KLING VS. HEBERT
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on whether the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit. This query arose from the case of Randall Kling who initially filed suit in state court alleging his dismissal from the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was in retaliation for submitting written complaints about workplace and ethics violations. He later filed a complaint in federal district court citing substantially similar facts and seeking relief for violations of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana answered the certified question by stating that prescription or the period within which a lawsuit may be filed is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. The Court explained that the essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved. The court emphasized that notice is sufficient when it fully informs the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and what is demanded of the defendant. Thus, the court took a balanced approach between a broad interpretation of interruption and a narrow one, placing emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-by-case basis.
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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #006 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the 26th day of January, 2024 are as follows: BY Griffin, J.:: 2023-CQ-00257 RANDALL KLING VS. TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. SEE OPINION. Crichton, J., dissents and assigns reasons. Crain, J., concurs and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Griffin. Griffin, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2023-CQ-00257 RANDALL KLING VS. TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit GRIFFIN, J. Invoking Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (“United States Fifth Circuit”) certified to this Court the following question: “In Louisiana, under what circumstances, if any, does the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupt prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit?” Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2023). We answer the certified question as follows: Prescription is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. 1 Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII provides, in relevant part: When it appears to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any circuit court of appeal of the United States, or to any district court of the United States, that there are involved in any proceedings before it questions or propositions of law of this state which are determinative of said cause independently of any other questions involved in said case and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal court before rendering a decision may certify such questions or propositions of law of this state to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for rendition of a judgment or opinion concerning such questions or propositions of Louisiana law. This court may, in its discretion, decline to answer the questions certified to it or reformulate the question certified. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Certified questions are decided on the facts presented to us by the federal court. See, e.g., Menard v. Targa Resources, L.L.C., 23-0246, p. 2 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So.3d 1238, 1240. Randall Kling filed suit in state court alleging his firing from the Licensing and Certification Division of the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control (“ATC”) was in retaliation for submitting written complaints describing workplace and ethics violations committed by then-Assistant Secretary of the ATC, Troy Hebert. Mr. Kling’s state petition named the Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”), which includes the ATC, as the sole defendant and asserted a single claim of violation of Louisiana’s constitutional right to free expression. He did not allege any federal claims. A jury awarded him compensatory damages and lost wages, the latter of which was reversed on appeal. Mr. Kling’s subsequent writ application to this Court on the issue of lost wages was denied. Kling v. Louisiana Department of Revenue, 18-1480 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/18/19), r’hg denied (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/7/19), 281 So.3d 696, writ denied, 19-1434 (La. 11/5/19), 281 So.3d 671. Prior to this Court’s disposition of Mr. Kling’s writ application, he filed a complaint in federal district court asserting substantially similar facts and sought declaratory relief, damages (including lost wages), and reinstatement for violations of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Mr. Kling named thenCommissioner of the ATC, Juana-Marine Lombard, in her official capacity, and Troy Hebert, in his individual capacity, as defendants. Mr. Hebert filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss arguing Mr. Kling’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, not pleaded in his state court suit, were prescribed.2 The federal district court granted Mr. 2 The prescriptive period for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in Louisiana borrows from the one-year liberative prescriptive period for delictual actions set forth in La. C.C. art. 3492. See SS v. State ex rel. Dept. of Social Services, 02-0831, p. 7 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 926, 931. 2 Hebert’s motion and dismissed Mr. Kling’s federal suit against Mr. Hebert with prejudice. Mr. Kling appealed. The United States Fifth Circuit, observing a lack of clarity in Louisiana jurisprudence, certified the foregoing question of law to this Court which we granted. Kling v. Hebert, 23-0257 (La. 4/18/23), 359 So.3d 499. DISCUSSION The certified question asks whether there are any circumstances in which commencement of a suit interrupts prescription as to legal claims not asserted in that suit.3 “Prescription is interrupted … when the oblige commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue.” La. C.C. art. 3462. Interruption of prescription continues as long as the suit is pending and runs anew from the last day of interruption. La. C.C. arts. 3463 and 3466. Mr. Kling argues in favor of a broad interpretation wherein interruption is effective as to all causes arising out of the same operative facts identifying the same right/duty and the same violation of the legal theory pleaded irrespective of the source of the legal obligation.4 Mr. Hebert advocates a narrower approach such that the actions in the two suits must be the same to provide notice to a defendant. We find a more balanced methodology is warranted. The starting point for the interpretation of a statute is the language of the statute itself. Menard, 23-0246, p. 3, 366 So.3d at 1241. As noted by the United States Fifth Circuit, La. C.C. art. 3462 “is silent as to this particular aspect of interruption’s scope.” Kling, 60 F.4th at 287. We therefore turn to related provisions 3 Although this court has the authority to reformulate the certified question, for the sake of comity with the federal court that posed the question, we choose not to utilize the dissent’s approach to address the issue before us in the context of res judicata, which requires a completely different analysis. We decline to address Mr. Kling’s arguments as to solidary obligors as it is beyond the scope of the certified question and was not addressed by the United States Fifth Circuit. 4 3 of the positive law to discern its meaning and context. See Menard, 23-0246, p. 4, 366 So.3d at 1242. “An obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person, called the obligor, is bound to render performance in favor of another, called the obligee.” La. C.C. art. 1756. “A civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right. It is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction.” La. C.C.P. art. 421. Article 3462 may thus be rephrased as stating prescription is interrupted when the obligee files a pleading presenting the demand for the enforcement of a legal right/duty to a court of competent jurisdiction and venue, against the obligor. The essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved.5 Nini v. Sanford Bros., Inc., 276 So.2d 262, 264-65 (La. 1973). The underlying reason why prescription does not bar a subsequent claim is that a defendant has adequate and timely notice by legal demand that liability arising out of the factual occurrence pleaded is sought to be enforced against him. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 376 So.2d 950, 954 (La. 1979); see also Tate, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 211, 233 (1969) (“fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is only to afford a defendant security of mind and affairs if no claim is made timely, and to protect him from stale claims and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof”). Prescription is interrupted when a defendant knows or should know, prior to the expiration of the prescriptive 5 As early as Flower v. O’Connor, 17 La. 213 (1841), this Court observed: It is clear from this doctrine of Pothier, that in order to determine the effect and extent of a legal interruption, we must enquire more particularly into the object and cause of the action, than the right of the plaintiff, the manner in which it is prosecuted and the competency of the court in which it is instituted; and endeavor to ascertain how far the knowledge of the titles on which the action is founded, has been brought home to the defendant by the judicial demand; and we do not hesitate to conclude that, if it be established that the defendant has been judicially notified of the titles which are the foundation of the demand for the whole of the property or of the debt, so as to acquire sufficient knowledge of the rights which are sought to be enforced against him by a suit, there results from said suit a legal interruption in favor of those to whom such rights may belong. 4 period, that legal demands are made upon him from the occurrence described in the petition. Nini, 276 So.2d at 264; Parker v. Southern American Ins. Co., 590 So.2d 55, 56 (La. 1991). Notice is therefore sufficient when it fully apprises the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. See Theriot, 376 So.2d at 953 (citing Callendar v. Marks, 185 La. 948, 952, 171 So. 86, 87 (1936)). “[I]f what is filed can be classified as a ‘pleading presenting the demand,’ prescription will be interrupted whether or not the original pleading sets forth a cause of action.” Batson v. Cherokee Beach and Campgrounds, Inc., 530 So.2d 1128, 1130 (La. 1988) (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 421); Theriot, 376 So.2d at 953; Findley v. City of Baton Rouge, 570 So.2d 1168, 1170 (La. 1990) (“[w]hile designed to protect a defendant against prejudice from lack of notification of a claim within the period of limitation, prescriptive statutes are not designed to protect a defendant against non-prejudicial pleading mistakes”); Tate, supra, at 233. This correctly places the emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-bycase basis, rather than quixotic attempts at offering a precise definition of a cause of action. Examining the spectrum of jurisprudence is illustrative. In Theriot, this Court found a prior suit by plaintiff’s workers’ compensation insurer against the defendant fully apprised the defendant that judicial claim was being made to enforce his liability for personal injuries to the plaintiff thus defendant received notice that plaintiff himself might intervene in the suit. 376 So.2d at 95354. Theriot affirmatively cited to National Sur. Corp. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 247 La. 905, 918, 175 So.2d 263, 268 (1965), wherein this Court similarly found a prior negligence suit by the workers’ compensation insurer of plaintiff’s employer against defendant tortfeasors put the latter on notice of subsequent intervention by the plaintiff reasoning that “one principal cause of action resulting from a single tort 5 exists herein.” Notwithstanding the problematic use of the phrase “cause of action”6 in National Sur. Corp., combined with Theriot it stands for the proposition that notice is sufficient to interrupt prescription where there is one underlying obligation owed by the same obligor to ostensibly the same obligee. See Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 440 So.2d 93, 95 (observing that because the compensation insurer has paid part of the employee plaintiff’s damages, it is entitled to recover to the extent of those payments as partial subrogee). In Parker, this Court found that a prior workers’ compensation suit against an employer – despite ultimately being dismissed on an exception of no cause of action – gave sufficient notice to a defendant liability insurer in a subsequent tort suit observing there “is factual connexity and the parties are closely related.” 590 So.2d at 56. The Parker Court reasoned both suits were based on the occurrence of the employee’s death and the monetary liability of the employer. Id. (further observing a lack of prejudice in the liability insurer’s ability to prepare and conduct a defense); Findley, 570 So.2d at 1171-72; Tate, supra, at 234. Thus, this Court implicitly found that in addition to the two suits being instituted by the same obligee, they dealt with the same underlying obligation and presented the same demand for monetary damages. See Thompson v. Town of Jonesboro, 16-1224, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/2/17), 222 So.3d 770, 774 (discussing Parker). Conversely, in Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So.2d 350, 354 (La. 1975), this Court found no interruption of prescription as the first suit gave defendant insurers no notice that plaintiffs were claiming damages resulting from the negligence of a co-plaintiff/employee – the first suit being based solely on the alleged negligence of six named executive officers. The Court additionally observed that “[a] cause of action in tort has no identity independent from the defendant upon 6 Theriot applied the reasoning of National Sur. Corp. despite the fact the first suit in Theriot was dismissed for a failure to state a cause of action. 376 So.2d at 953-54. 6 whose fault it is based.” Id., 314 So.2d at 353. Thus, the obligation or duty owed in the first suit (relating to negligence from the executive officers) was distinct from the obligation in the second suit (relating to negligence from co-plaintiff/employee. See also Thompson, 16-1224, pp. 6-7, 222 So.3d at 774 (while first suit for mandamus notified defendant of a dispute concerning plaintiff’s entitlement to office, it did not put defendant on notice of a possible claim for monetary damages); Illes v. State ex. rel. Div. of Admin., 14-0689, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/14), 168 So.3d 646, 649 (observing a claim for loss of consortium is separate from any claim of the primary victim). Mr. Kling’s interpretation risks undermining the purpose of prescription statutes and invites the potential for abuse. See Tate, supra, at 233 (“a party’s assertion of one claim or defense should not, by mere reason of the original filing, preserve indefinitely all other claims or defenses by him against his opponent”). “[I]t must not be overlooked that intended ill-pleading could sometimes be used to obtain the procedural advantage of delay desired by an ill-pleader.” Id. at 240. A plaintiff’s conscious choice or strategic decision to withhold potential claims to circumvent prescription statutes or avoid res judicata should not be countenanced. See La. C.C.P. art. 425 (“party shall assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation”); Tate, supra, at 240 (observing ill-pleading could lead to “increased judicial traffic caused by unused trial days and further hearings so resulting [that] may prejudicially delay other litigants and may decrease the efficiency of the judicial system as a whole”). Mr. Hebert’s interpretation risks penalizing pleading mistakes and inartful phraseology.7 7 It is well-settled that pro se litigants are accorded greater leeway in the interpretation of their pleadings. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Maggio, 440 So.2d 1336, 1337 (La. 1983) (pro se petitioner “is not to be denied access to the courts for review of his case on the merits by the overzealous application of form and pleading requirements or hyper-technical interpretation of court rules”); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pro se filings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings by lawyers”). 7 See Theriot, 376 So.2d at 954; Parker, 590 So.2d at 56 (“law strictly construes statutes of liberative prescription”). Framing the relevant inquiry around notice strikes a balance between these competing policy concerns. DECREE We have answered the certified question as set forth in this opinion. Pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, the judgment rendered by this Court upon the question certified shall be sent by the clerk of this Court under its seal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to the parties. CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED 8 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2023-CQ-00257 RANDALL KLING vs. TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN ms OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit CRICHTON, J., dissents and assigns reasons: Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, Section 1, setting forth the provisions permitting this Court to certify questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, any circuit court of appeal or any district court of the United States, also allows this Court, in its discretion, to "reformulate the question certified." In my view, the circumstances giving rise to this certified question require such a reformulation. The Fifth Circuit presented the following certified question: "In Louisiana, under what circumstances, if any, does the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupt prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit?" Randall Kling v. Troy Hebert, et al., 60 F.4th 281, 288 (5 th Cir. 2023). However, this Court need not reach the issue of prescription, as plaintiffs subsequent claim in federal court is barred by res judicata principles. Accordingly, I would reformulate the certified question as follows: "In Louisiana, can a party demand a judicial remedy which existed at the time of a prior judgment, arising out of the same facts, which he failed to assert in a prior suit which has now been 1 concluded follow, by a final judgment that question Louisiana's current review, the judgment existing that and merged (2) in La. R.S. 13:4231, the law, a valid except provides: and final on appeal judgment or other is direct of the plaintiff, arising matter all causes of action out of the transaction of the litigation or are extinguished in the judgment. that is in favor of final of the defendant, judgment is the subject bars a subsequent (3) in A judgment favor of in any subsequent issue actually litigated arising matter and the judgment conclusive, are found The statute judgment is the subject at the time occurrence favor of final If the judgment existing that extent: is in at the time occurrence by the same parties, to the following For the reasons in the negative. in 1991. provided between that remedy?" principles was enacted as otherwise conclusive If be answered res judicata of which Except (l) would primary version that did not grant all causes out of the transaction of the litigation action the action between and determined plaintiff causes of action. or the them, or are extinguished on those either of action defendant with respect if its determination is to any was essential to that judgment. The comments in the law. to the statute The concomitantly fairly statute narrowed and fully "The new central by claiming is not whether inquiry cause of action (a concept asserts of action the subject matter broadened of which which the for made a party the second is difficult action to define) La. R.S. principles to re-litigate is based and thus already cause of action. on the same cause or but whether 13:4231, change an issue a "new" out of the transaction action." a "substantial res judicata he or she is asserting arises first revisions Louisiana the possibility litigated a cause note that the 1990 the second or occurrence Cmt. (a). action which See is also Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 95-654 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So. 2d 624, 632 (quoting promoting "judicial and to assert same). The purpose economy and fairness all rights which arise of the amendments by requiring was clearly the plaintiff out of the same transaction stated as to seek all relief or occurrence." La. R.S. 13:4231, Cmt. (a). See, e.g., Lafreniere Park Foundation v. Broussard 221 F.3d 804, 13:4231 810 "provides (5'h Cir. 2000) a broad (Dennis, application J., wrxting of res judicata 2 for the court, to foster judicial finding La. efficiency R.S. and protect litigants the defendant from duplicative litigation."). "Res may defeat an action by declaring has already been litigated." Walton v. Burns, 151 So. 3d 616, 621, citing La. R.S. 13:4231. Furthermore, defendant, La. R.S. 13:4231(2) then "all causes of action out of the transaction extinguished and the judgment In other words, "causes provides of action" or could state "causes of action asserted" which because it is in favor at the time of final judgment that is the subject or "claims" have been brought by extinguished if a judgment that bars a subsequent were brought the the claim is a concept 47,388, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/13), existing or occurrence judicata matter of the of the arising litigation action on those causes are of action." that existed based on the facts which are barred. Notably, in the first litigation, the statute does not but rather existing based on facts. Relatedly, of action La. C.C.P. art. 425(A) arising litigation." out The 1990 expands the scope judicata and puts transaction of the of the comment this parties ' There is also an analogous reduces his claim judgment, and is precluded is the subject in La. he remits thereafter addressed article explains that "[t]his causes made of to bring it within matter action defense arising must out states that "[w]hen for which of res of the be raised."i2 the jurisdiction of his claim of the amendment in the of the litigation c.c.p. art. 5, which demanding the relationship subject all the portion from is the changes matter party shall assert all causes that the that cause of action thereon, 2 This Court recently notice provision on a single is rendered this to reflect on that or occurrence to Article or occurrence judgment transaction states that "[a] a plaintiff of a court and he did not pray for it judicially." between La. R.S. 13:4231 and La. c.c.p. art. 425 in Carlo Carollo, Jr., et al., v. State of Louisiana, DOTD, 21-1670 (La. 9/9/22), 346 So. 3d 751. The Court's decision resolved a circuit split in Louisiana regarding whether La. c.c.p. art. 425 should be read in pari preclusion discussed res device. herein, judicata, a warning b e asserted independent materia The Court notice La. R.S. 13 :4231 or whether examined and ultimately it follows or with the 1990 concluded that because that art. 425 serves as a "rule that all causes of action in the same suit." preclusion Id. at 763. provision, amendments arising Thus, but rather to follow broadened during out of the same transaction is enforced of the Court through be an independent to the res judicata the amendments for parties a majority 3 art. 425 should found, the exception principles, as the scope of litigation; i.e., as or occurrence must art. 425 is not an of res judicata. With these principles in mind, we tum to the reformulated question under the facts of this matter. Plaintiff Division of division 2011, was the terminated Louisiana of the Louisiana he filed District from Alcohol asserting a claim free expression pursuant to Art. compensatory damages the additional remedy Appeal reversed Plaintiff thereafter of that matter, filed also filed the same set of facts and reinstatement federal court capacity in federal On November court suit, this relief, Secretary of the ATC approximately denied 30, 2011. trial, plaintiff"s right for new trial, seeking general damages 3, 2019, (including and Fourteenth (Troy Court of award. to our dispensation on October of the to was awarded Circuit ATC after application. asserting lost wages), rights. in her Hebert) one month writ plaintiff 26, Igth Judicial in the and prior is a On May The First damages Commissioner which constitutional the of his First Certification ("ATC"), a motion court the 5, 2019, Court filed affirmed district declaratory named a jury in this Court violations and the then-Assistant capacity. federal plaintiff but and of Revenue but it was denied. application alleged Control of Louisiana's Plaintiff award and seeking for suit, suit Licensing on March 1, § 7.3 Following wages a writ Tobacco of violation and lost wages. lost the Department of reinstatement, the in of Revenue, the Louisiana Court, job and Department suit against his In his official in his individual plaintiff Kling filed his v. Louisiana Department ofRevenue, 19-1441 (La. 11/5/19), 281 So. 3d 671. The record makes clear that Charge" Alcohol all of the of the litigation Licensing and Tobacco Based each of this and out of plaintif:f's Certification termination Division of the as "Captain Louisiana Office in of Control. on the language following arises five of La. elements R.S. 13:4231, must this be satisfied Court for has established a finding that that a second 3 Section 7 of Article I of the Louisiana Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, but is responsible for abuse of that fireedom." 4 actton is precluded by res judicata: final; (3) the parties "(l) the judgment or causes occurrence of action asserted that was the subject v. State, 07-2469, Pollingue, p. 10 02-1385, that in this instance, 9/8/08), p. 7 (La. 2/25/03), a valid and final judgment, is one rendered by parties, disposing The court of appeal's satisfies this certiorari becomes final judgment 4 Comment writ court 1053. or in part, c.c.p. is timely after citing after subject proper notice became final and definitive ("When a judgment of five days, has mailed 5, 2019, and the was cmt. exclusive the denial following and therefore court of legal holidays, by the supreme provides: To have any preclusive effect a judgment must be valid, that is, it must have been rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject matter and over parties, and proper notice must have been given. The judgment must also be a final judgment, that is, a judgment that disposes of the merits in whole or in part. The use of the phrase "final judgment" also means that the preclusive effect of a judgment attaches once a final judgment has been signed by the trial court and would bar any action filed thereafter unless the judgment is reversed on appeal. Having the res judicata effect of a judgment attach at the time of final judgment is rendered by the trial court is in accord with our present law on lis pendens, see Code of Civil Procedure Articles 531, 532. 5 for of appeal for certiorari.") and Final" given. d (1990).4 an application of the of judgment matter 13:4231 on November v. is no doubt a valid R.S. art 2166(E) the clerk the Inc. the existence La. filed, a delay There of res judicata, both U.S.A., or citingBurguieres of La. R.S. 13:4231, application to run on the day after (d), "Valid So.2d over in the and (5) the Chewon 194, For purposes in whole litigation." 1049, is out of the transaction So. 2d 187, jurisdiction See La. and definitive of the application 843 in this matter ofplaintiff"s supreme 993 So. 2d at 1049, requirement. to the commencing court denial 843 suit arose of the first requirements with of the merits 02-1385, this Court's two are met. a court Burguieres, matter asserted in the first litigation; in the second (La. the first (2) the judgment (4) the cause or causes of action are the same; second suit existed at the time of final judgment cause is valid; The both suits common third are "the law res judicata mean requirement same. mandate Court in the words, "[t]here successors, must same must or others v. Crown analysis, the plaintiff, as well an defendants, be 'identity in both suits." of so long Corp., parties is that the before suit. requirement This identity, 843 share the the and or secretaries the same "quality" as parttes the doctrine same their as parties. Thus, subdepartment for purposes must In other parties, same "quality" of does not at 1054. of the ATC in and the but that the parties whenever agency law of parties' 359 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. 1978). including the parties the civilian Burguieres, as they as the commissioners all share that "[b]oth a subsequent identity appear Zellerbach the statute have the same physical capacities exists under has stated can be used to preclude appear capacities This that there that the parties Welch of res judicata under that this employed in their individual of res judicata and their interests are closely aligned.5 See Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 042551 of (La. 1/19/05), creative 893 So. 2d 738. pleading or employers or supervisors will defeat this requirement. file suit up and down abuse of the system naming (either Under as defendants as agencies To do so would the chain is precisely the facts of command what of this case, there of different or in their allow individual an aggrieved of employers the principles levels outlined is no amount of plaintiff's capacities) plaintiff to merely in perpetuity. herein that Such an seek to avoid, and"[tlhe interests ofjustice are not served when a concerned party is excluded from the litigation." 616, Walton v. Burns, 47,388, p. 12 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/13), 151 So. 3d 622. 5 There are exceptions to the res judicata principles as set forth in La. R.S. 13:4232. are present in this matter, those exceptions are: Although none (1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment; (2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice; or, (3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action. 6 Regarding in the second plaintiff's suit first the Louisiana written those stnt, the fourth complaints plaintiff for Troy alleged damages facts, violations has been met. (the of plaintiff" Moreover, alleged retaliation), the fifth Accordingly, intertupted in my prescription the same relief in federal to La. R.S. 13:4231 arising view, and La. he failed in another in Charge" to do so, under court court c.c.p. suit, plaintiff art. 425, plaintiff or occurrence: of the Licensing Louisiana For In his federal court damages, Fourteenth7 suits, I find asserted this in federal termination in is also met. plaintiffs state is now barred his termination Division to raise from suit seeking Pursuant all claims employment of ATC. he cannot court from in state court. was required principles, and Amendments. in both sought and Certification res judicata for submitting suit (plaintiff's of whether under of the ATC). the cause of action for res judicata litigation, or speech relief, of action that he unsuccessfully out of the same transaction as "Captain and asserted first in retaliation secretary in the first regardless on the federal court First6 because requirement fired declaratory s causes also arose out of the same occurrence in the and reinstatement. his of action of expression previous seeking of or causes judgment of his freedom Hebert same nature final he was allegedly he sought the the duplicative requirement court against alleged of the violations when violations, that the cause at the time suit set forth reinstatement Given existed Constitution alleged requirement now Because seek relief or jurisdiction.8 6 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. 7 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 8 Importantly, an appellate court, such as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in this instance, may recognize the exception of res judicata on its own motion pursuant to La. c.c.p. art. 927(A)(3). 7 Thus, as set forth herein, I would answer negative. 8 the reformulated question in the SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2023-CQ-00257 RANDALL KLING VS. TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit CRAIN, J., concurs with reasons. I agree that interruption requires notice sufficient to fully apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim and what is demanded. However, I write to emphasize that the defendant is only on notice of those causes of action specifically alleged. Separate causes of action that are later brought are not interrupted by the initial suit because the defendant does not have notice from the petition. A petition must contain “a short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of action arising out of . . . the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation” as well as “the material facts of[] the transaction or occurrence.” La. Code of Civ. Proc. art. 891. (Emphasis added). Article 891 draws a distinction between material facts and causes of action arising from them. Both must be pled. Louisiana Civil Code article 3462 provides that “[p]rescription is interrupted when the . . . obligee commences action against the obligor[] in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue.” Addressing what is actually interrupted, La. Civ. Code art. 3462 cmt. (b) explains: “[t]he filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts any kind of prescription as to the causes of action therein sued upon . . ..” (Emphasis added). Consequently, the express language of the statute requires that prescription continue to run against causes of action not pled. 1 While Article 3462 uses the word “action,” and the comment uses “causes of action,” neither of which are defined, a “civil action” is defined as “a demand for the enforcement of a legal right.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 421. I discern no difference between the terms. Therefore, applying the definition of “civil action,” prescription is only interrupted for specific claims pled, as those are demands made for the enforcement of a legal right. Similarly, La. Code of Civ. Proc. art. 425, which addresses preclusion by judgment, requires a party to “assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.” (Emphasis added). Again, a party must do more than allege material facts. They are required to allege all causes of action arising from those facts. Requiring the petition to articulate both the facts and, more specifically, all causes of action furthers the fundamental purpose of both prescription and res judicata, which is to offer a defendant finality. See Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 475 So.2d 1040, 1045 (La. 1985) (An important purpose of prescription is to provide a defendant psychological and economic security if no timely claim is made, and to protect a defendant from stale claims and loss of relevant proof.). I concur. 2 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2023-CQ-00257 RANDALL KLING VS. TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit GRIFFIN, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Respectfully, it is unclear whether the “same parties” requirement of res judicata is met where a governmental entity is sued in one suit and an employee is sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his individual capacity in a second suit.1 As observed by the United States Supreme Court: [I]t is clear that a suit against a government official in his or her personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the governmental entity. A victory in a personal-capacity action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity that employs him. Indeed, unless a distinct cause of action is asserted against the entity itself, the entity is not even a party to a personalcapacity lawsuit and has no opportunity to present a defense. That a plaintiff has prevailed against one party does not entitle him to fees from another party, let alone from a nonparty. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167-68, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106, 87 L.Ed.2d 114. I would therefore leave it to the federal courts to determine the applicability of res judicata under the facts presented. The irony is Mr. Kling’s contention that his initial suit against the LDR constitutes notice to Mr. Hebert for liability in his individual capacity simultaneously supports the dissent’s position that the party defendants are the same thus triggering res judicata. 1 Notwithstanding my position on the applicability of res judicata, I stand by the concerns over the potential for abuse as articulated in the opinion of the Court.
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