State Of Louisiana VS Errol Farrar
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIG. NATED FOR PLBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT' OF APPEAL F'IRST CIR(; UIT NO, 2013 KA 1635 n STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS ERROL FARRAR Judgment Rendered: x : x * * R 2 4 ' Q' Ip x Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Coart In and for the Parish of St. Tammany S te of Louisiana Case No 474320 The I onorable Allison H. Penzato, Judge Presiding x * x ; Lieu T. Vo Clark Counsel for DefendanUAppellant Mandeville; Louisiana E rrol Farrar Walter P. Reed Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee District State of Louisiana Attorney Covington, Louisiana Kathryn W. Landry Baton Rouge, Louisiana x u ; :* x BEFORE: KUHN, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND THERIOT, JJ. THERIOT J . The defendant, Errol Farrar, was charged by bill of information with three counts of armed guilty on all counts. robbery, La. R.S. violations of 14: 64. He pled not The state severed counts one and three, and it proceeded to trial on count two only. Follouuing a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged on that count. The state filed a habitual offender bill of information, alleging the defendant to be a second- felony habitual offender. The defendant subsequently admitted to the allegations in the habitual offender bill, and the trial court sentenced him as a second- felony habitual offender to fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. 2 Following his sentencing as a habitual offender, the defendant filed a motion for new trial and a motion for post- verdict judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied both motions as untimely. In addition, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence over thirty days after his sentencing as a habitual offender. The trial court also denied that motion as untimely. The defendant filed an earlier appeal, but this court dismissed that appeal as untimely under La. Code Crim. P. art. 914. See State v. Farrar, 2011- 2261 ( La. App. lst Cir. 4/ 23/ 12) ( unpublished). He subsequenfly filed an applicarion for post-conviction relief with the trial court, seeking aM outof-time appeaL The trial court granted the defendant' s request for an out- oftime appeal, and this appeal follows. In this appeal, the defendant asserts a single assignment of error which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence The habitual offender bill of information alleged that defendant had previously been convicted of aggravated battery on October 12, 2000, in the 24th Judicial District Court under docket number 00- 03678. 2 On the same date ( August 1, 20ll) he admitted to the contents of the habitual offender bill, defendant also pled guilty to the previously- severed charge of armed robbery in count three of his felony bill of information, and to two counts of simple robbery from another bill of information. None of those convictions are at issue in defendant' s instant appeal. 2 supporting his For th conviction. following reasons, we affirm the defendant' s conviction, habiivai o tfericier adj udication, and sentence. FACTS f n 4 a; 20, 2( U9, T ffany 11i?cheli was working as a cast ger at a Circle K con enience stor ? SRzde11. L n zisiar a. ro ud i3G a. rn., she heard someon enter the store, Shor l; thzreafter, Mitchell noCaced a black male walk in the direction of her counter, peer into the rear office where her manager was located, and then enter the immediate area where she was standing. The male told Mitchell that if she valued her life, she would open the cash register drawer. As he made that statement, the male showed Mitchell a black and brown gun that was secured in his waistband. After taking money from the register, the male £led the store. Mitchell called the police to report the robbery. During the subsequent investigation, Mitchell unequivocally identified the ciefendant in a photographic lineup as the black male who entered her store and rp bed her. Slidell Police Officer Mark Michaud ivas in hiG pa trol vehicle when he heard radio traffic about a a rmed robbery. A vehicle traveliMg on Florida Avenue near Front Street drew his attention because its headlights were initially passed. tumed off, but ere subsequently turned on as the vehicle Officer Michaud made a U-turn and illuminated his emergency lights in an attempt to stop the vehicle, A brief high- speed pursuit ensued until the vehicle skidded to a stop in a parking lot bordered by a pri% acy fence. The driver exited the vehicle and hopped the fence. Officer Michaud did not pursue the suspect further, but he ran the vehicle' s VIN nupnber, which identified it as belonging to Serena Jackson, Detective Stacey Callender and Sergeant George Cox, both of tlae St. Tammany Parish Sheriff' s Office, questioned Serena Jackson later the same 3 day. Jackson told them that she 13ved at h:,r home on Palm Drive with her boyfriend, the defendant. When Det ctive Callender and Sergeant Cox accompanied Jackson to her home in an attempt to arrest the defendant, he again fled on foot. After a briez craanhunt, Slidell Police Officer 1Vlichael Rice rrzsted the defendant with he assistana e of his I- 9. The defendant gave a vid otaped conf ssion to Slidell P lice Sergeant Shawn McLain in which he admitted to the instant robbery and several other robberies. However, defendant adamantiy denied using a gun in any of the robberies, including that of Tiffany Mitchell. The police never recovered a gun. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In his sole assignment of errar, the defendant argues that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the armed robbery of Tiffany Mitchell. Specitacally, he contends that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable do xbt that h was armed with a dangerous weapon at the time he committed t1 ie robb ry. A violates conviction due process. based qn insufficient See li.S. Const. amend. vidence canalot stand, as it XI'; La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, ihis court rriust consider wktether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See . 7ackson v. Virgnia, 443 U. S. 307; 3 19; 99 S. C` . 2781, 27$ 9, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979): t See also La. Code Cz-im. P. art. 821( B); State v. Ordodi, 2006- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946 So. 2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1308- 09 ( La. 1988). The .7ackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821( B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and 4 circumstantial, for doubt. reasonable When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15: 438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 2001- 2585 ( La. App. lst Cir. 6l'21/ 02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. In order to secure a conviction for axmed robbery, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an offender took something of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while the offender is armed with a dangerous See La. R. S. 14: 64( A). In the instant case, weapon. the defendant does not dispute that a robbery took place ar that he was the person who perpetrated it. In fact, he testified at trial admitring to his culpability for the robbery. However, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of the robbery. The only evidence presented at trial that defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon came from the victim, Tiffany Mitchell. The police were unable to recover a weapon during their searches, and defendant was adamant, in both his videotaped interview and his trial testimony, that he did not possess a weapon during the robbery. Despite the state' s inability to introduce into evidence the w apon used during tlie cornmission of the robbery, the victim' s testimony alone was sufficient to establish that the robbery was committed with a dangerous weapon. See State v. Rash, 444 So. 2d 1204, 1206 ( La. 1984); see also State v. Craddock, 2010- 1473, ( La. App. lst Cir. 3/ 25/ 11), 62 So3d 791, 795, writ denied, 2011- 0862 ( La. 10/ 21/ 11), 453 So.2d 625, 630- 31 ( La. App. 73 So.3d 380; see also State v. Sterling, lst Cir. 1984). The victim testified that the defendant showed her a gun in his waistband after he instructed her to open 5 the cash register and threatened her life_ Although the victim was not familiar with sp cific types of guns, she was certain that the item she saw in defendant' s waistband was a gun of some type, favorable to the prosecuti n, this testim on fact that the defencCant - Viewed in the light most was sufficie*it ta establish the as arnred ui? a dari erous weapu; h at ihe tiine of the robbery. The defendant testified, in contrast to the victim' s testimony, that he did not have a weapon at tkie time of the robbery. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends on the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. given to The trier of fact' s determination of the weight to be testimony is not subject to appellate review. Thus, an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder' s determination of guilry. See State v. Williams, 2001- 0944 ( La. App. l st Cir. 12/ 2'8/ O1), 804 So. 2d 932, 939, writ denied, 2002- 0399 La. 2/ 14/ 03), 836 So. 2d 135. Here, the jur, clearly balieved the vzutim' s testimony mare than it balieved y the defendant' s own self-serving testimony. In reviewing the evidenCe, we cannot say that the jury"s determination of the defendant' s guilt was irrationai under the facts and cixcumstances presented to it. See Ordodi, 946 So. 2d at 662. This assignment of error zs without merit. CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRIVIED. 6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
