Shih Chang Hu VS Evergreen of the South, Inc. d/b/a Taste of China Restaurant and Yi Hua and Fang Hua

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

STAT C? F l. l.? IiT,4nfA C3! nT ? F APP AL FI ¬' 1" f; I 7" NO. 2a1s CA P773 SHIH CHAN FiU VERSUS EVERGREEN OF THE SOUTH, INC. D/ B/ A TASTE OF CF#INA RESTAURANT YI HUA & FANG iUA 7udgment rendered MIAY 2 4 014 Appealed fram he 19' Judicial Dis* rict in and for the Parish nf Eask ourt atcr? f ouge, Louisiana Triai Court f n. 562. 144 Honorable Tfm khy iC if y, 7udge BRENT P. FREDERICK A70RNEY FQR BATON ROUGE, LA PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE SkIH CHAPJG HU ROBERT T. TALLEY ATTfiRNEY" FOR BATON ROUGE, LA DEFENDANT- 1 APPELLANT FANG HUA ROBERT T. TALLEY PRO SE BATON ROUGE, LA INTERVENOR- 2ND APPELLANT x** BEFORE: PETfIGREVH, McDONAf D, AND McCLENDON, ) J. c% , f 2 5, PETTIGREW, ). This matter is befor s on appea F; orn S Ffern er 4, 2013 j udgment of the trial court ordering the disbursement ef the ur ds r depcasi ri khe registry of the court to plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we a Frm. FACTS AND PROCEDl1RAL HISTORY The present appeal stems from a contract dispute between plaintifF, Shih Chang Hu, and defendants, Yi Hua and Fang Hua. In a prior decision by this court, a May 18, 2011 judgment, in favor of Mr. Hu in the from December 14, 2007 ( the date the mount suit w s f $285, 180. 98, plus judicial interest originally filed), was affirmed. Shih Chang Hu v. Evergreen of the South, Inco, 2011- 2170.( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 17i12) unpublished), writ denied, 2013- 0750 ( La. 5j17; 13), 118 So. 3d 379 (" Hu I"). During the pendency of the prior case, Mr, Hu obtained an Ex parte wrlt of attachment without bond, authorizing the seizure of the Huas' famil hame, lACated at 3822 Windsong Drive in Baton Rouge. Subsequently, when the Huas sold their home in 2009, after paying closing costs and the balance owed on an existing mortgage, the net proceeds of the sa{e 101, 587. 93) were deposited into the registry Qf the court. Mrs. Hua filed a motion to dissolve the writ of attachment and withdraw the deposit from the registry of the court. These matters proceeded to a hearing before the triai court on December 9, 2009, at which time the trial court denied Mrs. Hua' s motior, but ordered that Mr. Hu suppiy a security bond for the writ.l Included in tne trial court's origina! judgRn nY ir the prior suit was an order by the trial court that the East Baton Rouge, Paris Clerk. af Gourt release the funds being held in the registry of the court to Mr. Hu. Immediately, upon receiving notice of the signing of the judgment by the trial court io Hu I, counsel for the Fivas, Robert Talley, attempted to intervene, claiming a first rank priority and priuilege over the funds on deposit in the Mrs. Hua unsuccessfuily applied for writs to this court and to the Louisiana Supreme Court following the trial court's denial of her motion to dissolve the writ of attachment. Shih Chang Hu v. Evergreen of the South, d/ b/ a Taste of China Restaurant and Yi Hua and Fang Hua, 2010- 0044 ( W. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 17/ 10) ( unpublished writ action), writ denied, 2010- 0653 ( La. SJZ8J10), 36 So. 3d 249. We note that the issue of homestead exemption was not raised by Mrs. Hua in this prior attempt to dissolve the writ of attachment 2 registry of the court. Citing La. R. S. 37: 2]. F 2r. Taii y argued he was entitled to a first rank priority and privilege superior t ail other priveieges and security interests for the amount of his contractual attorney ees a Supreme Court denied writs ir Hu I, th d expens s.` Subsequently, after the Louisiana dis ut< ;?v r the money in the registry of the e court continued. On May 28, 2013, Mrs. Hua filed a " Motion Ta De*ermine Rank, Priority And Privilege Of Funds On Deposit In The Registry Qf The Court," requesting that the trial court " determine the proper and appropriate 9egal rank, prioriry and privilege of all competing claims to the $ 101, 587. 93 funds on deposit in the registry of the court." Also, on that same date, Mrs. Hua filed a " Motion To DisSolve Attachment And Motion To Withdraw Deposit From The Registry Of The . Courk," maintaining that her homestead exemption rights, pursuant to La. R.S. 20: 1( A)( 2), should be recognized and that she be permitted to withdraw the first $35, 000. 00 of the funds on deposit in the registry of the court. On May 29, 2013, Mr. Hu filed a " Mocion For Disbursement of Registry Funds," requesting that the entirety of the amount witf in the registry of the court be disbursed to him because it was less than the tqtai m aunt of tn judgment owed. These matters were originally set fQr contradictory hearing on August 26, 2013, at which time all of the motions were cQntinued to September 3, Z013. After listening to z On May 31, 2011, the trial court signed arf order deny:'ng Mr. ' i'alley's petition of intervention, noting as follows: " Denied. Final judgment previously entered. No substantive alteration can be made post signing of judgment. Thus, this is appealable issue at best." Qn, November. 21, 2011, this court granted Mr. Talley' s writ application from the trial court's May 31, 2011 judgrSient, finding tha't it was an appealable judgment and remanding the matter to the trial court with an order that the trial court grant Mr. Talley an appeal. Mr. Talley was ordered to " submit an order of appeal to the district court within thirty days" of this court's action on the writ. Shih Chang Hu v. Evergreen of the South, Inc., 2011- 1195 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 21J11) unpublished writ action). At a subsequent trial court hearing on September 3, 2013, the trial court considered a " Motion to Dismiss Appeal" filed by the Clerk of Court against Mr. Talley for failure to pay estimated appeal costs. At said hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, but ordered that Mr. Talley complete a designation of the remrd for his appeal within fifteen days so that the appeal could proceed forward. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Talley ever complied with this order or perfected an appeal of the trial court's denial of his request to intervene. Thus, the trial court's May 31, 2011 judgment is fnal, and Mr. Talley is not a proper party to these proceedings. Although Mr. Talley was granted a devolutive appeal by the trial court in this enatter, we find that he is nat properly before us as an appellant. Accordingly, we pretermit considerat;or, of the issue he raises on appeal with regard to his legal fee; r.e., that he is entitled to first rank priority and priuiiege over the funds on deposit in the registry of the court to the extent of his contractual attomey fees and eacpenses, with interest from the date of withdrawal. See Mike M. Marcello, Inc. v. Louisdana Gaming Control Bd., 20G4- 0488, pp. 4- 7 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 6/ OS), 903 So. 2d 545, 547- 549; La. Code Civ. P. art. 2086. 3 brief arguments from respective co ans i pt rn er 3, 9 th Oi3 hearing, the trial court stated as follows: I' m taking int account ev I' m going to take into rytr aecoun rp: 4r My ha sur m tted. , r th ii ac it r so -- we are on this is, I agree with the tp9ai riwffi] in entitled all right. So where his mat er that they are to the entirety of it [ the $ 101, 587. 93] -- I'm going to sign the judgment attached to the motion for disbursement [ ofJ registry of funds May 29th by the send it through processing. that was filed on plaintiff ,.., T am going to sign it ... and Mr. Talley asked for a temporary skay of the distribution of the funds pending an appeal, but the trial court repeatedly denied his request. The trial court signed an order that same day that read, in pertinent part, as follows: IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND. DECREED that the funds being held in the Registry of Co rt in the a nount of $ 101, 587. 93, plus interest of $514.D1 [ be} and are hereby disliurse as follows: The amount of $115,.370. 56 made payaole to: Shih Chang Hu, and his attorneys of record, Dodson, Hooks & Frederick, BPF On September 4, 2013, the trial cou t sign d an arr e+ ded order as follows IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the funds being held in the Registry of Court in the amount of $ 101, 587.93, plus any and alf accrued interest on said sum" from the date of deposit until the date of disbursal, be and are hereby disbursed to: Shih Chang Hu, and his attarneys of re ord, Dodson, Hooks & Frederick, BPF It is from this judgment that Mrs. Hua has appealed assigning the following specifications of error: The triaf court erred in failing ,to properly rank and prioritize all compeking claims to the $ 1fl1, 5t37. y3 :in funds on depasit in the Registry 1. of the Court, and faiiing to appropriat ly recognize Appellants' legal interests in such funds.° 3 Mrs. Hua and Mr. Talley both applYed to this court- for supervisory writs and a stay of the triaf court's September 4, 2013 order. This court's action aras tne same for bcth parties, i. "WRIT DENIED. REQUEST e., FOR STAY DENIED." Shih Chang Hu v. Er ergreen of the South, Inc.r 2013- 1545, 2013- 1546 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 9/ 13) ( unpublished writ actions;. 4 As previously indicated, Mr. Talley is not properly before us as an appellant. Thus, we will not address any arguments related to whether the trial court erred in failing to recognize his legal interests in the funds in question. 4 2. The trial court erred in summarily enying Appellants an evidentiary hearing and due process right ita cia m a privwlege and prority on the 101, 587. 93 in funds on depos t sn th RegisE y of the Cour±, summarily n funds the R g: str fi the Court disbursed to ordering alf PlaintiffiAppellee judgm the deposited Func s release of hih t'.h hiu, and rEfJSing to stay da uc' oa ti an of:Appel9 ants' nterESt nt creditor i n in the funds, DI CID T! IYI Fai/ure of Tria/ Court to Conduct Praper Hearing Assignment ofErrof No. 2) In her second assignment . of error,. Mrs. court to order the funds distributed. t rgues, that it was error for the kriaE Nei N r: Hu without onductin a proper contradictory hearing. Mrs. Hua asserts that althougl she ppea ed at the hearing on September 3, 2013, with witnesses and evidenc preparea ka prc ve er entitlement to the funds in the registry of the court, the triai court rufed f om the bench after hearing only argument from respective counsel. We agree with Mrs, Hua that the trial court erred in not conducting a proper contradictory hearir g before rendering judgment. The hearing in this matter was set ursuant t the " Motion To Determine Rank, Priority And Privilege Of Funds On Ueposit in 7 e Registry Of The Court" fiied by Mrs. Hua. As the she was cleariy reYief requested upon Searles, 2008- M Hua in s. entitled and which res uired s;; to be decided contradictorily privilege by the funds 09$, on u rith ar depr s ¬ r motic n was not something to which 4r ar, r 4th r c ty in 'the eqis ry proof, lthe rriatter was required lairning ar interest, prsarity, or af the court. 52e Searles vo p. 3 ( La, App.. 1 C'is. 3;' 27/? 9), 9 a a. 3d 997, 998; La. Code Civ. P. art 963. 5 The September 3, 2013 transcript and +' rnutes from said hearing confirm that the trial court received no evidence and he d n.o witnesses prior to ruling that Mr. Hu 5 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 963 provides, iri pertiraent part, as fcllows: If the order applied for by wr tten mation s one to which mover is ciearly entitled without supporting proof, the court may grantthe or er c parte and without hearing the adverse par[y. If the order applied for by wriiten motlan is one tca which the mover is nok clearly entitled, or wf ich requires supporti ig proof, the motion shali 6e served on and tried contradictorily with the adverse party. 5 to atl the the same day, d testified, ar surmise thafi heard funds i? tsi parties was entitled r n n* v e cum ral c sev g*_ red i dpp r af t : ¢, only, the ri, e a e ar a ru+ er h a c t'7e r ca r c c te- b r 3; 1t 13, u r: ort ri: N, rEer, at s me point iater tha raic>se F the initia4 hearar ia : : iu iri arguments a s ar st _ r d arir c. ci. ' Four witnesses h s, can only n he ein the triaf court adi lssibilbty of this evidence. La. Code Civ. P, art. 1636.6 Our review of the September 3 2Qi.3 C earing transcript reveals no mention of the proffer hearing by either the trial court or any of th pa! ies. The onfy reference we can even find to a " witness" came during a t{iscu sion between Mr: Taliey and the trial court concerning the accuracy of the judgmen t prepared y counsel for Mr. Hu. After the triai court advised the parties that it was " gc ing to sigr gi F judgment attached to the mo'rson for disbursement [ of] of registry funds tl w at I s r fMay. 29th by the iaintiffo" fhe following colloquy occurred: MR. TALLEY: Judge, migh[ I c 6j; t? THE COURT: Sure. the ex- ra xe ri t ir that.? counsel for Mr, Hu] fled ... MR. TALLEY: suggested to the court that the noni s 9r [ t; e r istry of the court gather judicial interest, that calculated lega! interest amount and frorra pu hak i ate 4f depasit and he actuaily tF rder and that is from the 6 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article1636 provedes as f i9qvvs: A. When the court rules against the a rszissioi ity of any evedence, it shall either permit the party offering such evider ce to make a cm lete record thereof, or permit the party to make a statement seiting fiortt the nakure f tha evidence. B. At the request of any party, the c9u: mav aiicsvv aoy excluded avidence to be offered, subject to cross-exarrrination: cn the r cnrd d cing a recess or such other time as the court shall designate; oa by depc sition rake; r efor a person authorized oy Arti fe 1434 within completion thirty days suoseq,ueht t of the trial or hea' t ag, whi tti nr JS`vn hever is lat.. fi` any such evidence o the W^ en the Tecord is comp9eted during a recess or other designaterl time, or y de; c s iUn, iher will be o necessfty for the requesting party to make a stak r rt setting fi'ovth thP nature of ihe evidence. C. In all cases, Che court shall° stat t E reaso for its ruiing as t the inadmissibility of the evidence. This ruiing ' shali be revieovable on appeai wi±hout ttl e necessity of further formality, L. If the court permits a par!y tc rriake cc r piete rec ard cf tha evideroce hela inadmissible, it shall allow any othe Na!tv the pp r ie ii to mske a recQrd ir the same manner f any evidence bearing upo ± Fe zvidence t+Eld t be inadmissible. Although there is no specific ruling in the recard " y th tr'ai w irt concerning the proffer, et is lear from the transcripk of the initial September 3, 2Q1's hearing that th2 triai court did no[ consider the prof ered eviqence in making its cYecision herein. 6 standpoint of the 3s t clerk, ' hat registry of the court do r ot a judicial interest. So the fig; 9es roneaus. The monies in the xp+:: slp i au ~ eev r gafihered le al interest or are i he rit yy wrong on that judgment. rra g and it, but t s v+ The court to -a witness frorro the registry clerks fffo is free to THE COURT: sign I' m going a s a n th we a;. tually-- judqmen*_, d' m I had procured going to sign the judgment. cca I ask fi a the distribut c i of the funds Your Ffor, MR. TALLEY: be stayed pending appellate review? No. No. T` m signir g the judgment, we're disbursing it. THE COURT: So I will sign the We' ve been through the appellate process aiready. Thank you, gentlemen. judgment that has previously been submit e. Nonetheless, the parties apparent6y returned i o the trial. court later that same day According to M s. Hua`c a peal brief, this hearing " occurred for the proffer outside the presence of the trial judge hearing. afterthe ecnciusior of his rule docket.° We fnd nothing in the record to contradict Mrs. Hua"s recaliection of the events of the day. In fact, although the cover sheet of the transcript of t. e September 3, 2013 proffer hearing references " The Honorable Timothy E. Kelley, Judge Fresiding," there is no indication in the transcript that Judge Keliey was actu fly present during the profFer hearing. The jurisprudence indicates thak Vrh n lega{ errQr is found and a complete record has been made, the appellake court i including the proffered evidance. ta conduct a de novo review of the record, Hofliday vo Holliclay, 2000- 0533, p. 7 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 17/ O1), 795 So. 2d 423, 429. I r onssderpr th s record, we recognize thatthis court is " authorized and, indeed, req' irec tu rer7d r a zde merit 'whach is just, lega!, and proper upon the record on appeal."' 2003- OOS4, p. 5 ( La. 4/ 23/ 04), App. J cksor+ Vat. . ife Ins. Co. v. Kennecly- Fagano ( 1 Cir: 2( 6/ 0 870 So. 2d 307. S73 0.2 44, 4, wrif denied, 2004- 0600 ( La. Hov, ev r, "( t] oere ar r cases where the weight of the evidence is so nearly equal khat a irst hand view of`witnesses is eSsential to a fair resolution of the issues." 708 ( La. 1980). Ragas v. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 707, Where such a need arises; " kh case should be remanded for a new trial." Landry v. Bellanger, 2002- 1443, p: 15 ( La. 5%2Q/ 03), 85Z So. 2d 94, 954. It is the duty of the aRpellate courk ta determine when " the court can fairly find a frt,m : the evidersce case b fc re us, sYie recc n not in the preponderance of c: E or whethar the case should be car," remanded. Id. In the on the motic i incfuding thE record, r c` r_ proffered e ta a 1 a remand ior another hearing s c, i F guc 4 ti:; r? c e, aa c n ¢. ' Thus, we v+ i il review the i cl + etermine a preponderance of the evidence. See Moore v. Clark, 527 io, 2d 293, 302 ( La: App. 1 Cir. 1987). App/icabi/ity ofHomestead Exemption Assignment ofError No. I) Mrs. Hua argues on appeal that the frst $35, 000. 00 of the funds on deposit in the registry of the court belong to her pursuant to her homestead exemption rights. In response, Mr. Hu contends that the homestead exemption issue was abandoned by Mrs. Hua as the issue was not raised until w ll after the May 18, 2011 judgment was final. Although there may be some validity to Mr; H' s abandonment argument, we have nonetheless considered the homestead eraiptic» iss ae in our ' de novo review of the record and find that Mrs. Hua has effect+ vely w ived her homestead exemption in this case. Homestead exemption is provide fr r ir La, R.S. 20: 1, which sets forth, in pertinent part, as follows A. ( 1) The bona fide homestead cor sists af a residence occupied by the owner and the land on which the residence is located, including any building and appurtenances located thereon, ar d any contiguous tracks up to a total of five acres if the residence is within a municipality, or up to a total of two hundred acres of land if the residence is not located in a municipality. 2} The homestead is exempt fr m sei ure and sale under any writ, mandate, or process whatsoev r, except as provided by Subsections C and D of this Section. Th s exerriptiar extends to ' thirty-five thousand dollars in value of the homestea i, except in s: he case of obligations arisi g directly as a result of a catastr phic ar termina! illnes$ or injuryF in which case the exemption shali app y te the fu i v aiue of the homestead based upon its value one year befor from seizure and sale shall e such seizu; e. T'his homestead exemption nd ut r at caily to the proceeds from any property insurance poiicy rece;ved as a r suit c f darriag caused by a gubernatorially declared disast r 'tv a hor iestead and that are held separately in an escrow account dentifiea as insurance proceed paid frorrr the damage of a F omest ¬ad 8 for it repair ar r lacement. C. This exemptio o shaH r c t p: y u ds y caf the oifovying debts: For the 1 af r a as t%aR any part of s: h purchase ci; urcnase price. 2) For labor, mor+ ey, r a; d. ra! f arroi!-, far buiVdin, repa rin9, or improving the hpmestead, ilic officer, or fduciary, or any 3) Far liabilities ineurred tay any . attorney at iaw, f r money collee t d o , ec ived n deposits. 4) For taxes or assessments. 5) For rent which bears a pr+ iiege ¬ por said property. 6) For the amount which may be, due a homestead or building and loan association for a loan made y it on the security of the property; provided, that if at the time f maiCiny sue.h loari 'khe borrower be married, and not separated from bed and oara frorr' the other spouse, the latter shall have consented thereta 7) For the amount which may be due far money advanced on the security of a mortgage on said pr er yrf pr; vi edF that if at tfne time of granting such mortgage Ehe morkgag4r be m ried, and aot separated from bed and board from ti er spo# e, the latter snall have the consented thereto. 8) For any obligati n arisdng from ti e conviction of a felony or misdemeanor which f as the aossibifity of imprisonment of at least six months. D. The right to sell voluntarily dny properly that is exempt as a homestead shall be preserved, but oo saie shall destroy or impair any rights of creditors thereon. Any pe son ent,tl d a a homestead may waive same, in whole or in part, by signin a writker waiver thereof; a copy of such waiver shall be provided tc Yn hqmeown r; however, if 'th person is married, and s ot separated from ed und ooard from the other spouse, then the waiver shall not Ge effeGtive u less signed by th larter, and all such waivers shall be recorded in ti ie r-o4rtgage records of the parish wher the separate hom stead property is s e: ate. of one of 'rf e spa H w ver; if the homes"ead s tt e t ses, e hnrnestead exemption may be waived by that spouse .ai ne , in ar y, mnrtgage granted on ti e homestead, without the necess y f obEaini! g a waiver from the nonowning spouse. The waiver may be either ge eral or special and shrall have effect from the time of r ccir'[ ny:"T e u aiv r shall c ot e required 'pr p rmitted for the rendersng af rned cai tKeatme[ t, medi al services, or hospitalization. Notwithstanding any other rovision of law to the contrary, a waiver of. exe nption from seizu e as t an xempted homestead shal! automatically include insurance far that prop rty to fhe ex!tent subjec to the creditor°s mortgage or securit interest. According to the record; Mrs. Hua voluntarily sold her home on September 2, 2009. The HUD- 1 Settlement Statement reflects a sale= price of $ 213, 000; 00 with 213, 164. 38 listed as the gross amount due ko th 9 seller. After setElement charges of w... .. 17, 510. 00 remaining Mortgage, were $ taxes 144, 625. 52,. Inc. (" Welis 101, 587. 93 depositing parish and s a ioi nt,. t9 Faryo'°) i th: t p asst; y u' ez iva a e:, t ;t m; fram xhe saie 1 Qe. 86 wer u` a f chat besr g depusitec i to the fun the in y ar ±ra. tic?r o: ayoff to V+/ells Fargo Home y, 037. 59, 4vith the remaining c, e;; ` paid, the funds srt, Thu:, ° t s cie i at prior to sc ey;stry of the ca t, f rs. Hua paid off an existing mortgage with Welis F rgo. Nr: umably; this neant that e tner the 1A ells Fargo mortgage contained a waiw- af ihF sneste d exempti; n by Nlrs. kit a ir that by voluntarily paying off the Wefls Fargo m t ag out of the funds sf e receive from the sal af her home, Mrs. H a effertively waived the homestead exerr ptian in favor of Wells Fargo. 35, 000. 00, went Either way, fhe entire amo r t of the homestead exemption, to satisfy that ciaim. Accord'tnyfy, there is no merit to Mrs. Hua' s argument that the first $ 35, 000. 00 of the fund5 on deposit in the registry of the courk belong to her based on her homestead exemption ric hts. CONCLUSION For the above and foreg ir y easc ns + i firrn he triai cQUrt' s Sepiember 4s 2013 judgment, All costs associated wi'tn : tois ap; eal are assessed against defendantappeliant, Fan Hua. AFFIRMED. v STATE ( F LOUI PAl A COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2013 CA 1773 SHIH CHANG HU VERSUS EVERGREEN OF THE SOUTH, INC. D/ B/ A TASTE OFCHINA RESTAURANT YI HUA & FANG HUA i McCLENDON, 7., dissenting. The majority states because " Mrs. Hua paid off an existing mortgage with Wells Fargo, [ p] resumably the Wells Fargo mortgage contained a waiver of the homestead exemption." documentation. I find this to be an error given that the record lacks said Nevertheless, even assuming that the mortgage documents contained a waiver, a creditor that does not have a homestead waiver cannot encroach upon the homestead exemption merely because the mortgage holder has a waiver. See Acadian Bank v. Foret, 602 So. 2d 1097, 1098 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1992). In other words, the waiver would only waive the homestead exemption in favor of Wells Fargo, but not in favor of other creditors, including the plaintiff. The majority alternatively concludes, without citing any legal authority, that voluntarily paying off the mortgage, Mrs. Hua " effectively waived" the homestead exemption. I note, however, that voluntary sale of the home and payment of the mortgage homestead 2007) ("[ exemption. does not equate to an automatic waiver of the See In Re McCollum, 363 B. R. 789, 794 ( E. D. La. T] he court finds no error in the bankruptcy's court's conclusion that a Chapter 13 debtor may clair the Louisiana homestead exemption for the first 25, 000. 00 in proceeds from his voluntary, post- petition sale of his home.' Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 1

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.