STATE OF LOUISIANA Vs. RAMON A. CARTER
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STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2002-KA-0742 VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL RAMON A. CARTER * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA * * ******* APPEAL FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 424-114, SECTION “J” HONORABLE LEON CANNIZZARO, JUDGE ****** JAMES F. MCKAY III JUDGE ****** (Court composed of Judge Miriam G. Waltzer, Judge James F. McKay III, Judge Dennis R. Bagneris, Sr.) HARRY F. CONNICK DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ORLEANS PARISH ANNE M. DICKERSON ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ORLEANS PARISH New Orleans, Louisiana 70119 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee PAMELA S. MORAN LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT New Orleans, Louisiana 70184-0030 Attorney for Defendant/Appellant AFFIRMED On August 21, 2001, Ramon A. Carter was charged by bill of information with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A). He pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on August 27th. A twelve-member jury found him guilty of the responsive verdict of possession of cocaine after a trial on October 11th. The State filed a multiple bill charging the defendant as a third felony offender, and after a hearing on December 11th at which the defendant admitted to his identity on one prior conviction, he was sentenced as a second offender to serve five years at hard labor under La. R.S. 15:529.1. At trial Detective Richard Pari testified that on July 17, 2001, after meeting with a confidential informant, he and his partner established a surveillance of a house at 301 Tricou Street in order to corroborate the information they had received. The detective saw a man leave the house and drive away in a red Kia. The man was making what the detective described as a “heat run,” that is driving aimlessly around the neighborhood checking for a police presence. He returned to 301 Tricou Street and picked up a woman who had been in the residence there. The driver then went to the corner of St. Maurice Street and Chartres Street where he stopped. The woman in the passenger position reached out the window to a woman standing on the corner and made a hand-to-hand transaction which the detective suspected to be a drug transaction. The couple was stopped by the officers and found to be in possession of cocaine. They were identified as Vanessa Peters and Gerry Miller. Detective Edward Prater told the jury that his part in the investigation was to remain near the residence and watch for a blue Oldsmobile; the driver of that car was suspected of supplying drugs to the couple at 301 Tricou Street. While maintaining a surveillance of the house, the detective observed a blue Oldsmobile approach and stop at the corner of Alhambra Street and Tricou Street. A man got out of the car and met with a woman who had come out of the house. He handed her a small object and then left. Shortly thereafter, she got into the red Kia. Officer Mark McCourt testified that his part of the investigation was to serve as the takedown unit. He was in an unmarked car in the area when he received via radio the news of the hand-to-hand transaction between the defendant and the woman near the residence. When the officer stopped the blue Oldsmobile at the corner of Tupelo Street and Burgundy Street, he noticed the driver reaching towards the floor on the passenger side of the car. Officer McCourt asked the driver to step out of the car and immediately advised him of his Miranda rights, and the defendant said he understood his rights. When the officer searched the car, he found a bag under the passenger’s side; it contained what appeared to be crack cocaine. Additionally there was a digital scale in the trunk. Ramon Carter, the driver of the Oldsmobile, was found to be carrying more than $600 in cash. He admitted that he had delivered $100 worth of cocaine to the woman at 301 Tricou Street. The parties stipulated that the drugs found in the Oldsmobile were tested and proved to be crack cocaine. In a single assignment of error the defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding him a second offender because the minute entry in the prior offense is a boilerplate form that fails to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights when he pleaded guilty. At the multiple bill hearing, the defendant admitted to identity on the prior offense. The State introduced the docket master, the arrest register, the waiver of rights/guilty plea form and the minute entry to establish the defendant’s Boykinization in the prior offense. The defense attorney objected to the minute entry as a boilerplate form. In State v. Alexander, 98-1377 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/00), 753 So.2d 933, writ denied, 2000-1101 (La. 4/12/01), 790 So.2d 2, this Court, considering the State’s burden of proof at a multiple bill hearing, stated: LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 D (1)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. In State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769, 779-780 (La.1993), the Supreme Court stated: If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information, the burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. If the State meets this burden, the defendant has the burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. If the defendant is able to do this, then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea shifts to the State. The State will meet its burden of proof if it introduces a "perfect" transcript of the taking of the guilty plea, one which reflects a colloquy between judge and defendant wherein the defendant was informed of and specifically waived his right to trial by jury, his privilege against self-incrimination, and his right to confront his accusers. If the State introduces anything less than the "perfect" transcript, for example, a guilty plea form, a minute entry, an "imperfect" transcript, or any combination thereof, the judge then must weigh the evidence submitted by the defendant and by the State to determine whether the State has met its burden of proving that the defendant's prior guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights. (footnotes omitted). 98-1377 at pp. 5-6, 753 So.2d at 937. In the case at bar, the State introduced a waiver of rights form listing all three Boykin rights. The form has a space for initials next to each right, and it contains the defendant's initials in each space. The form is dated and signed by defendant, counsel and the trial judge. The State also filed the docket master, which indicates the defendant was in fact represented by counsel, and a pre-printed, dated minute entry in which the defendant’s name, his attorney’s name, the offense, and the sentence are handwritten. This Court has held that a minute entry showing that the defendant was attended by counsel at the time he pleaded guilty and a properly executed waiver of rights/guilty plea form is sufficient to carry the State’s burden under the multiple bill statute. State v. Wolfe, 99-0389 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/19/00), 761 So.2d 596, writ denied, 2000-1889 (La. 9/14/01), 796 So.2d 671; State v. Weaver, 99-2177 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/6/00), 775 So.2d 613, 621. Thus, the State carried its burden of showing the validity of the 1998 guilty plea. There is no merit in this assignment. Accordingly, for reasons cited above, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. AFFIRMED
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