Williams-White v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club

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SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION PENSC-CIV-2022-00001 STATE OF MAIN~ PENOBSCOT CO\JNTY NADA WILLlAMS-W!-jITE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) v. I ) INTER!NSURAN8E EXCHANGE ) ) OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB, ORDER on PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) Defendant.: ) Before the Cou1t'arn Plaintiff Nada Williams-White's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant lnterin~urance Exchange of the Automobile Club's Cross"Motion for Summary " Judgment, both P\lrsuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56. The central issue before the Court is whether I Williams" White c~n re~over under the underinsured motorist coverage provision in her own I• insurance policy ftji' injuries she sustained while in a vehicle not covered by the policy. Even when viewed in the lighi most favorable to Williams-White, the facts show that, as a matter of law, the "other"owned vehicle" .exclusion and the ·'named driver" exclusion in her insurance policy unambiguously e4ludes her from recovering for this accident. Additionally, these exclusions do I 0 . not contravene Maine'~ insurance statutes nor well"e.stablished Maine precedent. Therefore, Williams-White i~ not1 entitled to summary judgment and her Motion is DENIED, and lnterinsurance Exchange's Crnss-Motion is GRANTED. I. FA~TUAL BACKGROUND This case s'tems',from a motor vehicle accident which resulted in Plaintiff Nada Williams" ' White ("Williams-:White") suffering significant injuries. Williams"White sought to recover monies i thrnugh an insural)Ce policy she held with Defendant Interinslll'ance Exchange of the Automobile , I Club ("lnterinsurance").'The following facts are taken from the Summary Judgment record and . are undisputed, bej11g taken from a joint Statement of Undisputed Material Fact ("Joint S.M.F.") '' '' to which both parties stipulated. On July t:,O, 2019, Williams-White was riding as a passenger on a three-wheeled ,I motorcycle driven :by Calvin White ("Calvin") when he lost control, and the motorcycle crashed (the "Crash"), (Joint S.M.F. 'il'il 1-5.) The Crash occurred due to Calvin's negligence, and Williams White is legally e11titled.to recover from him for her damages. (Joint S.M.F. i! 6.) Williams-White suffered injuries c~used:by the Crash, and her damages exceed $100,000. (Joint S.M.F. 'il'il 8-9.) Calvin was the ow:ner of the motorcycle and carried an insurance policy ("Motorcycle Policy") on I the motorcycle with a policy limit of $100,000. per occurrence, (Joint S.M.F. 'il'il 7, 10.) Williams ' White was not ai·named insured under the Motorcycle Policy, and the Motorcycle Policy's ' ' I insurance carrier paid Williams-White the policy limit of $100,000. to co111pensate her for the . ' \ damages resulting·from·the Crash, thereby exhausting the li111its of all insurance policies held by Calvin related to tpe motorcycle. (Joint S.M.F. 'il'il 11-13.) Willia111s-White carried an automobile insurance policy ("Interinsurance Policy") with 0 lnterinsurance tha\ prov ided uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of up to 1 : • $250,000. per per~'on apd $500,000. per occurrence, and which was in effect on the date of the Crash. (Joint S.M.F. 'il'il 15, 17.) Williams-White is the named insured under the Interinsurance ' Policy. (Joint S.M.'F. 'i!'il, 19-20.) Calvin is not a named insured under the lnterinsurance Policy, but he is the "resident" sp'ouse of Williams-White under the Interinsurance Policy. (Joint S.M.F. 1111 19-20.) Calvin's h10torcycle is not an insured vehicle under the lnterinsurance Policy. (Joint S.M.F. 'i! 18.) '' 2 '/ Interinsurance was notified of and consented to Williams-White's settlement under the Motorcycle Policy. (Joint S. M. F. 1[ 21.) Subsequent to the Motorcycle Pol icy settlement, WilliamsWhite made a claim under the undel'insured portion of the lnterinsurance Policy to cover her I damages beyond the $100,000. she had already recovered. (Joint S.M.F. ~ 22.) In response to this claim, Interinsurance has asserted that it is not obligated to provide coverage due to the application of the "other-owned veh,icle" exclusion in the uninsured and undet·insLll'ed motorist coverage of the lnterinsurance:· Policy and due to an application of the "named driver" exclusion in the ' ,, Interinsurance Poli·cy. (Joint S.M.F. 1[ 23.) The relevant language to the exclusionary clause in the Interinsurance Pol(cy provides in relevant part: DEFINITIONS Throughou.t this policy: 1. Certain ~ords. and phrases have a defined meaning when printed in bold italic type. We use the following definitions: Bodily inj~iy - nieans bodily harm, siclrness, or disease, including death therefrom. Occupying, occiipied or occupancy - mean being in or upon, getting in, out, upon, or off. Person - n~eans , a human being. I 'I Resident, reside or residing - mean actually living in the household you live in. 2. "We", "us", "our" or "Exchange" - mean the lnterinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club. 3 !·' 3. "You" or,'"your" - mean any named insured on the declarations page. If there is only one nar:ned insured on the declarations page and that insured is a person, "you" or "your" in'clude's the resident spouse of that person. I,. ' 1,, ' PART III - UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE I . COVERAGE E :_ UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAbE - ~ODILY INJURY ! OUR PROMISE TO YOU - COVERAGE E 1. We will ~ay compensatory damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover froji1 the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or underins111/ed motor vehicle because of bodily injury: a. sustained by an insured; and b. chusedfby an accident arising from the ownership or use of the 11ni/1sured' motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle. \' PERSONSI INSURED - PART III I I Under COVERf:GE E, insured means: 1. You. ' ADDITIO,NAL DEFINITIONS - PART III Motor vehicle - means a self-propelled vehicle designed for and used primarily on streets and'high0ays to transport persons or property, but does not include: a. a1.:snowmobi le; b. ti11 all-(errain vehicle, unless registered for highway use or is operated on~ highway; c. a· moto'rized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device; d. any vehicle operated exclusively on tracks. Underins~red ni9tor vehicle - means a motor vehicle or trailer of any type for which insu,ranc<coverage is provided, but in amounts less than either: a. tre minimum limits for bodily injlll'y liability insurance provided for under the financial responsibility i~~s of the state of Maine; or b. the ,, limits of the injured paay'i luiiiisured 'ni'Citorist coverage. 4 ' '', i WHAT IS NOT COVERED - EXCLUSIONS PART III ' not apply to bodily injw,i sustained: COVERAGE E does 1. By you, ivhile occupying or when struck by any motor vehicle you own which is not insur~d for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with t~at vehicle. (Joint S.M.F. Ex. II. JI:, at 14-15, 22-23.) ' PR@CEDURAL POSTURE Williams-White filed the Complaint in this action on January 6, 2022, asserting a claim for breach of contract ,against lnterinsurance for refusing to pay her underinsured motorist coverage claim. On March 1 18, 2022, Williams-White filed this Partial Summary Judgment Motion 'I ' ("Motion") and the Parties' joint Statement of Undisputed Material Fact. On April 15, 2022, . lnterinsurance filed its .opposition to the Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Cross-Motion").: On April 29, 2022, Williams-White filed her reply to the Motion, and opposition to the Crnss'.Motion. On May 9, 2022, lnterinsurance filed its reply to the Cross Motion. The Moti0n and, Cross-Motion, both now fully briefed, are in order for decision. III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD An entry of summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving pai'~y is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. S~e Dyer v. DOT, 2008 ME l06, 11 14, 951 A.f d 82 j; see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and' there is a genuine issue when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the fact." Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ~ 1.1, 48 A.3d 774 (citations omitted). At summary judgment, a court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Curtis v. Porter, 200 I ME 158, 11 6, 784 A.2d 18. 'The meaning of the language in an insurance contract is a question of law and "whether the underlying facts bring the claim within the policy exclusion is likewise a matter of 5 I law." Allstate Inc. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 263 A.2d 78, 80 (Me. 1970); see also Foremost Ins. Co. )'. Levesque, 2005 ME 34, 11 7, 868 A.2d 244; Peerless Ins. Co. v. Wood, 685 A.2d 1173 (Me. 19~6). IV. DISCUSSION At issue in \hese motions is whether Williams-White can recover for her injuries sustained in the Crash throu~h the.,uninsured and underinsured coverage in her insurance policy. To resolve the motions, the Court 117ust determine the answer to two main questions. First, does the "other owned vehicle" exclusion in the insurance policy at issue unambiguously exclude Williams-White from recovering fo,r her injuries stemming from the Crash? Second, if the "other-owned vehicle" ' exclusion in the ij:iolicy unambiguously bars Williams-White's recovery, is the exclusion ', permissible under Maine's insurance statutes and Maine precedent? The Court will address both ' I ' of these issues in t~rn below. 1 A. :r1ie Language of the Interinsurance Policy Is Unambiguous and It Bars Willi~ms-White's Recovery for Injuries Sustained in the Crash. ' ' Williams-'ijhite :argues that the language of the Interinsurance Policy is ambiguous, and , that ambiguities should, be construed against lnterinsurance, as the insurer, under established Maine law. Specifically, Williams-White argues that certain instances of "you" and "your", although both are defin.ed terms in the Interinsurance Policy, should not be read with the meaning 0 The Comt acknowlePges that lntcrinsurance raised the !nterinsurance Policy's "named driver exclusion as an alternate argument justifying' denying Williams~Whitc recovery for injmies sustained in the Crashi and that Williams~White has argued against this justification in her Motion. However, because the "other owned vehicle" exclusion sufficlcntly'reso!Vbs the Motion and Crnss-Motion, the Court wl!I not extensively discuss the "named driverll exclusion. In ~.rief, tiif! plain language of the "nam~d di·i\'.el'" exclusion in the lntel'insurance Policy unambiguously prohibits Williams-White from any recovery in this instance. Additionally, this Court notes that while the Law Cami l,rns addressed "other-owned vehicle" exciiisions several times, the Law Couti has not yet addressed the "name~ driver" exclusions in its decisions. See e.g., Hall v. Patriot Mui. Ins. Co., 2007 ME 104, ~11 11-12, 942 A.2d 663. Nevertheless, "named driver" exclusions affect insurance policies in a similar way to "other owned vehlcle 11 exclusions ahd do not facially violate Maine insurance statutes. Furthermore, "named driver'' exclusions are, like u~ther~owned vehicle" cxclusions,justifiable as a matter of public policy. 1 6 of "you" and "you1·" as :<;lefined where the words are not balded and italicized. Williams-White suggests that if thi~ amb;iguity were construed against lnterinsurance, the "other-owned vehicle" ' I exclusion in the lnt,erinsurance Policy would not prevent her from recovering. The Court disagrees : ' with Williams-White's i·eading of the contract, finding that the definition of "you" and "your" •,. should apply throd:ghout the contract. When the contract is read this way, it unambiguously bars 11, Wi 11 iams-White frpm recovering in this case. I'. "You" Is Defined in the Interinsurance Policy and Has the Meaning ,,. Established in the Definitions Throughout the Interinsurance Policy ! To come to a decision on the meaning of"you" in the Interinsurance Policy, the Court must interpret the language of the Interinsurance Policy. When a court interprets an insurance policy, if the language is unambiguous, a court must "interpret it in accordance with its plain meaning," but 1. a court construes ,;ambiguous policy language strictly against the insurance company and liberally ' in favor of the poli°cy holder." Haskell v. S!ale Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2020 ME 88, ~ 15, 236 A.3d ' 458. "When a tern~· is expressly defined within the four corners of an insurance pol icy, an inquiring ', court must defer lb that definition and thereby give effect to the intent of the parties." Medical ' ' Mui. Ins. Co. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing In re Blinds to Go 443 F.3d I, 7 (l st Cir. 2006) (interpreting an insurance policy in a diversity Share Purchase Litig., ' ' ' jurisdiction case u,nder Maine law) ("Where the parties to a contract take pains to define a key term specifically, their peali~gs under the contract are governed by that definition.")). A court reads the ', policy's language "fro1~1 the perspective of an average person untrained in either the law or the insurance field in light, of what a more than casual reading of the policy would reveal to an I ordinarily intelligent insured." Kelly v. North East Ins. Co., 2017 ME 166, ~ 5, 168 A.3d 779. Neverthel~ss, although it may be true that the language of an insurance policy is complex and some pmtions hard ·to understand at first glance, this does not "justify excising such provisions 7 from a contract [as·i:rnly] when they are ambiguous is their interpretation affected, and the insured given the benefit of the doubt." Patrons v. Oxford Mui. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 19 (Me. ' i l 990). An insurance policy mllst be examined as a whole to determine whether it is ambiguous, and "a dispute over the '.meaning of a term, 'or [the] inability of the insut·ed to understand the : ' policy, does not render the contract ambiguous."' Progressive Northwest Ins. Co. v. Metro. Prop. & Gas. Ins. Co., 2021 ME 54, ~ 10,261 AJd 920 (quoting Colford v. Chubb Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 687 A.2d 609, 614,(Me. 1996)). The main tl\rust of Williams-White's argument as to the ambiguity of the lnterinsurance Policy is that the word '.'you" in the underinsured motorist exclusions does not necessarily only have the variety of defined meanings established in the definitions section, but rather might limited colloquial meaning. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J, 14-16.) Williams-White alternately have a more ,. ' argues that although "you" is defined in the lnterinsurance Policy, because in the definitions it is \ written that"[ cJertain words and phrases have a defined meaning when printed in bold itci/ic type", '·· the fact that "you" 'is notlbolded in the underinsured motorist exclusion section means that it could be interpreted as not haidng its defined meaning. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 14-16, Ex. A, at 14.) ' Williams-White's at·gument does not persuade the Court, however, and the very language of the lnterinsuran.ce Policy plainly rejects Williams-White's reading. The language concerning bold and italic typ~ is in, a different section of the definitions from the definition given for "you". (Joint S.M.F. Ex. A, at '!4-15.) Additionally, unlike in the section containing the bold and italic type language, wh·ere every term defined is balded and italicized when defined, in the section where "you" is defined, the word "you" is neither balded nor italicized, and simply within quotation marks. (Joint ?·M.F. Ex. A, at 14-15.) Nothi11g about this suggests that a word or phrase needs to be balded and italicized for it to have the meaning accorded to it by the definitions. 8 Furthermore, the v~i·y lan,guage Williams-White relies on does not imply what she wishes it would. "Certain words an/! phrases have a defined meaning when printed in bold italic type" does not mean that all word~ and,phrases have a defined meaning when printed in bold italic type, rather ' ' only that certain wprds and phrases do. (Joint S.M.F. Ex. A, at 14.) Indeed, the language of the ,, I : ' lnterinsurance Policy quite clearly establishes that "you" is a defined term for the whole of the ' ' lnterinsurance Poliby regardless of formatting, as it states: "Throughout this policy: ... 3. "You" or "your" - mean ~·ny named insured on the declarations page. If there is only one named insured on the declarationstpage ·and that insured is a person, "you" or "your" includes the resident spouse I ' of that person." (Jc\,int S.:M.F. Ex. A, at 14-15.) : ,1 Although ti)e Court reads the language of the Interinsurance Policy "from the perspective of an average person untrained in either the law 01· the insurance field," this reading is still a "more I than casual reading of the policy." Kelly, 2017 ME 166, ~ 5, 168 A.3d 779. In doing so, the Court I· • a cannot simply disr~gard defined term. The definitions of the lnterinsurance Policy do not require i that the term "you'; be balded or italicized, and "[w]hen a term is expressly defined within the four corners of an insu;:ance policy, an inquiring court must defer to that definition and thereby give effect to the inten( of the parties." Medical Mut. Ins. Co, 583 F.3d at 60. Resultant.ly, when the word "you" is used in the exclusions, it is not used ambiguously, but has only one possible meaning: it is usec\ with.'all of the meanings in the definitions of the Interinsurance Policy. t; I 2., When "You" Has its Defined Meaning, the Exclusions Plainly Bar , Williams-White from Recovering Under the lnterinsurance Policy Having resolved, that "you" is unambiguous in the lnterinsurance Policy, the Court now I ' ' I ' I , , turns to the exclusion language of the [nterinsurance Policy. The exclusions section provides: COVERAOE E 8oes not apply to bodily in}lllJ' sustained: I 9 I. By you, 0hile occupying or when struck by any motor vehicle you own which is not insur~d for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with tliat vehicle. (Joint S.M.F. Ex. if., at 23.) This section, the "other-owned vehicle" exclusion, excludes certain ,.' other vehicles not c:overep by the policy. As the definitions provide, "you" 111eans both the insured, namely, Williams-White, and the insured's resident spouse, namely, Calvin White. Thus, when the definition for "you" e.stablished in the lnterinsurance Policy is insetted, this section of provides I that coverage is excluded for any injury sustained: !. By [Will:ia111s~~hite or Calvin White], while occupying or when struck by any motor vehible [Williams-White or Calvin White] own[s] which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle. (Joint S.M.F. Ex. A, at 2.J.) . . When the 1'nterin'surance Policy is read this way, as it must be, it is clear that the injuries suffered by Willi~ms-White in the Crash are excluded from coverage. Williams-White was . ' occupying Calvin's,, motorcycle, which was not insured under the lnterinsurance Policy, when the ' Crash occmred a1Id Williams-White was injmed. This is the very kind of situation that the exclusion was writ.ten to exclude from coverage under the lnterinsurance Policy. Accordingly, the Court finds that, u[1der the language of the lnterinsurance Policy, Williams-White is barred from . . making any recovery for injuries sustained in the Crash. B. The Exclusion Barring Williams-White's Claim Under the lnterinsurance ,Policy Does Not Violate Maine Insurance Statutes and Precedent. ' Williams-White ,alternately argues that if the "other-owned vehicle" exclusion precludes recovery, then the 'exclu~ion is not valid under Maine law because it violates the Maine insurance statutes. Williams-White argues that the "other-owned vehicle" exclusion violates Maine insurance law by:·preventing her from having any possibility to recover in an uninsured or 10 : I ,. underinsured motorist ,. scenario ..However, this exclusion is valid under Maine law. There is precedent consideri'ng ne,arly identical exclusions, and the Law Court has repeatedly and recently 'I found such exc\usi6ns to'be valid and enforceable. ·, The Law Court has repeatedly considered cases whei'e patties have asserted that "other 1. ' ' ' owned vehicle" exclusiohs violate Maine insurance statutes, specifically 24-A M.R.S. § 2902, or I ' ' contravene public iiolicy: See 24-A M.R.S. § 2902 (2022); Estate ofGalipeau v. State Farm lv!ut. Auto. ins. Co., 201'6 ME' 28, 11119-15, 132 A.3d 1190, Estate ofLewis v. Concord Gem. Mui. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 34, \112, n. 9, 87 AJd 732; Hall, 2007 ME 104, ~~ 11-12, 942 A.2d 663; Cash v. Green Mountain his. Co), 644 A.2d 456, 457-58 (Me. 1994); Bear v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 519 ' : A.2d 180, 182 CM{ I 98p); Gross v. Green Mountain ins. Co., 506 A.2d 1139, 1142 (Me. 1986); Hare v. Lumberme.ns Mi,11. Cas. Co., 471 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Me. 1984); see also Maurice v. Stale Farm Mut. Auto. Jns. G:o., 235 F.3d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Maine law in a case ' ' concerning an "other-owned vehicle" exclusion question). Despite strictly construing exclusions !' ' i ·in insurance policies ag~inst the insurer, the Law Court has repeatedly found that "other-owned ,' \ vehicle" exclusioni do n~t violate Maine insurance statutes or public policy. 2 See, e.g., Hall, 2007 . ' ME I 04, ~ 11, 942 A.2d 663 (summarizing a series of decisions on "other-owned vehicle" exclusions). As recent!)( as 2916, the Law Court considered an appeal that "invite[d the Law Cow·t] to depa1t from [its] clear and long-standing precedent" on "other-owned vehicle" exclusions. Estate of Galipeau, 2016,, ME 28, ~ 12, 132 AJd 1190. Noting that Maine law had been unchanged on this point for "some thirty years", the Law Cou1t considered the appellant's argument that there 'Under Maine law, :.excldsions and exceptions in insmance policies are disfavored," and a Court construes them strictly against the insurer. Pall'ons Oxford Ins. Co. v. Harl'is, 2006 ME 72, 117, 905 A.2d 819, . 11 was a "growing national trend" of finding "other-owned vehicle" exclusions invalid. See id. The Law Court also dis~ussed a treatise which recognizes that many states' courts only permit similar ,, .' exclusions if they "at·e specifically authorized by the state's uninsured motorist legislation." id. : , 11 13 (citing 1 ALAN 'J. W101ss & JEFFREY E. THOMAS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 4. l 9(C) (3d ed. 2005)). Nevertheless, the Galipeau Court declined the appellant's invitation to reve1·s~ long.standing Maine precedent, finding no compelling reason for a change in established law and hold.ing that there was, in fact, a valid policy basis for allowing "other-owned vehicle" exclusion~, as they allow vehicle owners and insurers the ability to contract specifically fo1· how much coverage they want to carry or provide on a vehicle. Estate of Galipeau, 2016 ME 28, 11~ 14-15, 132 A.3d 1190 (holding that the principle of stare dee/sis guides the Law Court not to depart from established law unless a compelling reason for such a departure exists). As lnterins\trance correctly identifies in its Cross-Motion, the lnterinsurance Policy is quite like many of the policies that the Law Court has considered when addressing this issue. (Def.'s Cross Mot. Summ'. J. 11-13.) For ·example, in Hall, the Law Court considered a policy which excluded coverag() for '"bodily injury' sustained: 1. By an 'insured' while 'occupying', or when ,, ' struck by, any motor vehicle owned by that 'insured' which is not insured for this coverage under ', . this policy. This it:cludd,s a trailer of any type used with that vehicle." Hall, 2007 ME 104, 1114, 942 A.2d 663. Just, like ih the lnterinsurance Policy, the definition for the owner of the non-covered , vehicle includes a, resident spouse, as in Hall the term '"insured' includes '[y]ou or any 'family member." The term 'you' in the policy includes both: 1. The 'named insured 'shown in the , Declarations; and'.2. The spouse if a resident of the same household." Id. The language of the policy in Hall and the language of the lnterinsurance Policy are nearly identical in both structure 12 ., ., . '' I 'I \ and meaning. The L~w c·ourt found that the exclusion in Hall unambiguously applied and was not 1· ., in violation ofMainp insurance law. 11, 15. i': ' Id.,, In light of t~;e Int~rinsurance Policy's similarity to other policies considered by the Law Court, and the Law pourt\ firmly established and longstanding stance on "other-owned vehicle" exclusions, the Court doe$ not find that the Interinsurance Policy violates Maine insurance statutes ,.I ' or public policy. A~ a result, the Court finds that Williams-White is baned from any recovery ,: ,!· I under the lnterinsur~nce,Policy for her injuries sustained in the Crash. I' ) ,, V. COl':/CLUSION I Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams-White, the Court finds that I' ,I the language of the jnterirtsurance Policy is unambiguous, and that, as it is written, Williams-White I I is not entitled to re~overy for injuries suffered in the Crash. Furthermore, the Court does not find , I f,' I that the exclusions:j whicih bar Williams-White's recove1y' under the Interinsurance Policy are 1, f,, I contrary to Maine i11surance statutes and established Maine precedent. For these reasons, the Corni I, : I denies Williams-White'.~ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, and grants [nterinsurance's I, , I I Cross-Motion for S'ummary Judgment. ,. I ',. , / ;:, ·I ,., I Entry is: : I I I, Plaintiffs Motion for Summa1y Judgment is DENIED, Defendant's Cross-Motion for ' ' . Summary Judgmel)t is GRANTED. " '! The clerk is direct~d to ihcorporate this order into the docket, by reference, pursuant to M. R. Civ. G . 'I ,, ! P. 79(a). ,. 12/01/2022 ! Date Ann M. Murray, Justice Maine Superior Corni 'I ORDER/JUDGl\/IBNT ENTE:RED IN THE COURT DOCKET dN:_J 8,.- i l- ;;1.0o!;;l. : ' 13

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