Bennett V. LP Murray & Sons, Inc.
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STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.
SUPERIOR COURT
DOCKET NO. CV-09-52Q
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MARCELA BENNETT,
Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF WAINO RAY,
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Plaintiff
ORDER
v.
L.P. MURRAY & SONS, INC.;
MAINE LIFE CARE RETIREMENT
COMMUNITY d/b/a! PIPER SHORES,
and LIFE CARE SERVICES LLC.
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on a motion to dismiss by Defendant L.P.
Murray & Sons, Inc. in accordance with M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit, brought by the personal representative of decedent Waino Ray
("Plaintiff'), arises from a slip and fall that occurred on February 2, 2008 at a retirement
community located in Scarborough, Maine. The retirement community is owned by
Defendant Maine Life Care Retirement Community d/b/a! Piper Shores and managed by
Defendant Life Care Services, LLC (collectively referred to as "Piper Shores"). At all
material times Ray was a resident at Piper Shores. Defendant L.P. Murray & Sons, Inc.
("Murray") is a business engaged in sanding and snow removal. Murray contracted with
Piper Shores to provide the retirement community's sanding and snow removal.
The facts and allegations in the complaint state the following:
",
On the evening of February l, 2008, Murray sanded Piper Shores walkways, but
did not sand again on the morning of February 2, 2008, despite being aware that freezing
rain and snow would make the area icy and slippery for the residents of Piper Shores. At
approximately 9:00 am Ray fell on an unsanded icy walkway outside the entrance to the
main building and struck his head. Ray was aided by friends and employees of Piper
Shores, but refused transport to the hospital. After resting in the main reception Ray
returned to his apartment and was subsequently witnessed to have an altered mental state.
Emergency services were then requested to transport him to the hospital. At the hospital
Ray was unresponsive and diagnosed with a subdural hematoma with midline shift that
was fatal without surgical options. Ray died on February 4, 2008 from his head injury.
Plaintiff has sued the Defendants for negligence and wrongful death. Plaintiff
alleges that by failing to properly sand Piper Shores Defendant Murray breached its duty
to protect the residents from falling on ice or snow and to maintain the premises in a safe
and reasonable condition, thus causing Ray's injuries. Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendant Piper Shores was negligent as it failed to ensure that the walkways were
properly sanded prior to the time they would be used by the elderly residents of Piper
Shores. The Plaintiff has also brought a wrongful death claim based on the Defendants
alleged negligence.
,
Murray does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to bring a claim for negligence
against Piper Shores. However, Murray argues that since it contracted its services to
Piper Shores only, it did not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff. Therefore, Murray
contends, the Plaintiff has no basis for a negligence claim as to Murray.
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about September 21, 2009, the Plaintiff filed a complaint for negligence
and wrongful death. After being served, Defendant Piper Shores filed an answer on
October 28, 2009, and Defendant Murray filed an answer on November 3,2009. On or
about November 30, 2009, Murray filed a motion to dismiss with an incorporated
memorandum of law. On December 2, 2009, the Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss. On December 9, 2009, Murray filed a reply to Plaintiffs opposition. l
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review.
"A motion to dismiss "tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Livonia v.
Town ofRome, 1998 ME 39,
~
5, 707 A.2d 83, 85. In determining whether a motion to
dismiss should be granted, the court considers "the allegations in the complaint in relatio
to any cause of action that may reasonably be inferred from the complaint." Saunders v.
Tisher, 2006 ME 94,
~
8, 902 A.2d 830, 832. The facts alleged are treated as admitted
and are viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Jd The court should
.
dismiss a claim only "w,hen it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief under any set of facts that he [or she] might prove in support of his [or her] claim."
Jd (quoting Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001 ME 169,
~
5,785 A.2d 1244, 1246).
I Although not pertinent to the pending motion before the court, subsequent to the motion to
dismiss filings, Defendant Piper Shores filed a cross claim against Defendant Murray for
contribution, indemnity, and negligence. Defendant Murray answered the cross-claims on
January 19,2010.
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II.
Negligence
Murray has moved to dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiff has failed to plead facts
that could establish that Murray owed a duty to the Plaintiff, thus the negligence claim
cannot stand.
To sustain a claim for negligence "a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
showing duty, breach, causation, and damages." Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, 'il
14,930 A.2d 1016, 1020; see also Dunham v. HTH Corp., 2005 ME 53, 'il8, 870 A.2d
577, 579. A party has a duty of care when he or she "is under an obligation for the
benefit ofa particular plaintiff." Quadrino v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 588 A.2d
303,304 (Me. 1991). Whether a duty of care exists is a legal question. Pelletier v. Fort
Kent GolfClub, 662 A.2d 220, 222 (Me. 1995). "A defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw on a negligence claim if that defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff."
Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd Partn., 2001 ME 37, 'il1O, 767 A.2d 310,313.
The court must now determine whether the Plaintiff has adequately plead facts
that Murray owed a duty of care to Ray and the other residents of Piper Shores. Saunders
v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, 'il 8, 902 A.2d 830, 832 (noting that when ruling on a motion to
dismiss a court must determine whether "any cause ofaction [] may reasonably be
inferred from the complaint") (emphasis added). Murray did not owe Ray a duty as a
possessor of land. See Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, 'il25, 930 A. 2d 1016, 1023
(citing Denman, 1998 ME 12, 'il'il5, 7,704 A.2d at 413-14). It is not disputed that Murray
did not own the walkway in question. Murray's only relation to the property was through
the contract with Piper Shores to provide its snow removal and sanding. Murray did not
occupy or manifest an intent to control the property simply by agreeing to these contract
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serVIces. See id? Therefore, the court finds, as a matter of law, that Murray did not owe
a duty to Ray under a premises liability theory.
However, despite being unable to sustain a negligence claim on the basis of
premises liability, the court concludes that, when viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff as required at this stage in the proceedings, the Plaintiff has
adequately plead a claim that Ray was an intended beneficiary of the contract between
Piper Shores and Murray.
The Law Court has stated that for a plaintiff to prevail on an intended beneficiary
theory he or she must show that the property owner intended that he or she receive an
enforceable benefit under the contract. Denman v. Peoples Heritage Bank, Inc., 1998
ME 12, ~ 9, 704 A.2d 411, 414-15. "It is not enough that [the plaintiff] benefited or
could have benefited from the performance of the contract. The intent must be clear and
definite, whether it is expressed in the contract itself or in the circumstances surrounding
its execution." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
At this stage in the proceedings, notably without having the benefit of the contract
between Piper Shores and Murray to examine in accordance with M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),3
the court cannot say as a matter of law that the Plaintiff as a resident of the retirement
community was not an intended beneficiary of the contract between Piper Shores and
For example, in Alexander, the Law Court cited to Denman in its holding that the defendant
plowing contractor did not owe a duty to the plaintiff simply because he was under a contract to
clear the road, nor was there "a duty based on a failure to affirmatively act because [the plowing
contractor] did not create the dangerous situation ... ; rather the danger was created by the natural
accumulation of ice and snow." Alexander, 2007 ME 108, n.13, 930 A. 2d at 1024 (citing
Denman, 1998 ME 12, ~~ 5, 7,704 A.2d at413-14).
3 M.R. Civ. P. 12(b) states that if, on a motion to dismiss, "matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
2
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Murray. When viewing the allegations in the complaint4 the court concludes that the
Plaintiff has adequately plead a negligence cause of action based on an intended
beneficiary theory. See Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94,
~
8, 902 A.2d 830, 832. More
evidence is needed to determine whether the contract between the defendants, or
circumstances surrounding its execution, indicate a clear intention to create in the
Plaintiff enforceable rights.
The court need not address Murray's motion to dismiss in relation to the wrongful
death claim as that claim is contingent upon a finding of negligence. See 18-A M.R.S.A.
§ 2-804.
CONCLUSION
As the standard for a motion to dismiss mandates that all facts must be viewed in
a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the court concludes that the Plaintiff has adequately
plead a negligence cause of action as to Defendant Murray. As such, Murray's motion to
dismiss is DENIED.
The court is able to infer a negligence cause of action from the complaint based on the following
statements:
• ~ 6: Piper Shores "had a contract with Defendant L.P. Murray to provide services
including sanding and salting the walkways around the buildings of the Piper Shores
facility used by the elderly residents to prevent the walkways from becoming slippery
from ice and snow."
• ~ 11: "In accordance with its contract for sanding and salting, Defendant L.P. Murray
provided sanding services during the evening hours of February 1, 2008, but did not sand
again during the morning hours of February 2, 2008 including up to 9:00 am, despite
being aware that rain would make the icy walkways more slippery and that residents of
Piper Shores would be using the walkways to: get from building to building; walk their
dog or for recreational purposes."
• ~ 20: "Defendant L.P. Murray had a duty to properly sand the premises of Piper Shores to
protect the residents from falling on ice or snow and Defendants Piper Shores and Life
Care Services had a duty to maintain the premises in a safe and reasonable manner for the
use of the residents of Piper Shores."
(See also Complaint ~~ 23-25.)
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6
The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
DATED: April 1, 2010
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7
. Wheeler, JustIce
<OF COURTS
berland County
O. Box 287
Maine 04112-0287
WENDELL LARGE ESQ
RICHARDSON WHITMAN LARGE
PO BOX 9545
PORTLAND ME 04112-9545
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BADGER
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NELSON LARKINS ESQ
PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY
PO BOX 9546
PORTLAND ME 04112-9546
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J. Box 287
Maine 04112-0287
MARK RANDALL ESQ
PO BOX 17915
PORTLAND ME 04112
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STATE OF T\IIAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.
SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO: CV-09 520
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STATE OF MA\NE
Cumberland, ss, Clerk's Office
MARCELA BENNETT,
Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF WAINO RAY,
DEC 01 2011
RECEIVED
Plaintiff,
DECISION and ORDER
V.
LP MURRAY & SONS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants
Before the court is Defendants', Maine Care Retirement Community,
d/b/a Piper Shores, and Life Care Services, LLC, Motion for Summary Judgment
on Counts I (negligence) and II (wrongful death) of the Plaintiff's Complaint.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit, brought by the personal representative of decedent Waino
Ray ("Plaintiff"), arises from a slip and fall that occurred on February 2, 2008 at a
retirement community located in Scarborough, Maine. The retirement
community is owned by Defendant Maine Life Care Retirement Community
d/b/a/ Piper Shores and managed by Defendant Life Care Services, LLC
(collectively referred to as "Defendants" or "Piper Shores"). At all material times
Ray was a resident at Piper Shores. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <JI 3.)
Piper Shores contracted with L.P. Murray & Sons, Inc. for plowing snow
from the building, fire lanes, parking areas and sidewalks, spreading salt/ sand
and salt as required on the premises, snow blowing and shoveling walkways.
(Defs.' Stat. Facts <JI 5.) Under this contract, L.P. Murray would treat Piper Shores
1
if there was a storm, if they were called by Piper Shores' security, or if called by
Cape Elizabeth Public Works. (Defs.' Stat. Facts<[ 9.)
Piper Shores' maintenance and security staff were also responsible for
snow and ice removal. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 12.) The inspection procedure for
when either maintenance staff or security staff on the overnight or weekend
shifts came on duty was to ensure that the emergency exists, entrances, and exits
were clear. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 16.) This inspection was to occur from the
exterior. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 17.) After this was complete the individual would
do an inter~or inspection and a vehicle inspection. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 18.) If
there is an emergency when the security guard begins his or her shift, the
individual may forego the inspection until the emergency has been dealt with.
(Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 20.)
On the evening of February 1, 2008, L.P. Murray went to Piper Shores and
spread a salt/ sand mixture on most areas, including around the front entrance.
(Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 22.) On February 2, 2008, security guard Richard Preston
arrived for his shift at 7:45 AM. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 25.) He first responded to an
emergency. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 28.) He then did interior rounds and checked
the entrances and exits. (Defs.' Stat. Facts<[ 29.) He then conducted a vehicle
patrol of the premises. (Defs.' Stat. Facts<[ 31.) At 8:55AM he received a call on
the radio of an emergency at the front entrance. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 31.)
Upon arriving, the security guard was informed that Mr. Ray had fallen
on the ice in front of the building. (Defs.' Stat. Facts <[ 34.) After the emergency
was under control, the security guard went outside to observe the area where
Mr. Ray fell. (Defs.' Stat. Facts<[ 38.) He discovered ice on both sides of the front
entrance that was difficult to see but visible from certain angles. (Defs.' Stat.
2
Facts
<IT
42.) He then salted the area and put up yellow caution signs. (Defs.' Stat.
Facts qrqr 45-46.) Later that day, the security guard and other staff responded to
an emergency in Mr. Ray's apartment. (Defs.' Stat. Facts q[ 49.)
Emergency
response was contacted and Mr. Ray was brought to the hospital where he later
passed away. (Defs.' Stat. Facts qrqr 50-51.)
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Piper Shores was negligent by failing
to ensure that the walkways were properly sanded prior to the time they would
be used by the elderly residents of Piper Shores. The Plaintiff has also brought a
wrongful death claim based on the Defendants alleged negligence.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
M.R. Civ. P. 56( c); see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77,
<IT
4, 770 A.2d
653. An issue of "fact exists when there is sufficient evidence to require a factfinder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Inkell v.
Livingston, 2005 ME 42, q[ 4, 869 A.2d 745 (quoting Lever v. Acadia Hasp. Corp.,
2004 ME 35, q[ 2, 845 A.2d 1178).
This action in negligence and wrongful death is based on the alleged
negligence of Piper Shores for failure to exercise reasonable care in preventing
the iced condition of the brick walkway on which Mr. Ray slipped and fell,
causing his death. "To survive a defendant's motion for a summary judgment in
a negligence action, a plaintiff 'must establish a prima facie case for each of the
four elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages."' Davis v. R C
& Sons Paving, Inc., 2011 ME 88, ,-r10, 26 A.3d 787 (quoting Quirion v. Geroux, 2008
ME 41, ,-r 9, 942 A.2d 670). The Defendants appear to challenge both the scope of
3
duty it owed and whether or not there was a breach of that duty. The existence
of a duty of care is a question of law. Laurence v. Howard Sports-Topsham, 2009
Me. Super. LEXIS 129, *10 (May 5, 2009). "Whether a duty was breached and
whether a defendant's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances are
questions of fact for the jury." Budzko v. One City Center Assoc. LP, 2001 ME 37, err
10, 767 A.2d 210 (2001).
"A business owner owes a 'positive duty of exercising reasonable care in
providing reasonably safe premises ... when it knows or should have known of a
risk to customers on the premises."' Budzko, 2001 ME 37, err 11, 767 A.2d 210
(citing Currier v. Toys'R'Us, Inc., 680 A.2d 453, 455-56 (Me. 1996)). Maine courts
have on many occasions taken the opportunity to define, limit and restrict the
common law duty of care in negligence actions related to winter weather.
Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, err 19, 930 A.2d 1016 (2007). "[The courts] have
held that an owner or occupier of land has no duty to remove natural
accumulations of ice and snow with reference to persons passing by the
premises, or in landlord-tenant relationship." Isaacson v. Husson College, 297 A.2d
98, 103 (Me. 1972) (internal citations removed). However, the Law Court
declined to extend this reasoning to the business-invitee and possessor-ofland situation. "[T]he mere fact that snow and ice conditions are prevalent
during the course of our severe Maine winters is not in and of itself sufficient
rationale for the insulation of the possessor of land from liability to his business
invitees." Id. Where a landowner has a duty to protect against hazardous
conditions, it does not make sense to remove that duty simply because the
hazardous condition is created by snow and/ or ice. Alexander, 2007 ME 108, err
24, 930 A.2d 1016.
4
The Defendants cite section 7-64 of the Maine Jury Instruction Manual as
stating the elements that a plaintiff must establish to prove a negligence claim
when snow and/ or ice is involved. Those instructions state that an ordinary
duty of care is required and that the plaintiff must prove (1) that there was an
accumulation of snow/ ice that was the proximate cause of the injury, (2) that the
snow I ice was present for a time of sufficient duration prior to plaintiff's injury to
enable a reasonably prudent person to discover and remedy, or warn of, it, and
(3) that the defendant knew of the condition, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known of the condition, and did not correct it or warn of it.
Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual§ 7-64 (4th ed. 2011).
The case law makes clear that a landowner continues to owe a duty of care
to business invitees even when a hazardous condition is created by a natural
accumulation of snow and/ or ice. The remaining question is whether there was
a breach of that duty. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has not elicited
enough evidence during discovery to prove that the ice on which Mr. Ray
slipped and fell was present for a sufficient time to enable the Defendants to
discover it or to prove that, had the security guard completed his inspections
differently, he would have discovered the ice before Mr. Ray fell. The question
of breach is typically a question of fact for the jury.
It is undisputed that the area where Mr. Ray fell was at least partially
covered with ice at the time of his fall. (Defs. Stat. Facts <JI<JI 39, 40, 42, 43.) At oral
argument, the Defendants claimed that it is purely speculation to state that had
the security officer examined the entrances and exits from the exterior that he
would have discovered the ice before Mr. Ray fell. However, the security officer
testified that the ice would have been discovered had he done an exterior check.
5
(Pl. Stat. Facts <JI 41.) The Plaintiff also put forth evidence that the "first thing" to
be done was an exterior check unless there was an emergency but that after the
emergency was cleared, the exterior inspection should be completed. (Pl. Stat.
Facts <JI 25.)
It is also undisputed that Piper Shores was aware that this area "could have
patchy accumulation which was usually broken up with the application of salt."
(Defs.' Stat. Facts <JI 41; Pl Stat. Facts <JI35; Defs.' Reply Stat. Facts <JI 35.) However,
the extent to which the Defendants "should have known" that this area was often
covered with ice is disputed. (Pl. Stat. Facts <JI 34; Defs.' Reply Stat. Facts <JI 34.)
The Plaintiff cites to testimony of Mr. Stilphen to state that the area in question
was subject to recurrent ice formation from run-off from melting snow and from
the roof area that lacked gutters. (Pl. Stat. Facts <JI 34.) Furthermore, the
testimony of Mr. Murray, stating that he was instructed not to use sand in this
area even after he explained why sand was necessary, may be evidence of
breach. (Pl. Stat. Facts <JI 36.)
It is also disputed whether the weather conditions on February 2, 2008 were
such that the Piper Shores should have known that the recurrent condition
would potentially exist. (Pl. Stat. Facts <JI 49; Defs.' Reply Stat. Facts <JI 49.) At
oral argument, the Defendants stated that the inspections completed throughout
the day reveal no other ice on the grounds of the facility. This evidence could
support a jury's finding that because ice formed in this area when no other areas
had ice, the Defendants should have inspected it more frequently or in the first
instance.
These are genuine issues of material fact that must be determined by a fact
6
finder. Also, the court finds that there is sufficient evidence on which a jury
could make a finding of breach. Therefore, resolution of the case on summary
judgment inappropriate.
The entry is:
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of the
Plaintiff's Complaint is denied.
DATE: December 1, 2011
J
A. Wheeler
Justice, Superior Court
Mark Randall Esqobo Plaintiff
Erin Berry Esq-obo Defendants Maine Life Care
and Life Care Services
7
tN/
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.
SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO: CV-09-520
. ~·· 'r J
r
MARCELA BENNETT,
Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF W AINO RAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
LP MURRAY & SONS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants
Before the court is the Marcella Bennett's Motion for a New Trial on the
grounds that no credible evidence supports the jury's verdict and the substantial
justice has not been done. In 2009, Ms. Bennett filed a complaint against Piper
Shores asserting negligence and wrongful death on behalf of her father's estate.
The court conducted a jury trial in June 2012. The verdict form required the jury
to first determine the question, "Were the Defendants Life Care Community, Inc.,
d/b/a Piper Shores and Life Care Services, LLC negligent and, if so, was their
negligence a legal cause of Waino Ray's death?" The jury responded in the
negative, and returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Without a transcript and relying on the deposition testimony used in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, plaintiff argues that the
evidence is uncontroverted on the issues of the duty to Waino Ray and breach of
that duty. Plaintiff contends that the uncontroverted testimony includes
admissions that (1) defendants have a duty to check walkways for ice each
morning, (2) on February 2, 2008, the defendants did not check the walkways
including the brick walkway next to the main entrance, (3) the defendants
1
allowed the ice to remain in the walkway, and (4) these actions of defendant
resulted in Mr. Ray falling on the ice and suffering a fatal head injury.
The Defendants, Maine Care Retirement Community, d/b/a Piper Shores,
and Life Care Services, LLC, (Piper Shores), counter that (1) the plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate any basis for claiming that the verdict was clearly and
manifestly wrong, and (2) there is credible evidence that supports the jury's
verdict and it would be inappropriate to take away the jury's duty and right to
decide the case.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Bennett's argues that the evidence did not support the jury's verdict,
and that unless the jury acted with bias, prejudice, or improper influence, or has
made some mistake of fact or law, it could not have rationally returned a verdict
for the defendants because the evidence on negligence adduced by the plaintiff
was uncontroverted.
In order to reach its verdict, the jury only had to conclude that the plaintiff
had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Piper Shores was
negligent. Even if much or all of the plaintiff's evidence was uncontroverted the
jury was not required to accept the plaintiff's version of the events if reasonable
inferences would support an alternative conclusion. Ma v. Bryan, 2010 ME 55, err
8, 997 A.2d 755. Based on the entirety of the evidence admitted at trial, the jury
may have reasonably inferred that the defendants' actions were not negligent. A
jury is permitted to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Garland v.
Roy, 2009 ME 86, err 17, 976 A.2d 940, 945. The difficulty in obtaining a new trial
pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 59(a) is "precisely because 'a fact-finder, whether it be a
jury or a court, is not required to believe witnesses, even if the testimony of
2
witnesses, be they experts or lay witnesses, is not disputed.'" Dionne v. LeClerc,
2006 ME 34, err 15, 896 A.2d 923, 929. In the particular case at bar, the plaintiff's
chief difficulty is that in her arguments she has not considered the evidence in its
entirety nor has she established that the jury was compelled to find in her favor
on each element of her claim.
Although the parties had stipulated that Waino Ray fell on ice and the
resulting head injury from that fall on February 2, 2008 caused his death on
February 4, 2008, Ms. Bennett still has the burden of proving negligence.
"Whether a duty was breached and whether a defendant's conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances are questions of fact for the jury." Budzko v.
One City Center Assoc. LP, 2001 ME 37, err 10, 767 A.2d 210 (2001). And, even if the
jury could have reached a different result, the court cannot conclude there was
no credible evidence to support the jury's verdict.
Under Maine law, the owner of property has a duty to use reasonable care
to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition in light of the totality of
the existing circumstances. However, a property owner does not guarantee the
absolutely safety of its premises; its duty is to use ordinary case to ensure that the
premises are reasonably safe, guarding against all reasonably foreseeable
dangers. To prove negligence where snow and ice are involved, Ms. Bennett was
required to prove at trial that it is more likely than not that: (1) there was an
accumulation of ice on the premises that was a cause of Mr. Ray's injuries; (2) the
ice condition had been present for a time of sufficient duration prior to Mr. Ray's
injury to enable a reasonably prudent person to discover and remedy or warn of
it; and (3) Piper Shores knew of the ice condition and did not correct or warn of
it, or did not know of the ice condition but in the exercise of reasonable case
3
should have known of and corrected or wamed of the condition. See Alexander,
Maine Jury Instruction Manual§ 7-64 (4th ed. 2011). With the exception of the first
element, Ms. Bennett has failed to demonstrate that the jury was compelled to
find in her favor on each of the second and third elements of her claim. See Ma v.
Bryan, 2010 ME 55, 9I 6, 997 A.2d at 758.
Although the parties had stipulated that Waino Ray fell on ice and the
resulting head injury from that fall on February 2, 2008 caused his death on
February 4, 2008, Ms. Bennett still has the burden of proving negligence.
"Whether a duty was breached and whether a defendant's conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances are questions of fact for the jury." Budzko v.
One City Center Assoc. LP, 2001 ME 37, 9I 10, 767 A.2d 210 (2001). And, even if the
jury could have reached a different result, the court cannot conclude there was
no credible evidence to support the jury's verdict.
Reviewing all of the evidence in its entirety and in a light most favorable
to the verdict, Provencher v. Faucher, 2006 ME 9, 9I9I 2, 6, 898 A.2d 404, 405, 406,
the court concludes that the jury could have reasoned that although there was an
accumulation of ice on the walkway at Piper Shores that was the cause of Mr.
Ray's injuries, either (1) the ice condition had not been present for a time of
sufficient duration prior to Mr. Ray's injuries to enable a reasonable person to
discover and remedy or warn of it or (2) Piper Shores did not know of the ice
condition and could not have not have known of and corrected or warned of the
condition. Given the timeline of the events that unfolded on the late evening of
February 1 and early morning hours of February 2, the jury was not compelled to
find the second and third elements of negligence in plaintiff's favor.
4
Here, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Piper Shores did not
know of the ice condition on the morning of February 2, 2008, until after Mr. Ray
fell. The jury may have concluded that Piper Shores was exercising reasonable
care on the morning of February 2 in light of the testimony of Richard Preston,
Leland Murray and Lou Miller. Based on their testimony, the jury could have
found that the surface of the accident site was maintained and treated between 8
and 10 p.m. on the evening of February 1, that at that time the precipitation was
rain, and that the temperature was warming. The jury could have also found
that there was no need to return to treat the surface at Piper Shores during the
night and the next morning because the precipitation had stopped and the
temperature went well above freezing.
The jury could also have found that Piper Shores' was acting reasonably
by establishing priorities to ensure the safety of its residents, and that these
priorities were to ensure that the roads in and out of the community were open
for emergencies and that emergency exits remained open so emergency
personnel and residents could enter and exit buildings. The jury could have
found that the area where Mr. Ray fell was not a priority location. The jury could
also have found that Mr. Preston, the maintenance and security staff person who
came on duty at 7:45a.m. on the morning of February 2, acted with reasonable
care when he first attended to an emergency call, and then followed the
established priorities by completing his interior rounds of checking that the
emergency exits were clear, and by beginning to conduct his vehicle rounds to
check the exterior of the building. Unfortunately, he was interrupted by a radio
call for a fallen resident (Mr. Ray) before he could complete his exterior rounds.
The jury could have found that under all these circumstances, including the
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weather on February 1 and 2, the rising temperatures, the place of the fall was
not a priority area, the location of sand and salt barrels including one near the
front entrance adjacent to the site of Mr. Ray's fall, and the emergency rounds
performed by Mr. Preston on the morning of February 2, that Piper Shores'
conduct was reasonable and the defendants did not breach their duty to Mr. Ray.
The jury was not required to accept the evidence of plaintiff's safety
expert on the issues of the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct or the duty
owed to Mr. Ray by the defendants. The jury could have considered the policies
and procedures of Piper Shores and how they were carried out on February 1
and 2 and concluded that Piper Shores did not act negligently. The jury was not
compelled to find negligence in light of the entirety of the evidence.
Finally, although Bennett's motion for a new trial asserted that the jury's
verdict must have been due to prejudice, bias, passion, or mistake of fact, Bennett
has pointed to nothing in the record that might demonstrate prejudice other than
the fact that the verdict was not in her favor. The "record is entirely devoid of
any indication that the jury reached its verdict on any improper bias, and in the
absence of 'any verifiable external manifestations' of such impropriety," this
court must accept the verdict. Ma v. Bryan, 2010 ME 55, at<][ 9, 997 A. 2d at 760.
Accordingly, the court concludes that there is no evidence on the record of
any jury bias, prejudice, or misconduct; that there is no evidence to support a
suggestion that the jury failed to follow the law; and that the jury's verdict is
supportable by the entirety of the evidence.
The entry is:
Motion for a New Trial DENIED.
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July 31, 2012
Plaintiff-Mark Randall Esq
Defendants (Remaining)- Nelson Larkins Esq
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