State Of Louisiana VS Jamica Warren
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE F LOiJ1SIANA COURT OF APPEAIa FIRST' CIRCi:IT i0. 2013 KA 1? 24 STATE OF LOUISIANA r VERSUS r' JAMICA WARREN r Judgment Renrtered: R 2 4 201 Appealecl frc,m the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Washington State of Louisiana C se No. 10 CR3- 110491 The Honorable Scott Gardner, Judge Presiding Prentice L. White Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant Baton Rouge, Louisiana Jamica Warren Walter P. Reed Counsel for Plantiff/Appellee District State of Louisiana Attorney Covington, Louisiana Kathryn W. Landr° y Baton Rouge, Louisiana F kx * x * aF F BEFORE: KUHN, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND THERIOT, JJ. THERIOT, J. The defendant, Jamica V6'arren; was charged by bili of information with attempted second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 27 and 14: 30. 1 ( R. S. 1); count 14: 55 ( aggravatec count instrumentalities, a 2 j; crianinal ansi violatian datriage Yo property; illegal of L.. R. S. use of , veapons i4; 9 ( count 3). violation of La. or dangerous 1' he def ndant pled not guilty to the charges and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on counts 2 and 3. For the attempted second degree murder charge count battery, 1), he was found guilty of the responsive offense of aggravated a violation of La. R. S. 14.34. See La. C. Cr.P. 814( A)( 4). The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied. For the ggravated battery conviction, the defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labar; for the aggravated criminal d mage to property conviction, he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor; and for the illegal use af weapons or dangerous instrumentalities conviction, he u as sentenced to two years imprisonment at hard labor. The sentences were designating ordered one to ran assigximent concurrently. of enror. The e£endant now apipeals, Vde affirm the convictions and sentences. FACTS On July 30, 2010, Justin Watson was at his godmother' s house on Jim Avenue in Bogalusa. When Justin went outside, he became involved in an altercation with an unknown At some point, the unknown person male. drew an AK-type rifle and began firing at Justin. Justin ran and took cover behind a car: AYthis point, another person with a handgun began shooting at Justin. 3ustin began running to his aunt' s house on a nearby street. As he ran, the person with tha handgun chased 2 him and shot at him. A bullet grazed Justin' s head, causing anly a supergicial d. wour. Sometimq later, Justin procured a handgun and went back to the area where the stwoting occurred. Justin felt that the person or people who shot at him stayedi at the house at 1625 Warren Street, avhich was across the street from his godmother' s house on Jim Aeenue. E3ec;ause Justin' s godtnother' s house had been struck by gunfire, Justir, out of reta iatien, fired shots a2 Yhe house on Warren Street, striking it several times. Chief Joe Culpepper, with the Bogalusa Police Department, interviewed Justin about the shootings. In the interview, 7ustin identified the defendant as the person who shot at him with the handgun. At trial, however, Justin testified that it was not the defendant who had shot alt him. The video of the interview was played for the jury. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In his sole assignment f error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Specif cally, the defendant comtends that his identity as the perpetrator was not established by the State. A conviction based on insuf cient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U. S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, 2. The standard of review ior the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether ar not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the Essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 278'1, 821( B); State State v. v. 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979j. See La. C. Cr.P. art. ONdodi, 2006- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946 So.2d 654,' 660; Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1308- 09 ( La. 1988). The ,Iackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standa d for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reaso able 3 doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15: 438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes' every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001- 2585 La.App. lst Cir. 6/ 21/ 02), 822 So. 2d 141, 144. Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by only one witness is to support a conviction. sufficient It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second- guess those determinations. See State v. Hughes, 2005- 0992 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 943 So. 2d 1047, 1051. State v. Davis, 2001- 3033 ( La:App. lst Cir. 6/ 21/ 02), 822 So.2d 161, 163- 64. In his brief, the defendant asserts there was reasonable doubt as to his identify as one of the shooters because, at trial, Justin Watson recanted what he had told Chief Culpepper in his recorded statement. Specifically, the defendant suggests that what Justin told the chief about the defendant shooting at lum was a lie and that, during his statement, he was intoxicated from cocaine use. In his interview with Chief Culpepper, Justin stated that he got into an argument with an unknown male while standing outside his house on Jim Avenue. The unknown person drew a long rifle (likely an AK-type weapon) and started shooting at Ju tin. Justin ran and took cover behind a car. At that moment, JusYin saw the defendant approach from fhe side and begin shooting defendant at him chased Justin' s head. with after a handgun. Justin ran down the street, and the him, shooting at him. One of the bullets grazed At trial, Justin recanted only that part of his statement wherein he identified the defendant as the second shooter. Instead, Justin 4 testified that he thought the shu ter with the handgun was the defendat t, but, in fact, it was not him. Justin cc uld not identify who that shooter was, but insisted it was not the defendant. Chief Culpe per the defendant Justin testiiied that at the time he told th wa shooter, h( Justzn) was " drtit ging hard." DespiYe Justin' s recantafiori at trial, th jury chase ±o believe that what Justin told Chief Culpepper was the trath. Our review of Justin' s sta ement reveals that Justin, unhesitatingly and matter- of-factly, idenrified the defendant several times as the shooter. He was lucid and coherent and did not appear intoxicated. When asked at trial if Justin appeared to be impaired or on drugs, Chief Culpepper responded that Justin was " in total control of his faculties, other than being a little agitated." The defendant notes in his brief that when speaking to Chief Culpepper, Justin identified the defendant as " Mike." This assertion is inaccurate. In his interview, Justin identified Jamica" as the shooter. Justin pronounced the name with a long " i" so that the defendant' s name sounded Iike " Jc' - Mike'- 2,"' 3 Physical evidence corroborated Justin' s statement to Chief Culpepper regarding the identity of the defendant as the shooter with the handgun. Justin testified at 2ria1 that the gun in the defendant' s nand i% an automatic. as Justin thought the gur mi ht be a . 45. At the scene where Justin indlcated the defendant was shooting at hirzl, the police found twelve .40 c liber cartridge cases on the ground Six days after the shooting, the defendarlt was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for speeding. A police officer remov d the defendant from the vehicle and found a handgun on the floorboard where the defendant had been sitting. The officer seized the gun, which k ad a The character hat looks like an upside-down " e" is a schwa, which is unstressed and sounds like " uN' ( like the " a" in " about.") 5 magazine in it and a live round in the chanibet. The gun, identi fied a a .40 . caliber Glock pistol, was submitteci for testing. Deputy Lloyd Morse, an expert in firearms examination with the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff' s Office, testified that the twelve . 0 caliber cartridge ca es at the scen were fired from the G1c ck pistol found a the defendant' s feet in the vehicle. The argument regarding safficiency set forth by the defendant i9 based on credibility determinations. Despite the discrepancy in 7ustin' s trial testimony with the statement he provided to Chief Culpepper about the shooting, the jury, given the corroborating physical evidence, chose to believe Justin' s recorded statement, which identified the defendant as the shooters. ne of Perhaps the jury felt Justin partially recanted his recorded statement out of fear of retaiiation. In an} event, the trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any w7tness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact' s determination of the wei ht to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review: An appellate conrt will not rewei h the evidence to overiurn a faetfinder' s determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97- 226I ( La. App. lst Cir 9i25/ 98), 21 So. 2d 929, 932. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a " thbrteenih juror" in assessing what iveight to give evidenc, in criminal cases. See State v. Mttchell, 993342 ( La. 10I17/ 00), 772 So. 2d 78, 83. The fact that fhe recoxd cantains evidence which conflicts wxth the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient. State v. Quinn, 479 So. 2d 592, 596 ( La.App. 1 st Cir. 1985). In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, 6 one witness' s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is suffic ent to support a factual anclusion. S` ate v. Hrggins, 2003- 19s0 ( La, 4/ 1/ 0$), 898 t So. 2d 1219, 1226, cert, denied, 546 LT. 3. 883, 12E S. Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 ( 2005) Further, the teat:inony of the tiictim alone is sufficient tai prove the elements f the offense. Stczte v. Orgeron, 512 So. 2d 467, 4 69 ( L. App. l st Cir. 198?), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 113 ( La. i.98$}. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier Of fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocen e presented by the defen3e, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is aplother hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. See State v. Moten, 510' So. 2d 55, 61 ( La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So, 2d 126 ( La. 1987). Tlie jury heard all of the testimony and viewed all of the physical evidence pre sented to it at trial and, notwithstanding any conflicting testimony, fou nd the defendant guilty. The jury' s finding of guilt reflected the reasbnable conclusion Yhat based on the physical evidence, and Justin' s statementl to the police immediately followin the shooting, whic: identified the defenc ant as one of the shooters, the defendant svas 2he person who shot at Justin, s riking the house behind Justin, and shc rtly th ereafter, striking Justin in a grazing shot to the head In finding the defendant guiky, the jury- clearly rejecaed the defense' s theo ry of misidenti£ccation. See Moten, 510 So. 2d at 61. ' After a thorough review of the racord, we find that the evidence negates any reasonable probability of misidentification and suppo ts the jury' s finding of guilt. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light znost favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have',found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of aggravated i attery of Justin Watson, aggravated criminal damage to property, and the llegal 7 use of a weapon. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( L.a. 1/ 21/ 09), 1', So3d 417, 418 ( per curiam). The assigzmn nt of enror is without merit. DECREE F r the .reasons convictio et fort: herei ab ve, we 2ffnrn the deferjdant' s s and aentences. CONVICTItJNS ANll SENT'ENCES : FFIRMED 8
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