In Re: Marcus J.

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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2503 September Term, 2006 ___________________________________ IN RE: MA RCUS J. Murp hy, C.J., Meredith, Moylan, C harles E., Jr. (R etired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Meredith, J. Filed: September 10, 2007 The Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore City, sitting as the juvenile co urt, dismissed the exceptions filed by Marcus J., appellant, because the exceptions purportedly failed to comply with the exceptions policy of the C ircuit Court for Baltimore City. Marcus contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing the exceptions. We agree that the exceptions should not have been dism issed. Acc ordingly, we s hall vacate th e judgme nt of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings.1 1 In Forster v. Hargadon, 398 Md. 298 , 299-301 (2007 ), the Court of App eals gave the following overview of the juvenile hearing process in Maryland: With an exc eption n ot releva nt here, R ule 11-111a.2. authorizes a Juvenile Court master to hear any ca se or matter a ssigned by the court. Proceedings bef ore a master are recorded. CJP § 3-807(b)(2); Rule 11-110a. In keeping with the limited role of th e master, bo th the Rule and the statu te specify that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the master do not constitute final orders or final action by the court. Rule 11-111a.2. and CJP § 3-807(d)(1). Within ten days after the conclusion of a disposition hearing, the master must transmit to the judge the entire file in the case , together w ith a written report of the m aster's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. A copy of the report is served on each party to the proceeding. Both CJP § 3-807(c)(1) and R ule 11-11 1c. permit an y party to file exceptions to any or all of the master's proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations, or orde r. Rule 1 1-111 c. specif ies, however, that [e]xceptions shall be in w riting, filed with the c lerk with in fiv e days after the master's repo rt is se rved upon the party, and shall sp ecify those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or on the record. (Empha sis added). T hose requ irements are also set forth, in generally similar language, in the statute. See CJP § 3-807(c)(1) and (2). Both the Rule and the statute permit an e xcepting p arty, other than the State in a de linque ncy case, to elect a hearing de novo or one on the record ma de before the master. R ule 11-111c. and C JP § 3-807(c)(2). Both the Rule and the statute make clear that, whether the hearing is de novo or on th e record , the hearing shall be limite d to those m atters to which exceptions have been taken. (Em phasis a dded). See Rule 11-111c. and CJP § 3-807(c)(4). As noted, all of those requirements - that exceptions specify (contin ued...) Facts and Procedural Background In Juvenile Petition No. 606237011, the State alleged that Marcus was delinquent and committed the following delinquent acts: wearing/carrying/transporting a handgun, wearing/carrying/transporting a dangerous or deadly weapon, and possessing a regulated firearm. An adjudicatory hearing was held before a juvenile master on September 14, 29, and October 5, 2006. Only two witnesses testified. The arresting police officer testified as the State s witness, and 14-year-old M arcus testified in his own de fense. Their testimony was mostly compatible, but the police officer testified he observed Marcus throw down an item that turned out to be a revolver, whereas Marcus testified he never had possession of a gun, and that the object he had jettisoned as the police officer approached was a bag containing some marijua na. A fingerprint analysis of the gun, ordered by the State, was in progress and not completed by the conclusion of the hearing, but, to avoid further delay in completing the hearing, the State stipulated that Marcus s fingerprints were not on the gun. In her oral findings of fact at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the master stated: The Court finds the testimony of the State s witness to be consistent and credible. And, also , finds, quite fr ankly, the Res ponden t s testimony to be 1 (...continued) whether the hearing before the court is to be de novo or on the record, that, in either event, they specify the issues to which the aggrieved party excepts, and that the hearing, whether de novo or on the rec ord, is limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken - are im posed by State law and are Statew ide in ap plication [.] (Footnotes omitted.) Th e historical de velopme nt of M aryland s system for adjudicating juvenile matters was described in detail by the Court of Appeals in an opinion written by Judge Marvin H. Smith in In the Matter of William Anderson, 272 Md. 85 (1 974). 2 consistent and credible, except for that one point. What was it that he threw? And, in that area, the Court finds that the State s witness was most consistent and credible. Th erefore, find s that the State has met [its ] burden beyond a reasonable doubt, [and] finds the facts sustained. The master thereafter entered a written recommended order dated October 6, 2006, and found all three counts sustained. The master s written findings that were set forth in the supp ort of the master s reco mmendation that t he ch arge s be s ustained state d sim ply: [T]he following evidence was accepted: The testimony of witnesses supported the sustained counts. Conflicting testimony concerning the sustained counts was resolved in favor of the witnesses for the State. Parties stipulated that Respo ndent s fin gerprints were not found on the revolver. A disposition h earing w as held on November 3, 2006, at the conclusion of which the juvenile master ente red a writte n recommendation that the court find that Marcus is a delinquent child. The master further recommended that Marcus be placed under an order of probation to the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services, and subject to a number of conditions during the indefinite period of probation. Within five business days, on November 9, 2006, Marcus filed a Notice of Exception and Request for Hearing that stated: Pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 3-815(c) [sic] and Rule 11-111(c) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, please be advised that the Respondent excepts to the findings and proposed orders of Master Zakia Mahasa, on the 3rd day of November, 2006, in the abovecaptioned petition(s) and requests that the matter be set for a hearing de novo, before the Judge of this Honorable Court and in support of the exception, notes these errors: 3 Respon dents council [sic] is excepting to Ma ster Mahasa s findings at the adjudicatory hearing held on 10/6/06 and the disposition hearing on 11/3 /06. M aster Mahasa erred in her admission of an [sic] n on exper ts [sic] testimony on the operability of a handgun over Respondents council [sic] objection. Moreover, Master Mahasa erred in her facts and finding s in the a djudica tory and d ispositio n hearin g.[ 2 ] On December 8, 2006, the case was called for a hearing in the circuit court on Marcus s exceptions. The Assistant State s Attorney moved for a postponement because of a calendar mixup tha t precluded the prosecu ting attorney who had been handling the case from being present, and stated: [T]he State is requesting a postpone ment .... [T]he State did not know it was in toda y. That in addition, Judge Edward Hargadon has issued a policy that had to be filed in all e xception h earing [sic], and it is my understanding, since I don t know the contents of the file that policy was n ot filed in this matter. The pinch-hitting prosecutor was correct that no exc eptio ns po licy order similar to the one quoted in Forster, supra, 398 Md. at 302-03, had been filed in the present case.3 2 Although the master s recommended order pertaining to the adjudicatory hearing was dated October 6, 2006, the last session of the adjudicatory hearing was actually concluded on October 5, 2006. 3 In Forster, supra, 398 Md. at 302-03, the Court of Appeals recounted that, on November 11, 200 6, Judg e Edw ard R. K . Hargadon, as Judge -in-Charg e of the Juv enile Div ision of th e Cir cuit C ourt for B altim ore C ity, directed the clerk to enter routinely [a form ord er] in each case in which exceptions had been noted to a master s report. That [form] order ... provides as follows: An Exception having been filed from a Recommendation of a Master in the above-captioned matter, it is pursuant to Maryland Rule 11-111 and Md. Code Cts. & Ju d. Proc. § 3- 807, OR DER ED that: 1. The C ourt ma y, upon motion of a party or sua spon te, dismiss the (contin ued...) 4 Notwithstanding that fact, the presiding judge took issue with Marc us s failure to comply with the policy of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City regarding the filing of exception s in juvenile matters: THE COU RT: ... I review ed the Co urt file, and [,c ounsel,] it does not look like you complied with Judge Hargadon s policy pertaining to the filing of exceptions. 3 (...continued) exce ption if th e exc eptio n does no t state with spec ificity: a. The items to which the party takes exception; and b. Whether the exception hearing is to be heard on the record or de novo; 2. If the party filing an exception requests a hearing on the record, and unless the presiding judge or the Judge-in-Charge orders otherwise: a. That party shall, no later than 10 days from the date of this ORDER, file a memorandum which: i. Specifies any finding of fact and conclusion of law to which that party is taking exception; and ii. Specifies the reason(s) as to why the Master s recommended finding of fa ct(s) or conc lusion(s) of la w is in error; and b. Any other p arty to the hearing shall file a responsive memorandum no later than 10 days after the filing of the excepting party s memorandum; 3. Pursuant to Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-807(c) and Maryland Rule 11-111(c), if the party filing an exception requests a hearing de novo: a. Any evidence presented shall be limited to the specific issues raised in the exception; and b. The Court may rely upon the evidence recorded before the master for any matters to which an exception was not raised. 4. In ad ditio n to the delive ry of copies of the exception and the memorandum to all parties, the pa rty filing an exce ption or me morand um shall deliver a copy of the exception and the memorandum to the presiding judge, or if a judge has not been designated, to the Judge-in-Charge. 5. A transcript of the proce edings before the m aster need not b e prepared prior to the hearing on the exception unless the Court so orders. 6. Any issue no t specifically set fo rth in the exc eption and the accompanying memorandu m is waived un less the Court finds there was good cause f or not sp ecifying t he issue . 5 [Defense Counsel]: Y our Honor, I would object to the policy. I filed exceptions on the ninth, I believe, of November. ... Specifying what I was excepting to, and the exception request. And, what was the date of Judge Hargadon s O rder? *** THE COU RT: Th ere s no da te in the Ord er...but as I recall it w ent into effect early October. [Defense Counsel]: ... Your Hono r, still I did file the exception and the exception does specifically state what I m excepting to. [Prosecutor]: But it also requires that the excepting party file a Memo concerning the specific issues raised in the exceptions. In fact, the exceptions policy order quoted in Forster v. Hargadon, supra, 398 Md. at 302-03, only requires a memora ndum to be filed [i]f the party filing an exception requests a hearing on the record. (Emphasis added.) The exceptions policy order does not require such a memorandum if the party filing the exception requests a hearing de novo. Nevertheless, the presiding judge noted that Marcus had not filed any memorandum, and, even though no exceptions policy order had been entered in this case, continued the discussion as if such an order had been entered: THE COUR T: It says that in addition to the delivery of copies of the exception and memora ndum to all parties, the party filing exception s on [the re cord] shall deliver a copy of the exception and the memorandum to the presiding Judge, or if a Judge has not been designated to the Judge in charge. I checked[,] my office didn t get anything. It also says, well, go ahead. [Defense C ounsel]: Your H onor, I filed m y exceptio ns[.] [T]he law i[s] very clear that my Client is allowed an exception de novo hearing based on filing in the exceptions with the Clerk s office, which was properly done within five days. That is the law. The law that my Client is entitled to an exception de novo, as long as I file the exception within five days. That is what the law states. 6 THE COURT: But what does the Court what does Judge Hargadon s policy say? [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, see the policy v. [sic] law. The law states that my Client is given the right to an exception de novo hearing THE COURT: No doubt about it, but as part of the law, administrative bodies also promulg ate policies for the efficient administration of the law, and Judge Hargadon as the Judge in charge o f Juvenile d ecided to im plement a policy to make the law operate m ore efficien tly. I realize your office sought a stay. The Court of Appeals has not acted and so the policy of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, according to Judge Hargadon and Judge Holland, unless and until the Court of Appeals stays the policy, the policy implementing the law will remain in effect. [Defense Counse l]: Well Yo ur Hono r, then I wo uld argue th at my Memorandum is included in the Notice of Exception, I filed. THE COURT : All right. Let s cut to the chase. This will be reset for [the prosecutor who had been handling the case] to be here. It will be reset for the State to summ ons [its] witn esses and it ll even be reset for [defense counsel] to comply with the policy. Pick a date, please. [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I will be objecting to the reset, becau se in essence ar en t you grantin g the State s p ostponem ent? THE COURT: Yes, I am, but I m doing you a favor, because you didn t comply with the [Defense C ounsel]: I understand that, Y our Honor. THE COU RT: Le t me mak e it easy for you. You failed to comply with the policy, your exceptions [sic] dismissed. Thank you. I ll make it real easy for you. Your exceptions [sic] dismissed. [Defense Counsel]: And, I object on the record. THE COU RT: Well object for the record. [Defense Counsel]: I m going to object for the record. THE COU RT: Have a good day. Your exceptions [sic] dismissed. 7 [De fens e Co unse l]: (in audible) Postpon eme nt po licy. THE COU RT: I gav e you half a loaf of b read. You didn t wa nt it, you re [sic] exceptions [sic] dismissed. In the court s written order dated December 12, 2006, adopting the findings and disposition recommended by the master, the court recapped the ruling made at the hearing on Marcus s exceptions as follows: As a result of the Exception hearing in the above case(s), the Court finds: ... This Court ruled that the Exception request was not filed according to the [prosedures/guide lines [sic] outlined by the Juvenile Administrative Judge. [Defense counsel] objected and requested that the Court proceed . The Court agreed to postpone the Exception due to the unavailability of the State and the fact that Counsel for the resp ondent had no t complied with the C ourt s exce ption policy. Exception is dismissed by Court for failure to co mply with the Court s exce ption policy. On December 14, 2006, Marcus noted an appeal to this Court from the circuit court s final or der. Discussion The single question presented in appellant s brief is: Wheth er [the cou rt] erred in dismissing the exc eptions . 4 Because we view the statement of exceptions filed by Marcus 4 In support of appellant s claim that the circuit court erred in dismissing the exceptions, Marcus includes the following contentions in his brief: (a) Judge Hargad on s order constitutes an illegal local rule, a s it usurps bo th legislative authority of the General A ssembly and the Rule-m aking authority of the Cou rt of Ap peals. (contin ued...) 8 as sufficient to preserve his right to a de novo hearing, we answer appella nt s que stion yes . We hold that the circuit court erred in basing its dismissal of the exce ptions on the juvenile s alleged failure to comply with a local exception policy that as applied in this case purportedly imposed requirements beyond those set forth in Rule 11-111 and CJP § 3807(c). 5 Because appellant does not challenge the validity of either Rule 11-111 or CJP § 3-807 and indeed, did not challenge either the rule or the statutory prov ision at the circu it court level there is no d ispute of the fact that both provisions a re properly app licable to this 4 (...continued) (b) The requirements of the order are counter to the requirements of Courts & Judicial Pro ceedings A rticle, generally; Sec tion 3-807 specifically; and Maryland R ule 11-111 by the order s inclusion of dismissal as a sanction for insufficient specificity, the order s bu rdensom e additiona l requireme nts relative to th e filing of m emorand a in cases when the exceptions are to be heard on the record, and the order s limitation of de novo hearings to the specific issues raised in the exception. (c) The onerous requirements of the order (and its effects) violate State and federa l constitu tional pr inciples of due proces s and eq ual pro tection. (d) In dism issing the ex ceptions, [th e court] abu sed or failed to exercise h is discretio n. 5 Maryland Rule 1-102 generally prohibits local rules (with specified exceptions not here applicable), and provides: Unless inconsistent with these rules, circuit and local rules regulating (1) court libraries, (2) memorial proceedings, (3) auditors, (4) compensation of trustees in judicial sales, and (5) appointm ent of bail bond com missioners and lice nsing a nd regu lation of bail bon dsmen , are not r epeale d. No circu it and local rules, othe r than ones re gulating the ma tters and subjects listed in this Rule, shall be adopted. (Emphasis add ed.) See also Bastian v. Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 332 (1963) (local rules must not b e inconsisten t with state rule s or statutes); Walker v. Haywood, 65 Md. App. 1, 13 (1985) (judge s p olicy not binding on other judg es). 9 case.6 And, because no scheduling order was entered in this case either in the Hargadon exceptions policy format or otherwise we do not reach the issue of whether dismissal of 6 CJP § 3-807(c) provides: (c)(1) Any pa rty, in accordance with the Maryland Rules, may file written exceptions to any or all of the master's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, but shall specify those items to which the party objects. (2) The party who files exceptions may elect a hearing de novo or a hearing on the record before the court unless the party is the State in proceedings involving juvenile delinquency under Subtitle 8A of this title. (3) If the State is the excepting party in procee dings invo lving juven ile delin quency, the hearing shall be on the record, supplemented by additional evidence as the judge considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. (4) In either case, the hearing shall be limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken. Rule 11-111(c) provides: c. Review by Court if Exceptions Filed. Any pa rty may file exceptions to the master's proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed with the clerk within five days after the master's report is served up on the party, an d shall specify those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or on the record. Upon the filing of e xceptions, a prompt hearing shall be scheduled on the exceptions. An excepting party other than the State may elect a hearing de novo or a hearing on the record. If the State is the excepting party, the hearing shall be on the record, supplemented by such additional evidence as the judge considers relevant and to which the p arties raise no objection. In either case the hearing shall be limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken. We no te that R ule 2-5 41 is no t applica ble to ex ception s from a juven ile maste r. See Rule 1-101(b) ( Title 2 applies to civil matters in the circuit courts, except for juvenile causes under Title 11 of these Rules.... ). 10 the exception s would h ave been an appro priate sanctio n for a party s f ailure to com ply with a properly crafted scheduling o rder.7 Upon measuring Marcus s notice of exceptions against the plain language of the controlling State statute and rule, we conclude that Marcus was entitled to a de novo hearing on his exceptions. In the words of Rule 11-111(c) and CJP § 3-807(c)(4), Marcus was entitled to be heard de novo with respect to the matters to which exceptions have been taken. The right to a de novo hearing before a judge is imp ortant because, as the Co urt of Appea ls put it bluntly in State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 599-600 (1998), it [is] clear from the rules and case law that masters have no judicial authority.... In concise summation, masters are not judges, nor are they judicial officers. T his is not to belittle the extremely valuable contrib ution m asters m ake to th e effic iency of th e juven ile justice system, bu t, as the Court of Appeals stated in Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486 , 492 (1991): Litigants ... in all judicial pro ceedings[ ] are entitled to h ave their caus e det ermined ultim ately b y a duly qualified judge of a court of competent jurisdiction. (Quoting Ellis v. Ellis, 19 Md. App. 361, 36 5 (197 3).) 7 As the Court of Appeals explained in Forster, 398 Md. at 302: Judge Haragdon was designated as the Judge -in-Charg e of the Juv enile Division and, as such, was charged, amo ng other res ponsibilities, w ith establish[ing] policies and procedures for the day-to-day operation of the juvenile court subje ct to the app roval of the administrative judge and provid[ing] administrativ e guidanc e to the dep uty clerk, helpin g with day-to-da y proced ural issu es. See also Maryland Rules 1 6-101(d)(2)(vi) and 16 -202(b)(1). 11 Although the State contends that Marcus J. merely filed a bald exception and failed to specify those ite ms to which [he] object[ed] as required by Section 3-8 07(c)(1) an d Rule 11-11 1.c, our review of the Notice of Exception and Request for Hearing filed by Marcus leads us to conc lude otherw ise. Using lan guage sim ilar to the wording of the first sentence in Rule 11-111(c) that provides [a]ny party may file exceptions to the master s proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or proposed orders, appellant s timely notice of exceptions stated: the Respondent excepts to the findings and proposed orders of Master Zakia Mahasa, on the 3rd day of November, 2006. The notice further stated: Respondent[ ]s coun[se]l is excepting to Master Mahasa s findings at the adjudicatory hearing he ld on 10/6 /06 and the disposition h earing on 1 1/3/06. ... Ma ster Mah asa erred in her facts and findings in the adjudicatory and disposition hearing. In addition, the notice of exception pointed to the allegedly erroneous admission of opinion testimony, given by the police officer who was the State s only witnes s and wh o was no t qualified as an expert, regarding the operability of the handgun M arcus was alleged to h ave possessed. In compliance with the second sentence of Rule 11-111(c), the notice of exception further specified whether the hearing is to be de novo or on the record, and stated that the appellant requests that the matter be set for a hearing de novo. The third sentence of Rule 11-111(c) mandates that a hearing on the exceptions shall be promptly scheduled. The rule specifies: Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing shall be sche duled o n the ex ception s. There is no indication in this rule that the circuit court has discretion to decide whether to conduct a hearing on the exceptions. This is consistent 12 with the provision of CJP § 3-807(c)(2) that specifies that a juvenile who files exceptions may elect a hearing de novo.... Both the rule and the statute include the statement that the hearing shall be limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken. But we must reconcile and harmonize this limiting provision with the other language in CJP § 3-807(c)(1) giving the parties the option of filing exceptions to all of the master s findings, conclusions, and recomm endations. (Empha sis added.) A ccordingly, w e have co nsidered w hether the a llencompassing nature of Marcus s exception to the master s facts and findings at both the adjudicatory hearing and the disposition hearing is su fficiently specif ic as to the nature o f his compla int to satisfy the specificity requirement set forth in both Ru le 11-111(c) (the exceptions shall specify those items to which the party excepts ) and CJP § 3-807(c)(1) (the party shall specify those items to which the party objects ). Although the ap pellant s exception is stated broad ly, it does accurate ly and adequately communicate that Marcus was seeking a de novo hearing on all issues, as he was e ntitled to elect. As noted above, CJP § 3807(c)(1) specifically provides that any party may file written exceptions to any or all of the master s findings, conclusions, and recommendation s.... (Em phasis a dded.) 8 Because a juvenile is, in fac t, entitled to elect a de novo hearing on exception s, and is entitled to file exceptions to all of the master s findings, conclusions, and recommendations, we view the exceptions filed by Marcus as suffic iently specific to c ommu nicate his elec tion to avail 8 In another context, in Spruell v. Blythe, 215 Md. 117, 124 (1957), the Court of Appeals, acknowledging the broad inclusiveness of the word all, referred to the uncom promis ing (w ord) all . 13 himself of that right. Indeed, requiring a party who elects a de novo hearing w ith respect to all of the master s fin dings, con clusions, and recomm endations to state in grea ter detail what those findings and recommendations were would be redundant and serve no useful purpose. We con clude that the statute and ru le do not im pose such a hurdle in the path of a party seeking a de novo hearing as to all matters decided by the master. Accordingly, we vac ate the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case for a de novo hearing on appellant s exceptions. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY VACATED. CASE REMANDED FOR F U R T H ER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE. 14

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