from the purchase price because the proceed s of sale were not held by H utton an d Ma dine in jo int tenan cy. Id. at 443-45. The Madine Court reasoned that the param ount facto r in determ ining wh ether the pro ceeds of s ale of joint pr operty remain jointly held most often is the intention of the parties. Id. at 444. The Court stated that there was no showing by writing or by fact or circumstance that a joint tenancy in the proceeds of Woodlands was created or intended to be created and . . . we see no reason or basis to infer one. Id. at 445. T he State had no need to execute its tax lien on the real prop erty, rather than the proceeds, that Hutton and Madine held in joint tenancy, because the transaction at issue was the sale of that real property to the State. Analogizing to the instant case, the State in Madine simultaneously occupied the positions of both appellant and appellees here. We are also mindful that judgment liens serve an important function in the law of real property with respect to notice. Under Maryland law, a judgment lien is a general lien on real property of the debtor and signifies only the right of the judgment creditor to order the sale of the debtor's property to satisfy his judgment. Back v. IRS, 51 Md. App. 681, 693, cert. denied, 294 M d. 542 (1982). Money judgments must be recorded and indexed when they are ente red. See Md. R ule 2-601 (c) (2007). O nly if a judgm ent is prope rly recorded and indexed does it become a lien on the d ebtor s r eal prop erty. C.J. § 11-4 02(b), (c); M d. Rule 2-621 (2007). The purpose of indexing and recording is to provide a way to give notic e to purchasers, mortgago rs, lien holders and the like, of the prior conveyances of, or 17 encumbrances on, the property of a particular person. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Schlossberg, 390 Md. 211, 230 (2005). Therefore, once recorded and indexed, a lien serves as constructive notice to would-be purchasers of real property held by the judgment debtor that the deb tor s pro perty is en cumb ered. See Waicker v. Banegura, 357 Md. 450, 464-65 (2000) ( [I]f a party, or the clerk of a court, for whatever reason, indexes the judgment under a name tha t is not identical to the name in which r eal property in th e county is held of record, the general pu blic will not be on constructive notice that a judgment lien exists against that particular piece of re al estate. ); see generally id. at 460-65 (discussing purposes of judgment lien statu tory schem e). The result that appellant desires would run wholly contrary to the purpose of the judgment lien statute. If appellant were correct, in nocent purchasers could, by the act of signing a contract to purchase a parcel of real property, create an encumbrance upon the proper ty. That the law does not contemplate this result is shown by Fick v. Pe rpetual Title Co., 115 Md. App. 524, cert. denied, 347 Md. 15 3 (1997). F ick, a judgm ent creditor, m oved to levy and execute on a judgment only after his judgm ent debtor, Saint-Bell, had conveyed her jointly-held real property to a third party couple, the B ourqu ins. Id. at 528-31 . Saint-Bell had created the jo int tenancy during the penden cy of the prior lawsuit from w hich Fick s judgment resulted, by deeding the property, which she had held as sole owner, to herself and her daugh ter as join t tenants . Id. at 528. Prior to sale, the Bourq uins retained Perpetual T itle Company to perform a title search on the property to determine whe ther the property was 18 encumbered by a lien. Id. at 530. Perpetual s title search discovered the open judgment against Saint-B ell, and th at the pro perty wa s held in joint ten ancy. Id. at 544. Perpetual disclosed these results of the title search to the Bourquins and advised them that the judgment did not aff ect the title to the pr operty. Id. In the case before the Fick Court, Fick alleged that both the conveyance creating the joint tena ncy and the conveyance from Saint-Bell to the Bourquins were frau dulent attem pts to escape the judgm ent. Id. at 531.8 Fick also added a negligence count against Perpetual Title, claiming breach of a duty to search the land records. Id. at 531- 32. The Court rejected Fick s negligence claim. Id. at 548. We obs erved that the unpaid judgmen ts did not constitute liens against the property at the time of [Perpetua l s] title report because th e property w as owne d by Ms. Sa int-Bell and her daughter as joint tenants, and the judgment had not been executed. Id. at 544-45. Noting that appellant did not levy against the property until three days after the settlement of the conveyance to the Bourquins, id. at 548, the Court held: Therefore, appellant failed to prove a valid lien against the prop erty. Absent proof of a valid lien, neither Perp etual nor its agents could possibly have been negligent in conducting the title search. Id.9 8 In the instant case, appellant did not allege in her c omplaint, b efore the c ircuit court, or before this Court, that the conveyance to appellees was fraudulent, or that there is any other basis on which appellees would not be considered bona fide purchase rs, as the circuit court fo und. 9 We noted that Fick receiv ed his writ of execution before the settlement, but that Fick had not shown when the sheriff received the writ. Fick, 115 Md. App. at 548. The Court of Appeals s later decision in Helinski, supra, 376 Md. 606, made clear that the sheriff s receipt (contin ued...) 19 Our decision in Fick presages our conclusion here. If, as we held in Fick, it is not negligent to advise a client to proceed with purchase of a property that is held in joint tena ncy, where o ne of the jo int tenants is a debtor on outstanding judgments, it cannot be the law that those judgments would become encumbrances upon the property when the client contracts to purchase it. If that were the law, the title insurance company in Fick might have been liable,10 because the very purpose of title insurance is to protect[] the insured against loss or damage as a result of defects in or the unmarketability of the insured's title to real property. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. West, 110 Md. A pp. 114, 128 (199 6). In sum, appellant was awarded a judgment in August 2003. At any time between that point and October 2004, when the Cha mbe rs co ntracted to sell the Prop erty, appellant co uld have executed on the judgment, thereby severing the joint tenancy, liquidating the p rope rty, and satisfying her judgment from the proceeds. Instead, appellant sat on her rights until June 2006, over a year after the property had been fully conveyed to appellees. By that time, appella nt s righ ts had w ithered a way. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 9 (...continued) of the w rit does n ot contr ol; it is the e xecutio n of the writ tha t is releva nt. 10 The insurance company in Fick would still not have been liable to the plaintiff, however. As we noted, if any valid lien had existed, and if [Perpetual] negligently failed to discover it, [Perpetual] would have breached no duty owed to Fick. [Perpetual] owed a duty only to . . . the Bourquins. . . . Fick, 115 Md. at 547. 20

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