Darling's Hyundai V. Hyundai Motor America

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STATEOFMAI1\'E KLNNJ::BEC, SS SCPER!OR COURT CIVIL ACTIOJ\ DOCKET NO AP-14-1 DOCKET NO. AP-14-2 DOCKET NO. AP-14-3 /II MH- rtN- Vl-JD-/5 } } ) DAR!.NG'S HYTJ:\IDAI, Plaintiff- Appellee. } ) ) ORDER ) HYUNDAl MOTOR M1ERICA, ) } ) Defendant-Appellant. Defendant/Appellant Hyundai Motor America ("'IIyundai'") appeals the District Court's small claims opinion in Docket Nos. SC-201 3-0287, SC-2013-0289, and SC2013-0290 (collectively. the Small Claims Judgment) pursuant to .'vt.R Cw P 760. The Small Claims Judgment held that Darlmg:".< was entitled to a 94% markup Wldcr 10 .'vt.R S A § 1176 ("section 1176") on remanufactured radio, rear seat entertainment ("RSE"). and 1\a~igation units (collectively, the "remanufactured units'") installed under warranties on llyundai vehicles. Hyundai argues it is not required to pay Darling's the 94% markup be~ause Darling's did not ··provide"' the remanufactured units under the meaning of section 1176. Darling" s argues the District Court properly fmmd Hyundai was required to pay the markup because, fi-om the perspective of the vehicle owner, llyundai docs "provide" the remanufactured \UlllS. Forthe reasons discussed below. the court denies 1-lyundai"s M.R. Civ. P. 760 appeal. l I. Background Darling· s is an automobile dealer/li"anch1.qee of Hyundai, the manufacturer/franchisor. Darling's is contractually required to perform warranty repairs on Hyundai vehicles at no cost to the customer. Darling's filed four small claims action~ in the Augusta District Court in .'vlay of2013 regurding warranty repairs. The District Court ruled in favor of Darling's and Hyundai appealed the judgment on three of the four claim~. In the three claims at issue, Darling's performed repairs on Ilyundai vehicles CO\"ered by llyundai's express warranty at no charge to the customer> Pur~uant to the parties' agreement, as embodied by the 2013 Hytmdai Warranty Policy and Procedure's Manual ("Warranty Manuar'), Hyundai reimburses Darling's for labor costs and for the llyundai parts used in warranty repairs. Section 5.1 of the Warranty 'vbrlllal provides that Hyundai will reimburse Darlmg's for the costs of the parts by paying the dealer net price plus an additional pam handling allowance based on the dealer net price. Hyundai utili7e8 a 40% markup on the dealer net price a.~ the "parts handling allowance" for nearly all of its dealers in the counuy. Maine dealers, however, arc afforded a different pans handling allowance per Maine law. Specifically, section 1176 requires the manufacturer to reimburse the dealer for any parts prov1ded at ·'the rcta!l rate customarily charged by that [dealer[ for the same parts when not provided in satisfaction of a \VlUTanty ... •· 10 M.R.S.A. § 1176. The "retail rate" is the price that a dealer would '·customarily"' charge a nonwarranty ~ustomer for that same part. See Darlinr; ·s v Ford Motor Co., 1998 ME 232, 'i[IS, 719 A.2d Ill 2 (hereinafter '·Ford Mol or Co. /998"'). 1 II ere, the parties stipulated that th~ '·r~tail rate," or the average percentage markup. to be applied to all pans used by Darling's in v.arranty repairs 1S 94%, A.ccordingly. each llm~ Darling· s performs a warranty repair, 11 receive' a reimbursement including both the dealer net pnc~ and the 94% markup from Hytmdai. In the three cases at issue. Darling's pcr!Urmed repair~ in which the remanufactured units \Vere installed under warranty. !"he repairs at issue are governed by section 5 .fi of the Warranty Manual, which explains that, unlike most other parts, Darling's is not required to keep a supply ofnev. radio, RSE, or navigation units. Instead, Darling's mu.<l replace these defective parts with the remanufactured units that are stocked by a parts dtstrihution center. When Darling's orders and receives a remanufactured unit, llyundai invoices Darling's for the remanufacrurcd dealer net price. After Darling's m>tall~ the remanufacrurcd unit, it must mail the defective unit back to Hyundai to receive a credn in an amount equal to the pnce for which it v,as invoiced. The question at issue is whether Section 1176 requires Hyundai to pay the 94% markup in addition to the dealer net price fOr the remanufacillred units. A. Summary of the Small ClaimsJu.dgme_l)l "]he District Court determined that Hyundai "a$ required to pay Darling's the 94% markup on the remanufactured units. Small Claims Judgment, 2-4. It explained that "hile Darling's is not permitted to stock new radio, RSE, or navigation systems for waJTanty repairs. Hyundai does require Darling's to perfonn those warranty rcpmrs ll!.ing remanufactured parts. ld. at 3 From this, the District Court explained that viewed from Section 1176 offers further details r~gardmg how this rate is determined that are not pert1nent to resolving the present d1spute. t 3 the vehide ovmer·s perspective, Darling"; has '·provided'" the rcmanutitdured unit as pan of the \Varranty process. !d. Furthermore, the District Court cxplamed that the La\V Court rejected a construction of section 1176 similar to the one proffered by llyundai in FOrd MolrJr Co. 1998. fn that case, the manufacturer argued that section J 176 did not cover, and that markup payments were not owed f(lr, '"sublet repairs," i.e. repairs that ·'occur when the dealer must make a repair, but cannot pruvule the specialized labor or materials required to make the repair." ld (quoting FordMowr Co 1998, 1998 YIL 232, <: 20, 219 A.2d Ill) The dealer must instead hire a subcontractor to make the repair. /d. rhc Law Coun rejected the manufacturer's argument that the dealer was not '·providing" the labor or parts involved in the sublet repairs as the term is used in section 1176 explaining: We determine that section 1176 includes reimbursement for sublet repairs. The starute governs re1mhursement of all repairs in which a manufacturer '·requires or permit> a motor vehicle franch~>.ee to perform labor or provide parts in satisfaction of a \Varranty .... , 10 M. R. S.A. § 117 ( l ~~7). Smce ~ection 1176 apphcs to all v.arranty repairs, 1t applies to warranty repairs accepted by dealers who lack the ability to make all repairs on tl1eir premises, as well as to the dcalcr:s who have the ability to make all repairs on tl1eir premise> Id. (quoting Ford .'dolor Co. 1998, 1998 ME 232, ~ 21, 219 A.2d 111. Accordingly, the Distncr Court held that section 1176 applies to warranty repairs involving Hyundai remanufactured units. Small Claim> Judgment, 3. II. Discussion Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 76D, Hyundai only appeals questions of Jaw. specifically the District Court's mtcrprelation of section JJ 76 Section 1176 provides, in pertinent pan: ' lf a motor vehide franchisor requ~r_es or permit< a motor vehide franchisee to perform labor .Q!JlJ:OYide parts in satisfaction of a warranty created by the ti-anchisor, the frJnchisor ... shall reimburse the franchisee for any parts so pro\·ided at the retail rate customarily charged by th>tl franchisee for the >ame part~ when not provided m satisfaction of a warranty. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1176 (cmph<~si; added). ls~ues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Ford Motor Co. v. Dar/inK's. 2014 ME 7. ~ 15, ~6 A. 3d 35 The primary purpose in statutory interpretation 1~ to giYe effect to the intent of the Legislature. Central Maine Power Co. v Devereux Manne, !nc., 2013 ME 37, ~ g, 68 A.3d 1262. Courts extliYline the plain meaning of statutory language seeking to gi>'C efl"ectto the legislature's intent and "ill construe statutory language to avoid absurd, illog!Cal, or inconsistent results. Jd Courts also construe the whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonioll.' re8ult, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be ;~chieved. Id. All words in a statute are given meaning, and no words are treated as surplusage if they can be reasonably construed !d. Any findings of fact by the District Court w!ll not be set aside unles.< dearly erroneous 'viR. Civ. P. 760. In support ofil< appeaL Hyundai raise8 the following argum~nl.<: 1) Section 1176 does not require Hyundai to pay Darling· s the 94% markup for the remanutactmed units at i"'ue; 2) The Small Claims Judgment's interpretation of section 1176 impenniss1bl} abrogate8 the parties agreement that Hyllildm is the exclusive provider of the remanufactured r;~dios; and 3) The Smalls Claims Judgment's interpretation of section 1176 impermissibly conflicts with other laws 5 A Whether Section 1176 Requires Hyundai to "Reimbu_rse" Darling's for the Remanufactured Umts at Issue Hyundai raises four arguments in support of its position that section 1176 does nm require Hyundai to pay Darling'~ Ilyundai argues that became the the 94% markup on the remanufactured units. First, partie~ agreed Hyundai, not Darling's, would provide all of the remanufactured units to Darling's. the remanufacrnrcd units arc not within the scope of>ection 1176. In pa.rticular, [[yundai points to section 5.6.1 of the 2013 Warranty Policy, which slates that the Hyundai Parts Distribution Center ''will stock and ship all remanufactured radioiRSE;Navigmion units," that upon >hipping the part, Hyundai wGuld '·invGice the Dealer at the remanufactured dealer net price," and that ··[t]hc pnce of the unit will match the price of the credit processed for the returned inoperative (core) umt ,. Hyunda1 fLITlher argues that treating the remanufactured units as outside the scope of section 1176 would not have adverse dl:Octs because the rcmanufadured units are a narmw subset the parties agreed to treat differently by contract. Indeed, unlike typ1cal warranty repair~, where a dealer provides parts from its ov,.n imentory, section 5.6 states that Darling's 1S not allowed to stock the remanufactturd parts. Instead, Hyundai provides those parts. Second, Hyundm argues that there is no basis for Darling's chUm that it is entitled to "reimbur•ement" because Hyundai promptly credited Darling'' the full amounts for the warranty repair part.,_ As >uch, Hyundai Jrgues that if Darling's paid nothing for the pans, there is notl1ing for Hyundai to rcJmbursc and nothing on "hich to base a markup. Th1rd, Hyundai argues that Ford Mo10r Co 1998, upon which the Small Claims Judgment relied, is mapplicable_ Hyundai argues that in Ford Mo/Or Co 1998. it was und1sputed that the dealer was permitted to perform labor for the warranty repair at issue, 6 Jnd the only question was whether the dealer was cmitkd to recover the statutory markup on charges for labor performed by a subcontractor tu whom the dealer •mblct rhe repair work Lnlike Ford Moror Co_ ]99!1, Darling-s was ncirhcr r~quired nor permitted to provide the remanufactured units for warranty repairs in this case. In Jil.ct, Hyundai argue.,, the agreement be!'ween the parties cxphC!tly prnvided that Hyundai would provide the warranty rcpan part,, not Darling's. Fourth, Hyundai takes issue with the District Court's finding that viewed from the perspective of the 'ehicle owner, Darling·' has '·provided" rhc remanufactured radio unit as part ot" the warranty repair proce8s. llyundai argues that the statute does not require that the transaction be viewed from the vehicle owner's pcrspecti,·e. Instead, the question is whether the dealer ·'provided the parts." Here, the D1strict Court did nm err in determining that section 1176 requires Hyundai to pay Darling's the 94'h• markup on the remanufactured units. Alrhough section 1176 contams ambiguity regarding the term ·'provide;' the remanufactured units arc not sufficiently d1stinct from "typical'" parts that indisputably \varrant the 94% markup. As noted, Hyunda1 attempts to distinguish the remanufacrnrcd unit' from "typical parts," which it agrees Darling· s "provides,'' based on the fact that Darling's i' expres>ly prohibited fi-om 'locking the rcmanulil.ctured units for warranty repair. Warranty Manual, § 5 .6. I . As a result, Darling's docs not haYe to set aside warchou;e space, maintain an inventory, or otherw1sc mcur overhead costs fOr the remanufactured units. However, it is undisputed that Darling's orders the remanufactured units in the 'ame manner it orders ''typical" parts u>ed by Darling's in part~- "·arrC~nty In addition, Hytmdai ultimately provides all of the repairs pur;uant to the parties· agreement. See 7 \Varranty Manual. l .0 (A.). Boiled dovvn, the primary distinction bet\~een the remanufactured units and "typical'" parts is that Darling's does not keep the rcmanu!actur~d unit< stG~ked at its deal~rsh1ps. This distmctwn docs not warrant differem treatment under section 1176. fhis interpretation i> supported by the Law Court's opinion Ford Motor Co. /998, which adopted a broad construction of section 1176. As discussed above, Ford Mol or Co I 998 determined that suhlet repair' should not be treated diiTerently under section l 176 just because the dealer lacks the ability to make aJl repairs on their premises. 1998 ME 232,, 21, 219 A.2d 111. V..'hile Ford Motor Co. /998 did tum in part on the !act that it would treat dealer'> diiTerentl} ba.~ed on their ability to handle diiTerent repairs on premises, it also rcjGctcd a carvc-oll! to the ~cope of sectwn 1176 and put forth the broad statement that section 1176 "applies to all warranty repairs[.]"' id. Accordingly, Ford Molor Co. 1998 supports rejecting the distinction Hyundai wishe8 to draw between remanufacrurcd tmits and '"typicar' partg under sectwn 1176. Furthermore, the legislative intent behind the Business Practices Between "'lotor Veh1clc Manuliicturers, Di.,tributors and Dealers Act ("Dealers Act"), under which section 1176 was enacted, provides addi tiona! >upport J(Jr the broader interpretation of sccuon 1176 adopted by the Small Claims Judgment. The Legislarure enacted the Dealers Act due to a disparity in bargaimng power between manufacturer~ and dealers. Acadia Afotors, Inc. v. Ford Moror Co, M4 F.Supp. 819, 827-28 {D. Me. 1994); ajf'd in pun. rev 'd mpurr on other grounds, 44 F.Jd 1050 (lst Cir. 1995). In particular, the Legislature wanted to prC\Cnt manufacturer_'>, "unwilling to pay the fair and full price for r~pai!'> made necessCLry when their automobiles failed to meet warranty standards." from 8 forcing dealers 10 ~hilt costs of performing warranty 'NOrk to nonwarranty customers. Id {quoting :'vie. LD_ 1878. 109th Leg., 2d Sess. {Smtcment of Fact). Accordingly, interprctmg .<ection 1176 in a broader fashion, to cover the remanufactured units. is consistent \V!th the Legislature's concern for protecting dealers. See id Hyundai"s additional argument' lack merit. In particular. Hyundai's claim that Darling's has no ba.'i' for ''reimbursement'" becau~e Hyundai promptly credited Darling's the full amount for the part and that if Darling's paid nothing for the parts. there is nothing to r~imburse must fall bccaLI'e it ignores the fact that Darling's did pay for the remanufactured umt,_ The fact that Hyundm promptly reimbursed Darling', for the payment does not change this fact or somehow exempt it from paying Darhng'> the full amount oF the payment due, i ~-the 94% markup. Fmally, Hyundai's attack on the Small Claims Judgment for basing its holding in part on how the vehide om1er \'v"Ould view the "arranty repairs, docs not change the outcome of this case. \Vhik the ~ourt agrees section 1176 does not mandate that the transaction be vie"ed from the perspective of the vehicle's owner, this does not mean scctwn l\76 do~s not appl} to the remanufac!Ured units. As discussed abme, the plain language of the starntc combmed \Vith the fact that there is no meaningful difference between the remanufactured units and "typical"' parts, the Law Court's interpretation of section 1176 in Ford /Uolor Co_ 1998, and the lcg1slative intent behind the Dealer> Act demonstrate that the remanufactured ur.its are subject to section 1176 and that the Small Claims Judgment reached the right rcsulL 9 Whether the District Court's Interpretation of Section 1176 lmpermissJbly Abrogates the Parties' Agreement that Hvundai is the Exclusive Prov1dcr of the Remanufdctured Radios Hyundai argues parts can be prcl~ided se~l!On 1176 does ~ot bar the parties from agreeing that certain by the manufacturer in,tead of the dealer. Indeed, the statute only requires a m:mufacturcr to reimburse a dealer for parts the dealer is "required" or ··permitted'' to ··provide·· for >wrranty repair. Hyundai argue,, a_, discussed above, that the parties agreed Hyundai 'WOllld provide the remanufactLJTed units, not Darling's. From this premi,e. Hyundai cites to case law arguing that absent a clear mandate from the !egislarure. the court should not mterfcrc with the private agreement of parties. Su General A-forors Corp. v. Darling's, 444 F.3d 98. 109 (l st Cir. 2006). Hyundai further argues that if the legislature had intended to require manufacturers to pay a markup on parl' they provide at no charge, it COllld have done 50, as evidenced by statute-, doing precisely that in other jurisdictwns. See fla. Stat.§ 320.696(3 )(c) ("If a licensee furnishes a part or component to a [dealer] at no cost to usc in pertorming repairs Wlder a ... warranty repair. the licensee shall compensate the dealer for the part or component in the 'ame manner as warranty parts compensation Wlder this subse~tion, le'" the dealer cost for the part-·); Va. Code. Ann.§ 46.2-1571(5) ("lfa manufacturer. furnishes a pan w a dealer at no cost for use by tbe dealer m performing work for 'Which the manufacturer ... is required to c<Jmpensate the dealer under this section, the manufacturer ... shall compensate the dealer for the part in the same manner as warranty parts compensation"). Theref(Jre, Hyundai argues the Small Claims Judgment's interpretauon of section !176 effectively reads this proviSiOn imo statute. even though the 10 Legi<lature has not taken any action to indicate it intended 10 "interfere with the barg;~ins that have been struck'' beh>;een manul'acturers and dealers. Hyundm's clmm that section 1174 would interfere with llyundai's contract "i1h Darlmg'~ 1S premi~ed on the notion that Hyundai, not Darling's, provided the remanufactured units under section 1176. As discussed in section II, A, .wpw, however, this argument is without merit. For purpo~es of 'ection 1176, Darling's '·provided" the remanufactured units_ Similarlv, Hnmdai's argwncnt that the Legislature would have explicitly required manufacrurers to pay a markup on parts they provided at no charge is based on the premise that Hyundai provided the remanulacturcd units at no charge. Again as diocuo-;ed in -;ection II, A, supru, Darlmg's did pay for the remanufacrured units in the same manner it paid fOr all parts used in warranty repairs. The fact that Hyunillli promptly reimbursed Darling's for the payment does not ch;~nge this tact. In addition, 10 \-f.R.S.A. § 1178 i' dear that Hyillldm and Darling's agreement is subject to the provisions of the Dealers Act. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1178 ("Written or oral agreements between a manufacrurer ... with a motor vehicle dealer including, but not limited to .. the franchise agreement .. policies and pro~edure agreemenls, bulletins or manuals .... and all other such agreements in which the manufacturer ... has any direct or indirect interest, are subject to this chapter")- In other word-;. the legislature detenninell the Dealers Act should modify Hytmdai's private agreements with dealers. llyundai recognizes as much when it stipulated that the average markup is 94% instead of the 40%, prw,ided in the Warranty Manual. Finally, it is 'Worth noting that in addinon to not being binding in Mamc. the Virgmia and Florida starutes Hyundai cites do require manufacturer> to pay a markup to dealer' on parts provided ;~t no cost when used m 11 warranty repairs, pwviding further e\·id~nce rhm the remanufacrured units warrant the 94% markup pa) ment C. W_het)1e[ the J)istr_ict Court's Interpretation of Section 117 6 Conflicts w1th Other ProvJsJons Hyundai argues that the parto exchange program at ,-,sue-wherein remanufactured units are quickly provided to veh1cle owners rather than the lengthier proces.< of >hipping the dd:Octive llmts to Hyundai, having Hyundai repair them, and then shipping them back to the Dealer-benefits Maine consumers by providing them a replacement part quickly. Indeed, llyundai notes that the Legi;latme has given tacit approval of parts exchange program by enl!cting leg"lation to lilcihtate them. In parllcular, Hy undai cites to 29-a \I.R. S.A. § 1803, which provides that Darling's is required "[to] allow a customer to inspect replaced parts and. _relum replaced parts to the cuswmer on request unless the facility is required to T€ll1TTI the parts to the manufacturer._ under a bona fide warranty or exchange amJngcmcnt." Based on this, Ilyundai argues the Small Claims Judgment's interpretation of section 1176 would effectively read parts e-;change programs out of law. While Hyundai does not explam how this would read parts exchange programs out of law, 1t is presumably due to the increased cost of paying the markup on parts exchanged therein. Here, Hyundai"s argument> are again without m~nL Nothing in the Small Claims Judgment's interpretation of section 1176 prohibits the use of parts exchange programs as recogni7ed by 29-a M.R.S.A. § 1803. Furthermore, while the Small Claims Judgment"s interpretanon of scctwn 1176 may make parts exchange programs more cxpcns1vc for Hyund.ai-and in turn dealers and customers-this consideration has nothing to do 'With the proper intcrprctatwn of section 1176 Section 1176 rcqmres manufacrurers to 12 reimburse dealers at the retail rate ~LJ.,lomarily charged-here equivalent to the dealer net price plus 94% markup. The effect> th11 may have on parts exchange programs-which are not part of the Dealers Act- do not alter the court's interpretation of 'ection 1176. 111. Conclusion The O!Slntt Court did not err in finding that wa!Tanty repairs invoh ing the remanufactured units arc subject to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1 176 and that llyundai was required to pay Darlmg's the 94% markup on the remanufactured Wlits. The plain language of sed ion 1!76 combined with the lack of a meaningful difference between the rcmanlll"actured Wlits and ''typical" parts, the Law Collrt' s interpretation of seCiion l l 76 in l·ord Mutor Co. !991!, and the legislati,·e intent behind the Dealers Act support this ruling. Furthermore. contrary to Hyllildai 's contentions, the Small interpretation and apph~ation agreemcm or conflict with court denies Hyundai" s Judgment" s of section 1176 did nut impermissibly abrogate the parties· mh~r ~I.R. Claim~ .<tatutes such as 2 9-a M_R.S.A. § 1803. Accordingly, the Ci\". P_ 760 appeal. PursuJnt to M.R Ci,, P_ 79(a), the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this Order by reference in the docket ~- jus~ Dated; January 20,2015 Michaela Murphy, Maiue Superior Court 13 -- Date Filed 113114 Kennebec County Docket No. AP-14-01 F Action: Small Cla1ms J. Murphy Darling's Hyundai Hyundai Motor America PlaintifFs Attorney Defendant's Attorney Judy Metcalf, Esq. PO Box 9 Brunswick, ME 04011-0009 BiAI'!i'lai'A MeCulel'leA LLP Brandon B1eglow, Esq_ World Trade Center East 2 Searsport Lane, Suite 300 Boston, MA 02210-2028 PatAeh 8tra·nSFiei!Je, Es~ (Withdrawn) DAe Feelerel 8tFeet BesteA, M,<\ 02110 -Frederick Badger, Jr., Esq -Joshua Randlett, Esq PO Box 2429 Bangor, ME 04402-2429 Date of Entry 1110114 Entire file (SC-13-287) transferred from Augusta D.C. on 1!3114. 1123114 Transcript, filed (1113/14). Hearing took place on October 2, 2013 with Judge Dobson. 1123114 Notice and Briefing Schedule Issued_ Copy to Judy Metcalf, Esq., Patnck Strawbridge, Esq_ 1128114 Letter re: attorney fee affidavit, filed 1/10/14. s/Metcalf, Esq. 2/21114 Defendant-Appellanfs Brief, filed_ s/Strawbridge, Esq 3125114 Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief, filed 3124/14. s/Palient, Esq. 4111114 Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief, filed 417/14. s!Strawbridge, Esq_ 6119114 Oral argument scheduled for 718/14 at 2 30 p m Notice of Hearing sent to Attys Metcalf and Strawbrtdge. 6125114 Joint Motion to Continue Hearing, filed. s/Metcalf, Esq. s!Bigelow, Esq 6/25114 ORDER, Murphy, J. Jo1nt Motion to Continue Hearing is GRANTED. The hearing scheduled for 7/8/14 will be continued and rescheduled for the next available hearing date at the Court's convenience. 6/25/14 Oral argument scheduled for 9!3114 at 2:30p.m. Notice of Hearing sent to Attys Metcalf and Strawbridge. Page 1 AP-14-01 9/3/14 Oral argument held, J. Murphy presiding_ Noreen Pallen!, Esq., Patrick Strawbndge, Esq and Brandon Bigelow, Esq. Tape 1898, Index 2716-3540 Under advisement 12/16/14 Entry of Appearance, as counsel for Defendant Hyundat, liled 12/12/14 s/Badger, Esq. s/Randlett. Esq_ 12/16/14 Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. for Defendant Hyundai, tiled s/Strawbridge, Esq 1/21/15 ORDER. Murphy, J_ (1/20/15) The Court denies Hyundai's M.RCiv P_ 760 appeal. Copy to Attys Metcalf, Bigelow, and Badger. Copy to Repositories 1/22/15 File returned to Augusta D.C. Page 2 Date Filed 113114 Kennebec County Docket No. AP-14-02 F Action Small Clajms Darling's Hyundai Hyundai Motor America Plaintiffs Attorney Defendant's Attorney Judy Metcalf. Esq. PO Box 9 Brunsw1ck. ME 04011-0009 Patrie!\ StrawBriElge, Es~. (Withdrawn) BiAgAam MeGceteAeA LLP OFie FeEleFal Street BeslsFI MA 02110 -Frederick Badger. Jr.. Esq. -Joshua Randlett. Esq. PO Box 2429 Bangor, ME 04402-2429 Date of Entry 1/10/14 Entire file (SC-13-289) transferred from Augusta D C. on 113114. 1/23/14 Transcnpt. filed (1113/14) Hearing took place on October 2. 2013 with Judge Dobson. 1/28/14 Nolice and Bnefing Schedule issued on 1123/14. Copy to Judy Metcalf, Esq., Patrick Strawbridge, Esq. 1128/14 Letter re· attorney fee affidavit, filed 1/10114. s!Metcalf, Esq. 2121/14 Defendant-Appellant's Brief, filed. s!Strawbridge, Esq 3125114 Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief filed 3/24/14. s/Patient. Esq. 4/11114 Defendant-Appellanfs Reply Bnef. filed 4!7114 s!Strawbridge. Esq. 6/19114 Oral argument scheduled for 7/8/14 at 2:30p.m. Notice of Hearing sent to Attys Metcalf and Strawbridge. 6/25/14 Joint Motion to Continue Hearing. filed. s!Metcalf. Esq 6125/14 ORDER, Murphy. J Jo1nt Motion to Continue Hearing is GRANTED. The hearing scheduled for 718/14 will be continued and rescheduled for the next available hearing date at the Court's convenience. 6/25/14 Oral argument scheduled for 9/3114 at 2:30pm. No~ce of Hearing eent to Attye Metcalf and Strawbridge. s!Bigelow, Esq. Page 1 AP-14-02 913114 Oral argument held, J Murphy presrding_ Noreen Patient. Esq., Patnck Strawbridge, Esq and Brandon Bigelow, Esq. Tape 1898, Index 2716-3540. Under advisement 12/16114 Entry of Appearance, as counsel for Defendant Hyundai, filed 12112114. s/Badger, Esq. s/Randlett, Esq. 12/16114 Notice of \lllithdrawal of Counsel, for Defendant Hyundai, filed. s/Strawbndge, Esq. 1121/15 ORDER. Murphy, J. (1/20/15) The Court denres Hyundai's M.R Crv_ P 760 appeaL Copy to Attys Metcalf, Bigelow, and Badger. Copy to Repositories. 1/22115 File returned to Augusta D.C. Page 2 AP-14-02 Date Filed 1/3/14 Docket No_ AP-14-03 Kennebec County F Action: Small Clajms Darling's Hyunda1 Hyundai Motor America - - - Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney Judy Metcalf Esq. PO Box 9 Brunswick, ME 04011-0009 Patrie!\ 81FaNSFill§le, Es~. (Withdrawn) BiA(:)Raffi MeGtdeReA LLP 0Ae Fe!leFal S!Feet BeslaA, MA 92110 -Frederick Badger, Jr., Esq -Joshua Randlett, Esq_ PO Box 2429 Bangor, ME 04402-2429 Date of Entry 1/10/14 Entire file (SC-13-290) transferred from Augusta D_C on 113/14. 1/23/14 Transcnpt, filed (1/13/14). Hearing took place on October 2, 2013 With Judge Dobson. 1/28/14 Notice and Briefing Schedule issued on 1/23/14_ Copy to Judy Metcalf, Esq, Patrick Strawbndge, Esq. 1/28114 Letter re: attorney fee affidavit, filed 1/1 0/14. s/Metcalf, Esq. 2121/14 Defendant-Appellanrs Brief, filed 3/25/14 Plaintiff-Appellee's Briel, filed 3/24/14_ s/Patient, Esq. 4/11/14 Defendant-Appellanrs Reply Brief, filed 4nl14. s/Strawbridge, Esq. 6/19/14 Oral argument scheduled for 716114 at 2:30 p_m_ Notice of Hearing sent to Attys Metcalf and Strawbridge. 6/25/14 Joint Mallon to Continue Hearing, filed. s/Metcalf. Esq. s/Bigelow, Esq. 6/25/14 ORDER, Murplly, J. Joint Motion to Continue Hearing is GRANTED. The hearing sdleduled for 718/14 will be continued and rescheduled for ttm next available hearing date at l:tie Court's convenience 6/25/14 Oral argument scheduled for 9/3114 at 2:30p.m. Notice of Hearing sent to Attys Metcalf and Strawbridge. s/Strawbridge, Esq_ Page 1 AP-14-03 9/3/14 Oral argument held, J. Murphy presiding. Noreen Patient, Esq., Patnck Strawbridge, Esq. and Brandon Bigelow, Esq. Tape 1696, Index 2716-3540 Under advisement. 12/16/14 Entry of Appearance. as counsel for Defendant Hyundai, iiled 12112/14. s/Badger. Esq s/Randlett. Esq. 12/16/14 Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. for Defendant Hyundai, iiled. s/Strawbridge. Esq. 1121/15 ORDER. Murphy, J (1120115) The Court denies Hyundai's M.R.Crv. P 76D appeal. Copy to Attys Metcalf. Brgelow, and Badger. Copy to Repositories. 1/22115 File returned to Augusta D.C. Page 2 AP-14-03

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