Karnes v. Kwasnik

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STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO: AP;;1-006 [lJV -CUi~l- L( "-'"" J'ti~'OI; / cyo... UNDA KARNES, Plaintiff, v. ORDER MAREK KWASNfK, Plilintiff-Appellee Lindtl Kilrnes initiilted this forcible entry ilnd detainer ilction against Marek Kwasnik on December 9,2010. The District Court entered judgment for Ms. Karnes on January 26,2011, following hearing. Mr. Kwasnik now appeC1ls the judgment of the District Court and requests both a stay of execution C1nd a jury triill de novo. Actions for forcible entry and detainer are governed by Title 14, chapter 709 of the Maine Revised Statutes and Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80D. A party appeclling from tIle judgment of the District Court may request "jury triC1l de novo on any issue so triable of right" in the Superior Court. M.R. elv. P. 800(f)(2)(A) (2010). The party must file C1n affidavit "setting forth specific fC1cts showi ng that there is a genuine issue of mC1terial fact as to which there is a right to trial by jury." ld. Mt'. KWflsnik requests a jury triC1l on the "issues of promissory estoppel, estoppel by mist'epresentC1tion, estoppel by representi:ltion, equitclble estoppel," clnd whether Mr. KWClsnik holds the subject property C1S C1 tcnclllt-in-collllllon 1 ,~ with Ms. K;:1rJlCS. These are lJ1J qucstiolls of lilVV, not fact. The court hils nonetheless reviewed "all the affidavits and tIle whole record" and determined that there are no genuine issues of fact material to the leg-ill issues. M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f)(5) (2010). Mr. KWilsnik's request for a jury trial is denied, and the court will review the judgment of the District Court for legal error. [d. Testimony at the hearing in District Court was consistent. Ms. Karnes and Mr. Kwasnik began a romzmtic relationship in or around January 2004. err. at 7, 39.) At that time they moved in together and lived in ;em apartment Jt 99 Swett Road. (Tr. at 1'3,35.) The two sharcd responsibility for their bills zltld living expenses while at the Swett Road ilpartment. (Tr. at ii, 35.) In late 2005 or early 2006, Mr. Kwasnik and Ms. Karnes decided to buy a home. (Tr. ,1t ii, 35-36, 40, 42.) Mr. Kwasnik was not employed or otherwise earning money at the time. (Tr. at 19, 35-36, 41.) Ms. Karnes purchased the property ,1t 81'3 Peaked Mountilin Rd., the subject of this action, in February 2006. (Tr. at 8, 32.) While Mr. Kwasnik was involved in the purchase and assisted with logistics, he did not finJncia]]y contribute to the transJction. (Tr. at 36, 40-41.) Ms. Karnes is the only person named in the deed and thc lllortgagc,l and she pf1id f1U of the rCf1] estate taxes. (Tr. at 11,13, 'lH, 36, 41.) Mr. ](wJsnik knew that the deed ,vas in Ms. Karnes's name, Zlnd did not wZlnt his own name to Zlppear for unspecified rC'150ns. (1r. Jt 41.) Mr. KWJsnik 'lgreed at the heJring thLlt he hLls no claim to the property through any written deed, (Tr. at 'I ii.) In April 2006, Ms. Karnes executed a will lcLlving her property to Mr. Kw'lsnik. (Tr. ,It 29-30.) Mr. Kw'lsnik never resullled employment or othervvise earned Jny income other them sm,111 cash received in exchJnge for odd jobs done 1 There W,lS no down pJyment. (Tr. at 43.) 2 for friends. (Tr. at 19-20,36-37.) lIe did perform some improvements to the property during this time. (Tr. at 30, 42.) After moving into the residence at K8 Peaked Mountain Rd., Ms. Kwasnik did not contribute any money towards the mortgage, property taxes, utilities, groceries, gas, or building supplics. 2 (Tr. at 20, 32,37.) If Mr. Kwasnik did contribute financially, the amount was admittedly immaterial. (Tr. at 37.) Ms. Karnes son passed away in 2007. (Tr. at 21.) Ms. Karnes asked Mr. Kwasnik to go back to work in late 2009 or early 2010, but he refused. (Tr. at 20.) Ms. Karnes also asked Mr. Kwasnik to leave the property, and again he refused. (Tr. at 20.) She then initiated eviction proceedings against Mr. Kwasnik. While there is some dispute about hovv notice was accomplished, Mr. Kwasntk did receive notice of eviction by November 4,2010. (f-rearing Ex. 5.) Mr. Kwasnik rC'fused to leave, and Ms. Karnes removed herself from her llome in the last week of November 20Hl. (Tr. elt 26.) Ms. I(arnes timely filed this action for forced entry and detainer on December 9, 2010. Ms. Karnes and Mr. Kwasnik are both adul ts, they have never been married to each other, and they have no children. (Tr. at 46-47, 51.) A hearing WilS held in District Court on January 26,2011. Mr. Kwasnik argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because it was a domestic-relations suit, and that he ovvns a fifty-percent interest in the subject property through estoppel. (Tr. at 4-5, 52-53.) When the court speci fically asked !\!II'. Kwasnik if he was raising a defense based on service of notice to Cluit till' prc'mises <lS prescribed by Title 14 section 6002, Mr. KWClsnik rL'sponded: "No. I rv'ls. KClrnes testified that the pm-tics IlwtuCllly understood th'lt they would con ti nue to share thei r expenses eq uCllly after acqu iri ng <1 house. (Tr. Cl lJ 9.) Mr. KWClSlllk denies thClt any such Clgl"Cemcnt existed. (Tr. at 32.) This dispute of fact is genuinc, but immCltcrial. 2 3 Clrn only rClising my ... previous issues-promissory estoppel Clnd jurisdiction .... " (Tr. at 25-26.) After hearing the testimony, the presiding judge found that Ms. Karnes was the owner of the premises Clt 88 Peaked Mountain Rd. and Mr. Kwasnik was subject to eviction. The pL1rties were not mClrried and hod no children. Ms. Karnes had not IT"tade any promises or misrepresentations to Mr. Kvvasnik to induce him to act to his detrirnent. Rather, she had purchased the property in her own name in 2006 wi th his knowledge and consent. No co-tenclncy had ever been crcclted, Mr. KWClsnik wos at most Cl tenant-Clt-will, and his tenancy had been properly terminated. On appeal, ML". KWClsnik c10ims the District Court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to heClr this matter, and erred in finding that he has no legal interest in the subject property. He also c1Clims that the notice of termination Wi:1S technically defective. This IClst motter is easily dealt with, as Mr. KWClsnik expreSSly disclaimed ,my objection on the basis of notice <It the hearing. He w<lived this defense by failing to pursue it below. The question of jurisdiction is resolved just as easily. Ms. Kornes i:lnd Mr. Kwasnik were never mL1rried ond hL1ve no children, so Title 19-A governing domestic relations does not opply. Despite Mr. Kwasnik's protests to the contrary, hc never had a legal re1<ltionship with Ms. Karnes <lnd their wmcllltic rel<ltionsllip h<ls no be<lring on this action. This is " 0 summary proceeding to determine the single issue: vvho is entitled to the immedi<lte possession of the property." Fros/ Vow/ioll/ollff Props., fllc. v. Poliller, 199<;) ME 15, (118,723 A.2d 41R, 421. The District Court found th<lt Ms. Karnes is the only person so entitled, <lnd this court 'lgrees. 4 Mr. J(vvJsnik bJses his clJim to the property on estoppel. Estoppel is generJl/y understood as "the principle which precludes a party from asserting to Jnother's disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously asserted by him." Begil/ v. Sabattl/s, 409 A.2d 1269, 1271 (Me. 1979) (quoting 28 Am. Jur. 2d § 29) (quotJtions omitted). In particulJr, the '''doctrine of promissory estoppel 'applies to promises that arc otherwise unenforceable,' and is 'invoked to enforce [such] promises ... so as to avoid injustice.'" Harvey v. Oow, 2008 ME 192, <1111, 962 A.2d 322,325 (quoting Daigle COllllllcreial crollp, Tile. v. SI. Laurcllt, 1999 ME 107, (~ 14, 734 A.2d (;67, (72). Mr. Kwasnik himself denies thdt the pClrtTes ever had Cln agreement to share responsibility for the expenses of property ownership. (Tr. dt 35-36.) Despite this, he also testified thClt when the deed WClS issued in Ms. Karnes's nJme, they "hCld [Cln] agreement that it fWClsl our house Clnd ... it's gonnCl [sic1 be for-for us." (Tr. Clt 41.) At most, Mr. Kwasnik describes a vague utlderstClnding of present f<lct in 2006. Mr. KWClsnik knew, however, thClt Ms. KClrnes WclS the sole ti tleholder. I fc h<ld purposefully kept his nClme off the title documents. Mr. KWClsnik docs not clJim that Ms. Karnes induced him to keep his nelme off the ti tic documents, nor does he describe any words of trclnsfcr from Ms. Karnes to himself, nor docs he allege thClt she promised to trClnsfer him cl legCl] interest in the estelle at some future point. The fJct thClt Ms. J(Clrnes executed cl will Lwqueelthing the house to Mr. KWClsnik could not create Clllew present interest in the premises. Wills mClY be freely revoked, clnd no interest vests until death. Hlltchills v. Hl/tellillS, 141 Me. un, '180,41 /\.2d 1112,615 (1945). The only r('[eVClnce Ms. Karnes's will could hClve 5 to this action is that it refers to the. whole of the subject real estate as her own property.~ (Kwasnik Aff. at 8.) Mr. Kwasnik's efforts to improve the property likewise cannot make him il tenant-in-common with Ms. Karnes. His labor was not offered ilS consideration for an interest in the land. Mr. Kwasnik complains that Ms. Karnes will be unjustly enriched by his work if he is evicted. The court is hard-pressed to credit this argument when Ms. Karnes alone paid for the mortgage, utilities, gas, groceries, building lYlZ1terials, and Mr. KWC1snik's other incidents of living for approximiltely five Y<::'tlrs. Fi nZ1lly, 'illhe end of the hearing the District Court had the following exchange with Mr. Kwasnik: COURT: or Okay. And what "vas the promise? MR. KWASNTK: Promise basictllly was with the house is both us. (PAUSE) COURT: And you think thZ1t meant that if you split up thilt that "vas still true? MR. KW!\SNJK: ... The only thi ng which we tlctually-what 1 kind of thought-! proposed Ito Ms. Karnes] that-that our agreement will be-whatever she is on the record vested in, that r will hclVe-fi fty percent of-of thilt \;vill be unto me. Thtlt WtlS the only clgreement (TI", at 46.) The District Court implicitly found thilt iYrr-. KWClsnik could not re,lsonJbly hilve relied on this so-cCllled clgreelllenL, and did not. This court finds no error wi Lh Llll' District Court's reasoning on this or Llny other point. ~ The ~1l"0pl'rty ,It 88 !Jeilked Mountili 11 Rd. had former! y been identi tied ,\sI20 PCilked Mountain Rd. (Tr. ilt 9.) The entry is: Mr. Kwasnik's request for a jury trial de novo and his rnotiOll to stay the issuance of a wri t of possession are denied. The judgment of the District Court granting Linda Karnes possession of 88 Peaked is affirmed, and the clerk is directed to issl f)ATE:~2PI( 7 ad, Sebago, Maine, Date Filed 02-08-11 Cumberland ~----- Docket No. County Action Forcible Entry And Detainer Appeal LINDA E. KARNES MAREK A. KWASNIK PO BOX 2065 WINDHAM, ME 04062 VS. Plaintiff's Attorney ALICIA M. CUSHING, ESQ. GIVERTZ, SCHEFFEE, & LAVOIE, PA PO BOX 4801 PORTLAND, ME 04112 Date of Entry A_P~-_1~1_-_0- ,- 6 Dcrcndant's Attorney pro se ¢

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