State of Maine V. Cameron

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STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss. UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET PORTLAND Q.ocket No. CR-11-5783/t I 1/M k STATE OF MAINE v. MATTHEW CAMERON ) ) ) ) ) ) c {Af() ~ I C)/ I 1/ ;)._0 II ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE This matter came before the court on December 15, 211 for hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, dated September 9, 2011. Defendant appeared with his attorney, Matthew Nichols. Assistant District Attorney Tracy Leadbetter represented the State. Defendant is charged with operating under the influence on August 30, 2011. The motion asserts that the police officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle, that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to subject Defendant to field sobriety testing, that Defendant's Miranda rights were violated, and that his statements were involuntarily made. At the hearing, Attorney Nichols focused Defendant's challenge on the constitutionality of the stop, and did not pursue the other grounds asserted. The pertinent facts are as follows: At approximately 11 :30 p.m. on August 30, 2011, Lieutenant Hutcheson of the Portland Police Department was driving up Market Street near the Regency Hotel in Portland's Old Port. The officer was driving a Ford Expedition EL, an oversized SUV equipped with police lights and clearly marked as a police vehicle. ::=:; c c ¢ r-: ·~ Lieutenant Hutcheson testified that while he was in his vehicle he ~~bser~_~P::. Defendant walking down Market Street. Defendant appeared to be stagge~g. '[lJ~· . . Lieutenant testified that Defendant was walking in a staggering manner, "nota normal· . walking gait," such that the Lieutenant believed him to be inebriated. The Llfiuteriahi~; ~c observed Defendant walk to a parked truck and open and shut the driver's side~or. ~e saw Defendant stagger around to the passenger side, letting in a female passenger. He then observed the truck come out from Market Street and make a left onto Midcfle Street. The Lieutenant made a u-tum on Middle and proceeded to follow the truck. He was aware that at that time of night it is primarily drinking establishments and restaurants that are open in the Old Port. Based on his observation of Defendant's staggering gait considered in the totality of the circumstances, the Lieutenant decided to effect a stop, as he was concerned that Defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol. He did not engage his flashing blue lights on Middle Street, however, but waited until Defendant made a right tum from Union onto Fore Street before pulling him over. Lieutenant Hutcheson testified that he waited until that moment before stopping Defendant's vehicle because the roadside and traffic conditions on Fore Street were more conducive to field sobriety testing. The Lieutenant noted that Defendant had failed to signal when he turned right onto Fore Street, but added that Defendant's failure to utilize his tum signal did not factor into his decision to stop Defendant's vehicle, a decision he had made upon seeing Defendant take the wheel after staggering down the street toward his truck. The standard governing automotive stops is well-established: "[A] police officer must have an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. The officer's suspicion that any of these circumstances exist must be objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances." See, e.g., State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ~ 8, 960 A.2d 321,323 (citing State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ~ 11,814 A.2d 984, 987). Applying this standard, the court concludes that Lieutenant Hutcheson had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle. Rather than acting on mere speculation, see id. at~ 11, 960 A.2d at 323 (noting that "[t]he only requirement we have imposed on the reasonable articulable suspicion standard is that an officer's suspicion be more than mere speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch"), the Lieutenant's observations were such as would lead a reasonable police officer to suspect that the vehicle was being operated by an impaired driver. The court finds credible Lieutenant Hutcheson's testimony that he saw Defendant staggering toward his truck in a manner suggestive of intoxication. While defense counsel is correct in noting that an uneven gait is not necessarily indicative of intoxication, and could instead be attributable to a neurological disorder or other such medical condition, the Fourth Amendment does not require proof of alcohol-impairment to a certainty, near-certainty, or even a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ~ 9, 960 A.2d 321, 323. Rather, a stop passes constitutional muster so long as under the totality of the circumstances there was a sufficient basis for a law enforcement officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was driving under the influence. !d. ("The suspicion need only be more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch"). An officer may not stop a motorist simply because he is driving near a bar late at night, however, those facts are part of the totality of the circumstances that an officer may take into account. See, e.g., State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, 977 A.2d 1003 (upholding finding of reasonable articulable suspicion where officer, who "was investigating in the vicinity of a large, loud party where drinking of alcoholic beverages was likely occurring" saw a truck veer off the lane into a ditch); Connor, id. at ~ 18 (Clifford, J., with Levy, J., dissenting) ("That a person operates a vehicle outside of or near a bar, or late at night around the time that bars generally close, does not by itself amount to reasonable articulable suspicion, but can be considered by the officer in weighing the totality of the circumstances to determine whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists") (citing State v. Richford, 519 A.2d 193, 195 (Me. 1986); State v. Burnham, 610 A.2d 733, 735 (Me. 1992)). The court finds that Lieutenant Hutcheson made the stop because he observed Defendant stagger down the street toward his truck moments before Defendant drove away in that truck. Given the lateness of the hour, and aware of the proximity of a plenitude of drinking establishments open and serving at that time in the Old Port, a law enforcement officer observing Defendant staggering toward his truck before driving it would have a reasonable articulable suspicion of impairment sufficient to warrant a stop. Accordingly, the court finds that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard was met before the stop was effected on Fore Street. 1 Accordingly, because none of Defendant's grounds for suppression have merit, Defendant's motion to suppress is denied in its entirety. 1 Lieutenant Hutcheson testified that he did not factor Defendant's failure to signal into his decision, and the State argued, that the stop occurred at the time the Lieutenant formulated his decision to stop Defendant's vehicle. The court agrees with Defendant that the operative moment is the moment of the stop, as a motorist's Fourth Amendment interests are not implicated until he is "seized." See State v. Cilley, 1998 ME 34, ,-r 7, 707 A.2d 79, 82 ("whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred requires an objective analysis, and a law enforcement officer's uncommunicated, subjective intent to detain a citizen is not relevant to determining whether a seizure has occurred"). Resolution of this issue, however, is not determinative to the analysis, since the court finds in any event that Lieutenant Hutcheson had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle without taking Defendant's failure to signal his tum onto Fore Street into account. STATE OF MAINE vs MATTHEW CAMERON 185 NEW PORTLAND ROAD GORHAM ME 04038 Docket No CUMCD-CR-2011-05783 DOCKET RECORD DOB: 08/31/1976 Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS NICHOLS WEBB & LORANGER PA 477 CONGRESS ST., SUITE 800 PORTLAND ME 04101 RETAINED 09/13/2011 State's Attorney: STEPHANIE ANDERSON Charge(s) 1 OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE Seq 11493 29-A 2411 (1-A) (A) NEY I POR Class D 2 OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE Seq 11493 29-A 2411 (1-A) (A} NEY I POR Class D 0813012011 PORTLAND 0813012011 PORTLAND Charged with COMPLAINT on Suppleme Docket Events: 09/02/2011 FILING DOCUMENT - NON CASH BAIL BOND FILED ON 08/31/2011 09/02/2011 Charge(s): 1 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULED FOR 09/29/2011 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 1 NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 09/02/2011 BAIL BOND - $2,500.00 UNSECURED BAIL BOND FILED ON 08/31/2011 Bail Amt: $2,500 Date Bailed: 08/31/2011 #636 09/13/2011 Party(s): MATTHEW CAMERON ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/13/2011 Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS 09/22/2011 Charge(s): 1,2 SUPPLEMENTAL FILING - COMPLAINT FILED ON 09/19/2011 JAMES TURCOTTE , ASSISTANT CLERK 09/29/2011 Charge(s): 1 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT WAIVED ON 09/29/2011 09/29/2011 Charge(s): 1,2 PLEA - NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY COUNSEL ON 09/29/2011 Attorney: 09/29/2011 HEARING - MATTHEW NICHOLS DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 12/07/2011 at 01:00p.m. in Room No. 09/29/2011 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE NOTICE SENT ON 11/22/2011 09/29/2011 Charge(s): 1,2 CR 200 Page 1 of 2 7 Printed on: 12/19/2011 MATTHEW CAMERON CUMCD-CR-2011-05783 DOCKET RECORD TRIAL- JURY TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR 01/09/2012 at 08:30a.m. in Room No. 11 NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 12/07/2011 HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE HELD ON 12/07/2011 THOMAS D WARREN , JUSTICE Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS TRACY LEADBETTER DA: Defendant Present in Court UNRESOLVED 12/07/2011 MOTION - MOTION EXPERT WITNESS REPORT FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 12/07/2011 12/07/2011 MOTION - MOTION EXPERT WITNESS REPORT MOOT ON 12/07/2011 DEF ATTY HAS NEEDED INFORMATION 12/07/2011 Charge(s): 1,2 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 12/07/2011 12/07/2011 HEARING- MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 12/15/2011 at 01:00p.m. in Room No. 8 NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 12/07/2011 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ON 12/07/2011 12/15/2011 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 12/15/2011 MARY KELLY , JUDGE Attorney: MATTHEW NICHOLS DA: TRACY LEADBETTER Defendant Present in Court TAPE# 3432 INDEX 4110-4966 (1) LIEUTENANT GARY HUTCHESON PORTLAND PD CHAMBERS 12/15/2011 Charge(s): 1,2 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 12/15/2011 MARY KELLY , JUDGE 12/19/2011 ORDER - COURT ORDER FILED ON 12/19/2011 MARY KELLY , JUDGE ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 12/19/2011 Charge(s): 1,2 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED ON 12/19/2011 STATE WITNESS FILE W/ JUDGE KELLEY IN COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL A TRUE COPY ATTEST: Clerk CR 200 Page 2 of 2 Printed on: 12/19/2011

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